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A B S T R A C T 
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on i n t u i t i o n i s m i n epistemology i n general, and r e l i g i o u s epistemology 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , Ramsey's concepts of the discernment and d i s c l o s u r e 
are r e l a t e d to these r e f l e c t i o n s , A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of d i s c l o s u r e s i 3 
attempted and some of the problems r a i s e d by Ramsey's spectrum of 
examples of d i s c l o s u r e ~ s i t u a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d . The o b j e c t i v e and 
subj e o t i v e elements of the d i s c l o s u r e are stud i e d i n d e t a i l . 
The t h i r d chapter considers Ramsey's v/ork on r e l i g i o u s language? 
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N O T E 
Ramsey's w r i t i n g s are r e f e r r e d to by abbreviations 
not enclosed i n brackets„ The works of other authors are 
c i t e d by the author's surname followed where necessary by 
an. abbreviation i n brackets i n d i c a t i n g the p a r t i c u l a r work 
r e f e r r e d too I n both cases t h i s i s followed e i t h e r by a 
page number (which i s not preceded by the l e t t e r "p.") 
or by a chapter or section reference (which i s preceded by 
the usual abbreviation)„ 
2 
CHAPTER I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1. Object o f Thesis 
T h i s t h e s i s has a dual purpose . I i n t e n d t o 
p r o v i d e here an e x p o s i t i o n of I a n Ramsey's r e l i g i o u s 
e p i s t e m o l o g y and t h e way i n which i t developed, I hope 
t o o f f e r i n a d d i t i o n a c r i t i c a l assessment of Ramsey's 
t h o u g h t , i n d i c a t i n g i t s s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses as a 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e ge n e r a l debate c o n c e r n i n g t h e problem 
of r e l i g i o u s knowledge. 
2. B i o g r a p h i c a l Notes 
I a n Thomas Ramsey was born a t K e a r s l e y , B o l t o n , o n 
51st January, 1915* He r e c e i v e d h i s secondary e d u c a t i o n 
at F a r n w o r t h Grammar School and went up t o Christ's C o l l e g e , 
Cambridge i n 1935. 
As a s c h o l a r a t Christ's , Ramsey began t o rea d 
f o r t h e Ma t h e m a t i c a l T r i p o s w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of becoming 
a mat h e m a t i c a l p h y s i c i s t . However, a f t e r a s e r i o u s bout o f 
t u b e r c u l o s i s i n 1934 he r e t u r n e d t o Cambridge i n October 
1935 determined t o o f f e r h i m s e l f f o r o r d i n a t i o n i n t h e 
Church o f England. He gained a f i r s t i n p a r t I o f t h e 
:.lathematical T r i p o s i n 1936 and t h e n r e a d f o r p a r t I I A 
of t h e I.Ioral Sciences T r i p o s , g a i n i n g a n o t h e r f i r s t 
i n 1938. 
Ramsey's papers i n d i c a t e t h a t between 1936 and 
1939 he a t t e n d e d l e c t u r e s g i v e n by i.oor^ Broad, '.lisdom, 
V.aismann and ( e s p e c i a l l y ) h i s s u p e r v i s o r A.C. Ewing. 
I n 1938 he was awarded t h e Burney P r i z e f o r a d i s s e r t a t i o n 
e n t i t l e d "Tne Concept of t h e S u p e r n a t u r a l " . As Burney 
Student he read f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e c t i o n ( s e c t i o n V) 
of p a r t I I of t h e T h e o l o g i c a l T r i p o s , g a i n i n g another 
f i r s t s t h i s t i m e w i t h d i s t i n c t i o n , i n 1939° Ramsey 
a t t e n d e d l e c t u r e s a t t h e D i v i n i t y School g i v e n "by Dodd, 
J i l l i a m s , Boys Smith and Parmer . I t i s w o r t h n o t i n g 
one p a r t i c u l a r set of l e c t u r e s which Ramsey heard, i n 
1939: a s e r i e s on t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f James Ward g i v e n by 
Ramsey's s u p e r v i s o r i n t h e o l o g y , J 0S, Boys Smith, 
Ramsey's correspondence d u r i n g h i s t i m e a t 
Cambridge shows t h a t he was c o n s i d e r i n g t r a n s f e r r i n g 
t o O x f o r d f o r h i s t h e o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s ; but O x f o r d d i d 
not o f f e r a n y t h i n g l i k e a Burney S t u d e n t s h i p and Ramsey 
needed f i n a n c i a l h e l p . He d i d , however, move t o Ripon 
H a l l , O x f o r d i n 1939* t o prepare f o r o r d i n a t i o n . 
David Eawards quotes C.H. Dodd t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t one 
reason f o r t h e move v/as t h a t Ramsey hoped " t h a t by 
w o r k i n g h i m s e l f i n t h e new p h i l o s o p h y " propounded by 
a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , "he would be a b l e t o 
c o n s t r u c t a new a p o l o g e t i c f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y t a k i n g account 
o f a l l t h e y were s a y i n g , employing t h e i r methods but showing 
t h e i r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s up as a r b i t r a r y " (D. Edwards 23). 
At any r a t e Ramsey remained near O x f o r d a f t e r h i s 
o r d i n a t i o n , s e r v i n g as a s s i s t a n t c u r a t e o f Headington Quarry 
from 1940-43. 
I n 1943 Ramsey r e t u r n e d t o Cambridge as C n a p l a i n 
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o f Christ's C o l l e g e , where Charles Raven was s t i l l b l aster , 
Ramsey h e l d t h e pos t of C n a p l a i n f o r s i x y e a r s . From 
4 
t 
1944 he served as a f e l l o w of- t h e C o l l e g e and D i r e c t o r o f 
S t u d i e s i n Tneology and T.ioral Sciences; f r o m 1949 he was 
a t u t o r . I t was a l s o i n 1944 t h a t he became a U n i v e r s i t y 
L e c t u r e r i n D i v i n i t y and was a p p o i n t e d Canon T n e o l o g i a n 
of L e i c e s t e r C a t h e d r a l ( t h e l a t t e r post c o n t i n u i n g u n t i l 
1966), Ramsey d e l i v e r e d t h e S t a n t o n L e c t u r e s i n t h e 
P h i l o s o p h y o f R e l i g i o n a t Cambridge between 1947 and 1950. 
He was Hulsean Preacher i n 1950 and S e l e c t Preacher b e f o r e 
t h e U n i v e r s i t y i n 1944 and 1949 (and a g a i n i n 1956). 
I n 1951 Ramsey was a p p o i n t e d E f o l l o t h P r o f e s s o r of 
Ihe P h i l o s o p h y o f t h e C h r i s t i a n R e l i g i o n a t Oxford; f r o m 
t h a t d a t e he was a f e l l o w o f O r i e l C o l l e g e , He soon began 
t o be i n v i t e d t o g i v e courses o f l e c t u r e s i n o t h e r 
u n i v e r s i t i e s and t h e o l o g i c a l s e m i n a r i e s , and most o f h i s 
p u b l i s h e d work had i t s o r i g i n i n these occasions. While 
a t O x f o r d Ramsey was f u r t h e r drawn i n t o w o r k i n g f o r v a r i o u s 
bodies w i t h i n t h e A n g l i c a n Church. He served on t h e 
A r c h b i s h o p s ' Commission on D i v i n e H e a l i n g from 1953 t o 
1957» on the group which produced t h e r e p o r t on "The 
F a m i l y i n Contemporary S o c i e t y " ^ i n 1958, and on t h e Church 
Assembly Board f o r S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f r o m 1958 onwards. 
He was a l s o , f r o m 1964, D i r e c t o r of t h e Lambeth Diploma 
i n Theology. 
I n 1966 I a n Ramsey was c o n s e c r a t e d as t h e n i n e t i e t h 
6 
Bishop o f Durham. He wrote a t t h e t i m e t h a t he would 
"welcome v e r y much t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a wider u s e f u l n e s s " ; 
and, a l t h o u g h he gave up a number o f commitments on moving 
t o Auckland C a s t l e , his work l o a d d i d i n c r e a s e c o n s i d e r a b l y . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o h i s Diocesan d u t i e s ( c f . Bishop and FL) ne 
t o o k s e r i o u s l y h i s r o l e i n t h e House o f Lords and a l s o served 
as Chairman o f t h e Archbishops' Commission on C h r i s t i a n 
5 
D o c t r i n e ' , t h e I n s t i t u t e o f R e l i g i o n and Med i c i n e , t h e 
C e n t r a l R e l i g i o u s A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l ( t o t h e B.B.C. and I.B.A.) 
and s e v e r a l o t h e r bodies. He was a l s o Chairman o f t h e 
Commission set up j o i n t l y i n 1967 by t h e Church of England 
Board of E d u c a t i o n and t h e N a t i o n a l S o c i e t y t o i n q u i r e i n t o 
r e l i g i o u s e d u c a t i o n i n schools . T h e i r r e p o r t , The F o u r t h R 
( N a t i o n a l S o c i e t y & 3.P.C.K.: London), appeared i n 1970 . 
A i l t h i s t o o k i t s t o l l o f a man who v/as s t i l l 
v e r y much i n demand as a t e a c h e r and who c o n t i n u e d t o 
produce i m p o r t a n t work i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f r e l i g i o n . I t 
i s not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Bishop Ramsey - who v/as 
a l s o overweight - s u f f e r e d a severe h e a r t a t t a c k on E a s t e r 
Eve 1972. He d i e d on 6th October of t h a t year a f t e r a n o t h e r 
a t t a c k which o c c u r r e d d u r i n g h i s " f i r s t j o u r n e y t o London 
al o n e on 1Dusiness as u s u a l ' " s i n c e t h e e a r l i e r a t t a c k 
(D. Edwards 96). He was f i f t y seven. 
3. I a n Ramsey's V f r i t i n g s 
(A) P u b l i s h e d T/ork 
A l l Ramsey's p u b l i s h e d w r i t i n g s are on a s m a l l 
s c a l e ; c o n s i s t i n g o f r e v i e w s , sermons, a r t i c l e s , pamphlets 
and books of l e c t u r e s . McClatchey 1 s b i b l i o g r a p h y ( O A G7-75) 
l i s t s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 150 p u b l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s n a t u r e , and 
even so i t i s not complete, Donald Evans has w r i t t e n o f 
Ramsey's p u b l i c a t i o n s : 
Ramsey's p h i l o s o p h y i s s c a t t e r e d among many 
b r i e f o c c a s i o n a l p i e c e s , i n each o f which 
some o l d Ramsey i d e a s are sketched and some 
new Ramsey id e a s are i n t r o d u c e d . , 
Ramsey o f t e n remedies o b s c u r i t i e s and 
d e f e c t s i n one book or a r t i c l e by d e a l i n g 
w i t h them i n another. (Evans (IRTG) 126) 
For t h i s reason i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o survey t h e 
whole corpus o f Ramsey's p u b l i s h e d w r i t i n g s . Many o f t h e 
a p p r a i s a l s and c r i t i q u e s g i v e n i n contemporary t e x t b o o k s on 
p h i l o s o p h y o f r e l i g i o n concern themselves w i t h o n l y a few 
of h i s books ( o f t e n o n l y one: R e l i g i o u s Language) and are 
t h e r e f o r e most m i s l e a d i n g . I have found, f u r t h e r , t h a t much 
of v a l u e f o r t h e assessment of Ramsey* s t o t a l p o s i t i o n i s 
t o be gleaned from some o f h i s most " p o p u l a r " p i e c e s o r 
i s h i d d e n away i n obscure p u b l i c a t i o n s , A number o f t h e s e , 
t h e r e f o r e , appear i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y ( e . g . OCR, RFT). 
A v/ord i s perhaps a p p r o p r i a t e here about 
Ramsey's s t y l e , Evans has w r i t t e n o f Ramsey's " s t i m u l a t i n g -
b r i l l i a n c e and l i v e l y w i t " (Evans (IRTG) 126), and t h e 
books t h a t began t h e i r l i v e s as l e c t u r e s are c e r t a i n l y 
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f u l l o f s t r i k i n g metaphors and i l l u s t r a t i o n s . But t h i s 
a t t r a c t i v e s t y l e has c e r t a i n drawbacks, K e i t h Ward has 
a r t i c u l a t e d one o f them: 
L a r g e l y because o f h i s amusing use of such 
examples as f i s h i n g , penny-dropping and i c e -
b r e a k i n g , d i n n e r - j a c k e t - s p l i t t i n g and l i g h t 
dawning, Ramsey's account i s i n danger o f 
t r i v i a l i s i n g r e l i g i o u s awareness, even though 
t h i s i s f a r from h i s i n t e n t i o n . , 
(K.Ward (CG) 69) 
Ano t h e r d i f f i c u l t y w i t h Ramsey's s t y l e i s perhaps even more 
acute. An e x t e n s i v e use o f metaphor can l e a d t o a l o s s 
o f c l a r i t y . I t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o p i n Ramsey 
down t o a p r e c i s e p o s i t i o n , f o r i t i s not c l e a r how 
s e r i o u s l y he i n t e n d s us t o t a k e h i s v a r i o u s a n a l o g i e s . 
T h i s t h e s i s w i l l a t t e m p t t o c l a r i f y some of these 
a m b i g u i t i e s and t o produce a more s y s t e m a t i c view o f 
Ramsey's p o s i t i o n . 
(B) U n p u b l i s h e d V/ork 
The Archdeacon Sharp l i b r a r y o f Durham C a t h e d r a l 
houses I a n Ramsey's u n p u b l i s h e d papers, i n f o u r l a r g e 
cupboards. I have examined a l l t h e m a t e r i a l t h e r e t h a t 
seemed r e l e v a n t t o t h i s study and l i s t t h e main i t e m s 
below, i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r . There a r e i n a d d i t i o n a 
l a r g e number o f " l e c t u r e - handouts" f o r s t u d e n t s , l e t t e r s 
t o s c h o l a r s , t r a n s c r i p t s of broadcast m a t e r i a l , and o t h e r 
o c c a s i o n a l p i e c e s which w i l l be c i t e d i n t h e course o f 
t h i s t h e s i s . 










10 "The Concept o f t h e S u p e r n a t u r a l " , 
ijjurney P r i z e a s s a y ) , 1938. 
"Experience and P e r s o n a l i t y " , 
( t y p e s c r i p t f o r a bo o k ) , c.1945 
"An O u t l i n e of a C h r i s t i a n P h i l o s o p h y " , 
(a somewhat r e v i s e d and c o n s i d e r a b l y shortened 
v e r s i o n o f U-EP), c.1946. 
" C h r i s t i a n I n d i v i d u a l i s m " , ( p a p e r ) , c,1947» 
"Tneology and Language: Some I l l u s t r a t i v e 
Examples", ( p a p e r ) , c.1953. 
"Science, I i e t a n h y s i c s and R e l i g i o n " , ( p a p e r ) , 
c.1955. 
"Fact, Metaphysics and God", ( t y p e s c r i p t f o r 
a book), c. 1956-60. 
"The Problem of E v i l " , ( t y p e s c r i p t f o r a book), 
1971. 
"A Personal Credo", (paper f o r Church o f 
England S y n o d i c a l Commission on C h r i s t i a n 
D o c t r i n e ) , 1972. 
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The f i r s t f o u r items l i s t e d above p r o v i d e t h e 
major sources fir Ramsey's though t d u r i n g h i s time a t 
Cambridge as s t u d e n t and t e a c h e r , and a r e t h e r e f o r e o f 
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t . The papers on "Theology and 
Language" and"Science, Metaphysics and R e l i g i o n " , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h o t h e r b r i e f e r p i e c e s , supplement t h e sparse 
p u b l i s h e d evidence f o r Ramsey's t h i n k i n g i n t h e e a r l y 
y ears of h i s tenancy of t h e N o l l o t h c h a i r . U-PE i s 
u s e f u l i n p r o v i d i n g f u r t h e r evidence f o r Ramsey's 
mature views on r e l i g i o u s language, 
U-FI.IG w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o s e v e r a l t i m e s i n what 
f o l l o w s . I n h i s p r e f a c e t o R e l i g i o u s Language (1957) 
Ramsey promised "an independent and a l t o g e t h e r more 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f my s t a r t i n g p o i n t " , t o be 
p u b l i s h e d under t h e t i t l e F a c t , Metaphysics and God. 
T h i s was never p u b l i s h e d , b u t t h e p r e s e n t t y p e s c r i p t seems 
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t o be a d r a f t f o r t h a t book : a l t h o u g h i t does not i n 
f a c t bear any t i t l e . P a r t s of t h e work appear i n v a r i o u s 
of Ramsey's p u b l i c a t i o n s of t h e f i f t i e s and e a r l y s i x t i e s , 
b ut h i s l a t e r i d e a s and t e r m i n o l o g y a r e not t o be found 
w i t h i n i t s covers. I t i s i n v a l u a b l e as a source f o r a 
number o f t o p i c s i n Ramsey's t h o u g h t , a l t h o u g h i t cannot 
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be t a k e n t o r e p r e s e n t h i s f i n a l views i n these areas 
4. The "Cambridge P e r i o d " 
The u n p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l d a t i n g f r o m t h e 
n i n e t e e n - f o r t i e s and l a t e n i n e t e e n - t h i r t i e s presents a 
r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e o f Ramsey's thought f r o m t h a t 
p o r t r a y e d i n h i s l a t e r work. I n t h i s s e c t i o n I i n t e n d 
t o o u t l i n e Ramsey's main ideas-about p h i l o s o p h y and t h e 
p h i l o s o p h y of r e l i g i o n d u r i n g h i s "Cambridge p e r i o d " 
(up t o t h e summer o f 1951). The main body o f t h e t h e s i s w i l l 
t h e n deal w i t h Ramsey's more mature thought d u r i n g h i s t i m e 
as I X o l l o t h P r o f e s s o r a t Oxfor d (1951-66) and as Bishop o f 
Durham (1966-72), C l e a r l y one would expect a f u r t h e r 
e v o l u t i o n o f Ramsey's i d e a s and t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n over those 
l a s t 21 ye a r s of h i s l i f e , and such i s i n f a c t t h e case. 
But t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t of a sea-change between t h e work 
of Ramsey's Cambridge p e r i o d and h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g f o r us 
t o deal w i t h t h e two s e p a r a t e l y , 
(A) Experience 
Candidates f o r t h e Burney P r i z e a t Cambridge were 
r e q u i r e d t o i n d i c a t e t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e y had a v a i l e d 
themselves " o f t h e work of o t h e r s " . Ramsey's i n t r o d u c t i o n 
t o h i s 1938 essay l i s t s t h e names of L o t z e , Whitehead, 
Hegel, B r a d l e y and B e r k e l e y as t h e major i n f l u e n c e s on h i s 
thought a t t h a t t i m e . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t o 
f i n d him espousing a form o f I d e a l i s m . However i t i s 
Idealism o n l y " i n t h e sense t h a t ' p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are 
r e d u c i b l e t o s p a t i a l a b s t r a c t . * f r o m e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t i e s ' " . 
Minds are g i v e n a s i m i l a r s t a t u s : "both>indeed, are 
l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t i n g e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t i e s " (U-Burney 85). I n t h i s e a r l y , and u n d e r s t a n d a b l y 
i m m a t u r e , d i s s e r t a t i o n Ramsey a t t e m p t s t o c o n s t r u c t h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y around the n o t i o n o f a b a s i c e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t y 
as "the f u n d a m e n t a l l y c o n c r e t e datum" ( i b i d . 5 4 ) , an example 
b e i n g " ( l a m ) s e e i n g a sixpence". I t i s p o s s i b l e , Ramsey 
contends, t o a b s t r a c t from such a u n i t y an embodied 3 e l f and 
i t s Environment; out Ramsey s t r e s s e s t h a t such concepts are 
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a b s t r a c t i o n s , a s "mind" and "tiedy" are a t a f u r t h e r l e v e l of 
abstraction(53-59» 79-80). Yet even the e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t y 
i t s e l f i s l e s s c o n c r e t e t h a n , i , e . i s an a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m , 
the t r u l y u l t i m a t e c o n c r e t e datum: t h e v o l i t i o n a l u n i t y (13"0. 
Ramsey reminds h i s readers t h a t t o c o n c e n t r a t e 
on t h e more a b s t r a c t a t t h e expense o f t h e more c o n c r e t e i s 
t o commit what A.N. Whitehead had c a s t i g a t e d as t h e f a l l a c y 
o f "misplaced concreteness" (54). By h i m s e l f b e g i n n i n g 
w i t h t h e most c o n c r e t e datum Ramsey proceeds i n h i s essay 
t o c o n s t r u c t a r a t h e r t o r t u o u s argument t o prove t h e e x i s t e n c e 
o f a"non-human s e t " of e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t i e s " o f which t h e 
s p a t i a l a b s t r a c t s , c o n s t i t u t e the e x t e r n a l w o r l d " ( 8 6 ) . 
T n i s B e r k e l e y - l i k e argument i s t h e n extended t o show t h e 
n e c e s s i t y o f God's v o l i t i o n a l u n i t y (130-140) , 
Tne d e t a i l s of these arguments are by no means 
always c l e a r , but what the whole essay does r e v e a l i s 
Ramsey's commitment t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l maxim t h a t 
"Experience i s R e a l i t y " . On h i s r e t u r n t o Cambridge i n 1943 
t h i s major emphasis reappears i n h i s teaching and w r i t i n g . 
Ramsey a t t e m p t e d i n a number of u n p u b l i s h e d works t o 
develop and expand t h e t h e s i s of h i s Burney essay. Three 
t y p e s c r i p t s d a t i n g from around 1945/6 ( i . e . U-EP, U-OCP, U-Cl) 
r e p r e s e n t t h e most complete of these a t t e m p t s , one of them 
a t l e a s t (U-EP) b e i n g i n t e n d e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n . I n these 
works Ramsey s t i l l r e g a r d s himself as p r e s e n t i n g "a form o f 
Idealism" (U-EP •, U-0CP Q). T n i s i s f u r t h e r d e l i n e a t e d as /1 a 
"an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i d e a l i s m i n the sense t h a t a l l sense-
d a t a (and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r l i m i t s ) , are l o g i c a l l y r e l a t e d 
c o r r e l a t e s f r o m o r g a n i c e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t i e s . , . . " (U-OCP ) . 
Neither minds nor physical objects are u l t i m a t e e x i s t e n t s , 
f o r "the most fundamental sense of 'existence' i s that i n 
which an organic e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t y e x i s t s " (U-EP 71-72) . 
Winds, physical objects and sense-data only " e x i s t " i n the 
sense th a t they are abstractions from such e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t i e s , Ramsey cannot therefore support any claim about 
"the existence of physical objects i n a r e a l i s t sense" 
(U-EP 745 cf, i b i d . 53-36, OCP 13) , 
The Ramsey of the n i n e t e e n - f o r t i e s has been 
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described as being "saturated i n Whitehead" , and Whitehead's 
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i n f l u e n c e reveals i t s e l f i n Ramsey's concept of experience , 
I n a review published i n the Church Quarterly Review r o r 
1959 (Vol.160 , p400) f Ramsey was to describe Whitehead as 
"a giant indeed „..„a master of both c r i t i c a l and speculative 
philosophy", Ramsey was fond of quoting Vhitehe ad s more 
memorable d i c t a i n his l a t e r works (e.g. CD 66, F I 58), 
But i t i s i n the work of Ramsey's Cambridge period that 
Whitehead's in f l u e n c e i s most e x p l i c i t . 
This influence shows i t s e l f f i r s t of a l l i n 
Ramsey's continuing concern to avoid the f a l l a c y of 
"misplaced concreteness" ("concretion") o r " i l l e g i t i m a t e 
a b s t r a c t i o n " , and to espouse the"epistemological p r i n c i p l e 
of a t t a c h i n g to no ex i s t e n t a degree of concretion greater 
than i t deserves" (U-OCP 13) , To commit the f a l l a c y of 
i.iioplaced concreteness i s to " r e - i f y a b s t r a c t i v e s " ( i b i d , 9) » 
and "most of the t r o u b l e w i t h philosophy i n the past has 
been t h a t i t has t r i e d to a t t r i b u t e to a l l a b s t r a c t i v e s 
the degree of concretion belonging only t o tha t Sxperience 
owned by a se l f - i n - r e l a t i o n - t o - a n - e n v i r o n m e n t . , , " (U-EP 28 r 
cf. i b i d , 2 ) , I t i s not clear how f a r Ramsey i s being t r u e t o 
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Whitehead's own treatment of t h i s " e r r o r of mistaking the 
abstract f o r the concrete" (whitehead (SL"..r) 685 c f . (FR) 'lO); 
but, as we s h a l l have occasion to note again, Ramsey i s f a i r l y 
f r e e i n the way tha t he draws on other people's ideas and 
adapts them to h i s own use. At any r a t e , the "appeal to 
the concrete" i n 'Ramsey's thought i s b a s i c a l l y an appeal t o 
the concrete nature of actual experience, 
Ramsey claims that philosophy must s t a r t from a 
consideration of our basic awareness: an awareness which i s 
subject-object i n s t r u c t u r e . This i s the " E x p e r i e n t i a l U n i t y " 
of " n o n - r e f l e c t i v e " or "immediate" experience (U-3P ^5-27). 
I t must be a u n i t y "otherwise there i s a g u l f between 
Knower o,nd Known which no amount of ingenuity w i l l bridge" 
(U-OCP 3 ) ; but a fundamental d u a l i t y i s also e s s e n t i a l t o 
a l l experience, otherwise "we should not be aware _of 
a s h i l l i n g , . . . . o f a parabola" ( i b i d . ) , Further: " I f we 
>S"eelc a one-word d e s c r i p t i o n of experience which emphasises 
both i t s u n i t y and the d u a l i t y , I do not t h i n k we s h a l l do 
b e t t e r than describe i t as an Encounter" (U-CI b), 
" 'Encounter' .... suggests a dual a c t i v i t y , while at the same 
time not alt o g e t h e r concealing the u n i t y e s s e n t i a l t o the 
s i t u a t i o n " (U-OCP 4 ) . 
Both Bradley and '.Whitehead had stressed the u n i t y 
of experience and had spoken of a fundamental f e e l i n g -
experience. This f o r Bradley was an "immediate f e e l i n g " 
i n which "there i s no d i s t i n c t i o n between my awareness and 
that of which i t i s aware" (Bradley (ETR) 159; cf i b i d . 1 9 4 ) . 
Whitehead admitted h i s own "general adherence" to Bradley's 
d o c t r i n e of f e e l i n g (Whitehead (At) 231), but r e j e c t e d 
Bradley's view that such an experience was without a 
subject-object s t r u c t u r e . Against such a p o s i t i o n Whitehead 
argued t h a t "the subject-object s t r u c t u r e i s the fundamental 
s t r u c t u r e of experience" ( i b i d . Thus: 
The conventionalized abstractions prevalent i n 
epistemological theory are very f a r from the 
concrete f a c t s of experience. The word " f e e l i n g " 
nas the merit of preserving t h i s double 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of subjective form and of the 
apprehension of an object. 
( i b i d . 233; c f . (PR) 54-55, 256-257) 
On t h i s point Ramsey f o l l o w s Whitehead r a t h e r than 
Bradley; but i t i s to a t h i r d English philosopher, 
James Ward, t h a t he turns f o r f u r t h e r guidance^ c a l l i n g 
h i s own view "a possible development" from Ward's (tl-CI b ) . 
ward's r e b u t t a l of a s s o c i a t i o n i s t psychology c a r r i e d w i t h 
i t a stress on the fundamental nature of the conative aspect 
of experience, w i t h "the a c t i v e subject s i e c t i n g and 
attending to pr e s e n t a t i o n a l data i n view of an end or 
purpose" (Copleston (HP 8-l ) '^78). Ward argues, " a l l 
experience i s process.,, f e l t interchange. Broadly 
speaking, every o b j e c t i v e change of perception e n t a i l s 
a subjective change; and every s u b j e c t i v e change an 
obje c t i v e change " (J.Ward (KA. I I ) 130). H e continues: 
I t i s scarcely an exaggeration t o say th a t the 
objects of experience are not p r i m a r i l y objects 
of knowledge, but objects of conation, 
i . e . of ap p e t i t e and aversion. For though an 
object must be cognised before i t can be 
l i k e d or d i s l i k e d , s t i l l i t i s to i n t e r e s t i n g 
objects t h a t the subject mainly attends... ( i b i d , 131? 
cf . 133-134) 
Ramsey also concludes that "the most concrete, 
the metaphysically most u l t i m a t e experience" i s conational 
- an a c t i v e " s t r i v i n g " , r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Universe 
(U-CI 9) . Experience, then, i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i v i t y 
(U-OCP 4) » w i t h an a c t i v e subject i n union w i t h an a c t i v e 
object - an "encounter" indeed! Bradley's "immediate 
experience", Ramsey suggests, i s purely conative and not 
c o g n i t i v e at a l l 5 f o r c o g n i t i o n i s possible only- when an 
experience has undergone " a b s t r a c t i v e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " 
(U-CI 9)« Such experience, which-with Bradley - Ramsey 
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i d e n t i f i e s as R e a l i t y , i s therefore indescribable, and 
i n t h a t sense "unknowable" (U-CI 10; c f . U-EP 26-28), 
However, Ramsey argues, " R e a l i t y has two aspects -
metaphysical and spatio-temporal"; and "Tne only clues 
we have to the nature of metaphysical r e a l i t y are the 
spatio-temporal a b s t r a c t i v e s of r e f l e c t i v e experience,.." 
(U-OCP 5 ) . A i l c o g n i t i v e experience , then, i s conational 
( i n v o l v i n g " a t t e n t i o n " ) , being i t s e l f a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , 
or a b s t r a c t i o n , from the basic u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d conative 
experience (U-EF 49-50) . 
Hence Ramsey u t i l i s e s Ward's stress on conation 
i n order to r e c o n c i l e Bradley and ..'ard i n t h e i r debate 
over the basic u n i t y / d u a l i t y of experience. Ward had 
c r i t i c i z e d Bradley f o r emphasising the u n i t y of experience 
at the expense of i t s d u a l i t y , i . e . f o r p o s t u l a t i n g a 
f e l t u n i t y p r i o r t o the d u a l i t y of object and subject 
(Bradley (ETR) 175-176). On Ward's analysis "the d u a l i t y 
of subject and object i s p r i m o r d i a l ; presentations are 
from the f i r s t given as o b j e c t s , . , " (G. Dawes Hicks (JW) Zd6 
c f , J, Ward (~M I I ) 112), Bradley, however, had defined 
f e e l i n g as an awareness which was " n o n - r e l a t i o n a l " 
(Bradley (ETR) 174). Against t h i s Ward argued th a t 
awareness could not be n o n - r e l a t i o n a l , f o r " I s i t not 
co g n i t i o n , and does i t not involv e some measure of 
a t t e n t i o n t o a 'change'...?" ( J . Ward (BDE)15;cf.ibid. 28)s 
I n t e r p r e t i n g experience as a d u a l i t y i n u n i t y 
we should say t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n of subject 
and object i n experience e x i s t s always; 
but Bradley's view seems to be tha t only when 
immediate experience i s , i n f a c t , transcended, ^ 
does t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n , i n f a c t , a r i s e , ( i b i d . 2 6 ) 
Ramsey comments: 
Bradley and Ward indeed seem t o have parted 
simply because Bradley would not r e a l i s e t h a t 
h i s Sentient Experience was a u n i t y which 
could, nevertheless be and should be analysed, 
and Ward, f o r h i s p a r t , refused to believe 
that Bradley's Sentient Experience was 
other than R e f l e c t i v e Experience, I t max-
we l l be that the two agree i n one as we 
proceed, f o r we s h a l l argue t h a t R e a l i t y 
i s Experience, and a Un i t y , described and 
understood however only i n so f a r as i t i s 
abstracted by r e f l e c t i o n . (U-EP 7) 
So the i n d i v i d u a l i s conatively r e l a t e d to an Other 
i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n or encounter. According to Ramsey 
t h i s Other, the object of experience w i t h which we are i n 
immediate conative contact, can u l t i m a t e l y be analysed i n t o 
God and other selves (U-CI 11)„ The arguments which lead 
to t h i s conclusion are presented as analyses of the nature 
of the c o g n i t i v e experience which forms a part of the 
conative encounter ( i b i d . 10). 
The argument f o r other selves i s as f o l l o w s : 
"Such and such events (indeed a l l events i n v o l v i n g human 
co-operation..,..) would be h i g h l y u n l i k e l y to happen as 
they do i f there were not associated w i t h b o d i l y -
ab s t r a c t i v e s y, comparable to our own,other personal 
conational u n i t i e s " (U-OCP 8 ) . Tnis i s not an argument 
from analogy, Ramsey i n s i s t s , but an argument from 
16 
"inverse p r o b a b i l i t y " (U-BP 70 5 of. Ewing (PQP) 121). 
S i m i l a r l y , by means of an argument of "Berkleian form" but 
"quite d i f f e r e n t , , , epistemological presuppositions", Ramsey 
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argues f o r the existence of God : 
Tnere i s a r e g u l a r i t y and order i n the 
occurrence of the items i n our c o g n i t i v e 
experience. The r e g u l a r i t i e s are those 
enumerated i n the so-called causal laws 
of the sciences; the order i s tha t i n v i r t u e of 
of which we t a l k of "permanent" physical 
objects such as cha i r s , f i r e s and t r e e s , , , 
Kow t h i s r e g u l a r i t y and order cannot be 
a t t r i b u t e d e i t h e r t o ourselves,.,or 
to any group or groups of other human 
beings. ,7e can, th e r e f o r e , argue.,.. 
the existence of a being l e a s t inadequately 
described as a non-human conative agent,.,,, 
(U-CI 115 cf.U-EP 70, Sermon (z) 195) 
Or, as Ramsey l a t e r put i t i n his Stanton l e c t u r e s ; 
By three stages we j u s t i f y the use of the 
word "God" i n our metaphysical map, 
('i) Sense-data, l i k e a l l p a r t i c u l a r s , being 
a b s t r a c t i v e s , cannot e x i s t i n " i s o l a t i o n " , 
(2) Yet they cannot adequately be t r e a t e d as 
ab s t r a c t i v e s from e i t h e r our own, or any 
human, w i l l or w i l l s , 
(2) These two points j u s t i f y the use of a.word 
"God" which w i l l be associated w i t h the 
"external world" to make our d e s c r i p t i o n 
of i t s independency of human beings 
"adequate" and "complete". 
(U-IIA: "The Quest f o r a C n r i s t i a n Philosophy, ^ 
The Metaphysical Background", c, 1 948 , p.2) 
I n a b r i e f section i n "An Outline of a C h r i s t i a n 
Philosophy", Ramsey r e j e c t s the view t h a t sense experience, 
moral experience and r e l i g i o u s experience are three 
d i f f e r e n t and i s o l a t e d kinds of experience (U-OCP 18). 
His contention i s that " a l l experience, i f adequately analysed 
and i t s a b s t r a c t i v e s c o r r e l a t e d , would be at onoe sense-
experience, value-experience and r e l i g i o u s experience" 
( i b i d , 19) . "Religious experience", then, appears as a 
p a r t i a l d e s c r i p t i o n of an immediate encounter, of which 
"moral experience" and "value experience" are two other 
p a r t i a l d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t place p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t on 
d i f f e r e n t a b s t r a c t i v e areas. Thus r e l i g i o u s experience 
22 
i s not a d i s t i n c t i v e , sui generis experience , but i s 
continuous w i t h other forms of experience and i s always 
a possible element w i t h i n a l l our concrete u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
experience. Thus: 
"Sense-experience" and " r e l i g i o u s experience" are 
not two separate e n t i t i e s : the words describing 
the l a t t e r are merely a more adequate account 
of the other. The world i s indeed 11 d i v i n e 
v i s u a l language" i f we have eyes and heads to 
appreciate i t . (U-EP ?8; c f . i b i d . 94) 
I t i s cle a r that Ramsey was attempting i n such 
analyses of experience to r e a l i s e a hope which he expressed 
i n a l e t t e r published i n the Times L i t e r a r y Supplement 
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m 1943 « He wrote there of a"two-fold nope many of us 
share (a) tha t r e l i g i o u s experience w i l l soon f i n d an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a j u s t i f i c a t i o n and defence from concepts 
reached i n a co n s t r u c t i v e philosophy; (b) tha t such a 
philosophy w i l l a r i s e from a more c r i t i c a l analysis of 
perceptual s i t u a t i o n s than the Logical P o s i t i v i s t s have 
given us", 
I n whatever way Ramsey attempted to analyse 
r e l i g i o u s experience, he c e r t a i n l y believed i t to be of 
fundamental importance, Five years before the l e t t e r j u s t 
quoted, Ramsey the student had begun an essay on "Tne 
H i s t o r i c a l Element i n R e l i g i o n " by d e f i n i n g r e l i g i o n 
( f o r the purpose of the essay) as r e l i g i o u s experience (U-HE 
I'.Iuoh l a t e r , towards the end of h i s time at Cambridge, 
Ramsey was to conclude two U n i v e r s i t y Sermons w i t h passages 
s t r e s s i n g the importance of "worship", "wonder" and "awe" 
and the necessity of "discerning" God, h i s a c t i v i t y and 
his grace (Sermon ( l ) 438, Sermon (2) 195;cf. U-Sermon (BBC)4 
"Discernment" was not at t h i s time a t e c h n i c a l term f o r 
Ramsey, but we can perhaps trace here the inchoate o r i g i n s 
of a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t , and i n the end more acceptable, 
r e l i g i o u s episte. raology. As yet , however, the concept of the 
"disc l o s u r e " nad not been introduced. 
+ + -:-
I have concentrated on Ramsey's unpublished 
w r i t i n g s i n t h i s review of h i s early d octrine of experience 
because i t i s i n them we can f i n d i t s f u l l e s t and most 
systematic expression. I w i l l conclude t h i s section, 
however, by i l l u s t r a t i n g the way i n which Ramsey's ea r l y 
episte mology was r e l e c t e d i n the only three a r t i c l e s which 
he published during h i s time at Cambridge, They a l l date 
from the l a t e f o r t i e s and early f i f t i e s , 
Ramsey presented a paper at the Tenth I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Congress of Philosophy i n 1948 e n t i t l e d "Han and R e l i g i o n : 
I n d i v i d u a l and Community". This sums up h i s general 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n at tha t time and applies i t to the 
question "Should 'man' or 'community' be supreme?" (l.iRIC 308) 
He f i r s t of a l l argues against Hume that "percepts" were not 
the u l t i m a t e l y concrete data of the universe, but 'were r a t h e r 
" h i g h l y a b s t r a c t i v e " (308) , and then proposed an " a l t e r n a t i v e 
view", the one with which we are now f a m i l i a r : 
a l l experience i s an Encounter,... i n v o l v i n g 
a d u a l i t y i t i s also a u n i t y .,, experiences 
are always " owned ", and they are always "of" 
something...Tne f u n c t i o n of c o g n i t i o n i s to 
endeavour to portra y , i n terms of i t s own 
spatio-temporal and a b s t r a c t i v e data, the 
character of the fundamental Encounter i n 
conation.(509). 
Thus i 
Tnere i s i n our view, no " i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l " . 
For there i s , i n a conational encounter, a Self 
and an O t h e r . ( i b i d . ) 
™ ' ~ the 
And on the question of how/Other i s to be described, Ramsey 
comments: 
'./e can only describe " i t " m terms of the 
"data" given i n co g n i t i o n . But tha t gives us 
goou grounds f o r describing " i t " i n terms of 
other selves and God , ( i b i d . ) 
A s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n i s o u t l i n e d i n the course of 
a longer a r t i c l e on Science and R e l i g i o n , published i n 1949 
(SRCP), Again Ramsey stresses the u n i t y of observer and 
observed i n experience (296) , a view which i s " n e i t h e r 
'objective realism', nor ordinary idealism - whether 
absolute or s u b j e c t i v e . Both subject and object are 
l o g i c a l l y inseparable, and mutually necessary, c o n s t i t u e n t s 
of experience " (297) . Such experience i s "an a c t i v e 
encounter at a more concrete l e v e l than c o g n i t i o n . . . 
having some kins h i p w i t h conation and w i l l . . . " ( i b i d , ; 
c f . Sermon (2) 194)« I n 8. more popular discussion of 
r e l a t e d t o p i c s , presented i n a radio c&ate 'with 
C.A. Coulson early i n 1951? the references to Ramsey's 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y "Cambridge t h i n k i n g " are at t h e i r s c a n t i e s t . 
However even here he could be heard t o confess, " I l i k e 
immensely (the"] whole idea of experience as an encounter", 
arguing t h a t encounter i s "something much more concrete than 
anything these abstract maps and models suggest" (SR j ) ? ^ 
(B) Language and iietaphysics 
The feature of Ramsey's ea r l y work which immediately 
s t r i k e s anyone 'who knows h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s i s the lack of 
space devoted to the analysis of language. Out of the 137 
pages of the t y p e s c r i p t of "Experience and Pe r s o n a l i t y " , 
i'or example, less than a dozen are devoted to t h i s t o p i c . 
The e a r l y Ramsey wrote a great deal on the nature of experience 
and the i m p l i c a t i o n s of an analysis of experience f o r 
metaphysics and theology. But t h i s i s mostly done i n terras 
of e x p e r i e n t i a l and conational u n i t i e s and t h e i r abstracta, 
w i t h l i t t l e e x p l i c i t reference to language. However, 
the w r i t i n g s of the Cambridge period are e x p l i c i t l y 
metaphysical. Ramsej' was attempting there to construct a 
metaphysic of experience which would be consistent w i t h 
the major doctrines of orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y ; and to t h i s 
end he drew on the thought of metaphysicians l i k e Bradley, 
Whitehead, "ward and Berkeley. The method, st t.*le and 
conclusions of such a philosophy must have sounded ra t h e r 
dated, not so say obscure, to those who were more f a m i l i a r 
w i t h the work of Hoore, Russell and 'Wittgenstein, 
( i ) Ls^^ua£e 
"Language", Ramsey wrote " i s a sort of q u a l i t a t i v e l y 
homogeneous mechanism which expresses, i n i t s words and 
syntax, the various patterns w i t h i n the r e s t of r e f l e c t i v e 
experience. I f a crude analogy be pardoned: as we s i t i n the 
Cinemas of our minds, we co-ordinate noises w i t h the res t 
of the p a t t e r n on the d i f f e r e n t i a t e d Screen" (U-EF 8 ) , 
Language thus "provides an ordered symbolic system corresponding 
to the progressive d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of R e f l e c t i v e Experience..., 
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a framework which ...,regulates and expresses the o r i e n t a t i o n 
of a b s t r a c t i v e elements i n r e f l e c t i v e experience" ( i _ b i d , 7 ) . 
Y/ords and phrases, then, have a use i n representing the 
l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n and we must remember tha t they do 
r e l a t e to _d_i_fji^rent l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n (e.g. " s i g n i n g 
a document" i s a phrase r e l a t i n g to a part of a complex 
whole expressed as "promise keeping"; U-iilP b ) . I t i s 
simply a mistake, t h e r e f o r e , to claim that "to every word 
belongs 'something' " ( i b i d , y ) , 
Ramsey describes the above as an account of the 
'•ordering f u n c t i o n " of words. But our use of words also has 
a second f u n c t i o n : " i t forms the l i m i t i n g boundary of 
Q-'eflective} experience i n the Present and so regulates 
the p a t t e r n as i t develops" ( i b i d , ) , This " r e g u l a t i v e 
f u n c t i o n " i s described by what Ramsey 03.11 a the "L i m i t 
Theory of Language": "Words being defined w i t h regard to 
ab s t r a c t i v e sets w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y of r e f l e c t i v e experience" 
( i b i d , 11) , This theory appears to be derived from 
Whitehead's Method of Extensive A b s t r a c t i o n , which was a 
device whereby c e r t a i n s p a t i a l and temporal elements (e.g. 
"moment of time", " p o i n t " , " s t r a i g h t l i n e " ) were defined 
i n terms of " a b s t r a c t i v e sets" (e.g. of "durations", " c i r c l e s " , 
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or " o v a l s " ) . An a b s t r a c t i v e set i s a set of events which 
possesses two pr o p e r t i e s : 
( i ) of any two members of the set one contains the 
other as a part ( i . e . one "extends over" the other)5 
( i i ) there i s no member which i s a common part of 
every member of the set ( i . e . no event which i s "extended 
over" by every meiube r ) (Whitehead (CN) O0-61,79-81•(PR) 349-352). 
An a b s t r a c t i v e set thus resembles a nest of Chinese Soxes, 
except th a t there i s no smallest box i n the centre. Thus, 
f o r example,"a 1point 1 i s not an i d e a l e n t i t y at the centre 
or even an i d e a l l i m i t of t h i s route of approximation. I t 
i s defined as the whole convergent set. S i m i l a r l y a s t r a i g h t 
l i n e can be defined as the d i r e c t i o n of a route of overlapnin 
e l l i p s e s or oblong rectangles" (3ranet (7) 292)i "the element 
i t s a l f i s the whole class of a b s t r a c t i v e sets with the same 
convergent character" (Emmet (7P0) 205) . 
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I n an extension of t h i s technique t o the language 
of common sense Ramsey defines the token word "dog" as: 
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that physical r e a l i t y corresponding to the 
type l i m i t ( i n the present) of t h a t route of 
a b s t r a c t i o n i n r e f l e c t i v e experience v.'hich i s 
ma.de up of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s C1 , C2, C '3, 0. 
Q.rhich are assume of) t o be common to f o x t e r r i e r s , 
Great Danes and a l l dogs,.(U-3? 10) 
Such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s would approximate to those l i s t e d i n a 
d i c t i o n a r y under the d e f i n i t i o n of the word "dog". Metaphysical 
words, on the other hand, are "concerned w i t h the or g a n i s a t i o n 
of the word l i m i t s a t t a i n e d by ordinary routes of a b s t r a c t i o n 
w i t h i n r e f l e c t i v e experience"* They are "not the mere l i m i t s 
of any recognizable routes", and the r e f o r e "the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of metaphysics i s . . . . t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of Experience which 
i s not reducible e n t i r e l y t o the ab s t r a c t i v e s of ordinary 
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r e f l e c t i v e experience" ( i b i d . 13; . 
7e have^then, i n Ramsey's ea r l y theory of language, 
a so p h i s t i c a t e d but b a s i c a l l y r e f e r e n t i a l theory of meaning. 
7ords are used to r e f e r to e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y e i t h e r 
at the concrete, or (more u s u a l l y ) at an abst r a c t , l e v e l . 
There i s only a h i n t here of other uses to v.'hich language 
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might he put. But the h i n t i_s present, f o r the r e g u l a t i v e 
f u n c t i o n of language o u t l i n e d i n Ramsey's L i m i t Theory leaves 
room f o r his l a t e r i n t r o d u c t i o n of other f u n c t i o n s f o r 
c e r t a i n types of language. 
Before we take the discussion of Ramsey's early 
metaphysics f u r t h e r , v/e should note some other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of Ramsey's view of language, and i n p a r t i c u l a r i t s r e l a t i o n 
to experience. I n a student essay Ramsey had w r i t t e n : 
I do not t h i n k we can too o f t e n r e a l i z e t h a t , 
between (1) the occurrence of an experience E, 
and (2) the occurrence of a symbolic d e s c r i p t i o n 
of E (e.g. a d e s c r i p t i o n of E i n words), there 
i s no necessary connexion i n v i r t u e of which 
the l a t t e r assumes a p e c u l i a r k i n d of " i n f a l l i b i l i t y " . 
Neither ought we to for g e t t h a t , l o g i c a l l y and 
psy c h o l o g i c a l l y , "E" i s p r i o r to the " d e s c r i p t i o n 
of E", however t r u e i t may be tha t episte m o l o g i c a l l y , 
f o r other people besides the "subject" of S, 
knowledge of the d e s c r i p t i o n of E i s g r j j o r t o 
knowledge of E. Iiany of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
concerned w i t h Revelation are, I would suggest, 
d i r e c t l y traceable to a neglect of one, or both, 
of the pr o p o s i t i o n s j u s t stated.... 
Doctrine - i n so f a r as i t d i f f e r s from p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
theology - i s an attempt to perform an i n i t i a l 
" c r y s t a l l i z i n g out" of experiences.(U-Revelation 1 & 4) 
Thus, although "language has a f i n a l reference to experience" 
(U-EF 25) , Ramsey r e j e c t s the idea t h a t language can i n f a l l i b l y 
capture and encapsulate experience. Thus, Ramsey had already 
i n h i s e a i i e s t w r i t i n g s committed himself t o the view t h a t 
r e l i g i o u s language, i n c l u d i n g d o c t r i n e , i s an attempt somehow 
to "describe r e l i g i o u s experience", and that i t i s only 
through such language that others can enter i n t o our r e l i g i o u s 
experience (and v/e ourselves can enter i n t o the experience 
of the authors of S c r i p t u r e ) . "e thus f i n d here some of 
the elements of Ramsey's l a t e r views about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between experience and language i n r e l i g i o n ; i n c l u d i n g h i s 
stress on the t e n t a t i v e nature of t h e o l o g y ^ r.ncl the as s e r t i o n 
t h a t r e l i g i o u s language does not o f f e r a s t r a i g h t d e s c r i p t i o n 
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of the "Object" of r e l i g i o u s experience . 
( i i ) I'letaphysics 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough the Ramsey of the nineteen -
f o r t i e s already claimed t o be presenting a metaphysics which 
was both " t e n t a t i v e " and " e m p i r i c a l " : 
" Te n t a t i v e , because i t i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e scheme 
o f f e r i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of what i s i n f a c t beyond i t s grasp-
i t i s an attempt t o describe a u n i t y i n terms of i t s p a r t s . 
E m p i r i c a l , because i t begins w i t h what, from a 
human point of view, are the most obvious abstractions of 
32 " / 
our everyday experience . (TJ-HA: The Ojaest f o r a C n r i s t i a n 
Philosophy,(A) The Metaphysical Background", c,1948;cf, U-OCP 
Respite the r a t i o n a l i s t tone of much of Ramsey's 
work at t h i s time, h i s metaphysical speculation can l a y 
some claim t o being " e m p i r i c a l " , f o r i t takes as i t s s t a r t i n g 
point that most concrete of data; Experience. "Experience" 
here i s not to be r e s t r i c t e d to sense experience, although 
Ramsey "would s t r o n g l y deny that there i s any e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t y which has no s p a t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n "(U-Burney 78 ) . I n 
an undergraduate essay f o r A.C. Ewing, Ramsey lamented the 
fa c t that l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s ignored "p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n t u i t i o n " and "philosophical mysticism"(U-Vp), Later he 
was to stress t h a t such anti-metaphysical philosophers vjere 
not being t r u e to experience as they found i t : "against the 
e m p i r i c i s t we assert that the p o s s i b i l i t y and a c t u a l i t y 
of metaphysics l i e s i n experience being more than the 
p a r t i c u l a r s of c o g n i t i o n aggregated together" (SP.CP 297? 
c f . Sermon (2) 194), The only sort of metaphysics t h a t vms 
a v i a b l e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r Ramsey was one that could, claim t o 
l3e e m p i r i c a l . Hut i t -./as " e m p i r i c a l " not i n r e s t r i c t i n g i t s e l f 
to the data, of the senses hut i n analysing the concrete 
experience (from which sense data are merely one type of 
ab s t r a c t i o n ) i n a l l i t s f u l l n e s s , attempting to discover what 
must be the case i f experience - whatever i t s d e t a i l e d content 
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i s of t h i s general form , 
Thus the jiatuia of metaphysics was experience 
considered as a u n i t y more concrete than any "experienced, 
p a r t i c u l a r s " ( i . e . ourselves - as - a c t i v e l j ' •• encountering -
an - o t h e r ) . I t s task was "to provide us wit h a verbal map 
by which we may u n d e r s t a n d , t h i s u n i t y i n a l l i t s 
manifold d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s " . I t s mejfcliod was the c o n s t r u c t i v e 
one of " p r o v i & i n ^ the most comprehensive linkeage between 
categories "discovered, from a"broad survey of the map"^, 
(u'-HA: The Puest f o r a C h r i s t i a n Philosophy,(A) 
Metaphysical B ackground,c.1948, p.1) Ramsey contended 
th a t such a metaphysical scheme was not merely v e r b a l , but 
r e f l e c t e d some fundamental ontology. But he counselled 
caution i n the way i n which we postulate the existence of 
metaphysical e n t i t i e s ; thus Kant 1 s11 'regulative' ideas 
of Reason (of which God was o n e ) . _ d o r e f e r t o ' uomething' 
but t h a t something i s not to be conceived of as a quasi-
s c i e n t i f i c o b ject. The point i s t h a t a l l metaphysical 
words, i n the t o t a l i t y of any given metaphysical system, 
constitute a prof erred <felineation of tha t t o t a l immediate 
Encounter which i s 'metaphysical r e a l i t y ' . ',."e &ay( i n so 
f a r as wc do not uind arguing ' a n a l o g i c a l l y ' from a b s t r a c t i v e s ) 
suppose o n t o l o g i c a l 'things' corresponding t o some of such 
metaphysical words. But such a supposition i s a 'leap i n 
the dark' - an endeavour to describe, i n c o g n i t i v e terms, 
the Objective c o n s t i t u e n t of a s i t u a t i o n o r i g i n a l l y c o n a t i v e l y 
experienced. The p r i c e of such o n t o l o g i c a l l i b e r t y i s et e r n a l 
l i n g u i s t i c v i g i l a n c e , " (U-OCP 15-16) 
Tne sense i n which the adverb " a n a l o g i c a l l y " i s used here 
i s made cl e a r i n Ramsey's e a r l i e r discussion of Dorothy ?<;mmet * s 
views on the t o p i c of analogy (See Enmet (HUT) c h . Y I I l ) , 
Ramsey suggests: 
wi t h our theory of the c o n t i n u i t y between the 
immediate Encounter ("Pure" Act and "Pure" Being) 
and the spatio-temporal a b s t r a c t i v e s of r e f l e c t i v e 
experience, we have an episte biological -
tautological background more developed, and more 
sui t e d than Thomism i s , to an "an a l o g i c a l " use 
of language, while not necessarily i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h a l l the o n t o l o g i c a l conclusions which 
St Thomas would sponsor, With Miss Emmet, then, 
I would g l a d l y agree that most metaphysical 
words are "anal o g i c a l " - they are part of a 
pr e f e r r e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the immediate Encounter, 
to be i n t e r p r e t e d " a n a l o g i c a l l y " i n terms of 
the spatio-temporal a b s t r a c t i v e s which c o n s t i t u t e 
a .manifold of sense-experience. Metaphysical 
t h i n k i n g i s "analogical t h i n k i n g " , but i t need 
not necessarily imply the o.ntological background 
of St Thomas. ( i b i d . 15) 
Ramsey's ea r l y metaphysics, despite being - i n these 
ways - " e m p i r i c a l " and " t e n t a t i v e " , was c e r t a i n l y ambitious, 
For i t provided, as we have seen, a scheme which "demands 
the idea of a 'timeless s e l f ' . . , , and an idea of 'God' " 
(U-HA: "Tne Philosophical Presuppositions of R e l i g i o n and 
Science: C o n f l i c t and Synthesis", Cambridge period, p.5) . 
The arguments i n t e g r a l to t h i s scheme r e l a t i n g to the existence 
and nature of God were given above. I w i l l conclude t h i s 
section w i t h some notes on Ramsey's ea r l y view of the Self: 
the A c t i v e Subject of the Conational Encounter (and of i t s 
a b s t r a c t i v e element, c o g n i t i v e experience). 
( i i i ) The S e l f 
For Ramsey t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n about t h e S e l f 
i s whether i t can he c o m p l e t e l y d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f 
s p r t i o - t e m p o r a l p a r t i c u l a r s . A S e r i a l , o r Bundle, Theory 
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of the S e l f , as proposed hy David hume , would r e p l y i n t h e 
a f f i r m a t i v e : t h u s making man "no more t h a n a sequence of 
d i s c r e t e and separate s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l ' p e r c e p t s 1 " (IIRIC 308), 
But a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey t h e r e are major weaknesses i n such 
a view: 
Ask y o u r s e l f t h e q u e s t i o n : .."nat do I mean by s a y i n g 
of a mental o r b o d i l y process o r event t h a t i t i s 
"mine"? To t h a t q u e s t i o n I b e l i e v e no adequate 
answer can be g i v e n i n terms o f a S e r i a l Theory 
i n v o l v i n g o n l y s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l a b s t r a c t i v e s and 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . (lI-OCF 7 ) 
Since, w i t h t h e passage o f t i m e , more and more 
events come t o have the ( a l l e g e d a p p a r e n t ) 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f " b e i n g mine": how on e a r t h 
have we any constancy about t h e s e l f ? (U-SP 6 7 ) 
Such a t h e o r y seems v e r y p l a u s i b l e so l o n g as 
we assume a l l a l o n g tha.t t h e r e i s a S e l f , 
i n a sense d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t g i v e n by t h e 
t h e o r y , which can examine and d i s c u s s i t . ( i b i d . 68) 
Kume had committed the f a l l a c y o f i l l e g i t i m a t e 
a b s t r a c t i o n " i n supposing t h a t h i s 'pe r c e p t s ' ( m f a c t h i g h l y 
a b s t r a c t i v e ) were t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a l c o n s t i t u e n t s ( t h e 
u l t i m a t e l y c o n c r e t e d a t a ) o f th e u n i v e r s e " (1.P1IC 308). 
But what p l a u s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o Hume i s p o s s i b l e ? Eamsey 
r e j e c t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l Pure Ego t h e o r i e s as " u n i n t e l l i g i b l e " 
(U-II& "The Quest f o r a C h r i s t i a n P h i l o s o p h y " , ( A ) Tne 
L l e t a p h y s i c a l Background, 0 . 1 9 4 8 , p . 1 ) • I I e d i d so a p p a r e n t l y 
because they used language about a S u b s t a n t i a l S e l f which 
"would o n l y be j u s t i f i a b l e i f i t were an e x i s t e n t i n the 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l system", whereas they a c t u a l l y p o s t u l a t e d 
i t as b e i n g "beyond such a N a t u r a l Order" (U-Burney 103*s 
- M O " ! 56 xiamsey's own view, however, i s p r e s e n t e d 
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on some occasions as an " a l t e r n a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n " of a Pure 
•in 
Ego Theory (U-Burney 10 /{) , and on o t h e r s as a l e s s 
" i n a d e q u a t e " v e r s i o n o f t h e S e r i a l Theory (U-OCP 7 ) ^ . 
Ramsey d e s c r i b e s t h e S e l f as a c o n a t i o n a l u n i t y w h i c h i s 
a n a l y s a b l e i n t o a "mind" and a "body" and a " t i m e l e s s s e l f " 
( o r "Pure Ego"). Thus ho r e c o g n i z e s t h r e e s e t s o f a b s t r a c t i v e s 
from the o r i g i n a l c o n a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e on i t s s u b j e c t i v e s i d e : 
( 1 ) "I.Iental events d e f i n i n g as a l i m i t a 1 numan mind' " (U-OCP 7 ) ; 
( 2 ) " P n y s i c a l - v.'orld events d e f i n i n g i n p a r t as a l i m i t a 
'human body' " ( i b i d . ) ; and 
( 3 ) "a n o n - s p a t i o - te m p o r a l s e l f " o r "Timeless S e l f " (URIC 3 0 9 ) . 
Ramsey accepts t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n "Pure Ego" may r e a s o n a b l y 
be a p p l i e d t o ( 3 ) - the " u l t i m a t e , ' s u b j e c t i v e ' a b s t r a c t i v e 
c o n s t i t u e n t of t h a t u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u n i t y o f Present Experience 
which i s best d e s c r i b e d i n v o l i t i o n a l terms" (U-EP 5 9 ) . 
I n t h e a n a l y s i s o u t l i n e d above ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) are 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l a b s t r a c t i v e s ? ( 3 ) i s t h e non - s p a t i o -
te m p o r a l a b s t r a c t i v e . But a l l t h r e e are a b s t r a c t i o n s 
f r o m t h e S e l f , t h e s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u e n t o f t h e c o n a t i o n a l 
u n i t y . They are not i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g e n t i t i e s which 
somehow " b u i l d up" i n t o a S e l f . And as ( 3 ) i s an " a b s t r a c t i v e 
w i t h i n a c o n a t i o n a l u n i t y " (U-OCP 7 ) > Ramsey w i l l not 
countenance any t a l k about a " t i m e l e s s s e l f a c t i n g " ( c f , TI-EF 5 7 , M? 
I.ZRIC 3 0 9 ) . I t i s the c o n c r e t e S e l f , n ot any o f i t s a b s t r a c t i v e s , 
which can be s a i d t o " a c t " . 
Such a view, Ramsey c l a i m s , s u b s t a n t i a t e s " t h e 
fundamental r e l i g i o u s c l a i m t h a t man i s not r e d u c i b l e t o 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l terms" (IIRIC 3 1 0 ) and p r o v i d e s a p l a u s i b l e 
e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e problems ox s e l f i d e n t i t y and the "ownership" 
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of e x p e r i e n c e s . I t f u r t h e r o f f e r s a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
f r e e - w i l l , which can now "be analysed i n terms o f t h e 
me t a p h y s i c a l u l t i m a c y o f t h e c o n c r e t e , a c t i v e u n i t y 
( n e e d i n g f o r i t s f u l l a n a l y s i s a t i m e l e s s s e l f ) , r a t h e r 
t h a n as a species o f s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l i n d e t e r m i n i s m (cf„l,"RIC 3 0 9 ; 
U-XP 5 5 ) . F u r t h e r the n e c e s s i t y o f p o s t u l a t i n g a n o n - s p a t i o -
temporal " a o u l " as p a r t o f any adequate a n a l y s i s o f t h e s e l f 
a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t no " s u b j e c t can ever be a^d^qjiatel_y_ 
d e s c r i b e d i n temporal terms, or be s a i d t o cease t o e x i s t " 
(U-HA "Elements of P h i l o s o p h i c a l Tneology" 1 1 , 1 9 4 0 s.,p.2 ; 
c f . U-dP 1 1 0 , U-OCP 28 ) . Tne i m m o r t a l i t y of t h e s e l f may 
thus be presumed. 
F i n a l l y t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e s p a t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n 
t e s t i f i e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t "our experience i s of an embodied, 
and not a disembodied, s e l f " (U-Eurney 7 9 ) ; hence t h e 
" b i f u r c a t i o n o f r e a l i t y i n t o Hind and P.Iatter" (U-CI 6) must 
be r e j e c t e d . "We cannot have t h e e x i s t e n c e ( o r p e r s i s t e n c e ) 
of a Timeless S e l f w i t h o u t h a v i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e ( o r p e r s i s t e n c e ) 
of t h e c o n a t i o n a l u n i t y o f which i t i s an abstractive"(U-OCP 23), 
Thus Ramsey admits t h a t t h e r e i s a l a r g e element o f t r u t h 
i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e of t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e body, 
(C) The J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s B e l i e f 
The L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m f l o u r i s h i n g i n Vienna i n 
the t w e n t i e s and t h i r t i e s was r e p r e s e n t e d i n a r a d i c a l f o r m 
i n England by t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n of A.J. Ayer's Language, 
T r u t h and Logic p u b l i s h e d i n 1936 - w h i l e Ramsey was s t i l l 
an undergraduate. Ramsey had heard " p o s i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s 
of t h e V e r i f i c a t i o n H y p o t h e s i s " a t t h e l e c t u r e s o f Wisdom 
and Waismann (U-Burney, i n t r o d u c t i o n ) , and he began h i s Burney 
essay w i t h an account of V e r i f i o a t i o n i s m which both acknowledged 
i t s m e r i t s and r e v e a l e d i t s i n a d e q u a c i e s . Ramsey r e c o g n i z e d 
i t s v a l u e i n t h a t i t put us "on our guard a g a i n s t h i g h -
sounding language which means p r e c i s e l y n o t h i n g " as w e l l 
as s u g g e s t i n g c l a r i f i c a t i o n and p r e c i s i o n as "a purpose" and 
"an i d e a l " i n p h i l o s o p h y (U-Burney 2 1 a ) „ His fundamental 
o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c h o o l , however, was 
d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i t s a t t e m p t t o "mould P n i l o s o p h y on 
Mathematics" and th u s a t t a i n "a p h i l o s o p h y o f c e r t a i n t y " 
( i h i d o 1 4 ) . Ramsey f o u n d Ayer's "simple-minded c r i t i q u e " 
of t h e o l o g y t e n d e n t i o u s , V e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s were w i t h o u t 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e of t h e i r own and b l a n d l y assumed 
t h a t everyone e l s e was i n t h e same p o s i t i o n ( 2 0 - 2 1 ) , 
" I n d e c i d i n g , "as Ramsey put i t l a t e r , " t h a t a l l e x p e r i e n c e 
must conform t o h i s l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s , he i s g u i l t y of t h e 
e m p i r i c i s t e r r o r " (U-EP 4 ) , Ramsey wished t o r e j e c t b o t h 
L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m and h i g h a p r i o r i r a t i o n a l i s m , embracing 
r a t h e r "a t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e , . . . t h a t o f Whitehead" (U-Burney 21a 
As we have seen, Ramsey's L i m i t Theory o f Language 
i m p l i e d a " L i m i t Theory o f Meaning" (U-EP 13 ) which seems 
t o have allov/ed meaning t o any words, however " m e t a p h y s i c a l " , 
t h a t had some c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l a b s t r a c t i v e 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of r e f l e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . L e t a p h y s i c a l 
words served t o " d e s i g n a t e l i m i t s i m p l i e d by t h e l i m i t s o f 
o r d i n a r y s e t s o f a b s t r a c t i v e s " , thus o r g a n i s i n g them i n t o 
a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme (U-EP 1 3 ) , I n t h e absence o f p a r t i c u l a r . 
examples, however, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c u s s f u r t h e r t h i s 
t h e o r y of t h e meaning of m e t a p h y s i c a l w o r d s ^ . At any r a t e , 
Ramsey b e l i e v e d t h a t i t i m p l i e d a " h a r m o n i s a t i o n " of t h e 
coherence and correspondence t h e o r i e s of t r u t h : 
I n the f i r s t p l a c e , by making t r u t h a 
correspondence not between so c a l l e d f a c t s and 
words but between two s e t s of a b s t r a c t i o n s 
w i t h i n r e f l e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , v i s : l i n g u i s t i c 
and n o n - l i n g u i s t i c , i t i s a correspondence 
t h e o r y but w i t h a d i f f e r e n c e , f o r i t makes 
the correspondence more i n t e l l i g i b l e . On 
the o t h e r hand, i n e f f e c t i n g t h i s correspondence 
t h e r e i s c l e a r l y b u i l t up a coherent and 
comprehensive l i n g u i s t i c system which might 
w e l l serve as an a n a l y s i s - a " r e f l e c t i o n " -
of t h e o t h e r c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o n - l i n g u i s t i c 
system of a b s t r a c t i v e s , and whose i n t e r n a l 
harmony would, i n t h e case o f a new p r o p o s i t i o n , 
a f f o r d a u s e f u l c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h - depending 
on how harmonious t h e " f i t " o f t h e new 
p r o p o s i t i o n happened t o be (U-EP 1 4 ) 
But when i t comes t o t h e t e s t i n g o f r e l i g i o u s 
knowledge c l a i m s , Ramsey proclaims a t e s t which i s " f o r 
p l a i n men, t h e o l o g i a n s and p h i l o s o p h e r s a l i k e " , t h e t e s t of 
the Gospel: "By t h e i r f r u i t s ye s h a l l know them" (U-OCP 3 9 ) , 
"The f i n a l t e s t o f a p h i l o s o p h y w i l l be t h e l i f e t o which 
i t c o n s i s t e n t l y p o i n t s " (U-EP 2 9 ) ; indeed " p h i l o s o p h y 
must c u l m i n a t e i n l i f e i t s e l f " (U-OCP 3 9 ) . But t h i s t e s t 
i s not i n essence a species of e t h i c a l t e s t f o r 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l ( o r r e l i g i o u s ) systems o f t h o u g h t . I t i s , 
r a t h e r , t h e " e m p i r i c a l t e s t " o f measuring p h i l o s o p h y 
a g a i n s t t h e immediate e n c o u n t e r - e x p e r i e n c e fr o m which i t 
was born: 
Our view of p h i l o a p h y i s e n t i r e l y e m p i r i c a l . . . 
£itj f i n d s i t s aim and g o a l , not i n language, 
but r a t h e r i n t h a t Experience from which b o t h 
language and i t s c o r r e l a t e d a b s t r a c t i o n s are 
d e r i v e d . (U-EP k!8=29) 
But as "Experience i s r e a l l y an encounter o f w i l l s ; i n c l u s i v e 
o f , but wid e r t h a n , c o g n i t i o n " , t h e n " R e a l i t y i s never 
adequately 'Known'; o n l y ' w i l l e d ' . I t i s t o be l i v e d , and 
only t e n t a t i v e l y and i n c o m p l e t e l y t o be un d e r s t o o d " (U-HA: 
"Tne Contemporary P n i l o s o p i c a l C l i m a t e " , Cambridge p e r i o d ; 
cf« U-OCP 5 ) . And t h e " l i f e " which i s t h e u l t i m a t e t e s t f o r 
p h i l o s o p h y (and t h e o l o g y ) i s t h e o o n a t i o n a l u n i t y of t h e 
immediate Encounter i n a l l i t s c o n c r e t e n e s s ^ , 
( 5 ) The S i g n i f i c a n c e o f Ramsey's E a r l y Thought 
I n an u n p u b l i s h e d d i s s e r t a t i o n , C y n t h i a Cohen has 
complained t h a t "Ramsey's t a c i t m e t a p h y s i c a l p o s i t i o n . . . , 
t u r n s out t o have a, s u r p r i s i n g a f f i n i t y w i t h a b s o l u t e 
i d e a l i s m " (Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 2 6 4 ) . I s h a l l c o n s i d e r l a t e r t h e 
e x t e n t t o which t h i s i s t r u e o f Ramsey's more mature work, 
but our study of t h e u n p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l from h i s Cambridge 
p e r i o d , which was not a v a i l a b l e t o Cohen, r e v e a l s t h e 
p e r s p i c a c i o u s n a t u r e of t h i s remark. The e a r l y Ramsey d i d 
embrace, i f not a b s o l u t e i d e a l i s m , a t l e a s t "a form of 
41 42 I d e a l i s m " which drew on b o t h B r a d l e y and whitehead 
I n h i s paper " C h r i s t i a n I n d i v i d u a l i s m " Ramsey suggests t h a t 
" w h i l e metaphysics has i t s own p e c u l i a r p i t f a l l s , many w i l l 
c o n t i n u e t o wish t o make f o o l s o f themselves v r i t h B r a d l e y 
and Uhitehead t h a n t o i n d u l g e i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c seances 
of a '..'ittgenstein" (U-CI 6 ) . A l t h o u g h i n l a t e r years he was 
t o show c o n s i d e r a b l y more sympathy f o r t h e V J i t t g e n s t e i n o f 
th e Blue and Brown Books and t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
and t o a d o p t a s t y l e and approach t o p h i l o s o p h y more c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h what was a c c e p t a b l e i n t h e O x f o r d o f R y l e , A u s t i n and 
Strawson, I a n Ramsey seems t o have remained. - " i n h i s bones" 
something of an i d e a l i s t . Or at l e a s t he r e t a i n e d s u f f i c i e n t 
sympathy w i t h h i s e a r l i e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l guides t o b e l i e v e 
t h a t they s t i l l had something t o c o n t r i b u t e , d e s p i t e t h e 
" R e v o l u t i o n i n P h i l o s o p h y " . Two u n p u b l i s h e d remarks, d a t i n g 
from h i s time a t O x f o r d , i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t , Tnus i n 
"Fact, Metaphysics and God" (B1/«1) Ramsey wrote : "To b r i n g 
t h e l i n g u i s t i c i n s i g h t s of R u s s e l l a l o n g s i d e t h e f a c t u a l 
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CHAPTER I I : 
E X P E R I E T C E A O D I S C L O S U R E S 
1» Erora "Experience" t o " D i g c l o s u r e " 
D u r i n g h i s time a t Ccrabridge I a n Ramsey was concerned, 
as we have seen, w i t h t h e a n a l y s i s o f " e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t i e s " , 
and t h e more c o n c r e t e " c o n a t i o n a l u n i t i e s " . Ee b e l i e v e d 
t h a t such an a n a l y s i s r e v e a l e d t h a t e xperience was e s s e n t i a l l y 
an a c t i v e encounter between a Transcendent Subject and a 
r 
Transcendent O b j e c t , the l a t t e r b e i n g f u r t h e r d e l i n e a t e d 
as " o t h e r s e l v e s " and "God". I f t h i s i s t r u e of a l l 
e x p e r i e n c e , p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d , t h e n a l l experience i n t h e 
end i s r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , as i t i s a l s o sense e x p e r i e n c e 
and. moral e x j i e r i e n c e „ 
Ramsey c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h i s e x p o s i t i o n on t h e s o r t 
of b a s i c , u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e t o 'which 
both Bradley and '..'hit©head h?d a p p l i e d t h e name " r e e l i n g " . 
And i t \;cs the appeal t o t i i s p a r t i c u l a r element w i t h i n a l l 
e x p e r i e n c e , an element t h a t formed t h e c r u x of Ramsey's 
e a r l y r e l i g i o u s e p i s t e mology, which appears t o have been 
the jumping o f f p o i n t f o r t h e l a t e r development of h i s th o u g h t 
a s s o c i a t e d . . i t h t h e concept of t h e " d i s c l o s u r e " . T h i s 
e v o l u t i o n i s nowhere e x p l i c i t l y t r a c e d , but i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t o i n f e r i t s main f e a t u r e s from v a r i o u s h i n t s which Ramsey 
g i v e s us i n h i s p u b l i s h e d and u n p u b l i s h e d w r i t i n g s . 
The second p a r t o f the t y p e s c r i p t t h a t I have 
e n t i t l e d "Fact, i.ietaphysics and C-od" begins w i t h an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of B r a d l e y ' s views on metaphysics. A c c o r d i n g 
t o Ramsey, B r a d l e y ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of metaphysics depends 
on "an appeal t o some f a c t which, 'while not a l t o g e t h e r 
55 
d i f f e r e n t f r o m what o b j e c t i v e language r e f e r s t o , needs more 
s a y i n g about i t t h a n can be s a i d i n terms o f such o b j e c t i v e 
language" (U-PiVIG B l / 7 1 ) . B r a d l ey d e s c r i b e s t h i s fac+-, which 
i n part, eludes t h e l o g i c o f "terms and r e l a t i o n s " , as a 
" f e l t t o t a l i t y " . Ramsey goes on t o ask: 
But what i s t h e " f e l t t o t a l i t y " ? B r a d l e v would 
answer bv p r e s e n t i n g 1 us w i t h t h e f a c t i n 
cmestion. How? By an e m p i r i c a l experiment...... „ 
( i b i d . ) 
Ramsey a l l u d e s t o two accounts o f such an "experiment": an 
e a r l i e r v e r s i o n i n Appearance and R e a l i t y ( B r a d l e y (AR) 1 27-128), 
and a "more developed p r e s e n t a t i o n " i n c h a p t e r V I o f Essays on 
T r u t h jand R e a l i t y . I s h a l l auote "Rradlev's account from 
t h i s l a t t e r source and f o l l o w i t w i t h Ramsey's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : 
Our a c t u a l o b j e c t f a i l s t o s a t i s f y us, and we get 
the i d e a t h a t i t i s i n c o m p l e t e and t h a t a comnlete 
o b j e c t would s a t i s f y . Me a t t e m p t t o complete our 
o b j e c t by r e l a t i o n a l addi t i o n f r o m vn t h o u t and by 
r e l a t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n i'rom w i t h i n . And t h e r e s u l t 
i n each case i s f a i l u r e and a sense o f d e f e c t . \:e 
f e e l t h a t anv r e s u l t , s a i n e d t h u s , no m a t t e r how a l l -
i n c l u s i v e so f a r . would y e t be l e s s t h a n what we a c t u a l l y 
e x p e r i e n c e . Then we t r y t h e i d e a of a p o s i t i v e non-
d i s t i n f i i i i shed n o n - r e l a t i o n a l whole, which c o n t a i n s 
more than the nb.iect and i n t h e end c o n t a i n s a l l 
t i . a t we e x p e r i e n c e . And t h a t i d e a . s e e m s t o meet 
our demand. ( B r a d l e y CETR) 188) 
Ramsey comments: 
I n o t h e r words, i f we t a k e o u r s e l v e s i n any 
ffiven s i t u a t i o n and s e l e c t w i t h i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n 
some ob.iect o r o t h e r . , i n th e v e r v a c t o f 
s e l e c t i n g ; such an ob.iect we are aware of t h e 
incompleteness of our. s e l e c t i o n , and. aware t h a t 
as p r o v i d i n g -an account of t h e s i t u a t i o n of which 
i t i s a n a r t , t h e o b j e c t i n n u e s t i n n i s p l a i n l y 
i n a d e n u a t e . . , 
I n t h e d e s i r e t o reach a 1 ess inadeauate i d e a 
of what we are a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c i n g , we t h e n 
s t a r t , says B r a d l e v , t o use a r e l a t i o n a l 
t e c h n i q u e . t o i n t r o d u c e more terms r e l a t e d i n 
such and such ways t o t h e terms we have a l r e a d y 
di s c r i m i n a t e d . . . o r . . , t o i n t r o d u c e terms and. 
r e l a t i o n s i n t o what seemed at f i r s t a homogeneous 
area... (U-FLIG B1 / 7 3 ) 
But at no stage are we s a t i s f i e d w i t h such accounts, and 
so "the game goes on".,.,.. 
. . . . u n t i l somehow or o t h e r a s o l u t i o n breaks 
i n on us...For a t some p o i n t or o t h e r (urges B r a d l e y ) 
the v a r i o u s a t t e m p t s suggest and make p l a i n a 
common f e a t u r e o f them a l l , Tney b r i n g out and 
emphasize, where t h e l i g h t breaks, ...what we 
" a c t u a l l y " e x p e r i e n c e i n each case...a 
" p o s i t i v e non r e l a t i o n a l , n o n - o b j e c t i v e , whole 
of f e e l i n g " . ( i b i d . ; c f . B r a d l e y (3TF.) 18Q) 
Here, Ramsey c l a i m s , i s the "odd e m p i r i c a l f a c t " which j u s t i f i e s 
m etaphysics, and i t may be evoked i n the way t h a t B r a d l e y 
d e s c r i b e s . Thus B r a d l e y t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n , when p r o p e r l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d , i s t h e " e m p i r i c a l B r a d l e y " (TJ-FMG Bl/7?) "bo 
appeals t o a "most c o n c r e t e " , " g i v e n " f a c t - the immediate 
experience o r whole of f e e l i n g - as t h e b a s i s f o r h i s 
metaphysics. 
But t h e p o i n t t h a t Ramsey i s r e a l l y making o n l y comes 
home when we t u r n t o p a r t I I I of "Fact, Metaphysics and God". 
For t h e r e , i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o s m o l o g i c a l argument, 
Ramsey w r i t e s of a c e r t a i n " e l u s i v e awareness", d e s i g n a t e d 
as a " s e l f - o t h e r awareness", which i s induced by t h e 
search f o r c a u s a l antecedents provoked by t h e argument. 
"The hope of t h e argument i s t h a t suddenly some o t h e r f a c t 
w i l l s t r i k e us, r a t h e r l i k e t h e l i n e s o f a G e s t a l t diagram"; 
and t h i s " i s not a l l t h a t d i f f e r e n t f r o m B r a d l e y ' s e v o k i n g 
o f a ' t o t a l ' e x p e r i e n c e , by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e u n s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s 
of terms and r e l a t i o n s " (U-FIIG ( 2 ) 1 0 / 6 6 / 1 7 3 ) . Anyone who 
i s i ' a m i l i a r w i t h Ramsey's l a t e r work w i l l r e c o g n i s e here 
the s o r t of language which he uses, and t h e s o r t of s i t u a t i o n 
t o which he p o i n t s , i n d i s c u s s i n g h i s concept of the d i s c l o s u r e . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t he sees B r a d l e y ' s " t e c h n i q u e , . . f o r e v o k i n g 
what he c a l l e d 'immediate experience' " (PR 2 0 4 ° c f . CD 67-68) 
as v e r y s i m i l a r indeed t o t h e way i n "which d i s c l o s u r e s are 
evoked. B r a d l e y ' s immediate ex p e r i e n c e i s thus "a l o g i c a l 
synonym f o r what we c a l l an 'odd discernment' " (RL 5 2 ; 
cf.PVI.fl? 1 6 4 , BP.** 1 8 ) . 
. . i t h these s u g g e s t i o n s b e f o r e us, we may c o n s i d e r 
I ' u r t l i e r t h e development of R&msey's c p i s t e mology. I n h i s 
Cambridge p e r i o d , Ramsey s t r e s s e d t h e importance of a b a s i c 
s u b j e c t - o b j e c t experience - t h e " f e e l i n g " o f B r a d l e y 
( p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d ) and o f '.."hitehead - which i s a 
fundamental p a r t of a l l e x p e r i e n c e . He saw h i s t a s k t h e n 
as s i m p l y t h a t o f e l u c i d a t i n g t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
o f such an e x p e r i e n c e . But a t t h a t t i m e he pre s e n t e d 
l i t t l e by way of evidence t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e a l i t y o f t h i s 
basic e x p e r i e n c e ; we are s i m p l y t o l d t h a t i t i s t h e r e as 
the c e n t r a l element i n a l l e x p e r i e n c i n g . The l a t e r Ramsey, 
however, seems t o f e e l t h a t he now needs t o argue f o r t h e 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t of h i s e p i s t e mology, H e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t 
B r a d l e y h i m s e l f p r o v i d e d a s o r t of argument by i n d i c a t i n g 
a t e c h n i q u e by means of which "immediate f e e l i n g " can be 
evoked. And Ramsey takes t h i s f u r t h e r i n h i s own 'work on 
d i s c l o s u r e s . 
I n t h i s sense, then,Ramsey 1s p h i l o s o p h y becomes 
more o v e r t l y e m p i r i c a l , as t h e " e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t y " o f h i s 
Cambridge w r i t i n g s i s metamorphosed i n t o t h e t y p i c a l l y 
Ramseyan " d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n " . As we s h a l l see, t h e 
examples o f d i s c l o s u r e s t h a t Ramsey o f f e r s are v e r y d i v e r s e : 
out t h a t d i v e r s i t y ( f r o m h i s p o i n t o f vi e w at l e a s t ) i s 
r e a l l y o n l y s u p e r f i c i a l . For a l l d i s c l o s u r e s share t h e same 
s t r u c t u r e , and i n t h e end t h e y a l l d i s c l o s e the same o b j e c t . 
Furthermore^ d i s c l o s u r e s are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a l l forms 
38. 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . Here t h e s i m i l a r i t y between d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n s and t h e e a r l i e r e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t i e s should be 
obvious5 but more evidence can be adduced. Thu-s r e l i g i o u s 
e xperience when analysed i n terms o f d i s c l o s u r e s , l i k e 
r e l i g i o u s e xperience analysed i n terras o f e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t i e s , i s not s u i g e n e r i s t o r i t i s not separate from 
sense e x p e r i e n c e . The f o l l o w i n g passage may be compared 
w i t h t h a t quoted from Ramsey's e a r l y w r i t i n g s , above ; 
" r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e " emphasises those f e a t u r e s 
common t o a l l experiences (even "sense e x p e r i e n c e s " ) ; 
but those f e a t u r e s about which we s h a l l o n l y t a l k 
i n language which from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of p e r c e p t i o n 
l o g i c i s "improper", " p a r a d o x i c a l " , "odd". 
R e l i g i o u s experience t h e n i s a c l a i m f o r 
exp e r i e n c e which w h i l e y i e l d i n g i n p a r t t o 
p e r c e p t i o n l o g i c , i s not exhausted by i t ; an 
exp e r i e n c e which i n i t s t o t a l i t y i s o n l y evoked, 
induced , and i n t h a t sense "expressed", by 
p a r a d o x i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s . (U-FI.IG y / 4 7 . / l 5 4 ) > 
R e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e b u i l d s on and goes beyond sense e x p e r i e n c e . 
Both o r i g i n a t e i n d i s c l o s u r e s , and r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e s are 
mediated t h r o u g h t h e e m p i r i c a l f a c t s and f e a t u r e s of t h e 
w o r l d . The e:.;phasis on t h e i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s o f d i f f e r e n t 
types of ex p e r i e n c e i s thus m a i n t a i n e d i n Ramsey's l a t e r work: 
R e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e must not bo t a k e n as something 
s u i g e n e r i s i f t h i s means something l o g i c a l l y and 
a n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m sense e x p e r i e n c e . 
The k i n d of f a c t t o which m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o l o g y 
appeals must be sense experience and more. (TJ-FI.IG 
y / 5 o / " l 6 3 ; c f . i b i d . 1 / 5 6 / 3 8 ) . 
Ramsey's q u a r r e l , now as b e f o r e , i s w i t h t h e s o r t of " e m p i r i c a l 
myopia" (PF 3 3 8 ) i n epistemology t h a t stops s h o r t a t t h e 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l elements of a s i t u a t i o n . R e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
( a l o n g w i t h o t h e r experiences - e.g. our experience of o t h e r 
s e l v e s ) goes beyond, but i n c l u d e s , such elements. T h i s i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n Ramsey's f r e q u e n t use of t h e a n a l o g i e s of "depth" 
and "another dimension" when he i s t a l k i n g about d i s c l o s u r e s 
( e . g . TL 1 4 , P I 3 3 , H I 67, line. E r i t . 5 9 3 ) . 
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Ramsey s t r e s s e d i n h i s e a r l y work t h e mutual a c t i v i t y o f 
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i n e x p e r i e n c e , d r a w i n g a number of h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n s from premises r e l a t i n g t o c o n a t i o n a l ( o r v o l i t i o n a l ) 
u n i t i e s . Such language does not appear much i n h i s l a t e r 
w r i t i n g s , but i t i s c l e a r t h a t some of the components of h i s 
e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s are r e t a i n e d . But i t i s t h e d i s c l o s u r e 
t h a t i s now d e s c r i b e d as an " a c t i v e i n t e r c h a n g e " (l_DA 1 3 ) or 
"encounter" (RL 26 ) . I n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n we "oecome 
a l i v e " s u b j e c t i v e l y as t h e w o r l d "comes a l i v e " o b j e c t i v e l y 
(PA 194> ^ 7 ) » There "we know our a c t i v i t y i n m a t c h i n g 
i t w i t h an a c t i v i t y which c o n f r o n t s us..." (I.IDA 6 1 ) . I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t whereas t h e e a r l y Ramsey f o u n d i t 
necessary t o emphaa.se t h e a c t i v i t y o f the s u b j e c t i n t h e 
encounter e x p e r i e n c e , the l a t e r Ramsey s t r i v e s t o s a f e g u a r d 
the o b j e c t i v i t y o f experience by p u t t i n g t h e emplasis on 
the a c t i v i t y o f t h e o b j e c t or discernment. I n d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n s , he argues, "we are r e l a t i v e l y p a s s i v e " (RFT 2 8 ) . 
But i t i s o n l y a r e l a t i v e p a s s i v i t y . For t h e l a t e r Ramsey 
can s t i l l appeal t o Ward's d o c t r i n e of " a t t e n t i o n " i n h i s 
own a n a l y s i s o f t h e a c t i v e s u b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n ( c f . U-PLG 
B37/15O; TW 8 2 ) . And i n t h e end he ;;oes so f a r as t o d e f i n e 
personhood i t s e l f i n terms of a c t i v i t y (HP 1 2 7-128). 
C l e a r l y the d u a l i t y - i n - u n i t y , which Ramsey 
claimed i n h i s e a r l y work t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e fundamental 
f e e l i n g - e x p e r i e n c e , i s l a t e r t a k e n i n t o h i s epistemology of 
d i s c l o s u r e s . " N o t h i n g i s p r o p e r l y c a l l e d an 'awareness' 
which has not a s u b j e c t - o b j e c t s t r u c t u r e " (SEI 2 O 3 ) . Here 
Ramsey c o n t i n u e s t o f o l l o w Whitehead r a t h e r t h a n B r a d l e y 
( c f , V-W.G B 2 / 9 3 - B2/95, CL 3 3 7 , P I 9 8 - 9 ) . Even s e l f 
awareness s h o u l d r e a l l y be d e s i g n a t e d s e l f - o t h e r awareness 
(U-Ei.IC- 1 / 3 5 / 3 7 , 3 / 2 6 / 6 4 - 3 / ^ 7 / 6 5 ? SJI 2 0 3 ) . And " s e l f - o t h e r 
awareness", a,s we s h a l l see, i s hut an o t h e r name f o r " d i s c l o s u r e 
I n these ways, t h e n , we can t r a c e a c o n t i n u i t y between 
Ramsey's e a r l y ana l a t e r analyses o f ex p e r i e n c e . The s t r i k i n g 
d i f f e r e n c e , however, remains. I n t h e Cambridge m a t e r i a l 
Ransey'a emphasis on the c o n c r e t e c o n a t i o n a l / e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t y goes a l o n g w i t h h i s t r e a t m e n t of c e r t a i n e n t i t i e s as 
a b s t r a c t i o n s f r o m such a u n i t y . Thus t h e S e l f i s an 
a b s t r a c t i o n , and i s i t s e l f i n t u r n open t o f u r t h e r a b s t r a c t i v e 
a n a l y s i s y i e l d i n g "Hind", "Body" and "Timeless S e l f " . 
S i m i l a r l y p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are a b s t r a c t i o n s f r o m t h e 
e x p e r i e n t i a l u n i t y . I n Ramsey's l a t e r work i t i s t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n which i s s p e c i f i e d as the most c o n c r e t e 
datura: a '.cosmic d i s c l o s u r e b e i n g d e s c r i b e d as "the most 
c o n c r e t e o f a l l s i t u a t i o n s " (CPCF 54). iiov; Ramsey emphasises 
even more s t r o n g l y t h a n b e f o r e t h a t i t i s such c o n c r e t e 
s i t u a t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r metaphysics 
and t h e o l o g y . 
He 'would agree w i t h those who t r e a t metaphysics as 
a study " h a v i n g more concern f o r t h e c o n c r e t e t h a n f o r the 
a b s t r a c t " , b e i n g "somehow concerned w i t h i l l u m i n a t i o n , 
b r i n g i n g something v i v i d l y t o our a t t e n t i o n , g e t t i n g us t o 
'see' what b e f o r e had been u n r e c o g n i s e d " (CPCF 505 cf.CPL 2 4 8 ) . 
For Ramsey t h i s i n v o l v e s our c o n c e r n i n g o u r s e l v e s w i t h 
e x p e r i e n c e " a t i t s most c o n c r e t e " (CPCF 53). But he now 
p o r t r a y s t h e S e l f j ( p h y s i c a l ) o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e and God as 
b e i n g themselves d i r e c t l y d i s c l o s e d . The language o f 
2 
" a b s t r a c t i v e s " has disappeared . 
T h i s may be o n l y a change of emphasis and nomenclature, 
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b u t t h e c o n t r a s t between Remsey's e a r l y work and t h a t o f h i s 
l a t e r p e r i o d can be seen even more s t a r k l y i f a t t e n t i o n 
i s d i r e c t e d t o h i s account o f our knowledge of " o t h e r s e l v e s " 
and "God". I n the e a r l y w r i t i n g s such e n t i t i e s are p o s i t e d 
by an argument based on a b s t r a c t i v e s f r o m e x p e r i e n t i a l 
u n i t i e s : we know o f them by i n f e r e n c e , They/thus s t a n d at 
a f u r t h e r remove, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , from t h e c o n c r e t e data 
of e x p e r i e n c e . I n Ramsey's l a t e r w r i t i n g s , however, o t h e r 
selves and God are n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l l y i n t u i t e d i n a d i s c l o s u r e . 
I t seems t o me t h a t some of these changes are 
r e f l e c t e d i n a s h i f t i n Ramsey's g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
p o s i t i o n , I n h i s Cambridge days he sponsored "a form o f 
I d e a l i s m " which seemed t o make e v e r y t h i n g a f u n c t i o n o f 
(an a b s t r a c t i o n f r om) human ex p e r i e n c e . I n h i s l a t e r work 
t h i s i d e a l i s t n o t e i s c o n s i d e r a b l y toned down: w i t n e s s h i s 
account of s c i e n t i f i c models - an account which i s sympathetic 
t o a p o s i t i o n best c a t e g o r i z e d as " c r i t i c a l r e a l i s m " ( c f . Exeursusl) 
Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n s of o b j e c t i v i t y are c r u c i a l here, I s h a l l 
argue l a t e r t h a t h i s d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d e p i s t e m o l o g y i s an 
attempt t o t r a n s c e n d t h e i d e a l i s t / p h e n o m e n a l i s t v. r e a l i s t 
d i s t i n c t i o n . I t does so by r e d u c i n g a l l d i s c l o s u r e s t o 
" d i s c l o s u r e s of o b j e c t i v i t y " . For then what i s d i s c l o s e d i n 
a d i s c l o s u r e i s "raw o b j e c t i v i t y " ('"something* which i s o t h e r 
t h a n o u r s e l v e s " ; FD 1 3 1 ) , and t h i s can be t a l k e d about i n 
v a r i o u s terms, T . I e t e r i a l - o b j e c t language and sense-datum language 
are b o t h j u s t a l t e r n a t i v e , f a l l i b l e accounts of t h e o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e t h a t alone i s " d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n " and t h e r e f o r e " c e r t a i n " 
( c f . FD 1 2 1 ) . T h i s may sound v e r y l i k e Ramsey's e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n 
which he c h a r a c t e r i z e d not o n l y as "a form of i d e a l i s m " , but 
a l s o on one o c c a s i o n as " n e i t h e r ' o b j e c t i v e ' r e a l i s m , n or 
o r d i n a r y i d e a l i s m " (SRCP 297). However, Ramsey's whole 
approach i n h i s l a t e r work i s f a r more sympathetic t o a 
r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n , and f a r l e s s dominated by t h e j a r g o n o f 
a thorough g o i n g i d e a l i s m . And y e t , as I nope t o i n d i c a t e , 
some elements o f t h e i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n are r e t a i n e d . 
^' 'Broader E m p i r i c i s m " 
I n an a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e i n h i s f i n a l 
l e c t u r e , "Tne c r i s i s o f F a i t h " , Ramsey spoke o f t h e f a c t o r s 
t h a t l e d him t o develop h i s concept o f the d i s c l o s u r e . I t 
was, he s a i d , i n a " y o u t h f u l n e s s surrounded by l o g i c a l 
p o s i t i v i s t s and c h a l l e n g e d a t every p o i n t t o e l u c i d a t e t h e 
meaningfulness o f r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e " t h a t he came t o see 
t h a t such d i s c o u r s e must "appeal t o e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i a and 
more". "Faced by t h i s predicament'} Ramsey c o n t i n u e d , " I came 
t o t a l k o f d i s c l o s u r e as t h a t by which t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t 
makes i t s e l f known i n and t h r o u g h t h i n g s s p a t i a l and t e m p o r a l " 
(CF 3 4 - 3 5 ) . 
So the ep i s t e m o l o g y of d i s c l o s u r e s i s Ramsey's 
response t o the challenge o f r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . The l a t e r 
Ramsey saw h i m s e l f i n many ways as a t h e o l o g i c a l " f r o n t i e r s m a n " 
f a c i n g t h e common-sense paganism o f s c i e n t i s t s and e m p i r i c i s t 
p h i l o s o p h e r s (of.RS.CS ^7~, CPL 247, CPCF 5 2 ) . lie confesses: 
'T have always been aware o f t h e yawning gaps t h a t e x i s t 
between s c i e n t i f i c and e m p i r i c a l a t t i t u d e s and the C h r i s t i a n 
f a i t h " (U-Credo 1; c f . CELCE y 5 ) . Hence Ramsey does h i s 
t h e o l o g y c a u t i o u s l y " w i t h an awareness of down-to - e a r t h 
e m p i r i c i s t s b r e a t h i n g down my neck" (U-ITR Evans 2)„ 
..'e s h a l l see tha t Ramsey's whole philosophy of 
r e l i g i o n was worked out w i t h at l e a s t one eye on the 
e m p i r i c i s t challengers of theology, V.'nat Jerry G i l l has 
c a l l e d Ramsey's "epistemological arc" - "the movement from 
experience t o language and back to experience again" ( G i l l 
( I K ) 108) - i s constructed as f a r as possible on e m p i r i c i s t 
p r i n c i p l e s . Thus Ramsey anchors r e l i g i o u s language i n 
disclosure-experiences mediated through empirical 
s i t u a t i o n s , r e j e c t i n g a l l views of r e l i g i o u s experience 
that make i t t o t a l l y separate from sense experience. He 
analyses r e l i g i o u s language as a language of q u a l i f i e d 
models, the models being taken from our everyday experience 
of the empirical world. He i n s i s t s that r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f 
i s open to some sor t of emp i r i c a l t e s t i n g : i t must show 
"empirical f i t " w i t h the world, lie also attempts t o 
forge a synthesis between science and r e l i g i o n by i n s i s t i n g 
on the need f o r both tentativeness i n theology and 
i s 
metaphysics i n science. And a l l this/undergirded by a 
metaphysical viewpoint which i s disclosure-based, and hence 
i n some sense " e m p i r i c a l " . 
But i f Ramsey can be c a l l e d an " e m p i r i c i s t " i t i s 
only by widening the term so that i t no longer applies 
s o l e l y to the empiricism of the Logical P o s i t i v i s t s , 
Ramsey viewed himself as being very f i r m l y set i n the 
e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , But he recognized w i t h i n t h a t 
t r a d i t i o n both a narrower and a broader empiricism; and 
he found h i s r e a l home i n the t e r r i t o r y of the l a t t e r . 
I t should be noted th a t c r i t i c s of Ramsey's e m p i r i c i s t 
s t a r t i n g point o f t e n complain that by adopting i t he 
"already concedes too much" (llebblethwaite 642), and tha t 
" h i s r e l i g i o u s thought u r g e n t l y requires a core of disclosure 
ano i n s i g h t which empiricism w i l l not allow him" (Robinson 44) 
Pitmsey, however, would disagree; "believing t h a t a, "broadened 
empiricism" can be, and i s , a v i a b l e o p t i o n w i t h i n the 
e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , He would, on the other hand, agree 
w i t h a l l who r e j e c t a narrow or " p l a i n empiricism", which 
" i n i s o l a t i o n and by i t s e l f , . , would not be s u f f i c i e n t 
e i t h e r as an account of the world or humanity" (?L 53). 
I t i s p e r t i n e n t at t h i s point to discuss Ramsey's view 
of the e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n i n B r i t i s h philosophy^. 
(A) John Locke 
Locke's empiricism consists i n h i s denial of 
innate ideas ( J . Locke (Essay) Bk i ) and h i s i n s i s t e n c e 
th a t sensation and r e f l e c t i o n ( i n t r o s p e c t i o n ) are "the 
fountains of knowledge, from which a l l the ideas we have, 
or can n a t u r a l l y have, do spring" ( i b i d . B"K. I I , ch.I, sec. 2), 
But Locke's philosophy i s less r a d i c a l than that u s u a l l y 
connoted by the word " e m p i r i c i s t " , as G i l b e r t Ryle notes: 
'most of the doctrines v/hioh an i l t i p i r i c i s t (as 
o r d i n a r i l y defined) should hold are strenuously 
denied by Locke, That the evidence of p a r t i c u l a r 
perceptions can never be a foundation f o r t r u e 
knowledge, that true knowledge i s both completely 
general and completely c e r t a i n and i s of the 
type of pure matiematics, t h a t i n d u c t i v e 
generalizations from c o l l e c t e d observations can 
never y i e l d b e t t e r than probable generalizations 
g i v i n g us opinion but not knowledge, are doctrines 
which Locke's whole -issay i s intended to e s t a b l i s h . 
(Ryle (JLIIU) 25-26; c f . O'Connor (JL) 205-206) 
But when Ramsey w r i t e s of Locke's "broader empiricism 
c o n t r a s t i n g i t w i t h the narrow empiricism of some of h i s 
successors (Locke 20), he i s f a s t e n i n g on the r o l e played 
by i n t u i t i o n i n Locke'a epistemology. I n the second chapter 
4!? 
of Book IV of the ^ ssa^, Locke had di s t i n g u i s h e d three "decrees 
of knowledge" - i n t u i t i v e , demonstrative and s e n s i t i v e . He 
there defines i n t u i t i v e knowledge as a d i r e c t perception -
"without the i n t e r v e n t i o n of any other idea" - of the egreement 
and disagreement between ideas ( J . Locke (Ussay) Bk IV, ch. I I , 
Sec. 1 ) , and f u r t h e r extends i t t o cover our knowledge of 
our own existence ( i b i d , B K IV, ch. IX, sec. 3 ) c f . Cop lesuon 
(HP 5 l ) 1 2 4 ) . I n Ramsey* a i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s 19i>8 e d i t i o n 
of Locke's The keasonableneas of C h r i s t i a n i t y , he argues 
tha t Locke's account of prophecy' f u l f i l m e n t and miracles i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a f u r t h e r appeal to " i n t u i t i o n " . For Locke* 
revealed t r u t h s are n e i t h e r "contrary t o " nor "according t o " 
reason, hut "above reason". Such t r u t h s are not th e r e f o r e 
" i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h our cl e a r and d i s t i n c t ideas" but 
ne i t h e r are they simply derived by d i r e c t , i n t u i t i v e 
deduction from such ideas. They must instead be revealed 
by God, but way not be completely understood even then 
(("issr.y) Bk IV, ch. X V I I , sec. 2J - ch. XIX, sec, 3 ) . 7.ut 
our acceptance of a p u t a t i v e r e v e l a t i o n as_ r e v e l a t i o n must 
i t s e l f be reasonable, and t h i s w i l l depend on the supporting 
evidence of the outward signs of prophecy f u l f i l m e n t and 
miracles ( i b i d . Bit IV, ch. XIX, sees, 14-15). "/hen Ramsey 
turns to Locke's views on these two topics he discovers i n 
Locke an appeal to something very l i k e h i s own disclosure -
s i t u a t i o n s . r..?hus, f o r Locke, the f u l f i l m e n t of a prophecy 
was the success of a p r e d i c t i o n ( J . Locke (ilC) sec, 2.32), 
out iiausey comments: 
Is there simply a person to which a d e s c r i p t i v e 
lo.bel, already c u r r e n t , at long l a s t f i t s ? . . , . 
Xay not Locke rather have i m p l i e d t h a t i n 
b r i n g i n g alongside the person of Jesus the 
Xessiah l a b e l , there s t r i k e s us an aptness and 
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appropriateness of the kind which s t r i k e s us 
\ihan, f o r example, v;o soe at I on .3 l~.s i tho 
i r j i t n d oorre-3 i)Oiidi . i 3 t o the? map Tfe have pondered 
f o r years ...fLocke 13) 
This, Ramsey suggests, would "be an i n t u i t i v e d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n ( i t i d . ) 
S i m i l a r l y , i n regard to miracles, Ramsey contends 
t h a t on a proper i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Locke "a miracle s i t u a t i o n 
£is] i n t u i t i v e l y given, and never adequately assessed i n terms 
of idea p a r t i c u l a r s alone " ( i b i d , 15 ) . Analysing Locke's 
thought i n A Discourse of Miracles and A Th i r d L e t t e r 
Concerning T o l e r a t i o n , Ramsey notes h i s suggestion that the 
power of a miracle i s not the measurable power of c i v i l la// 
and concludes t h a t : 
a miracle must he given the same compelling 
power as belongs to an i n t u i t i o n , f o r t h i s 
i s a l l Locke has i n h i s ."journeyman" s bag 
"besides idea p a r t i c u l a r s , ( i b i d . ) 
m i r a c l e s . a r e something nf which i n the 
last, r e s o r t we are i n t u i + i v e l y aware. , , ( i b i d , 90) 
And 9 as Ramsey puts i t elsewhere, " i t would be these s i t u a t i o n s 
of power which, had Locke so wished, would have been f o r him 
metaphysical s i t u a t i o n s " (U-FMG 382/195). 
Ramsey must be c r i t i c i z e d here f o r forcing; h i s own 
insights,, at l e a s t t o some extent, on to Locke's epistemologv-
thus producing a niece of eisegesis r a t h e r than exegesis. 
We s h a l l o f t e n f i n d that when he i s analysing the views of 
other philosophers Ramsey reveals more of h i s own p o s i t i o n 
than he does of t h e i r s . 
( B ) George Berkeley 
Ramsey's references to Berkeley are more numerous 
than those to any other person. What he seems to 
appreciate above a l l else i n Berkeley i s h i s doctrine of 
"notions", which serves as a necessary supplement to Locke's 
"new way of ideas". I n a course of l e c t u r e s on B r i t i s h 
• J E i p i r i c i s n , d e l i v e r e d at Oxford i n 1962 (quotations are from 
student's notes), Ramsey spoke of Berkeley as a. "man of 
sense and more" adding "the 'more' however had to he 
n o t i o n a l l y given "by reference to our a c t i v i t y , a more which 
eluded observable ideas". Berkeley had recognized t h a t 
however important ideas were, an." f o r Berkeley they were of 
course a l l - i m p o r t a n t , there must i n a d d i t i o n be minds or 
s p i r i t s which know or perceive the ideas. \7e cannot have 
_id_eas of such minds and t h e i r operations, f o r ideas are 
passive and s p i r i t s are active -^ but we do have ''notjLons'1 
of them, Here i s Berkeley' e "notionalized empiricism" (BP 311 1 
B e r k e l e y wrote: 
a l l the u n t h i n k i n g objects of the mind agree, 
i n t h a t they are e n t i r e l y passive, and t h e i r 
existence consists only i n being perceived: 
whereas a soul o r s p i r i t i s an ac t i v e being, 
vfhooo existence consists not i n being perceived, 
but i n p e r c e i v i n g ideas and t h i n k i n g . . . . . 
I n a large sense indeed, we nay be said to 
have an idea, or r a t h e r a n o t i o n of s p i r i t , 
t hat is...we understand the meaning of the 
word, otherwise we could not a f f i r m or deny 
anything of i t . (Berkeley (p) 1734 e d i t i o n 
sees. CXJCXIX - CXL; c r . i b i d , sec.XXVII; (l)) 269) 
Berkeley's d o c t r i n e of notions i s ambiguous and undeveloped^ 
out i t s presence i n h i s philosophy makes c l e a r t h a t Berkeley 
does admit that something can be known without being an idea. 
I get a n o t i o n of myself d i r e c t l y , f o r one's s e l f nay be 
known "immediately, or i n t u i t i v e l y " * , but I may also a r r i v e 
at notions of other selves and God "by r e f l e c t i o n and 
reasoning" i n v o l v i n g inference by analogy from our own case 
(Berkeley (D) 267-263). "Hence the knowledge I nave of 
other s p i r i t s i s \^j^e^dip-_te_, as i s the knowledge of ny 
ideas; "but depending on the i n t e r v e n t i o n of ideas, "by me 
r e f e r r e d t o a^ejrfca^ or JsjojjrjLjts c - i s t i n c t from myself, as 
e f f e c t s or concomitant signs"{Berkeley ( r ) 1734 edition,CALV), 
Further: "we icnow other s p i r i t s by means of our own soul, 
Which i n t h a t sense i s the image or idea of t h e m ? i t having 
a l i k e respect to other s p i r i t s , t h a t hlueness or heat 
"by me perceived hath to those ideas perceived "by another" 
(Berkeley (?) sec, CXL; c f . Park 69-72, 94). 
Tnus there i s a common clement i n our knowledge of 
our selves, o? other solves and of God, a l l of which are 
given as notions and not as ideas. And Uerkeley has also 
drawn a s t r i c t p a r a l l e l "between the way we come to know other 
selves and the "way we come to know God. A nunan s p i r i t i s 
not perceived by sense ( f o r only ideas can be perceived), 
•out the t h i n k i n g and p e r c e i v i n g agent i s known to us through 
the signs and e f f e c t s of his a c t i v i t y (the ideas c o n s t i t u t i n g 
h i s body). I n . j u s t the same way God can be knownmediat o l y 
through the v i s i b l e e f f e c t s of nature ( c f , Berkeley (?) 
sees. CALVI - GXLIA5 (A) J i a l . IV, sec, 5 ) . 
Berkeley's immaterialism has been described as "what 
you get i f you s t a r t w i t h Locke's p i c t u r e and replace matter 
by God" (T nompson (B) 240). And Berkeley'a argument f o r 
God docs seem to s u f f e r from some of the same problems as 
Locke's argument f o r matter, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the eyes of those 
who do not share the former's curious prejudice against 
"aead", " i n s e n s i b l e " matter as a possible cause of ideas. 
Passing over such d i f f i c u l t i e s , however, Rrr.isoy latched onto 
the theory of notions as a l l o w i n g f o r a wider empiricism. 
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•'here Reusey i_s j u s t i f i e d i n claiming the support 
of Berkeley i s i n the area of s e l f knowledge; f o r Berkeley 
does profess an immediate, n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l , ov.'creness of 
the s e l f (through "inward f o o l i n g or r e f l e c t i o n " ; Berkeley 
(p) sec, L]C[RIk) , which i s very s i m i l a r t o Ramsey's s e l f -
disclosure ( c f , CCB 263-264, 27311 17). I t i s reasonable, 
t h e r e f o r e , f o r Rrnsey t o conclude t h a t : 
Berkeley i n his doctrine of notions i s p o i n t i n g 
to the empirical c u r i o s i t y of the s i t u a t i o n i n 
which I come to myself i n "being a c t i v e , and to 
the need to talk about t h i s s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i n a 
way that i s l o g i c a l l y p e c u l i a r by comparison 
w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e sentences. (BPBII 185 c f . I l l 69,71) 
( c ) Jojsejoh _Bj3tler 
I n h i s Oxford l e c t u r e course on B r i t i s h Bmpiricism, 
Rr.msoy turns from a consideration of Berkeley to look next 
at h i s contemporary Joseph B u t l e r , Ramsey j u s t i f i e s h i s 
i n c l u s i o n of B u t l e r w i t h these words: 
he too centres on the claim t h a t some s i t u a t i o n s 
cannot be r e s t r i c t e d t o ideas and sensations, 
and on these s i t u a t i o n s r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f has 
i t s empirical basis, „, (U.-GL 5) 
leva Ramsey seemed to have f e l t , much i n common w i t h B u t l e r , 
who, as Rrmsey o f t e n notes, was both a student at O r i e l 
and a Bishop of Durham! ( c f . ITR Owen 127- J B I 395-396; 
JB I I 1,0-9, 12; CD 23: Sermon (5) 14? UI?T 25). 
I n Religious Langua.ge Ramsey draws two themes from B u t l e r ' s 
Analogy of R e l i g i o n ; ( i ) " a 'self-awareness 1 t h a t i s more than 
1body awareness' ", and ( i i ) "a t o t a l commitment...which 
sees i n a s i t u a t i o n a l l t h a t the understanding can give 
us and more" (RL 15,17)* B'e may take each theme i n t u r n : 
51. 
( i ) Persons 
Ramsey views Bu t l e r ' s claim that i t i s "contrary 
to experience" to imagine t h a t "gross bodies ([arej ourselves" 
( B u t l e r part I , c h . V I I , p„150) as based on a Kamseyan 
d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n , "an awareness that as ' l i v i n g agents' 
we are more than our public behaviour" (RL 15; c f . F I 332-333), 
A reading of chapter I of part I of the Analogy ("Or a Future 
L i f e " ) , however, reveals t h a t B u t l e r ' s arguments there are 
based rather on analogies w i t h nature and questions of 
antecedent probability ( i n c l u d i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
body and mind i n t h i s l i f e ) , B u t l e r i s involved i n an 
argument (mainly by analogy), he i s not appealing to any 
Q 
special i n t u i t i v e experience . And indeed Ramsey's l a t e r 
references to Bu t l e r ' s discussion on the f u t u r e l i f e do not 
r e f e r to " s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e s " ( c f . JB I I 16-17). But Ramsey's 
main point survives t h i s o b j e c t i o n , I t i s that B u t l e r may 
also be quoted a,s one who claimed t h a t "we ourselves',,,,, 
are not 'objects' " (PB 333; c f , U-TLIB 4 ) . 
( i i ) Commitment and P r o b a b i l i t y 
But Bamsey's main appeal to B u t l e r i s i n the 
context of the themes of commitment and p r o b a b i l i t y , 
Ramsey claims t h a t i n B u t l e r ' s maxim " p r o b a b i l i t y i s the very 
guide of l i f e " ( B u t l e r I n t r o d u c t i o n , p,7), we have a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the " t o t a l commitment" of the r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e v e r which i s "appropriate to a 'question of great 
consequence' " (RL 17) and which goes beyond the (probable) 
evidence ( c f . KG 216-217). B u t l e r had argued t h a t i n 
r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s , as i n p r u d e n t i a l and moral s i t u a t i o n s , 
we may be j u s t i f i e d i n a c t i n g according to the balance of 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s (and indeed, apparently, on low p r o b a b i l i t i e s -
c f . B u t l e r 8,236-237, 257 e t c . ) , without expecting a l l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s to he resolved f i r s t . This 
doctrine has not, however, been u n i v e r s a l l y acclaimed ( c f . 
Stephen 242-243). A f a c t o r i n i t which Ramsey does not 
9 
make clear i s tha t B u t l e r also takes i n t o account the 
" u t i l i t y " ( p r u d e n t i a l consequences) of accepting a c e r t a i n 
theory ( c f . B u t l e r 298 - 299, 304 - 308). According to 
Anders J e f f n e r the "value" of a theory equals the "sum of 
u t i l i t y " ( i . e . the u t i l i t y of the theory i f i t i s tr u e 
minus the harm done i f i t i s f a l s e ) m u l t i p l i e d by i t s 
p r o b a b i l i t y ( J e f f n e r (BUR) b1 - 82). I f the value of 
accepting a theory or statement i s greater than the value 
10 
of accepting i t s negation then one ought to accept i t 
But Ramsey, as usual, i s less concerned w i t h 
accurate exegesis than w i t h u_sing another man's thought, 
And i t i s cle a r t h a t B u t l e r ' s account of p r o b a b i l i t y 
a t t r a c t s Ramsey as an apparent p a r a l l e l to h i s own view th a t 
" C h r i s t i a n convictions based on h i s t o r i c a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
are i n p r i n c i p l e reasonable" (CD 24), despite the f a c t t h a t 
" c o m m i t m e n t i s always at r i s k " (RPT 26), And the basis of 
t h i s reasonableness i s that r e l i g i o u s (and moral) commitment 
r e l a t e to what B u t l e r c a l l s "matters of p r a c t i c e " i n 
"questions of great consequence". So i t i s possible 
reasonably to wed a "problematic theology" w i t h a " t o t a l 
11 
assent" ( J B I I 16), a sure transcendent commitment wi t h 
1 2 
a t e n t a t i v e theology and uncer t a i n empirical evidence: 
Degree of assent i s not, i n matters of f a i t h , 
p r o p o r t i o n a l to evidence..., r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , , , 
i s as reasonable as a moral decision where we 
a c t . . . i n a way tha t goes beyond the evidence..,. 
( i b i d . 191 
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(l>) David Hume 
Be might t h i n k that w i t h Hume we have at l a s t 
a r r i v e d at a r a d i c a l l y "narrow empiricism". Hume's 
scepticism extends t o mental as wel l as m a t e r i e l substance, 
f o r he has no Berkleyan notions to augment h i s ideas and 
impressions ( c f . Hume (.'•JIIU) sec. I I , ^ 1 3 ) » Ramsey admits 
th a t an epistemology l i k e Hume's, i f i t i s based on 
impressions alone, cannot support a successful metaphysics 
(U-F1.IC- Draft 1/24; U-FUG B83/196). But he i s u n w i l l i n g to 
acquiesce i n the usual a t t i t u d e of theologians to t h i s 
"notorious i n f i d e l " w i t h h i s p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r committing 
d i v i n i t y books t o the flames. Ramsey f i n d s hope f o r 
r e l i g i o u s epistemology even i n David Hume! 
Ramsey views s e r i o u s l y the arguments aga.inst the 
proofs of the existence of God presented by Hume i n h i s 
Dialogues concerning Natural R e l i g i o n , agreeing that 
n a t u r a l theology cannot be b u i l t on observed f a c t by means 
of analogical argument ( c f . BBBBG (2) 10/74/131 ) . But he 
s t i l l claims to f i n d evidence t h a t Hume was i n some ways 
1 3 
nearer to Cleanthes than to Philo . I n a review of 
Nelson Pike's e d i t i o n of Hume's Dialogues, Ramsey wrote: 
I c e r t a i n l y agree th a t one might a t t r i b u t e 
to Hume a. p o s i t i o n very much l i k e the one 
we can a t t r i b u t e t o Berkeley, v i z , t h a t \:e 
know God as we know a f r i e n d , , . Does not Hume 
come near to Berkeley i n acknowledging t h a t 
the existence of God i s something which to 
use the phrase from Dialogue X I I , immediately 
"f l o w ( s ) i n upon you w i t h a force l i k e 
sensation?"... t h a t we become aware of God 
i n some kind of i n t u i t i o n or disclo s u r e . 
(Review Pike 233; c f . TL 7 ) 1 4 
This phrase a c t u a l l y occurs i n Dialogue I I I and comes from 
the l i p s of Cle ;;nthes, the f u l l t e x t being: 
Consider, anatomize the eye5 survey i t s 
s t r u c t u r e and contrivance; and t e l l me, from 
your own f e e l i n g , i f the idea of a c o n t r i v e r 
does not immediately flow i n upon you wi t h 
a force l i k e t h a t of sensation. 1„ 
(Hume (Dm) 128, emphasis added) ^ 
Elsewhere Ramsey categorises t h i s as "a '' sense' of purpose -
a discernment" (RL78). Here again, as w i t h Locke and 
Berkeley, Ramsey has s c r u t i n i s e d the e m p i r i c i s t ' s 
defences i n order to f i n d some gap i n t o which he can press 
his own epistemology of disclosures. I n Locke th a t gap 
was i n t u i t i o n and i t s (possible) r o l e i n s i t u a t i o n s of 
prophecy f u l f i l m e n t and miracles. I n Berkeley i t was 
the doctrine of notions and the r e l a t e d t o p i c s of our 
knowledge of other selves and of God. I n Hume i t i s t h a t 
philosopher's occasional rema/ks about " f e e l i n g " . 
These are to be found not only i n the Dialogues 
but also i n Hume's Appendix to hi s Trea t i s e of Human Hature. 
There Hume expresses doubts about some aspects of h i s views, 
presented i n the body of the T r e a t i s e , on the subject of 
personal i d e n t i t y : i . e . h i s celebrated "bundle theory" of 
the mind (Hume ( T ) , Bk I , Part IV, >'5ec. V I ) . This i s a 
theory t h a t Ramsey castigates f o r pretending t h a t " * I ' and 
'he' are l o g i c a l l y interchangeable" ( ? I 66) . I n the 
Appendix Hume rehearses the arguments i n favour of such a 
theory, reasoning t h a t : 
when we t a l k of s e l f or substance, we must 
have an idea annex'd t o these terms, 
otherwise they are altogether u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , 
Bvery idea i s de r i v ' d from preceding 
impressionsj and we have no impression of 
s e l f or substance, as something simple and 
i n d i v i d u a l , ',.re have, t h e r e f o r e , no idea 
of them i n tha t sense, (Hume (T) 633) 
V/hen T tu r n my r e f l e x i o n on myself, I ne^er can 
nerceive t h i s s e l f without some one or more 
percent!ons; nor nan I ever nerceive anv t h i n g 
but the ne-rcentinns. 'Tis the composition of these, 
t h e r e f o r e , which forms the s e l f , ( i b i ^ . 6 3 4 ) 
So f a r , so good: the s e l f i s simnlv a bundle nf 
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d.i s t i n c t -oercentions „ But when Hume ponders f u r t h e r on 
"the x i r i n c i D l e of connexion which binds them together" he 
can only confess; 
no connexions among d i s t i n c t existences are 
ev«r discoverable by human understanding 
We onlv f e e l a onnn°xinn or determination 
of the thought, to pass from one ob.iect to 
another. I t f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the 
thousht alone f i n d s personal i d e n t i t v . v/hen 
r e f l e c t i n g on the t r a i n of r>ast nerceintions„ 
that compose a mind, the ideas of them are 
f e l t t n be connected together, and n a t u r a l l v 
introduce each other, ( i b i d . 635) 
Ramsey seizes on t h i s . "Peeling" he argues i s something 
"perceptually odd" that cannot be described i n terms of ideas 
and impressions? i t relates t o an "odd s i t u a t i o n " i n which 
a sense of personal i d e n t i t y breaks i n on us ( c f . PF 335). 
As we survey a t r a i n of p a r t i c u l a r perceptions there i s a 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e (PD 127; of. RSCS 4 2 ) 1 8 . Ramsey r e c a l l s 
G i l b e r t Ryle's comments on the ambiguous l o g i c of the word 
" f e e l i n g " . Ryle notes that " f e e l i n g " can have an o b j e c t i v e 
reference, s i g n i f y i n g a perception - "we f e e l things w i t h 
our hands, l i p s tongues and knees" (Ryle (CI/l) 229). But 
sometimes the word " f e e l i n g " has a reference only to the 
subject: here i t i s a questionnotof'feeling X", but of "having 
a s c e r t a i n sort o f ] f e e l i n g " ( i b i d . 229, ? ? l ) . 
Ramsey commentLs: " i t i s t h i s verv p e c u l i a r i t y about the 
loa^o of 'feeling 1' which makes the word f i t so w e l l what i s 
being urged as something which i s both subjective and o b j e c t i v 
(SEI 202); "feeling,.,can never be less than a 'subject-
object f e e l i n g 1 " (U-FI.IG Draft 5/24). Here, v i a Ryle, Hume's 
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" f e e l i n g " i s brought i n t o l i n e w i t h t h a t of '.Whitehead and 
r e l a t e d also to the " f e e l i n g " ( i n a somewhat modified form) 
of Bradley and Schleiermacher (<V. 202, U-PWG (3) 11/9/201 , 
U-WWG g r a f t 3/24-5/25). Thus even Hume's empiricism ends up, 
i n Ramsey's hands, l e a v i n g room f o r - indeed demanding -
some sort of subject - object awareness or disclosure. 
(E) Contemporary B; i p i r i c i s m 
I f eighteenth century empiricism i s broader than 
i t sometimes appears, what of the contemporary scene? Ramsey 
assesses the two mcjor elements w i t h i n contemporary empiricism 
as £ r. i n t e r e s t i n meaning and a concern w i t h language 
( c f . C: jiasjaim ., CTL 2/;9), both of them d e r i v i n g from the 
pioneer work of Roore and i l u s s e l l . The l a t e r development of 
empiricism i n t h i s century f a l l s i n t o two stages: 
( i ) l o g i c a l P o s i t i v s n 
Ramsey admits t h a t here s t l a s t we have found 
"narrow empiricism" pure and simple. The immediate forerunner 
of l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m , however, the Wi t t g e n s t e i n of the ?ractatus 
was more l i b e r a l . He tended to view the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i n c i p l e 
i t s e l f as a piece of "useful nonsense" and allowed"a mystical 
f r i n g e t o h i s experience" (CCP 254; cfJCEI76-177,CPCP 4 8 ) . 
Indeed, Ramsey has spoken of a disclosure as something which 
came "close to what W i t t g e n s t e i n c a l l e d 'wonder at the 
existence of the world' " (U-BBC cf . 1124 and Wit t g e n s t e i n 
(T) 0.432=7, PP.149-151). 
But the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m which developed under 
the i n f l u e n c e of Wittgenstein's e a r l y thought was much 
more r e s t r i c t i v e . The p o s i t i v i s t s followed W i t t g e n s t e i n i n 
adopting a more l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t a t e d v e r s i o n of empiricism 
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than t h a t given, f o r example, by Hume. And on combining 
a l o g i c a l analysis of meaning w i t h an e m p i r i c i s t theory 
of knowledge, they concluded t h a t the meaning of every 
genuine statement was completely expressible by means of 
observation statements alone. Thus, f o r them, a p r o p o s i t i o n 
had meaning i f and only i f sense experience was s u f f i c i e n t 
19 
to decide i t s t r u t h . Thus l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m proclaimed 
a veto "on ::,ost of e t h i c s , almost a l l metaphysics and 
c e r t a i n l y a l l theology - f o r i n various ways t h e i r assertions 
claimed to go beyond sense experence" (CPCF <q-«). 
( i i ) T'ne Later Broadening of Contemporary B: n i r i c i s n 
ho theology could survive under the r u l e of the 
l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t c . ' but l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m i t s e l f was 
s h o r t - l i v e d , f o r i t contained w i t h i n i t s e l f from the s t a r t 
20 
the seeds of i t s own d e s t r u c t i o n . Post-war B r i t i s h 
empiricism therefore enjoyed "a broadening and a mellowing" 
(CPCF 49) which can s t i l l be discerned i n the movement today, 
M a n i f e s t l y the work of the l a t e r B i t t g e n s t e i n i s of primary 
importance here, and the l a t e r Ramsey was at l a s t ' able to 
appreciate i t ! By 1972 Ramsey was ready to wax prophetic 
on the subjects 
B*e may regard ".Jit t gens te i n , I suggest, as he 
who represents the development of l o g i c a l 
empiricism over some t h i r t y years, as,in the 
providence of God, the Cyrus of our time.(CP 29) 
The features of '..ittgenstein's philosophy which were 
taken up i n l a t e r empiricist:, " i t s concern w i t h language 
and i t s i n t e r e s t i n the concrete "(CBCB 51), ere Ramsey's 
own concerns i n doing p h i l o s o p h i c a l theology, Ramsey has 
therefore been placed by some students "squarely i n the 
t r a d i t i o n of the l a t e r . / i t t g e n s t e i n " ( G i l l (IB.) 44; c f . Richmond 43). 
Others, however.-, have chastiS'od Ramsey f o r n e i t h e r f o l l o w i n g , 
nor r e a l l y understanding, the Aasier ( c f . Cohen (LliL) 149° 
P h i l l i p s (PP'J) 133-H3). I n f a c t i t i s a mistake to over-
emphasize the inf l u e n c e on Ian Ramsey of ..'ittgenstein's l a t e r 
thought, Ramsey saw '..'ittgenstein as an archetypal "broadener" 
of empiricism and he thought t h a t he could discern some 
p a r a l l e l s between '..''ittgenstein's thought and his own 
( c f . \:G 11, PPI.iT 165), but otherwise he shows l i t t l e dependence 
on the o t h e r 1 a work. He nay be an h e i r , but he i s not a 
d i s c i p l e , 
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The phase of l o g i cal empiricism i n i t i a t e d by 
'..ittgenstein's "conversion" displays i t s e l f , as f a r as 
Ramsey i s concerned, i n three main ways (cf.CPCP 51-52, 
T3CF 220). There i s a renewed i n t e r e s t i n what i s 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y personal (evidenced by the work of Ryle, 
2 ? 
Strawson, Hampshire, Ayer e t c , ) . " There i s an acceptance 
of a wide range of uses f o r language, i n p a r t i c u l a r a 
r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s performative and evaluative functions 
( c f . A u s t i n and Hare). And l a s t l y , but not of the l e a s t 
importance i n Ramsey• s eyes, there i s a r e h a b i l i t i o n of 
some form of metaphysics - a l b e i t purely " d e s c r i p t i v e " ( c i ' . 
Ijtrawson). 
At any rate t h i s type of "mellowed and chastened 
empiricism" (L."TP 541) pronounces no peremptory veto on 
metaphysics and theology (cf.CPL 244). I n such an atmosphere 
of thought a philosopher of r e l i g i o n can - and must - do h i s 
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work « I t i s c e r t a i n l y an environment g r e a t l y to oe 
pre f e r r e d to the "Hegelian parody of C h r i s t i a n i t y which once 
f l o u r i s h e d at Oxford", f o r i t serves to " [ c a l l ] the b e l i e v e r 
back to the empirical s i t u a t i o n i n which h i s b e l i e f s nre 
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rounded" ( F r o n t i e r , 5,3 (1962), p.529). And i t i s to an 
analysis of such s i t u a t i o n s of disc l o s u r e that we must now t u r n , 
3. The Mature of Disclosure 
I w i l l attempt here, as far as i t i s possible, a 
purely d e s c r i p t i v e e x p o s i t i o n of Remsey's concept of the 
disc l o s u r e , before moving on to c r i t i c i s m and evaluation. 
I t i s important t o make some attempt to separate the 
exp o s i t i o n of Ramsey's thought from c r i t i c i s m of i t , f o r 
we need to grasp the range and v a r i e t y of h i s t h i n k i n g 
before "bringing i t before the bar of the c r i t i c . Ramsey 
r a r e l y pauses to provide c a r e f u l d e f i n i t i o n s or analyses of 
the d i f f e r e n t elements of h i s epistemology; what he does 
provide i s l a v i s h i l l u s t r a t i o n . V/e should allow him, then, 
to speak f o r himself through the use he makes of c e r t a i n 
terms and the vast number of i l l u s t r a t i v e examples he 
adduces, 
(A) T r a n s i t i o n a l Period: terminology 
Ramsey's early years at Oxford formed a " t r a n s i t i o n a l 
period" during which h i s Cembridge t h i n k i n g developed i n t o 
the p o s i t i o n which i s to be found i n the well-known p u b l i c a t i o n s 
rrom Religious Language onwards. The term "disclosure" f i r s t 
appears i n Ramsey's w r i t i n g s i n tha t p a r t i c u l a r work 
(published i n 1957 5 hut based on l e c t u r e s d e l i v e r e d two years 
e a r l i e r ) . But phrases which seem to be synonymous wi t h 
"disclosure" appear e a r l i e r than t h i s and they provide a 
connecting l i n k with Ramsey's Cambridge thought, together 
with some h i n t s as to the meaning of "dis c l o s u r e " i t s e l f . 
I w i l l examine each of these i n t u r n . 
6 O -; 
( 1 ) " ^ o n - I n f e r e n t i a l Awareness" 
I n the l e c t u r e summaries from Ramsey's teaching 
at Cambridge t h i s term i s used to designate our "immediate 
awareness" of the Other which i s known i n a conative 
interchange ( o f . IT-IAi: "LiLemonts of Philosophical Theology" 
I I , 1940s,p,l). I t appears l a t e r , i n h i s inaugural l e c t u r e 
at Oxford, as a phrase denoting the f a c t t h a t i s "the 
u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of metaphysical words" (l.A 18j c f , 
ibi,d. 16, 22 - 23) . I n a handout from the early f i f t i e s 
Ramsey i s s t i l l speaking of an " a c t i v e d u a l i t y - i n - u n i t y " , 
a "fundamental awareness (heightened i n ' r e l i g i o u s experience') 
of ourselves as ( a c t i v e l y } encountering an Other", And he 
claims t h a t we are " n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l l y aware" 0 1 t h i s "as 
other than ourselves" (U-HA: "The Idea of God",c.1951). The 
phrase i s used even l a t e r when Ramsey claims t h a t a non-
i n f e r e n t i a l awareness i s involved i n perceptual experience 
(U-FLIG- (3) 11/12/204) . 
(i!) 1 'Self-Other Awareness'1 
Tnis i s another term used by Ramsey i n the ea r l y 
f i f t i e s . S e l f - o t h e r awareness gives r i s e to a "notion" 
( i n Berkeley's sense) of our own a c t i v i t y , along with a 
"notion of our unique r e l a t i o n to an a c t i v e other" ( i l l 7 1 ) . 
This "odd awareness which a narrov/er empiricism overlooks 
to i t s l o s s " gives us access to "a s i t u a t i o n - subject and 
object i n s t r u c t u r e " , "a f a c t which e_x Jiyj^oJJ^ej3i can 
never be described, but only evoked or induced, or shown" 
(U-TLIS 4 ) . I n the e a r l i e r papers and l e c t u r e handouts 
rrorn Ramsey's time at Oxford i t i s t h i s term t h a t i s used 
most o f t e n (see CCP 262 - 264, 269; Homage 117 - 119). 
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Self-other avrareness i s described as a " t o t a l 
awareness" and r e l a t e d to Berkeley's " r e f l e x i o n " (CL 337), 
Arrdley's " p o s i t i v e whole of f e e l i n g " ( i b i d . ) .^nd the " r e e l i n g " 
r e f e r r e d to "by "both Whitehead and Hume (SEI 201 - 202) „ 
Arguments f o r the existence of God lead to s e l f - o t h e r 
awareness (u-PAG (2) 10/70/177; U-EA: "The Idea of God", c. 1 954, 
p . 1 ) ; indeed " a l l t o p i c s i n the Ih i l o s o p h y of R e l i g i o n , , . , 
r e l a t e to what we have c a l l e d a ' s e l f - o t h e r awareness' which 
i s made prominent i n ' r e l i g i o u s experience 1 " (U-IIA: "Prayer 
and I l i r a c l e " , 1950'- s, p . l ) . 
(w) " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y Aetaphysical/Theqljagi_cal jji/buation 1 1 
I f one surveys a series of summaries from Ramsey1s 
le c t u r e s on a given topi c produced at d i f f e r e n t times, the 
changes i n terminology "become very c l e a r , Thus the handouts 
from the l e c t u r e s on Preyer and Abrade show an e v o l u t i o n 
i n which the e a r l y term " s e l f - o t h e r awareness" i s replaced 
by "metaphysical s i t u a t i o n " , and then eventually by "disclosure". 
This p a r t i c u l a r sequence also reveals t h a t Ramsey introduced 
i i i c theory of models a.nd q u a l i f i e r s , and t h e i r evocative 
f u n c t i o n , before he s t a r t e d using the term "di s c l o s u r e " . 
The " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y metaphysical ( o r t h e o l o g i c a l ) s i t u a t i o n " 
appears i n the hand-outs and published m a t e r i a l from 1955 and 
- , 2 1956; i t was men replaced by the terminology of "disclosure*' 
The metaphysical or t h e o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n , l i k e the 
di s c l o s u r e , i s "evoked" by c e r t a i n techniques which cause the 
" l i g h t to dawn" (U-:Ai: "I m m o r t a l i t y c. 1955, p. 1 • P0 265? 
RL 51 - 5 8 , 153). I n i t s t u r n i t i s also r e l a t e d to Bradley's 
immediate experience (RL 52) . 
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(B) The "Disclosure - s i t u a t i o n " 
I n h i s essay "Facts and Disclosures", which was perhaps 
his most c a r e f u l - as wel l as one of h i s l a s t - pieces of 
w r i t i n g , Ian Ramsey attempted a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the term 
"di s c l o s u r e " , a word which he had been using i n a t e c h n i c a l 
sense f o r some seventeen years: 
I do not use disclosure i n what might be c a l l e d the 
newspaper sense of d i s c l o s u r e , i„e„, a sense which 
c a r r i e s with i t overtones of in f o r m a t i o n disclosed, 
I use "disclosure" not i n r e l a t i o n to i n f o r m a t i o n , but 
to r e f e r to s i t u a t i o n s about which various 
metaphorical phrases are commonly used. Such phrases, . 
f o r example, are those which speak of s i t u a t i o n s 
"coming a l i v e " , " t a k i n g on depth", s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which "the penny drops", where we "see" but not 
wi t h eyes of f l e s h , where something " s t r i k e s us", 
where "eye meets eye" and where "hearts miss a beat". 
Such s i t u a t i o n s may be of a dramatic and spectacular 
kind f o r which a metaphor l i k e "the i c e breaks" 
i s p l a i n l y appropriate, or they may be of the kind 
where we gradually come to "see" so tha t we speak 
more a p p r o p r i a t e l y of "the l i g h t dawning". (FD 115) 
Ramsey o f t e n uses the term " d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n " 
(e.g. F I 152, CE 182), and the above quotation appears at 
f i r s t sight to i n d i c a t e t h a t such s i t u a t i o n s of disclosure 
are merely components of a person's psychological biography 
( o f . PPIViT 175). But i n "Facts and Disclosures" Ramsey goes 
on to c r i t i c i z e those who have supposed "these disclosures;„„, 
to be j u s t some pe c u l i a r kind of 'experience', thought t o be 
'subjective' " (FD 115). Ramsey himself, i n h i s work at Oxford 
and a f t e r , i s very chary indeed of using the word "experience". 
The phrase " r e l i g i o u s experience" can be found only occasionally 
i n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , and even then i t i s o f t e n hedged about by 
"scare quotes" ( c f . PG 59, TG 88). And yet nothing could be 
more evident than t h a t Ramsey's whole thesis i s devoted to a 
general analysis of "experience" and a p a r t i c u l a r analysis of 
" r e l i g i o u s experience". 
The explanation of t h i s paradox l i e s of course i n 
Ramsey's ap p r e c i a t i o n of the sor t of c r i t i c i s m s t h a t have 
teen made of the concept o.C -."ul.is.ious experience by the 
opponents, as wel l as some supporters, of theism. The moat 
harmful of these c r i t i c i s m s i s that a r e l i g i o u s experience 
i s something which i s "purely s u b j e c t i v e " ; and the phrase 
'religious experience" can be used i n a dangerously ambiguous 
way i n t h i s regard. Antony Flew has o u t l i n e d the general 
d i f f i c u l t y : 
Experience can embrace almost everything which 
i s , i n a wide sense, psychological,,„. I t has 
also a fundamental and c r u c i a l ambiguity,., 
b e t w e e n , f i r s t , the sense i n which i t r e f e r s 
only to what the subject i s undergoing and, 
second, a sense i n which i t implies t h a t there 
must be an actual object as w e l l . (Flew (GP) 125-126, 
c f . Helm (VB) 151) 
Ramsey never t i r e s of s t r e s s i n g , as indeed he must, that h i s 
category of " di s c l o s u r e " i s intended to safeguard the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of experience i n general and r e l i g i o u s experience 
i n p a r t i c u l a r ( c f . CPL 249, PA 179). His concern i s w i t h 
"what i s o b j e c t i v e l y disclosed" (ITR Smart 109; cf.DCCD 12) , 
i o r "disclosures are not a matter of warm f e e l i n g s i n s i d e . . . 
They do i n f a c t r e l a t e t o a c o n f r o n t a t i o n of a c e r t a i n k i n d " 
BP I I 203) . Thus: "'..'hen we appeal to 'cosmic disclosures' 
we are not j u s t t a l k i n g about ourselves, nor merely of our 
own 'experience' " (TG 87) . I n the end a l l o b j e c t i v e 
reference, and only o b j e c t i v e reference, arises i n a 
disclosure (PD 119 - 122, liDA 61 - 62) . 
However i f Ramsey does understand that the problem of 
o b j e c t i v i t y i s the c e n t r a l issue i n r e l i g i o u s epistemology, 
and i f he has constructed h i s oxin disclosure-epistemology 
i n a conscious attempt to defend r e l i g i o n against the charge 
of being simply s u b j e c t i v e , why does he speak of disclosures 
as s i t u a t i o n s i n the way that he does? The answer seems to 
he t h a t , despite the "bi o g r a p h i c a l " and "psychological" 
language quoted above, Ramsey thought t h a t the use of the 
word " s i t u a t i o n " i t s e l f served to safeguard the ob j e c t i v e 
reference i n a way t h a t the word "experience" d i d not. I n 
a l e t t e r t o >/.?. Zuurdeeg, Ramsey wrote: 
instead of speaking of an I-o t h e r awareness I 
much p r e f e r now to speak of a " s i t u a t i o n " 
making i t much more evident t h a t here i s 
something which i s subject-object i n s t r u c t u r e , 
which i s both s u b j e c t i v e l y and o b j e c t i v e l y 
more than "what's seen, heard, touched etc." 
(U-ITR ,,'FZ 2) 
But our question now reappears i n a d i f f e r e n t form: V/hy 
should Ramsey t h i n k that the word " s i t u a t i o n " makes t h i s 
"more evident"? I can only assume t h a t i t i s because i t i s 
possible to speak of such a s i t u a t i o n as somehow i t s e l f 
" containing" both the subject and the object of the awareness, 
whereas t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y i s not open to us i n regard t o 
"awareness" or "experience". Thus i t would seem very odd 
to say of my sonse experience of t h i s t a b l e , or my moral 
experience of my duty, that such experiences "contained" the 
tabl e or my duty. But i f I t a l k instead of "the s i t u a t i o n 
i n which I see the t a b l e " or "the s i t u a t i o n i n which I 
discern my duty", then: 
(a) such s i t u a t i o n s can be s p e c i f i e d o b j e c t i v e l y ( " I was over 
there by the door l o o k i n g i n t o the room'etc.); and 
(b) i t now makes some sense to say tha t the t a b l e , and even 
my duty, i s a p a r t of the whole s i t u a t i o n , 
The s h i f t seems almost t o be a piece of l i n g u i s t i c s l e i g h t -
of-hand? f o r t a l k about " s i t u a t i o n s " concentrates a t t e n t i o n 
on my " p o s i t i o n " or "circumstances" and takes i t away from 
my "experience" or "awareness". And i t i s , of course, w i t h 
regard to the l a t t e r t h a t the problems a r i s e . Thus an 
examination of "my ( p u t a t i v e ) awareness of an ob j e c t i v e X" 
i s replaced by an examination of "the s i t u a t i o n i n which I 
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am ( p u t a t i v e l y ) aware of X", And i n the l a t t e r case i t i s 
much more easy to s l i p over i n t o speaking simply of "the 
s i t u a t i o n i n v;hich I am aware of X", Such a " s i t u a t i o n " 
now comprises: (a) myself as aware; and 
(b) X, the object of my awareness. 
The above analysis may appear r a t h e r f a r - f e t c h e d 
but i t does seem to be supported by the great m a j o r i t y of 
cases i n which Ramsey discusses s i t u a t i o n s of d i s c l o s u r e , 
"e w r i t e s : "•..'hat the r e l i g i o u s man clcims i s one s i t u a t i o n 
which i s both what i s seen and more than what i s seen" 
( C P L 245; c f . PP...'! 172), "a s i t u a t i o n not r e s t r i c t e d to 
the 'observables' of sense experience" ( P I 11 - 12; 
c f . i b i d . 114) . Such a s i t u a t i o n i s "perceptual and more" 
(FLL 385 c f . 3 4 6 ) , "a disclosure s i t u a t i o n comprising 'what 
i s seen and more' " ( P R 216), This i s a f a c t which contains 
both empirical f a c t s and meta-empirical f a c t s i n what might 
together be c a l l e d a "disclosed f a c t " . Rrmsey prefers to 
spe-k of " s i t u a t i o n s " r a t h e r than " f a c t s " ( c f . RL59, HG 211); 
but t h i s i s p a r t l y because f a c t s ore u s u a l l y token as the 
" f a c t s and features of the world around us" (PD 133? c f . 
ER 155)> whereas r e l i g i o n points to f a c t s which - while 
i n c l u d i n g empirical f a c t s - transcend them (l.IDA 60) , The 
t r a n s e m p i r i c a l (meta-empirical) element cannot be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y 
described, f o r t h a t would be to make i t an empirical f a c t . 
I t i s r a t h e r the " s o r t of f a c t " ( I T R Smart 111; cf.C? 34, 
iu)A 6l - 6 2 ) that i s known i n an " e m p i r i c a l l y odd" s i t u a t i o n 
which i s " 'natters of f a c t ' and more" ( R B 190; c f . P L 102), 
But i f we are seeking a " f a c t u a l " basis f o r r e l i g i o u s 
and metaphysical b e l i e f s i t i s to such d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s , 
or "odd empirical f a c t s " (TL 3 5 c f . SiJ p.assig^.), t h a t appeal 
must be made (FI 125, EL 171). A passage i n a l e t t e r from 
which I have already quoted sums up Hamsey's p o s i t i o n w e l l : 
C h r i s t i a n f a c t s are not supernatural i n the sense 
of being e n t i r e l y " n o n - s c i e n t i f i c " , or, s t i l l 
worse, as being what's seen, heard, touched etc, 
but i n "another world"..,.,. 
The C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i s supernatural i n the sense 
tha t i t i s founded on c e r t a i n f a c t s or " s i t u a t i o n s " 
f o r which s c i e n t i f i c language i s not adequate 
currency. Such s i t u a t i o n s p l a i n l y contain whrt's 
seen, heard, touched etc., but the claim i s t h r t 
they contain more as w e l l 
" ( U - I L ' H y.;i) 
Thus, f o r Ramsey, a disclosure i s a s i t u a t i o n , a f>. c t , which 
comprises or contains ( or "incorporates": "~DA 60) empirical 
f a c t together w i t h a transcendent "more". I t i s only 
beeruse there are such s i t u a t i o n s t h a t metaphysics and 
theology can get s t a r t e d . 
To t a l k i n t h i s manner i s to concentrate a t t e n t i o n 
on oniolog,/ r a t h e r than epistemology. The whole point of 
Ramsey's ana l y s i s , however, i s t h a t i t involves an appeal 
"to s i t u a t i o n s which are experienced" (RL 27, emphasis added), 
re:.ioe the d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n nay be t r e a t e d not only i n 
terns of whr?t i s disclosed, but -also i n terms of the wry i n 
which i t i s dioclossd: i . e . i n terms of our awareness or 
experience, A disclosure a f t e r a l l i s "r. s i t u a t i o n , , , to 
which a l l of us hove access i n on odd awareness" (U-TT.-IH 4 ) , 
Rar.'.ssy occasionally t r e a t s " s i t u a t i o n " as synonymous w i t h 
"experience" (e.g. TG 87) and commentators usually equate 
the two terms (Cohen (iRi:) 6, Erre (LLG) 139, T i l l e y (Thesis) 
108 - . 4 2 ) . Tut R ensey's more c a r e f u l statements r e f e r t o 
s i t u a t i o n s i n j./hi_ch wo have an experience: " s i t u a t i o n s . , , , 
where we 'see' but not w i t h eyes of f l e s h " (?D 115; cf,i<T 13) 
6 ? ' 
For tan s i t u a t i o n i s a category which i s wider than the 
awareness i t contains, and the category i s made even wider 
wl.en Rcncsy w r i t e s of "the Kind of s i t u a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of r e l i g i o n " as one of "discernment - commitment" or 
"discernment - response" (R.L 49 & 1295 c f , i b i d . ch.I passim ,0CR 2, 
PS 211. DCCD 10 - 11). 
(0) Disclosure, Discernment, Commitment 
I n a d d i t i o n t o the meaning of "disclosure" given 
i n the previous s e c t i o n where a disclosure was defined as a 
c e r t a i n type of s i t u a t i o n (as i n FD 115) Ramsey also 'writes 
more generally of disc l o s u r e as (an act, or event, or process 
o f ) r e v e l a t i o n ( o f , RL79, CP 34, TL 4, ATI 19, PA 196, 
Arte E r i t 602 e t c . ) . This i s c l e a r l y more i n l i n e w i t h the 
everyday use of the word, and i t s cognate verb "to disclose", 
The word "disclosure", then, may be used to denote a s i t u a t i o n 
( o r f a c t ) : we may designate t h i s sense of the term " d i s c l o s u r e " 1. 
I t may also be used, however, to denote the actual element 
of (mediated) r e v e l a t i o n which gives r i s e t o that s i t u a t i o n ; 
anc we :..ay designate t h i s sense of the term " d i s c l o s u r e " 2, 
"Disclosure" 1 thus s p e c i f i e s an odd f a c t or s i t u a t i o n 
comprising empirical f a c t s and "more", "Disclosure" 2, on the 
other hand, s p e c i f i e s the event - the "making known" or 
"exposing to view" - whereby the "more" i s revealed through 
the empirical f a c t s . I n t h i s l a t t e r sense " d i s c l o s u r e " i s 
a c o r r e l a t i v e term to "discernment": we discern or see the 
"more" as i t discloses i t s e l f or reveals i t s e l f to us. 
I t would appear prima f a c i e t h a t Ramsey uses the 
terms "disclosure" ( i n the sense of "disclosure" 2 ) and 
i2 
"discernment" synonymously?; and t h i s i s maintained, f o r example, 
by B r a i t h w a i t e ( ( U J R ) 250), Gaskin ( 1 3 1 ) L Schnetzer ( 6 1 ) . 
C e r t a i n l y Ramsey sometimes uses the two words interchangeably 
( c f , RL 23 C: 24) ; but i f discernment i s the c o r r e l a t e of a 
disclosure t h i s i s surely permissible. I n general, however, 
Ramsey does not here depart from normal usage which may be 
summarised as f o l l o w s : 
( i ) "discern ment" (noun) = i n s i g h t , perception 
("to d i s c e r n " ( t r a n s i t i v e verb) = to perceive c l e a r l y ) 
( i i ) " disclosure" (noun) = r e v e l a t i o n 
26 
("to disclose" ( t r a n s i t i v e verb) = to make known, reveal) 
Thus v/e discern and have discernments: but disclosures 
"nappen to us" as something i s disclosed _to us (or - as 
Ramsey prefers t o put i t - discloses i t s e l f to us). 
The word "discern ment" does not occur very o f t e n 
i n Ramsey's w r i t i n g s , despite i t s importance, (Once more perhaps 
t h i s i s because he wishes to use language that stresses 
the o b j e c t i v e nature of r e l i g i o u s c o g n i t i o n , language t h a t -
u n l i k e the word "discernment" - begs the question of the 
r e a l i t y of the r e l i g i o u s o b j e c t . ) "Discernment" i s p a r a l l e l e d 
by " r e l i g i o u s i n s i g h t " , " v i s i o n " (RL 20) and "awareness" 
(RL 'dQ), The basis of r e l i g i o n i s described as a "transcendent 
discernment" (OCR 2; c f . RL 15) , a " f u l l e r discernment" 
(RL 18), "a deeper v i s i o n " which goes beyond the objects of 
perception, "Such 'seeing* ", Ramsey w r i t e s , " i s the 
c o r r e l a t e of a d i s c l o s u r e " (...JGC 163)5 i ^ i s ' a response to 
a dis c l o s u r e " (CD 3)5 G i l l describes i t as "the subj e c t i v e 
aspect of a dis c l o s u r e " ( G i l l (IR) 5 2 ) . 
The f o l l o w i n g diagram summarises the elements w i t h i n 
the d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n , w i t h the terminology t h a t Ramsey 
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use.o of them: 
"DioCLosu:;;] - SIADAAAIOIT" (= "DISCLOJUII::" 1 ) 
S e l f : 
( I ) 
Aedium: 
/|V "D I O C A E T M A T " 
( i n s i g h t , i n t u i t i o n ) (- (response) » 
(of discernment/ ^ ' 
disclosure) p 
Cthe 
I I A I C A L CD J ' •nr • 
• UBJDCT' 
O '.. - .• -6' 
Aof•discernpeiit 
w ( = ' Subject /of.' 
disclosure):" 1/' 
(" • - 1 : A . I C A A 
O A J A C T / A T ATT) 
ATA.: This diagram cannot adequately incorporate the important 
" s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e " - the disclosure of the s e l f to i t s e l f -
i'or i n t h i s c:se the object of discernment i s not an Other, 
out the Self, 
Tiie Air gran may help to c l a r i f y Rrmsey's d i f f e r e n t uses of 
the t e r n _ai_scloG_ure: 
( l ) "Disclosure" 1 = (a) A ^itu.atio_n i n which "the penny drops", 
(^disclosure-situation; we "see" etc, ( i . e . a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which there i s ciiscernment) 
= ( b) A jdi±iia.t_Lon comprising e m p i r i c r l f r e t s 
ano (a meta-empirical) "more", 
= (c) A s i t u a t i o n of discernment-commitment. 
7 c 
(<0 "Disclosure" 2 = A mediated, r e v e l a t i o n of a meta-enpirical 
"more" through the em p i r i c a l (or 
l i n g u i s t i c ) elements of the s i t u a t i o n . 
As Donald Evans has noted, Ramsey sometimes uses the 
words "God" and " I " to r e f e r t o ohjjaj^ahles and rore (e.g.: 
ILL30, 2.3 191, ? I 100)- i . e . to r e f e r both t o the empirical 
element and to the "more" th a t i s disclosed through i t , Evans 
argues t h a t i t i s "usually most appropriate t o i n t e r p r e t 
Ramsey as using ' I ' and 'God1 to r e f e r t o the 'more* 
considered as d i s t i n c t from observables" (Evans (IETG) 1 3 5 ) ^ . 
1/nen Ramse;, uses such words to r e f e r to observables - and -
core i t nay be because he i s t h i n k i n g of the disclosures of 
God and I i n the sense of "dis c l o s u r e " 1. For to claim i n 
th a t sense th a t "God i s disclosed" would be to say tha t we 
know the transcendent God i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t includes but 
goes beyond, observables. Thus God i s "given" i n such a 
disclosure as observables and more, Evans' comment reveals 
h i s own preference f o r t a k i n g disclosure i n the sense of 
"di s c l o s u r e " 2 - where what i s disclosed i s the "more", 
disclosed through observables, He i s surely r i g h t t o 
concentrate on t h i s second use, f o r i t points more c l e a r l y 
to the d i s t i n c t i v e nature of di s c l o s u r e , whose c o r r e l a t i v e 
discernment i s an act of i n t u i t i o n mediated through but going 
beyond observablos, "Disclosure" 2 i s a r e v e l a t i o n of the 
meta-empirical through an empirical medium; the empirical 
medium i t s e l f i s given i n ordinary sense experience and not 
by the transcendent discernment^. I s h a l l myself use the 
term "disclosure" s o l e l y i n the sense of "di s c l o s u r e " 2; 
the connotation of "disclosure" 1 w i l l be covered by r e f e r r i n g 
to " d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s " or " s i t u a t i o n s of disc l o s u r e " . 
7? 
A preliminary note on the element of commitment i n 
the d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n might he relevant here, Ramsey 
contends th a t "a f u l l e r discernment which embraces 'objects 
of sense 1 and more, evokes and i s f u l f i l l e d i n a response, 
a commitment" (RB 191), For r e l i g i o n i s not a matter merely 
of transcendent i n s i g h t or i n t e l l e c t u a l a.ssent' b e l i e f i n 
God i s "a c o n v i c t i o n , a commitment" (RFA 32) . Ramsey 
argue3 t h a t moral commitment also has a disclosure basis: the 
whole of eth i c s being undergirded by a basic disclosure of 
value and moral claim ( c f . I.IJGC 162 - 163, ITL 394, AacQ, 113). 
The response of commitment i s l i k e t h a t of a musician "who,., 
i n keen devotion gives himself t o the p l a y i n g of J~a musical 
score], responding to the disclosure which i t has evoked" 
(TL 12)„ C h r i s t i a n commitment i s such a response, a 
devotion matching the disclosure of God i n Christ (RAT 34) . 
(D) I n t u i t i o n and Revelation 
D i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s may be described i n 
psychological language. I n such s i t u a t i o n s "our hearts 
miss a beat", "we come a l i v e " , and so o.n ( c f , AD 115, RL 19)* 
R am s e y c omm e nt s: 
c e r t a i n l y a l l r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n s may be said t o be 
a matter f o r psychology since they are obviously 
owned by and experienced by r e l i g i o u s men, But 
th a t i s as tr u e as i t i s t r i v i a l and unimportant, 
C e r t a i n l y I am appealing t o s i t u a t i o n s of which 
we may a l l become aware, But tha t does not make 
them "su b j e c t i v e " , . (RL 24) . 
a l l these s i t u a t i o n s . . . when they occur, have 
a n o^ijective reference and are, as a l l s i t u a t i o n s , 
J^ i^ Ldil2-^ £^ii&Pi ^ n s t r u c t u r e , "/hen s i t u a t i o n s 
"come a l i v e " , or the "ice breaks", there i s 
ob j e c t i v e "depth" i n these s i t u a t i o n s along 
w i t h and alongside any sub j e c t i v e changes.(ibid. 20) 
The d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i s not j u s t a psychological category, 
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s o r t of phrases r e g u l a r l y used i n popular speech f o r a 
s i t u a t i o n of " i n t u i t i o n " ( c f . I-'O 264). 
Kamsey himself claims t h a t a disclosure involves 
an act of i n t u i t i o n , or immediate ( i . e . non i n f e r e n t i a l ) 
i n s i g h t . C learly the l o g i c of the term " i n t u i t i o n " i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t i t should he t r e a t e d as a synonym f o r "discernment" 
(the verb "to i n t u i t " being a p a r a l l e l of the verb "to 
d i s c e r n " ) , however Ramsey of t e n r e f e r s t o the disclosure 
i t s e l f as an i n t u i t i o n (RSP 87, HSCS 6, 12, CPCP 54) . E i t h e r 
t h i s i s simply a misuse of language, or i t nay be the.t here 
(liPiSJL ^  115) Ramsey does sometimes use the word "dis c l o s u r e " 
to r e f e r t o what i s disclosed (and the v;ord " i n t u i t i o n " 
to r e f e r to what i s i n t u i t e d ) . On these grounds "dis c l o s u r e " 
could also be equated w i t h "discernment" f o r what i s 
disclosed i s the same as what i s discerned. I n any case 
Ramsey also w r i t e s of the discernment as an i n t u i t i o n 
(e.g. AC 73)» and t h i s usage w i l l be followed here. 
I t i s then the discernment, the awareness component 
of a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n , that i s n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l ( l i 21) -
and i n tha t 3 e n s e immediate (PD 11Q, 132) and d i r e c t ( E m c 
2 -1 
3 r i t . 602) , Ramsey argues th a t "with what i s disclosed we 
a r e ' d i r e c t l y acquainted' i n the d i s c l o s u r e " ( i l H 265; c f . FD 1 
So the basic element i n a disclosure i s not an i n f e r e n t i a l 
step, not even a step i n an argument from analogy ( c f , T'DA 16 
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I t i s an a l o g i c a l awareness i n v o l v i n g "a l o g i c a l leap" 
(TL 10) . 
I f Ramsey takes " i n t u i t i o n " as a synonym f o r h i s 
"discernment", he also t r e a t s h i s "disclosure" as synonymous 
v.ith 'revelation",, Tne "more" a c t i v e l y reveals i t s e l f t o us; 
i t i s not simply passively i n t u i t e d : 
a cosmic disclosure reveals something of 
whose existence we are aware p r e c i s e l y 
because we are aware of bei_ng confronted, 
Indeed we speak of a disclosure p r e c i s e l y 
when we acknowledge such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , 
something d e c l a r i n g i t s e l f t o us, something 
r e l a t i v e l y a c t i v e when we are r e l a t i v e l y 
passive, ( T G 07 - 80; of. OCR 2 ) 
Tne o b j e c t i v i t y of d i s c l o s u r e , Ramsey claims, i s p r e c i s e l y 
"the o b j e c t i v i t y of 'what declares i t s e l f t o us" (l.LDA 61 § CD ti8). 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t the occurrence of a 
disclosure cannot be guaranteed (RSCii 92, CALCE 95, CD 68, 
RL 129): a l l the em p i r i c a l c r i t e r i a . , a l l the elements of the 
disclosure medium, may be present - but the penny s t i l l may 
not "drop". I n the f i e l d of r e l i g i o n , of course, " t h i s i s 
only what has been meant by religious people when they have 
claimed t h a t the ' i n i t i a t i v e ' i n any 'disclosure' or 
• r e v e l a t i o n ' must come from Cod"*(?.L 79, c f , RL 1 8 9 ) 5 : \ 
(E) The Transcendence of Disclosures 
h d i s c l o s u r e , f o r Ramsey, i s fundamentally a 
transcendent disclosure. This i s expressed i n several ways:-
( i ) The "more" tha t i s disclosed i s transcendent; i t goes beyond -
i s more than - what i s e m p i r i c a l l y given. I n a s e l f -
disclosure we know ourselves as transcending our public 
behaviour ( c f , KG 208 - 209), and t h i s always accompanies 
our awareness of "some 'transcendent* other as w e l l , which 
i s l i k e w i s e transcendent i n being more than what pub l i c 
language speaks o f " ( l ; , I 99 ) . But i t i s my transcendent 3 e l f 
("what I am beyond the,.,ideas of sensation, which are given 
by d e s c r i p t i v e discourse,.. when I am d i s t i n c t i v e l y a c t i v e " ) 
which i s " t h e paradigm of transcendence" (BPPJI.I 1 8 ) . 
The " t r a n s c e n d e n t o b j e c t " of our discernment may 
be o f r.iany d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , but t h e most i m p o r t a n t examples 
are: a moral c h a l l e n g e ( P I 6 1 ) , a n o t h e r person, and God ( P I 9 9 ) ^ 
The o b j e c t s o f such discernments are c l e a r l y " r e l i g i o u s " or 
" m e t a p h y s i c a l " , f o r "whatever t r a n s c e n d s the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l 
i s a ' r e l i g i o u s ' t o p i c " (R3C3 6 4 ) , and: " i n so f a r as j j L t } 
i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e o b c e r v a b l e s around which i t a r i s e s 
i t i s i n t h a t sense m e t a p h y s i c a l " (iTL 339)« But Ramsey's 
wide spectrum o f d i s c l o s u r e examples i n d i c a t e s t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e 
may be t r a n s c e n d e n t i f t h e "more" goes beyond what i s d i r e c t l y 
g i v e n i n a l e s s obvious sense, Thus a d i s c l o s u r e o f an 
i n v a r i a n t , a g e s t a l t , or a p a t t e r n , h a r d l y r e v e a l s a 
t r a n s c e n d e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l "more" i n t h e way t h a t a s e l f -
d i s c l o s u r e o r a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e does. But t h e r e i s s t i l l 
some r e v e l a t i o n of a "more" i n these s i t u a t i o n s , f o r t h e 
g e s t a l t a,nd t h e p a t t e r n are "more t h a n " t h e dots or l i n e s 
on t h e paper ( c f . RL 23 - 24 , P I 93 - 9 4 ) . T h i s f e a t u r e 
of Ramsey's work, t o g e t h e r w i t h h i s l a t e r arguments t o t h e 
e f f e c t t h a t a l l experience i s d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d , n e c e s s i t a t e 
our making a d i s t i n c t i o n between d i f f e r e n t t ypes of d i s c l o s u r e . 
Such a d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l be based i n p a r t on the "degree o f 
transcendence" o f t h e i r o b j e c t s (c±'„ b e l o w ) . 
( i i ) Ramsey a l s o speaks of a d i s c l o s u r e " S i t u a t i o n as 
t r a n s c e n d i n g - g o i n g beyond - t h e e m p i r i c a l elements around 
which i t a r i s e s (PA 180; P I y8 - 9 9 ) . He thus p r e d i c a t e s 
transcendence o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e i n t h e sense o f " d i s c l o s u r e " 1s 
"a s i t u a t i o n which t r a n s c e n d s t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w h i l e i t 
i n c l u d e s i t " ( P I 74; o f . i b i d . 44 - 4 5 ) . The"transcendent 
c h a r a c t e r " o f a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e (CD 45) i Q f u n c t i o n o f the 
f a c t t h a t such a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n " i n c o r p o r a t e s b o t h t h e 
f a c t s and f e a t u r e s o f t h e w o r l d of o r d i n a r y experience 5 and 
something over and above those f a c t s and f e a t u r e s " (!DA6o). 
( i i i ) The r e s p o n s i v e element w i t h i n t h e d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n 
i s a l s o d e s c r i b e d as " t r a n s c e n d e n t " ( o f , P I 61 , OCR 2 ) , 
A " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ' r e l i g i o u s ' d e v o t i o n " i s "ono not exhausted 
by t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l o b j e c t s i t i n c l u d e s " ( P I 1 7 ) . 7.i i s 
"a commitment which goes beyond what i s seen" ( R B 1 8 9 ) . 
There seem t o be two aspects of commitment t h a t make i t 
" t r a n s c e n d e n t " : ( i ) t h e f a c t t h a t i t has t h e n a t u r e of "a l e a p 
o f f a i t h " , a r e a d i n g j^j/cgd v'bat i s o b s e r v a b l e t o embrace t h e 
t r a n s c e n d e n t o b j e c t ( c f . RE 1 8 9 ) ; and ( i i ) t h e f a c t t h a t 
t h e commitment i t s e l f cannot be a d e q u a t e l y d e s c r i b e d i n 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l terms ( c f . BA 404, DCCD 1 3)0 I n b o t h cases^ 
i t may be argued, t h e "transcendence" i n v o l v e d i s of a v e r y 
l i m i t e d n a t u r e : i t i s by no means "m e t a p h y s i c a l transcendence",, 
However, m e t a p h y s i c a l transcendence may be p r e d i c a t e d o f t h e 
r e s p o n s i v e commitment i n so f a r as i t i s " d e c i s i v e a c t i o n " 
i n which "we r e a l i z e our freedom". For our 'transcendent 
s u b j e c t i v i t y " i s not t o be r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e observ a b l e s o f 
our b o d i l y b e h aviour (MDA 60; cf, P I 17, 26) 
( i v ) But i t i s of course t h e "transcendent di_sc_er_nmenit'' t h a t 
i s t h e e s s e n t i a l element i n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s a t r a n s c e n d i n g i n t u i t i o n - 0 f o r m o f 
c o g n i t i o n t h a t i s mediated t h r o u g h , but goes beyond, what i s 
e m p i r i c a l l y g i v e n . I t i s hara^ey's " f u l l e r d i s c e r n m e n t " 
(HL 13, HE 1 9 1 ) „ b i n "deeper v i s i o n " (ll~2 1G3), and forms t h e 
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f o u n d a t i o n of h i s whole e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e d i f i c e „ 
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The transcendence o f the o b j e c t o f ciscernment 
ensures t h a t what a d i s c l o s u r e d i s c l o s e s w i l l u l t i m a t e l y he 
a £i££L^ J££« , J^ i e o b j e c t of discernment i s a permanent, i r r e d u c i b l e 
mystery; so Hamsey has a l l o w e d f o r a "senuine m y s t e r y i n t h e 
sense t h a t 'what t h e r e i s ' i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o o b s e r v a b l e s " 
(Fxl 2 1 0 ) . A g a i n i t i s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s e l f t h a t a f f o r d s 
the prime example: ""Jcch o f us i n h i s own s u b j e c t i v i t y has 
a paradigm o f mystery, and i t i s i r r e d u c i b l e mystery because 
the s u b j e c t w i l l never be e x h a u s t i v e l y o b j e c t i f i e d " (?L 6% 
of, LP'Ii 2 6 ) , ..'hat i s d i s c l o s e d i n a d i s c l o s u r e may t h e r e f o r e 
be.spoken o f o n l y by " t e n t a t i v e a p p r o x i m a t i o n " i n model 
language (lJ)A 2 3 ) . —o&els g i v e us a " p a r t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
of something which i n the l a s t r e s o r t eludes us" (I.HJR 263)5 
they " h e l p us t o be a r t i c u l a t e " about t h e mystery, but 
t h e y cannot g i v e us " d e t a i l e d knowledge" o f i t (U-P!] 625 
c f . 03311 9 0)0 i y a t e r ^ l i k e transccn&once, i s p r e d i c a t e d 
of b o th t h e o b j e c t o f discernment (= t h e s u b j e c t of d i s c l o s u r e ) , , 
and t h e d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i t s e l f ( c f . VI- 102, C:J 134 n . 2 4 , 
HL 62 e t c . ) , 
( F ) ghe___modium of t h e D i s c l o s u r e , an_d_j__ts_ I.Io_de_ o_f !Rvo_ca/tion 
I a n Hamsey's e p i s t e m o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g h i s r e l i g i o u s 
e p i s t o n o l o g y , i s based on t h e c o r r e l a t i v e concepts o f mediated 
d i s c l o s u r e ( r e v e l a t i o n ) and mediated discernment ( i n t u i t i o n ) . 
He w r i t e s : 
God.'s a c t i v i t y and mine always meet each o t h e r 
t h r o u g h t h e m e d i a t i o n o f observables £ofJ t h e 
s e c u l a r w o r l d . L i k e B e r k e l e y , and as a g a i n s t 
J.ialebranche, I f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o make sense 
of " d i r e c t i n s p i r a t i o n " i f t h i s i s supposed t o 
have no e m p i r i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t s whatever, (U-ITR Evans 3) 
G i l l comments t h a t i n Ramsey's viev. r: 
knowledge can n e i t h e r take place a p a r t f r o m 
t h e interaed.ie.ry f a c t o r s o f e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , 
nor lie equated w i t h these f a c t o r s ( G i l l ( T h e s i s ) 170; 
c f . ( i R ) 8? - 03) 
The mediated n a t u r e of d i s c e r n m e n t / d i s c l o s u r e i s 
i n d i c a t e d i n Ramsey's work by a v a r i e t y of p r e p o s i t i o n s . Host 
commonly Ramsey says t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e t a k e s p l a c e "around" 
i t s m e d i a t i n g element ( c f . TR 147, PA 178 - 179, "G 212, RD 1 2 2 ) ; 
but d i s c l o s u r e s are a l s o s a i d t o occur "through" (l.IDA h2, VII 102) 
or "out o f " (ESCS 15) the medium. V a r i o u s combinations of 
the s e , and o t h e r , p r e p o s i t i o n s are a l s o used. Ror example;-
" i n and t h r o u g h " (e.g. RRR 269, I'D 133)5 
" i n and around" ( e . g . I.IDA 4)5 
"from and around" ( e . g . I l l 12)5 
" t h r o u g h and around" ( e . g . RL 394, CD b ) ; 
"around and out o f " (e . g . I.UGC 163, ILIR 264)5 
"around and embraces" ( e . g . LI3-.I 14, 1 6 ) ; 
"around and i n c l u d e s " ( e . g . CE 184 n . 2 4 ) $ 
The medium o f a d i s c l o s u r e i s a l s o d e s c r i b e d as i t s " f o c u s " 
(..DA 62) o r " c e n t r e " (UP22) . 
A d i s c l o s u r e , t h e n , i s a mediated r e v e l a t i o n d i s c e r n e d 
by a form o f mediated i n t u i t i o n , RRmsey w r i t e s most Seq u e n t l y 
of d i s c l o s u r e s o c c u r r i n g around " t h i n g s " (DCCD 1 2 ) , " o b j e c t s " 
(3R I I 133), " e v e n t s " (kR 5 3 ) , " p e r c e p t i o n s " (U-Credo 2) and 
(empirical]) " i a c t s " (PD 1 3 2 ) . The p r e c i s e d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
a l l these need n o t d e t a i n us5 s u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t t h e y 
m a y . a l l be b r o a d l y c a t e g o r i s e d as " e m p i r i c a l " . I i n t e n d , 
t h e r e f o r e , t o l a b e l t h i s l a r g e c l a s s of d i s c l o s u r e s ? 
" d i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h an e m p i r i c a l medium". 
I t i s c l e a r , however, a l t h o u g h r a t h e r more s u r p r i s i n g , 
t h a t T.amsey a l s o c l a i m s t h a t d i s c l o s u r e s can occur "around" 
and " t h r o u g h " language. V;ords, phrases, sentences, n a r r a t i v e s 
and arguments may a l l act as media f o r d i s c l o s u r e s . Thus, 
f o r example, i n "Pacts and D i s c l o s u r e s " Ramsey v / r i t e s of 
d i s c l o s u r e s t h a t "occur around p h y s i c a l -oh j ect -ta_lk" (pj) 122, 
emphasis added). Elsewhere he draws a t t e n t i o n t o d i s c l o s u r e s 
"around" s i n g l e words and sentences - or whole n a r r a t i v e 
s e c t i o n s - i n t h e B i b l e (BS 51 ) ^ . These types of d i s c l o s u r e 
I w i l l l a b e l ; " d i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h a l i n g u i s t i c medium". 
There a l s o seems t o be a t h i r d t y p e of d i s c l o s u r e s 
for- Ramsey o f t e n w r i t e s of d i s c l o s u r e s which have b o t h a 
l i n g u i s t i c and an e m p i r i c a l base, here "language,,. 
t o g e t h e r w i t h a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n o f f a c t s , g i v e s r i s e t o a 
d i s c l o s u r e " (RL 118), Such d i s c l o s u r e s occur around the 
•world and language t o g e t h e r ; I s h a l l l a b e l them: " d i s c l o s u r e s 
t h r o u g h a mixed medium". 
An att e m p t villi now be made t o c l a s s i f y the examples 
o f f e r e d by Ramsey under these t h r e e headings3 i n d i c a t i n g 
a t t h e same ti m e the- ways i n wnich he b e l i e v e s such 
d i s c l o s u r e s are evoked. T h i s w i l l p r o v i d e us w i t h a broad, 
g e n e r a l survey o f t h e wide f i e l d o f Ramsey's d i s c l o s u r e s . 
( i ) P.^s_cJLj^sjires_J*}2££}iBh-^JLJS-ISjJLK^.8^,BSA^yS. 
The e m p i r i c a l elements around which d i s c l o s u r e s occur 
v a r y i n c o m p l e x i t y f r o m s i m p l e sounds and c o l o u r e d patches 
t o complex c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f p a t t e r n s of events. As examples 
of the s i m p l e s t type o f e m p i r i c a l medium we nay c i t e t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e of p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y t h r o u g h t h e sound of a w h i s t l e 
(OCR 4 , IlDCo y i ) and t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f a c o l o u r u n i v e r s a l 
t h r o u g h our e x p e r i e n c e o f c o l o u r e d patches (RD 130, ? I 106), 
But t h e u o s t fundamental k i n d o f d i s c l o s u r e t h r o u g h an 
e m p i r i c a l medium i s t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y 
or o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e t h r o u g h t h e s i g h t s , sounds, touches, 
t a s t e s and s m e l l s of sense ex p e r i e n c e (ZD 129 u passim ) . 
r i g h t 
As we p r o g r e s s i n c o m p l e x i t y / t h r o u g h t h e spectrum 
of examples we meet t h e i m p o r t a n t d i s c l o s u r e of t h e s e l f 
( t h e " I " ) which i s mediated, t h r o u g h t h e d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s 
we have o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d and o f our own body and i t s 
b e h a v i o u r (CR 182), Then t h e r e are t h e d i s c l o s u r e s we have 
of o t h e r s e l v e s t h r o u g h t h e i r o b s e r v a b l e bodies and b e h a v i o u r 
( R I 97 - 98 , 11SGS 1 4 ) , Even more i m p o r t a n t , t h e o l o g i c a l l y , 
are what Ramsey c a l l s "cosmic d i s c l o s u r e s " , Re d e f i n e s these 
as " s i t u a t i o n s where the U n i v e r s e 'comes a l i v e ' , , , i n (jthenQ 
the whole U n i v e r s e c o n f r o n t s us" (TG 8 7 ) , Such a d i s c l o s u r e 
may occur as we p r o g r e s s i v e l y "survey t h e v a s t unfathomable 
U n i v e r s e " (RSCti 5 3 ) ; Uut i t may a l s o occur around t h e s m a l l e s t 
o b j e c t o r event. Thus a f l o w e r may g i v e r i s e t o a cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e (CD &), as may a drop of dew o r a shower o f r a i n , 
a g a l e , o r a v o l c a n i c f i r e (l.ROA 3 - 4» 1 0 - 1 1 ) , Ran-made 
o b j e c t s and human events may a l s o serve as occasions o f 
d i s c l o s u r e - e,g, a symphony o r a p a i n t i n g (RRT 28) o r , more 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e events o f Jesus' l i f e (RR 4O5, RSC8 bO, 
":)A 40) and t h e phenomerathat f o l l o w e d i t - e.g. the empty 
tomb (ITR Shorten 315) and Jesus' a s c e n s i o n - d e p a r t u r e 
from h i s d i s c i p l e s (TL 21 - 2 5 ) , 
A n o t h e r type of d i s c l o s u r e t h r o u g h sense e x p e r i e n c e 
i s the d i s c l o s u r e of an i n v a r i a n t o r p a t t e r n t h a t t akes p l a c e 
around a c o l l e c t i o n o f o b j e c t s o r events, A s e r i e s o f d o t s 
nay d i s c l o s e a l i n e (liSCo 7 - 8 ) , a p a t t e r n , o r a p i c t u r e 
( F l y3 - 94> CD 5 ) . At a f u r t h e r stage t h e d i s c l o s e d p a t t e r n 
may i t s e l f a c t as a medium f o r d i s c l o s u r e ; a d i s c l o s u r e , 
perhaps, of a s c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t (RSCS 6 - 1 0 ) , o f t h e 
God of m i r a c l e s (ADA 21 - 2 2 ) , o r o f a person engaged i n 
p u r p o s e f u l b e h aviour (I.IDA 1 6 ) , 
Anon Ramsey w r i t e s of d i s c l o s u r e s around " e m p i r i c a l 
f a c t s " he i s o f t e n r e f e r r i n g t o f a c t s about p a t t e r n s of 
t h i n g s and e v e n t s , T h i s would be t r u e o f e t h i c a l and 
a e s t h e t i c d i s c l o s u r e s , where " v a l u e " o r moral " c l a i m " i s 
d i s c l o s e d around t h e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s o f an e m p i r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n ( c f . PD 131 - 132, 1.1 JGC 1 6 3 ) . Empirical s i t u a t i o n s 
a l s o g i v e r i s e t o d i s c l o s u r e s o f various concepts which a r e 
f r e q u e n t l y used i n t h e o l o g y : e.g. " i m m o r t a l i t y " (RL 52 - 5 3 ) , 
" p e r f e c t i o n " (RL 57), " u n i t y " (RL 5 4 ) , " s i m p l i c i t y " (RL 55" - 56) 
and t h e " e t e r n a l " (E passim, PD 1 3 1 ) . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o these g e n e r a l ways i n which an e m p i r i c a l 
medium can g i v e r i s e t o d i s c l o s u r e s , Ramsey o u t l i n e s two 
s p e c i f i c o p e r a t i o n s which have such an e v o c a t i v e f u n c t i o n , 
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The f i r s t o f these i s j u x t a p o s i t i o n . Two o r more " p a t t e r n s 
o f images" (OCR 3 n . 2 ) or e m p i r i c a l phenomena, ( l A.I 53) may 
t o g e t h e r g i v e r i s e t o a d i s c l o s u r e . For example a t h r e e -
d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t may be d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n j u n c t i o n 
o f our d i f f e r e n t views of i t (CCA 3, Lcck»14, TL 14 - 15)5 and 
metaphors are b o r n i n d i s c l o s u r e s a r i s i n g f r o m what Rp us ey-
es a l l s " t he t a n g e n t i a l m eeting" of two d i v e r s e c o n t e x t s ( e . g . 
" l i b r a r i e s " w i t h "powerhouses": Lli.i 5 2 ) , I t i s o f t e n t h e 
c o n t r a s t i n g n a t u r e o f the j u x t a p o s e d media, t h a t evoke t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e ! "as when l i g h t and shade g i v e 'depth* t o a p i c t u r e " 
(CD 3ut a t o t h e r times i t i s t h e is o m o r p h i c r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between t h e " c o n t e x t s " t h a t g i v e s r i s e t o a d i s c l o s u r e . Thus, 
i o r example, human p a t t e r n s o f "behaviour d i s c l o s e a " f a t h e r " 
or a " i r i e n d " . And i f t h e r e i s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p a t t e r n i n 
th e " b e h a v i o u r " o f the u n i v e r s e t h i s "cosmic p a t t e r n " v d . l l 
match o r "chime i n w i t h " the human p a t t e r n , "and 
t h e i r m a t c h i n g t h e n evokes a, cosmic d i s c l o s u r e around n a t u r a l 
events such as seed-time and h a r v e s t " (TG 8 1 ; cf. I 1 H 266, 
OCR 8 - 9 ) . Here the "human case a c t s as a c a t a l y s t f o r t h e 
cosmic case" (TG 6 ) , I n an e a r l i e r a r t i c l e Ramsey d e s c r i b e s 
two d i f f e r e n t ways i n which d i s c l o s u r e s may be generated; 
( a ) I n d i r e c t l y , when o t h e r f i n i t e d i s c l o s u r e s are 
used as c a t a l y s t . ? , . 
( b ) p ^ r e c t l ^ , as and when t h e w o r l d comes a l i v e around 
some p a t t e r n which p e r m i t s o f l i m i t l e s s 
development.(TRT 54) 
I n Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y Ramsey w r i t e s o f t h e 
c o n t r a s t between w i n t e r and s p r i n g ( w h i c h i t s e l f evokes a 
d i s c l o s u r e o f "what abides i n what changes") b e i n g brought 
'as a s o r t o f c a t a l y s t " a l o n g s i d e a case of death. Tnen 
"the w i n t e r - s p r i n g c o n t r a s t a c c e l e r a t e s and b r i n g s o f f (as 
we might say) t h e l a r g e r e v o c a t i o n , and w i t h o u t b e i n g 
n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e phenomenon of death - as i t 
would be i f we l i n k e d i t by the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s o f an 
argument from analogy" ( P I 84 5 c f , RSCS 13, BPEi: 22 , I.IBA 1 6 ) . 
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Thus, l i k e a c a t a l y s t i n a, chemical r e a c t i o n , t h e medium 
of t h e " c a t a l y t i c " d i s c l o s u r e a s s i s t s t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e 
o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e w i t h o u t b e i n g d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e 
l a t t e r " d i s c l o s u r e - r e a c t i o n " , Ramsey a l s o speaks o f "models 
b o r n i n d i s c l o s u r e s " a c t i n g as c a t a l y s t s , and he seems here 
t o be - r e f e r r i n g t o m o d e l - s i t u a t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n model-language 
(TL 53, 1343). 
Ramsey g e n e r a l l y p r e f e r s t o e x p l a i n t h e f o r c e of 
B u t l e r - l i k e " a n a l o g i e s " between the p a t t e r n s observed i n t h e 
n a t u r a l o r d e r and- t h e p a t t e r n s expected Oil the b a s i s o f 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c a t a l y t i c e f f e c t 
o f one medium o f d i s c l o s u r e upon another. There can be no 
argument by analogy here5 such an argument would be " p l a i n l y 
weak and c o n f u s e d , , . v i r t u a l l y w o r t h l e s s " ( P I 83 ; c f . LDA 16 - 1 
T h i s i s presumably because we cannot make t h e i n f e r e n c e which 
gets t h e argument s t a r t e d w i t h o u t assuming t h a t , f o r example, 
t h e d e a t h - s i t u a t i o n is_ t r u l y analogous t o t h e w i n t e r - s i t u a t i o n 
and t h e r e f o r e p r o b a b l y w i l l i t s e l f l e a d t o something 
analogous t o a s p r i n g - s i t u a t i o n . Ramsey he r e , as always, 
p r e f e r s i n t u i t i o n t o i n f e r e n c e . I f we are impressed by t h e 
s i m i l a r i t y between w i n t e r and d e a t h , t h e n t h e r e i s an 
" i n t e r l o c k i n g of p i c t u r e s " and - as "a m a t t e r o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
f a c t " - we a g a i n d i s c e r n "what abides i n what c h a n g e s " ( ? I 84 -
;7e might note t h a t t h e s e " c a t a l y t i c d i s c l o s u r e s " are 
e q u i v a l e n t t o "second o r d e r d i s c l o s u r e s " ^ but t h e l a t t e r 
term seems o n l y t o be a p p l i e d t o d i s c l o s u r e s i n a mixed 
medium (see b e l o w ) . 
The second " o p e r a t i o n " l e a d i n g t o a d i s c l o s u r e i s 
r e a l l y a more r e f i n e d v e r s i o n of j u x t a p o s i t i o n . Here a 
i&l^i-!i^.®A-J^£iSJ, °^ e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i s c o n s t r u c t e d 
( o r o b t a i n s n a t u r a l l y ) , and a d i s c l o s u r e occurs around such 
a s e r i e s . We become aware i n t h i s way o f " a c t i v i t y " o r 
"motion" when we see t h e f i n g e r of a c l o c k i n "two su c c e s s i v e 
p o s i t i o n s {V/hichJ arc s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e t o evoke a 
d i s c l o s u r e around them" (OCR 3)« S i m i l a r l y a d i s c l o s u r e 
of a c i r c l e may occur as we survey a s e r i e s of polygons 
w i t h an i n c r e a s i n g number o f s i d e s (RL 69; PO 2645 TG 9 " l ) , 
A d i s c l o s u r e of the i n v a r i a n t 7T nay a l s o be g i v e n t o us, i n 
t h i s case around a s e r i e s o f c i r c l e s o f i n c r e a s i n g d i a m e t e r 
(ODSR 24 , F I 114 - 115, RFT 26 - 2 7 ) . 
( i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s throu. gh _a A ^ f f l A ^ i J L J ^ x ^ - j j j i 
D i s c l o s u r e s "around" language a l s o t a k e many d i f f e r e n t 
forms o f v a r y i n g c o m p l e x i t y . A s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e word or 
phrase - " S i l e n c e ! " f r o m t h e schoolmaster, o r " l e t t h e r e be 
l i g h t " i r o n t h e C r e a t o r - may ope r a t e as a medium f o r d i s c l o s u r e 
(OCR 4 , 9; RSC3 y l , 93 - 9 4 ) . Through such language t h e 
school p u p i l s and t h e rea d e r s o f Genesis d i s c e r n a u t h o r i t y 
and c r e a t i v e power r e s p e c t i v e l y Remsey a l s o w r i t e s 
o f p r o p e r nouns and nicknames as media f o r d i s c l o s u r e s . 
Unxike d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , such names are a b l e t o evoke 
s i t u a t i o n s of p e r s o n a l d i s c l o s u r e . Ramsey c i t e s as examples 
from t h e B i b l e the use o f "Rary" m John 20 J~ and Jesus' 
use o f "Son of Ran" m t h e Gospels (OCR y - 10, RL 137 = 144, 
RPT 33, BS 5 0 ) , 
D i s c l o s u r e s a l s o occur, however, around l a r g e r b l o c k s 
of language. The p r a y e r s and hymns o f r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p ^ f o r 
example, o f t e n have e v o c a t i v e f u n c t i o n s - t h e i r language i s 
"used t o t a k e us i n t o , . , a moment o f s i l e n c e where God d i s c l o s e s 
h i m s e l f " (UP 2 1 ; c f , TRT 5 6 ) . Rven c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l and 
t h e o l o g i c a l arguments are seen by Ramsey as te c h n i q u e s f o r 
e v o k i n g a d i s c l o s u r e . Re c i t e s as examples c e r t a i n arguments 
f o r i m m o r t a l i t y ( P I 67 - 7<3> 8 0 ) 5 and some of t h e t h e i s t i c 
arguments (CRCP 55, BP I I 186), "Seeing the p o i n t " of j o k e s 
and p a r a b l e s s i m i l a r l y depends on our h a v i n g a d i s c l o s u r e 
around them(RL 21, CD 11 - 13, cf, RPT 2 7 ) , Thus, f o r example, 
"The purpose of a p a r a b l e i n d e e d i s t o generate a d i s c l o s u r e s 
we see i t s p o i n t when around the n a r r a t i v e t h e l i g h t dawns" 
(BS 51)« Ae nay note f u r t h e r t h a t even t h e fundamental 
d i s c l o s u r e of o b j e c t i v i t y can a r i s e around t h e medium of 
( e m p i r i c a l ) language: " t h e r e f e r e n c e o f e m p i r i c a l f a c t s . , , i s 
t o he f o u n d when d i s c l o s u r e s occur around p h y s i c a l - o b j e c t 
t a l k developed i n a c e r t a i n k i n d of way.," (PD 1 2 2 ) , 'Ramsey 
b e l i e v e s t h a t our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e meaning o f words and 
sentences i s a l s o d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d ( o f , G i l l ( i f i ) 52, RL 55"). 
J u s t as w i t h o i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h e m p i r i c a l media, 
d i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h l i n g u i s t i c media may a l s o a r i s e f r o m 
e i t h e r j u x t a p o s i t i o n or a g r aduated s c r i e s - i n t h i s case o f 
l i n g u i s t i c elements, Tne j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f two d i f f e r e n t 
languages, and e s p e c i a l l y two c o n t r a s t i n g languages, may 
evoke a d i s c l o s u r e . For? example: 
the m e t a p h o r i c a l e x p r e s s i o n "A i s B" a r i s e s 
i n a d i s c l o s u r e where languages A and B meet 
t a n g e n t i a l l y ( i u i 5 2 ) . 
t o communicate r e l i g i o n , v/e must b r i n g a l o n g s i d e 
i t s a s s e r t i o n s such o t h e r / s t o r i e s , such o t h e r 
d i s c o u r s e as a l r e a d y has d i s c l o s u r e p o i n t (OCR 115 
c f . i b i d . 1 6 ) . 
S i m i l a r l y t h e m i x i n g o f d i f f e r e n t " u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e " 
can g i v e r i s e t o d i s c l o s u r e s (RL 4 0 ) 5 and t h e " p i l i n g up" 
o f a nimber o f models - "the j o s t l i n g o f models" - may have 
the same e f f e c t (TL 10; c f , EL 1 5 4 ) . 
J u s t as i n t h e case of t h e e m p i r i c a l media, t a n g e n t i a l 
c o n t a c t may be between languages which t o some e x t e n t 
complement, " m i r r o r " o r " f i t " each o t h e r ; or i t may be 
between c o n t r a s t i n g languages, Examples of th e f i r s t type 
o f c o n t a c t i n t h e o l o g y are t o be f o u n d i n the d i s c l o s u r e s 
a r i s i n g from the j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f b i b l i c a l n a r r a t i v e s (e.g. 
o f t h e c r u c i f i x i o n ) and o t h e r language (e.g. t h e language o f 
s e l f - s a c r i f i c e s , "Good Shepherd" language) - c f , TL 14, 53« 
D i s c l o s u r e - by - c o n t r a s t o c c u r s , a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey, t h r o u g h 
t h e medium of t h e c o n t r a r y p a r a l l e l i s m o f some Hebrew P o e t r y -
as i n , e.g. Ps. 119 v. 143 (cf.CD 15"). The meaning o f a 
word ( i . e . i t s sense) i s a l s o o f t e n communicated by t h e 
method of c o n t r a s t s : by naming i t s o p p o s i t e u n t i l " the penny 
drops", Thus the concept o f " u n i t y " may be d i s c l o s e d by 
t a l k i n g o f d i v e r s i t y (many pi e c e s o f f u r n i t u r e - but one 
room; many rooms - but one house; many houses - but one c i t y 
e t c . ) : see RL 54« 
D i s c l o s u r e by a g raduated s e r i e s i s a l s o t o be 
f o u n d i n t h e medium of language. Such a s e r i e s i s i n v o l v e d , 
Ramsey c l a i m s , i n the B i b l i c a l account of C r e a t i o n w i t h 
i t s s u ccession of days a n d " c r e a t i v e a c t s (RSCS 9 2 ) , I t i s 
t o be found most c l e a r l y , however, i n examples o f i n f i n i t e 
s e r i e s i n mathematics. Kere t h e l i n g u i s t i c medium i s t h e 
"language" o f a r i t h m e t i c o r a l g e b r a . Ramsey's w r i t i n g s 
a r e peppered w i t h such m a t h e m a t i c a l examples; i n p a r t i c u l a r : 
The Sum t o I n f i n i t y o f a G e o m e t r i c a l P r o g r e s s i o n : 
r- n • 2 3 4 n - 1 Take t h e p r o g r e s s i o n , a, a r , ar , a r , ar . . . . . . . a r 
T h i s s e r i e s i s convergent when - 1<r< 1 (e.g. when a=1 and 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ \. *\ 
r=;3-, t h e s e r i e s i s : 1 , -2-, 3 * . . . = 1 , z, 4 , t " , ife- . . ) • 
A c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey, t h e I n f i n i t e Sum of such an i n f i n i t e 
c onvergent s e r i e s i s g i v e n i n a d i s c l o s u r e (RL ^9 - 6 0 , 
69 - 70 , PO 2 6 4 ) . I t i s ~ £ ( i n t h i s example j^r = 2)V 
The L i m i t of a S e r i e s : 
The I n f i n i t e Sum (above) i s a " l i m i t " ( i n mathematical t e r m s ) ; 
f o r t h e successive sums of t h e p r o g r e s s i o n t e n d towards 
t h e l i m i t of 2. The above example may t h e r e f o r e be t r e a t e d 
n + 1 , 
as a s p e c i f i c example of a d i s c l o s u r e of a " l i m i t " . 
"On s u r v e y i n g t h i s s u c c e s s i o n of terms jjaumsj we may w e l l 
have a d i s c l o s u r e w i t h which i s a s s o c i a t e d t h e i n t e g e r ' 2 ' , 
'Ae d i s c e r n a l i m i t , and we p o s i t '2 .*. Here i s a, d i s c l o s u r e 
which a r i s e s "by t h e p o r t r a y a l o f some graduated s e r i e s " 
(OCR 4 ) . 
N. ., , . . \ P r, t+ 100 101 
S i m i l a r l y w i t h a s e r i e s : -y» §» f» W ' ' ''"oT T02 ' " 
t h e l i m i t (=1 ) i s d i s c l o s e d as we survey t h e sequence 
or terms ( F I 120 - 122, FD 115, TL 8 ) 4 2 . Such examples may 
he . p a r a l l e l e d , Ramsey c l a i m s , i n t h e language o f t h e B i b l e 
and C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y . Thus t h e r e p e a t e d s a c r i f i c e s o f 
th e Old Testament r e f e r r e d t o i n Hebrews c h a p t e r 10 c u l m i n a t e 
i n t h e " l i m i t i n g case" of t h e Cross (OCR c f . CD 4 5 ) , and 
never e n d i n g s t o r i e s about t h e f u t u r e have t h e i r d i s c l o s e d 
" l i m i t " i n t h e Aschaton (FJ 1 2 4 ) . 
However f o r Ramsey's major a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s l i m i t 
t h e o r y we must r e t u r n t o h i s t r e a t m e n t of i n d i v i d u a l phrases, 
Ramsey's t h e o r y of models and q u a l i f i e r s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d 
i n g r e o t e r d e t a i l l a t e r , but a p r e l i m i n a r y s k e t c h must be 
i n t r o d u c e d a t t h i s p o i n t . A "model" i n Ramsey's t e r m i n o l o g y 
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i s a " s i t u a t i o n w i t h which we are f a m i l i a r , and which can 
be used f o r reaching a n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n w i t h which v/e are not 
so f a m i l i a r " (RL 61 ; c f , 1.1: 1 1 , I.uIR 2 6 4 ) . Thus mundane 
models are used i n t h e o l o g y i n an at t e m p t t o r e p r e s e n t t h e 
tr a n s c e n d e n t God, To do t h i s , o f course, they cannot be 
a p p l i e d l i t e r a l l y ( u n i v o c a l l y ) but must be q u a l i f i e d i n 
c e r t a i n ways. T h i s i s achieved i n t h e main by t h e use of 
' ' q u a l i f i e r s " which "have the l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r of d i r e c t i v e s , 
i m p e r a t i v e s , o p e r a t o r s " (CD '?")' t hey p r e s c r i b e a s p e c i a l 
RxBk. B„ ' ,,utuu pooS itxpcceq suoxq-sriqxs J O sq.ooCqo i^oT^xduo 
j o s e u o s a su i o (°oq.a MpooS Aj-QA-N s ,,poo1 A'xpx'eq,,) sesu.iqd 
jo S8TJC8S B SB .ISUITO uay^q. oq A'trm ssxoios s r q j j 'xapom 
aqq. uo J O T J T X ' B T U ) aqq j o u o t r a j a d o aqq. AaL paq.u..iauG.C 'sVyljfa's' 
aqq. i o t ? j UT GT P S A . X O A . U T ranxpaia aqq quqq S"['J8A.OJ: ajcaq UOATT 
STSA'x'au's aqq. q.TMI 'urnxpaui oxqaxriSuxx U qDnojcqq ss^nsoxocxp 
oq oq. rasas Asqq . 'O'T 'aQuxiT'u'ex uqSnoaqq,, QUO „puvio.X'3„ 
.ruooo oq. nees exapou: paxjxx~r\b « u ssxnsoTosxji snq£ 
"(1-9 'Zi) n P Q < ^ ° I S A - 3 P -^issaxptto 3J.v sui-xaq. sq.x su 6cquxod 
sax.xos qxioSxaAUOo a q. T U T J U T U B q o j q / . v oq q-^qq. sn uo u/.vup ^ B U I 
aaaqq s_j q.snC 'pua quoqq.Xi.v padoxeAap sx sx9P°"-i J ° uaoq.q.'3d 
aqq. e~a O S B I S auos q.t3 mooo Aw: qoxq;.v a x u s o x o s T p oxrasoo aqq. ux 
papsa/vaj: sx pof)„ 'uaqq. «A-SL\ sxqq. u j *(o2, T<±) sdoiOA.ep ssiMas 
q.uqq S B posoxosxp sx puc s e i i a s aqq. j o q.xaxx aqq S2 caAjras 
( lpoo3 A'xaqxuxjuj/ssaupoo-^ aq.xuxjuj_,| .xaqqjy; 'saxxas a q. TUT T U T 
ui3 j o nxaq q.s^x sqq. % B 8A . T O : J I B i 9 . i a u uso a;.v ^ o j ' s o u i o s '3 
qorts j o uixaq. qsux sqq- q-ou sx (po~o) upooQ A'xsq.TUTjui,, ( 9 Ti uT,) 
' (2,9 T I ' J 0 ) ' " " " " ' n (una) pooS 
(13) „ ° ' ' ' „ (uum) pooD A 'X- IT 'S . I (B) J |, (ui3Ui) pooS A"xp.xuiT ('e),, 
!ZU'S8U8S 
qxtaSvxaAUOO aq.xuxjLix ur; j o quqq oq q.uax"EATriba sx ooueiiba'- sxqq. 
j o ox3ox e i [ - 'sxopovi -q r iB j o aouanbas u ^'uxdoxa A.ap 'sseupooS 
uBunq j o x 9 P 0 U i 9*13- uo s^xon , , A X 3 T - T U T J U T n ^axjxx'ano o q j 'A'zix 
.'juxiioxioj Qqq u i ,,ssaupoo-o aqxuxjux,, S B po-g sasoxosip ,,pooS 
^X 3-"!-T I TTJ UTM T8Poai-PcTJTT"'-''1^"5 8VA ' ° '[--wcxa otto ospq. o;, 
*(L9 - 09 nSTapoin j o ATTY- I t3 
' * ' SuTq.u9.zo 6 seSuuqo axqq^s qq.x.-'. pus puo qnoqq.T,'A sxspou; 
iCTclTq.raa„ - . . T T B , , • ..q-oej^Od,, 5 ..oqxuxjux,, 'S»e - ca:axjxTU-af-. 
'(29 I I I ) ispoui aqq. Suxdoxo^-op j o (-h-i. : n U 0T^ i : ) 3' xTPu) f"'3'-'-
good nan" e t c . ) , where the phrases o f the f o r m e r s e r i e s c l e a r l y 
r e f e r t o t h e o b j e c t s o r s i t u a t i o n s ( o r images o r p i c t u r e s o f 
such s i t u a t i o n s : c f , RL 68) of t h e l a t t e r s e r i e s . I t may 
"be b e t t e r t o t h i n k o f o u a l i f i e d - m o d e l d i s c l o s u r e s cs 
d i s c l o s u r e s e i t h e r t h r o u g h an e m p i r i c a l medium o r t h r o u g h 
a mixed medium. However, we s h o u l d n o te t h a t m o d e l - s i t u a t i o n s 
are o f t e n t r e a t e d by Ramsey as " s t o r i e s " r f t h e r t h a n f a c t s 
( e . g . RL52, 62, 68 , OESR 18 - 19, U-PE 16, VA 1 0 0 ) : we " t e l l 
t a l e s u n t i l t h e penny drops and t h e v i s i o n comes" (FP 338). 
Indeed one of t h e " p i c t u r e ! } of b e h a v i o u r " (RL 6dt c f . U-FE 15) 
t h a t t h e model-word "good" p r o v i d e s i n v o l v e s a f i c t i o n a l 
c h a r a c t e r (Long John S i l v e r - RL 6 7 ) . A p o i n t I s h a l l be 
s t r e s s i n g l a t e r i s t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e a r i s i n g around an 
a c t u a l l y observed s t a t e of a f f a i r s ( o r a s e r i e s o f such 
a c t u a l s t a t e s of a f f a i r s p r o v i d e d by our memory o r i m a g i n a t i o n ) 
i s i n a d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r y f r o m a d i s c l o s u r e mediated t h r o u g h , 
o r evoked by, language which may o r may not r e f e r t o e m p i r i c a l 
f a c t . The d i s c l o s u r e s evoked by q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s do seem 
t o f a l l i n t o t h e l a t t e r , l e s s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y e m p i r i c a l , 
c a t e g o r y , 
( 1 i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h a mixed medium 
Ramsey w r i t e s f r e q u e n t l y o f d i s c l o s u r e s a r i s i n g f r o m 
" l a n g u a g e . . . t o g e t h e r w i t h a c e r t a i n p a t t e r a o f f a c t s . . " (RL 118). 
Such d i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h a mixed medium may occur i n many ways, 
but c l e a r l y t h e y csn a l l be subsumed, under t h e g e n e r a l heading 
t h a t we have met t w i c e a l r e a d y -- d i s c l o s u r e s by ^ ^ t a g o s j ^ ^ o n . 
I n t h i s case the d i s c l o s u r e a r i s e s f r o m a j u x t a p o s i t i o n of 
language and t h e w o r l d . 
\!e may t a k e Ramsey's a n a l y s i s of" prophecy as an 
example of a d i s c l o s u r e t h r o u g h a mixed medium. He argues 
t h a t t h e p o i n t o f a prophecy i s g i v e n i n a d i s c l o s u r e which 
a r i s e s around t h e p r o p h e t i c u t t e r a n c e t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t s . There may he a m a t c h i n g of p r o p h e t i c 
language and c u r r e n t f a c t s (as i n ITathan's prophecy to David: 
c f , R L 113) or t h e two may c o n t r a s t (as i n I s a i a h ' s prophecy 
o f peace and harmony i n a w o r l d of v i o l e n c e and. d i s o r d e r : 
c f . RL 1 1 4 ) . Both t y p e s o f j u x t a p o s i t i o n may g i v e r i s e 
t o a d i s c l o s u r e i n which we "see t h e p o i n t " of t h e prophet^s 
words. 
But t h e a c t u a l " f u l f i l m e n t " of t h e prophecy 
i nvo 1 v es a f u r t h e r , 1' se_co_nd . 0 r j ^ e r j k ^ di^scj^qsjire: i . e . 
"a d i s c l o s u r e evoked "by language which had a l r e a d y a 
d i s c l o s u r e base" (CD 4 6 n.1; c f . TL 16, F I 147) -
P r o p h e t i c language i s f u l f i l l e d , Ramsey c l a i m s , i f "when 
brought a l o n g s i d e some s i t u a t i o n or o t h e r , i t generates a 
second d i s c l o s u r e " (RL 117 )9 "when the language used o f o_ne 
d i s c l o s u r e i s used i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r f a c t s f o r a second 
d i s c l o s u r e " ( i b i d . 119)« For example, t h e language of 
1 A—16 
I s a - 7 L' ( t h e Emmanuel prophecy) o r i g i n a l l y gave r i s e t o 
a d i s c l o s u r e o f hope and promise when brought a l o n g s i d e t h e 
d e p r e s s i n g s i t u a t i o n i n Jerusalem d u r i n g the S y r o - H p h r a i m i t e 
a t t a c k on t h e c i t y i n 734 B.C. But when t h i s language was 
j u x t a p o s e d w i t h t h e l a t e r s i t u a t i o n o f t h e b i r t h o f Jesus, 
i t evoked a f u r t h e r d i s c l o s u r e : a d i s c l o s u r e o f hope i n 
Jesus as "God w i t h us" (RL 117 - 119). Aga i n t h e f i r s t 
d i s c l o s u r e . o r r a t h e r the l i n g u i s t i c element i n i t s medium, 
serves as a c a t a l y s t f o r t h e f u r t h e r d i s c l o s u r e . 
Tine e v o k i n g of a tfisclooure t h r o u g h language b e i n g 
"brought a l o n g s i d e , . „fects" (RL 119) i s "something l i k e 
v/hat occurs •'/hen two s i m i l a r p i c t u r e s - not e x a c t l y t h e same 
to he sure - on b e i n g "brought t o g e t h e r are suddenly seen i n 
a -lev; dimension, and t h e 'whole c i r c u m s t a n c e comes t o l i f e " 
(OBcSR 52 ) , Here i t i s a " t a n g e n t i a l c o n t a c t " between language 
and f a c t which s i v e s r i s e t o t h e d i s c l o s u r e (TL 1 5 ) . I t 
i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t Ramsey argues, i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e c r u c i f i x i o n , t h a t f o r most e a r l y 
C h r i s t i a n s t h e f a c t o f t h e c r u c i f i x i o n would not on i t s own 
have g i v e n r i s e t o any d i s c l o s u r e . I t i s o n l y when t h i s f a c t 
i s combined w i t h language, w i t h a t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
( i n t e r n s , perhaps, o f t h e S u f f e r i n g G e r v r n t o r the Remnant 
o f I s r a e l t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e occurs (CD 29 - 35)„ 
* * * 
I t might appear t h a t t h e r e i s y e t a n o t h e r c a t e g o r y 
o f disclosure-medium; i , e 0 o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s , G i l l argues 
t h a t r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e s are "mediated t h r o u g h " o t h e r 
d i s c l o s u r e s themselves ( o f . G i l l ( i R ) 5 9 ) . p r e s e n t s evidence 
from, a group d i j o u s s i o n i n Oxford t o s u p p o r t t h i s t h e s i s , 
c l a i m i n g t h a t Remsey t h e r e " d e f i n e d a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e i n 
terms of d i s c e r n i n g something about t o t a l r e a l i t y t h r o u g h 
the d i s c l o s u r e s o f every day l i f e " ( i j o i j l ) , I n t h e f i n a l 
c h a p t e r of I.~odels f o r D i v i n e A c t i v i t y , Rrrasey contends t h a t 
t h e o t h e r n e s s o f God nay be d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h dream images, 
p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , d u t y and the moral lav;, and persons, Then 
he adds; "but o n l y when dream images, p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , d u t y , 
persons become each the f o c u s o f a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e " ( I L D A 6 2 ) , 
Zow cm iiamsey's view some o f these media are themselves 
knovm i n a d i s c l o s u r e : t h i s c e r t a i n l y a p p l i e s t o persons and 
d u t y , hut i t a l s o a p p l i e s - i n h i s l a t e s t t h o u g h t - t o p h y s i c a l 
o b j e c t s as w e l l . 3o Jn a sense we have here d i s c l o s u r e s 
Mediated t h r o u g h o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s ; a.nd, indeed, i f p h y s i c a l 
o b j e c t i v i t y i t s e l f i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n t h e n the " e m p i r i c a l 
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medium" o f d i s c l o s u r e s i s i t s e l f d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d ' . 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n shows t h e n e c e s s i t y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
between d i s c l o s u r e s o f d i f f e r i n g s t a t u s , nn a t t e n p t a t which 
i s wade below. V.exe I s h a l l o n l y make one p o i n t about "the 
"medium" of d i s c l o s u r e s . I t seems p o s s i b l e i n t a l k i n g of 
mediated d i s c l o s u r e s t o adopt e i t h e r of two d i f f e r e n t 
languages: 
(a ) a language t h a t speaks o f a d i s c l o s u r e / d i s c e r n m e n t as b e i n g 
mediated t h r o u g h o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s / d i s c e r n m e n t s :e,g, " r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e i s mediated t h r o u g h sense experience "5 o r 
( b ) a language t h a t speaks o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e / d i s c e r n m e n t as 
b e i n g mediated t h r o u g h t h e s u b j e c t of o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s or 
t h e o b j e c t o f o t h e r discernments: e.g. " r e l i g i o u s e xperience 
i s mediated t h r o u g h p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s " . 
The l a t t e r usage would seem t o be t h e more common i n g e n e r a l 
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speech and i n itarnsey's work"1", and i s perhaps the l e s s 
c o n f u s i n g o f t h e two, I s h a l l f o l l o w i t i n t h i s essay. Here, 
t h e n , t h e medium of a d i s c l o s u r e i s t a k e n t o be an e m p i r i c a l 
or l i n g u i s t i c " e n t i t y " , r a t h e r t h a n a r e v e l a t i o n ( d i s c l o s u r e ) 
o r an awareness ( d i s c e r n m e n t ) , 
4- 4- 4-
Yet how s i g n i f i c a n t , i n any case, are the above 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between d i s c l o s u r e s t h r o u g h e m p i r i c a l , l i n g u i s t i c , 
and mixed media? I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e way Ramsey s l i d e s 
uncorcernedly between t h e d i f f e r e n t types i n d i c a t e s t h a t he 
does not wish t o draw these d i s t i n c t i o n s a t a l l . Thus 
Ramsey discusses d i s c l o s u r e s o c c u r r i n g t h r o u g h t h e t a n g e n t i a l 
m eeting of two " c o n t e x t s " (lIIS 52) and t h e n goes on t o 
speak of those c o n t e x t s b o t h as languages and as e m p i r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n s ( c f . a l s o CFGP 5 0 ) . S i m i l a r l y , i n h i s r e f e r e n c e s 
t o " p a t t e r n s " g i v i n g r i s e t o d i s c l o s u r e , t h e p a t t e r n s 
( p a t t e r n s o f human conduct or p a t t e r n s i n t h e U n i v e r s e : 
lu.Iii 266 - 267, and p a t t e r n s of images: OCR J n . 2 ) are 
e m p i r i c a l l y o b s e r v a b l e p a t t e r n s ; but one suspects t h a t 
Ramsey i s a l s o t h i n k i n g o f " p a t t e r n s " o f language. 
T h i s a m b i g u i t y does seem t o open Ramsey t o t h e c r i t i c i s m 
t h a t he does not d i s t i n g u i s h a d e q u a t e l y between e p i s t e m o l o g i c 
s i g n i f i c a n t " d i s c l o s u r e s of e n t i t i e s " and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y 
t r i v i a l " d i s c l o s u r e s o f concepts". I f t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n 
proves t o be a v a l i d one, t h e n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between d i f f e r e n t types of d i s c l o s u r e r.i-adium 
w i l l become apparent. I s h a l l argue below t h a t Ramsey's 
work i s f l a w e d by a n e g l e c t of b o t h these d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
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4 . The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f D i s c l o s u r e s 
Ramsey's c a t e g o r y of t h e d i f a c l o s u r e i s , as we have 
seen, a v e r y wide one. Indeed one of t h e c r i t i c i s m s d i r e c t e d 
a g a i n s t Ramsey's work i s t h a t t h e c a t e g o r y i s t o o widp »nd 
h i s examples of d i s c l o s u r e too d i v e r s e (e.g. Gaskin 133 - 134, 
140 - 141; T/IcClendon & Smith (IRM) 4 1 5 ) . C e r t a i n l y some 
a t t e m p t must he made t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e v a r i o u s forms 
of d i s c l o s u r e i n t h e broad "spectrum" ( A u s t i n (ffl.IP) 47) of 
examples o f f e r e d by Ramsey. Ramsey h i m s e l f a d m i t t e d , i n a 
l e t t e r t o Donald Evans, t h a t h i s examples "need b e t t e r 
o r d e r i n g " , and went on t o say how much he a p p r e c i a t e d t h e 
o r d e r i n g t h a t Evans h i m s e l f proposed (U-ITR Evans 1 ) ^ . 
V a r i o u s o t h e r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s have a l s o been suggested 
( c f 0 G i l l ( I R ) 52 - 60, McClendon & Smith (IRM) 415 - 417, 
Gaskin 131 - 1 3 2 ) . 
What f o l l o w s i s an at t e m p t a t anothe r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 
which may h e l p t o draw out some o f t h e main problems a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h Ramsev's concept of t h e d i s c l o s u r e and t o p r o v i d e a 
scheme on which t o base subsequent c r i t i c i s m . I n t h e p r e v i o u s 
s e c t i o n many of t h e examples of d i s c l o s u r e g i v e n by Ramsey 
have a l r e a d y been no t e d , a l o n g w i t h the media of such d i s c l o s u r e s 
and t h e i r mode of e v o c a t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 
however, i s based on t h e d i f f e r e n t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l o h j e c t s 
d i s c e r n e d i n these d i s c l o s u r e s . 
(A) I n t r o d u c t o r y Notes 
( i ) The major problem posed by Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n o f d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n s may be expressed as f o l l o w s : Remsey p r o v i d e s h i s 
readers with a wide v a r i e t y of examples, convinced that they 
are a l l examples of the "same thing " - i . e . a d i s c l o s u r e . 
One of h i s dominant concerns throughout h i s work seems to he 
to u n i f y apparently d i s p a r a t e phenomena under t h i s one general 
heading. As a c l a s s i f i e r , t h e r e f o r e , he seeks to subsume 
as much as p o s s i b l e under h i s newly discovered c l a s s i f i c a t o r y 
category. He thus t r e a t s " d i s c l o s u r e " not as the name of a 
p a r t i c u l a r " s p e c i e s " of experience or cognition, but as the 
name - to continue the b i o l o g i c a l metaphor - of a whole 
"phylum" i n the kingdom of experience. His major concern 
i s to i n c l u d e an ever i n c r e a s i n g number of i n d i v i d u a l s 
under t h i s broad heading. He i s much l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n any 
s u b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the examples of d i s c l o s u r e . 
We s h a l l see that Ramsey b e l i e v e s he has very good 
reasons f o r s t r e s s i n g the u n i t y of d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s , 
at the expense of t h e i r d i v e r s i t y . However, he does on 
occasions use language which suggests that he i s aware 
of t h a t d i v e r s i t y and does not wish to b l u r the r e a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s that are to be found among d i s c l o s u r e s . F o r 
example he w r i t e s of c e r t a i n everyday s i t u a t i o n s of discernment-
d i s c l o s u r e as "providing p a r a l l e l s to r e l i g i o u s discernment" 
(RL 19, ci". CD 5 ) . Such s i t u a t i o n s are "reminiscent of" 
(RL 18) r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s , and serve to 
provide "some i n t i m a t i o n " of them (CELCE 95) . But i t must 
be admitted that h i s more usual treatment of the d i f f e r e n t 
examples of d i s c l o s u r e does tend to b l u r the d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between them, and h i s epistemology leads i nexorably i n 
that d i r e c t i o n . 
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( i i ) Me have seen that a d i s c l o s u r e always r e v e a l s something 
"more" i n a s i t u a t i o n than i t s spatio-temporal elements, "but 
t h a t these "mores" are of widely d i f f e r i n g types. Those who 
c r i t i c i z e Ramsey f o r not defending the transcendent nature 
of the object of r e l i g i o u s experience often do so because they 
assume tha t the "more" of a d i s c l o s u r e i s always j u s t a "more" 
which i s a r e o r g a n i s a t i o n i n thought of what i s e m p i r i c a l l y 
given? that no discernment gives knowledge of anything 
over and above observables (c i * . N i c h o l l s 330 - 333» M i t c h e l l 
(JRB) 66, Smart (ICBC) 33 - 34, D a l f e r t h 46) . 
Ramsey has c e r t a i n l y opened himself up to such 
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by h i s frequent use of examples of 
d i s c l o s u r e i n which we become aware of a p a t t e r n or g e s t a l t , 
or recognize an e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t . Ramsey's language i s 
often taken as implying that such d i s c l o s u r e s are on the 
same l e v e l as d i s c l o s u r e s that r e v e a l , f o r example, moral 
o b l i g a t i o n , other s e l v e s or God. But i n these l a t t e r 
cases, although "no new 'observable f a c t ' i s presented',' 
what i s d i s c l o s e d around the observable f a c t s of the 
s i t u a t i o n i s "some challenge, some claim, something other 
than o u r s e l v e s " (MMR 264). Such an object of discernment 
may not be a new observable f a c t , but i t i s a new non-
observable, transcendent, f a c t . But when we recognize, i n 
a d i s c l o s u r e , a "goldfinch" by i t s plumage (PA 173 - 179)? 
or d i s c e r n a "cube" from twelve l i n e s drawn on a blackboard 
(RL 23 - 24) , the "mores" that are d i s c l o s e d are not 
"transcendent" to the same extent. Tney may be "more than" 
what i s present i n peroeption at a c e r t a i n moment, as a 
gestalt-whole i s more than the sum of i t s p a r t s . But they 
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are not of a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s from the 
em p i r i c a l f a c t s and f e a t u r e s which d i s c l o s e i t . I n other 
y/ords there i s transcendence and transcendence ( c f . Woods (T) 
61) , and to speak i n the same "breath of "God transcending 
the world" and a "cube transcending twelve s t r a i g h t l i n e s " 
i s simply confusing. As Ramsey him s e l f notes, "metaphysics, 
to be genuine metaphysics, must have reference to more than 
observables, i . e . to the unseen" (PPMT 162). A "metaphysical 
d i s c l o s u r e " , t h e n , i s one i n which the transcendent object 
transcends not j u s t these p a r t i c u l a r spatio-temporal 
e n t i t i e s but a l l such e n t i t i e s . Cubes "transcend" l i n e s 
but they remain no more than e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s 0 
( i i i ) Of the d i f f e r e n t types of "more" that d i s c l o s u r e s 
discloses, "the d i s c l o s u r e of I i s c l e a r l y i n a category of 
i t s own, Ramsey uses the term " s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e " , somewhat 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c a l l y , to r e f e r to the r e v e l a t i o n to an 
i n d i v i d u a l of h i s own s u b j e c t i v i t y or s e l f - i d e n t i t y „ 
I t i s a d i s c l o s u r e of the s e l f to i t s s e l f , i n which we 
"become aware of our s u b j e c t i v e transcendence. T h i s s e l f -
d i s c l o s u r e always occurs along with the d i s c l o s u r e of an 
o b j e c t i v e other. Ramsey claims t h a t ! 
not only may d e s c r i p t i v e events be so ordered 
as to d i s c l o s e a s u b j e c t which while i t 
i n c l u d e s them a l s o transcends them, but that 
d e s c r i p t i v e events may a l s o be ordered so as 
to d i s c l o s e an object which i n a s i m i l a r s o r t 
of way transcends them o b j e c t i v e l y and that 
indeed such a transcendent object i s a s s o c i a t e d 
with a transcendent s u b j e c t i n the same s i t u a t i o n . 
We become aware of i t as we become aware of 
ou r s e l v e s . (BP I 42 - 43; of. MDA 60 - 6 1 , 
CD 08, TL 6, MMR 264, CPCF 53, RSCS 43, 
PPMT 168 - 169, FD 120) 
s u b j e c t i v e transoendence occurs along with 
and as a response to o b j e c t i v e transcendence 
(U-HA: " I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Philosophy of Religion." 
1963, p.55 cf.CD « 8 , F I 99, TL 6, PG 67) . 
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I t should "be noted at t h i s point that Ramsey speaks 
of " o b j e c t i v i t y " only i n regard to d i s c l o s u r e s of the Other,, 
The I d i s c l o s e d i n a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i s c e r t a i n l y r e a l , but 
i t i s a r e a l subject and not a r e a l o b j e c t , and t h e r e f o r e 
i s not " o b j e c t i v e " . For Ramsey something i s " o b j e c t i v e " 
f o r a person i f i t i s "some t h i n g 'out there', and so other 
than h i m s e l f " (BP I I 198). He d e c l a r e s ; " I would never c a l l 
myself an 'object', though I am c e r t a i n l y an ' i n d i v i d u a l per= 
s i s t i n g through time' " ( i b i d . 199). In. an e a r l i e r note i n 
the same a r t i c l e Ramsey agrees with a c r i t i c (JoW. Cole) 
that the Ramseyan language of " s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e " ( d i s c l o s u r e 
of my s u b j e c t i v i t y ^ ) and of " a e l f awareness" (awareness of 
my personal i d e n t i t y ) sometimes takes a grammatical form 
that suggests that the s u b j e c t becomes an object. But, 
Ramsey contends, such a s s e r t i o n s "can be given a l o g i c a l 
form which avoids the blunder", l o r there must be a 
" s u b j e c t i v e awareness which i s not of an 'object' " ( i b i d . 
183 n„£). T h i s awareness must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a 
d i s c l o s u r e of o b j e c t i v e transcendence. Thus, f o r example, 
"God i s o b j e c t i v e i n the sense i n which, when we are aware 
of o u r s e l v e s , we are always aware of something other than 
oursdves" (VM 101). Ramsey t h e r e f o r e " r e s t r i c t s the term 
[ b b j e c t i v e Q to the 'more' which i s e x t e r n a l , other than I " 
(Evans (IRTG) 129). 
( i v ) Before t u r n i n g to s e c t i o n (B) - "The types of D i s c l o s u r e " 
- a f u r t h e r explanatory word i s required, A number of s p e c i e s 
of d i s c l o s u r e are d i s c u s s e d there i n some d e t a i l and 
c r i t i c a l l y analysed, while others are passed over b r i e f l y . 
Tne reasons f o r t h i s are th a t ( a ) c e r t a i n of the types of 
d i s c l o s u r e (e.g. mathematical d i s c l o s u r e s and d i s c l o s u r e s of 
u n i v e r s a l s ) can only "be s e n s i b l y analysed when a survey of 
the whole spectrum of d i s c l o s u r e s has put us i n a p o s i t i o n 
to examine c r i t i c a l l y some fundamental i s s u e s ; and 
(b) some other d i s c l o s u r e s (e.g. d i s c l o s u r e s of S e l f and God) 
are so important that they demand separate treatment i n 
greater d e t a i l l a t e r . 
(B) The Types of D i s c l o s u r e - I 
( i ) D i s c l o s u r e s of Meaning 
Examples have a l r e a d y been given of Ramseyan 
d i s c l o s u r e s i n which we "aee" the meanings of words and 
sentences and "grasp" the point of arguments, jo k e s , poems, 
and parables. I n these cases what i s d i s c l o s e d i s "more 
than" the l i n g u i s t i c medium through which the d i s c l o s u r e 
occurs, i n so f a r as the meaning (sense) of a language i s 
always "more than" the sounds or marks of that language i n 
i t s spoken or w r i t t e n form,, 
Ramsey s i m i l a r l y regards c e r t a i n i n v a r i a n t concepts 
of s c i e n t i f i c theory as reveeLed i n d i s c l o s u r e s ( c f , RSCS 26); i 
ne claims that we come to understand them through an i n t u i t i o n . 
Tnese i n c l u d e the concepts of mass (RSCS 9 - "the p o i n t -
p a r t i c l e ( i b i d . ) , "molecular magnets" ( i b i d . 65)» f o r c e and 
energy (MM 62) and the atom (RU 56 - 57). I s h a l l argue 
l a t e r that the meaning of such t h e o l o g i c a l concepts as 
immutability, i m p a s s i b i l i t y , u n i t y , s i m p l i c i t y , p e r f e c t i o n 
and e t e r n i t y are a l s o d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n ( c f , RL 50 - 58, E 
43 = 44) . I n such cases the concept i s d i s c l o s e d as we survey 
a scene or " t e l l a t a l e " , or juxtapose c o n t r a s t i n g images 
or i d e a s . Tnus, f o r example, the concept of p e r f e c t i o n might 
De explained by "developing a s t o r y " about human beings of 
v a r y i n g degrees of goodness u n t i l "a s i t u a t i o n was evoked which 
somehow or other presented to us the ' p e r f e c t i o n 1 xhe ' i d e a l ' 
a f t e r which we were s e a r c h i n g . . . u n t i l a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
d i s c l o s u r e was evoked" (RL 58)» We may a l s o consider 
Ramsey's many examples of d i s c l o s u r e s through models and 
q u a l i f i e r s (c±*„ RL 61 - 79 e t c . ) as f a l l i n g under t h i s 
heading i f they are indeed, as I s h a l l argue, d i s c l o s u r e s 
of l i m i t i n g concepts such as " f i r s t cause" or ' i n f i n i t e 
49 
goodness" . 
Other examples of d i s c l o s u r e s i n which we "see 
the point of something" (RFT 27) are to he found i n Ramsey's 
d i s c u s s i o n of the d i s c l o s u r e s of (the meaning of) agape 
(RE 4O4), d i s c l o s u r e s of the key-concepts of d i s c i p l i n e s 
such as h i s t o r y and s o c i a l s t u d i e s (CD 8, MM 62) , and 
d i s c l o s u r e s of the meaning of such words and phrases as 
"the U n i v e r s i t y " (U-FMG B59/172), "personal hacking" (PRPI 
349) and "the Truth" ( P I 73) . 
( i i ) Mathematical D i s c l o s u r e s 
I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Ramsey, as a mathematician 
turned p h i l o s o p h i c a l theologian, f i n d s examples of d i s c l o s u r e s 
i n the f i e l d of mathematics. I n t u i t i v e "mathematical i n s i g h t " 
(RL 69, OCR 15) i s e s s e n t i a l f o r a l l r e a l understanding of 
geometry and a r i t h m e t i c and t h i s i s , of course, a c o r r e l a t e 
of a "mathematical d i s c l o s u r e " . We can recognize two 
sub-categories; 
( a ) Geometrical d i s c l o s u r e s ; 
Ramsey i s very fond of u s i n g the examples of the 
d i s c l o s u r e of "a c i r c l e " around a s e r i e s of r e g u l a r polygons 
with an i n c r e a s i n g number of s i d e s ( c f . RL 69, TG 91, PO 264) 
and the d i s c l o s u r e of the i n v a r i a n t "fv around a s e r i e s of 
c i r c l e s of i n c r e a s i n g diameter ( c f . RPT 26 - 27, P I 114, 
OBSR 24). He a l s o mentions the d i s c l o s u r e of a s t r a i g h t 
l i n e , something "we cannot s t r i c t l y speaking draw" around a 
group of pencil5 , ink or chalk dots or " l i n e s " (RSCS 8 ) , 
(b) A r i t h m e t i c a l d i s c l o s u r e s ; 
We have already mentioned Ramsey's accounts of the 
d i s c l o s u r e of the l i m i t of a s e r i e s and the i n f i n i t e sum 
of a progression „ 
( i i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y 
" O b j e c t i v i t y , something other than o u r s e l v e s , an 
o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e " i s given, Ramsey claims, i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
(PD 119; c f . i b i d . 127). "Tne o b j e c t i v e reference of a 
word or phrase or a s s e r t i o n , , , i s given — s e l f - d i s c l o s e d — 
i n those d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n s to which a survey of the 
r e l e v a n t s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , or f e a t u r e s of the world, or 
c r i t e r i a l e a d s " (PA 178; c f . i b i d . 196). I t i s c l e a r from 
the context of these quotations that Ramsey i s r e f e r r i n g to 
the o b j e c t i v i t y of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s - e m p i r i c a l " t h i n g s " 
( c f . FD 126). He i m p l i e s 9 t h e r e f o r e , t h a t even sense perception 
has an i n t u i t i v e , d i s c l o s u r e b a s i s . Thus the concept of the 
d i s c l o s u r e i s fundamental throughout the whole f i e l d of 
epistemology. 
I n "Pacts and D i s c l o s u r e s " Ramsey denies that 
sense-data are d i s c l o s e d : 
What i s given immediately, what i s given 
without i n f e r e n c e , i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n . But 
i t i s not a sense-datum; i t i s r a t h e r o b j e c t i v i t y , 
something other than o u r s e l v e s , an o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e . T h i s , and t h i s alone, can be claimed 
as c e r t a i n , b a s i c , immediate, without i n f e r e n c e . . . 
(PD 119; c f . i b i d . 121) 
Sense-data, on the other hand, are " t h i n g s " (FD 122) which 
10.2 
have been introduced i n an attempt to express t h i s o b j e c t i v e 
ref e r e n c e i n languages 
What happens when philosophers sponsor sense-
datum language i s that some a s s e r t i o n s are 
taken as b a s i c i n c o r r i g i b l e accounts of the 
o b j e c t i v i t y which i s given i n a d i s c l o s u r e . 
I n t h i s way, the o b j e c t i v i t y , the o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e , and the r e l e v a n t a s s e r t i o n s are 
confounded. Tne s i g n i f i c a n c e of t a l k about 
sense-data i s t h a t i t i s r a t h e r t a l k grounded 
i n the d i s c l o s u r e of a r e f e r e n c e . Sense-
data were supposed both to give a secure 
o b j e c t i v e reference and a l s o to guarantee 
the c e r t a i n t y of a s s e r t i o n s e x p l i c a t i n g t h i s 
o b j e c t i v e r eference. But the c e r t a i n t y of 
the r e f e r e n c e only a r i s e s i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
and i s never t r a n s f e r a b l e to the a s s e r t i o n s 
themselves,(PD 121) 
Tne "raw", u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o b j e c t i v i t y given i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
cannot t h e r e f o r e be expressed i n any i n f a l l i b l e language: 
M a t e r i a l - o b j e c t language w i l l not s u f f i c e 
or we would_never have i l l u s i o n s ; sense-
datum language w i l l not s u f f i c e not only 
because there i s no sense-datum language -
R u s s e l l ' s "simple terms" are as bogus as 
anything could be - but because no one has 
ever made i t c l e a r what i s meant by a sense-
datum (FD 121) 51. 
Thus Ramsey's most mature epistemologi c a l t h i n k i n g l e a d s 
i s 
him to a p o s i t i o n which/'neither r e a l i s t nor i d e a l i s t / 
phenomenalist. For what i s d i s c l o s e d i n a d i s c l o s u r e of 
p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y i s not a m a t e r i a l object (cf.FD 121), 
nor a sense-datum ( c f . FD 120), but j u s t "something other than 
o u r s e l v e s " - o b j e c t i v i t y alone. 
I n a l a t e r part of the same paper Ramsey attempts 
to "mediate between A u s t i n and Strawson" ( i b i d . 126) i n 
t h e i r argument over " f a c t s " and " t h i n g s " ( c f . a l s o PA 177 -178). 
I n b r i e f , J.L. A u s t i n had c r i t i c i z e d Strawson f o r c l a i m i n g 
that there was a "complete d i f f e r e n c e of type" between a 
f a c t and a t h i n g (Strawson (T) 135). For F.P. Strawson a 
f a c t i s what a true statement s t a t e s ; whereas things, 
happenings e t c , are what statements are about ( i b i d . 136). 
F a c t s , t h e r e f o r e , are not " p a r t s of the world"; thi n g s , 
however, are ( i b i d . 140 - 14"0« A u s t i n ( c f , (PP) chs. 5 & 7) 
held.on the contrary that " 'Fact' was i n o r i g i n " - and may 
s t i l l be l e g i t i m a t e l y used as = "a name f o r 'something i n the 
world' " ( i b i d . 164). 
Ramsey comments; 
I am with Strawson....Faots and f e a t u r e s 
are i n the world, and of the world, but not 
i n the world as are t h i n g s . But I believe that 
Strav/son s t i l l needs to give h i s concept of 
"th i n g " f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s . I n what circumstances 
does o b j e c t i v e reference a r i s e ? I t seems to me 
that i t a r i s e s when we have a context of 
s u f f i c i e n t a rea to generate a d i s c l o s u r e and 
t h i s would be the case when we have s p e c i f i e d 
enough s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , circumstances or 
f e a t u r e s that l e a d to a d i s c l o s u r e of what 
Strawson would c a l l a " t h i n g " , a t h i n g which 
e x i s t s as the o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e of these 
f e a t u r e s , ( F D 126; c f . PA 178) 
Ramsey t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between'hatters of f a c t , the 
f a c t s and f e a t u r e s of the world around us" (FD 133)» and the 
o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e of such f a c t s . Strav/son's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between f a c t s and things i s a d i s t i n c t i o n "between ' e x i s t e n t s * 
and 'thinghood' " ( i b i d . 125), and f o r Ramsey: 
at some point or other when we t a l k i n one 
way or another about a number of such e x i s t e n t s 
there may occur a d i s c l o s u r e of " o b j e c t i v i t y " . , , 
when around the behaviour pa t t e r n s of what are 
c a l l e d bodies, and around the p h y s i c a l h i s t o r y 
of what are c a l l e d m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , an 
o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e i s d i s c l o s e d . ( F D 126) 
( i v ) R ecognition d i s c l o s u r e s 
I n h i s paper "Polanyi and J . L . A u s t i n " , Ramsey 
i n t e r p r e t s P o lanyi's concept of "comprehension" (or "understandin 
as a s p e c i e s of d i s c l o s u r e . Michael Polanyi had spoken of 
our (focal) awareness of an " e n t i t y as a whole" - a "comprehensive 
e n t i t y " or "coherent e n t i t y " - which a r i s e s out of, but i s 
d i s t i n c t from, our ( s u b s i d i a r y ) awareness of a set of 
p a r t i c u l a r s - or c l u e s •• r e l a t e d to the o b j e c t . He argued; 
V/e can recognize here two kinds of awareness. 
We are obviously aware of the object we are 
looking a t , but are aware a l s o = i n a much 
l e s s p o s i t i v e way - of a hundred d i f f e r e n t 
c l u e s which we i n t e g r a t e to the s i g h t of the 
o b j e c t . ?/hen i n t e g r a t i n g these c l u e s , we 
are attending f u l l y to the object while we 
are aware of the c l u e s themselves without 
attending to them. We are aware of them 
only as p o i n t i n g to the object we are looking 
a t . I s h a l l say that we have a s u b s i d i a r y 
awareness of the c l u e s i n t h e i r bearing on 
the object to which we are f o c a l l y attending. 
( P o l a n y i ( C l ) 86; cf.(PR) 239 - 242. (KB) 
458 - 463, (PK) 55 - 65 & passim ) " 
P o l a n y i gives as examples the p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of 
an e p i l e p t i c s e i z u r e by r e l y i n g on a multitude of c l u e s 
((PR) 239, (KB) 458), the student's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
n a t u r a l h i s t o r y specimens, and our everyday r e c o g n i t i o n of 
another person's f a c e ( ( L T I ) 4 - 5, (TD) 4 - 5). 
Ramsey himself connects t h i s a n a l y s i s with J . L . 
A u s t i n 1 s account of the r e c o g n i t i o n of a b i r d as a g o l d f i n c h 
"from i t s red head" or other f e a t u r e s ( J . L . A u s t i n (PP) 
63 - 86), and comments: 
What happens i n such ca s e s , I s h a l l suggest, 
i s that one or another f e a t u r e characterizing 
( s a y ) the head of a goldfinch, brings to mind 
a sequence of f e a t u r e s , few or many, and l e s s 
or more d i s c r i m i n a t e d , and t h a t we recognize 
the b i r d as a goldfinch when around t h i s 
sequence of f e a t u r e s a d i s c l o s u r e occurs. 
(PA 175) 
My suggestion i s that we can only speak of 
knowing a goldfinch from i t s head, i f around 
the " i n f i n i t e number of f e a t u r e s which are 
recognised, or could be picked out and 
recognieed" a d i s c l o s u r e occurs which d i s c l o s e s 
that object of which the f e a t u r e s are f e a t u r e s . 
Only then may we speak of an "object", e.g. 
a "goldfinch" being r e c o g n i z e d , ( i b i d . 179) 
Now we have already seen t h a t , f o r Ramsey, a d i s c l o s u r e 
of o b j e c t i v i t y i s a d i s c l o s u r e of "raw" o b j e c t i v i t y , a 
d i s c l o s u r e i n which we come to know c e r t a i n l y only that 
there i s something there, where we "have i n t u i t i v e c e r t a i n t y 
about something or other" (FD 129). Ramsgy argues that we 
cannot be wrong about the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h i s "something" 
but we can be wrong about our c l a s s i f i c a t i o n or d e s c r i p t i o n 
of i t , A d i s c l o s u r e of o b j e c t i v i t y becomes what we might 
c a l l a " r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e " when the o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e i s not only discerned, but d i s c e r n e d as a cat or 
a g o l d f i n c h or whatever . T h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same 
d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n , b u t now the o b j e c t i v e reference d i s c l o s e d 
i s " s p e l t out i n terms of" a c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "which 
o r g a n i s e r s ) c e r t a i n f a c t s and f e a t u r e s of the world" (FD 132). 
P o l a n y i ' s "comprehension'^ l i k e A u s t i n 1 s " r e c o g n i t i o n " , "goes 
beyond the f e a t u r e s which may be s e p a r a t e l y described" 
(PA 177)9 because those f e a t u r e s give r i s e to a d i s c l o s u r e 
of o b j e c t i v i t y . But the simple a s s e r t i o n , "Tnere i s something 
there" can be f i l l e d out by u s i n g the d e s c r i p t i v e c r i t e r i a 
( f e a t u r e s ) which served as the medium f o r the d i s c l o s u r e 
of o b j e c t i v i t y . One could then say, "There i s something 
t h e r e j i t i s an object having suoh and such f e a t u r e s ( s i z e , 
shape, colour e t c . ) ; i t i s a g o l d f i n c h " . "Goldfinch" i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , one of the l a b e l s which might be a p p l i e d to the 
something that i s d i s c l o s e d . P h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are not j u s t 
d i s c l o s e d as o b j e c t s , they are d i s c l o s e d aa o b j e c t s - of -
such - and - such - a-kind; they are recognized as c e r t a i n 
kinds of o b j e c t . 
We may note here a p a r a l l e l between Ramsey's 
d i s c l o s u r e epistemology and John Hick's epistemology of 
"experiencing - a s " . Hick'takes up'Wittgenstein's account-
of "seeing-as", developed with reference to p u z z l e - p i c t u r e s , 
and expands i t i n t o the notion of "experiencing - a s " 
( c f . Hick (RFEA) 23). He claims that " a l l experiencing... 
i s to he construed as experiencing - a s " ( i b i d . 27) , f o r a l l 
experiencing i n v o l v e s the a c t i v i t y of r e c o g n i s i n g - and 
"to recognise or i d e n t i f y i s to experience-as i n terms of a 
concept" ( i b i d . 2 5 ) 5 5 . 
I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n to Words about God. Ramsey 
himself quotes \7ittgenstein's remarks i n the P h i l o s o p h i c a l 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s on "noting an aspect" (Wittgenstein ( P i ) 
e e \ 
193 - 195 J» Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s t h i s passage as "suggesting 
that understanding a sentence i n v o l v e s much more than the 
understanding of a s t r i n g of words" (WG 9)» adding that 
Wittgenstein'a " f l a s h i n g of an aspeot on us" which "seems 
h a l f v i s u a l experience, h a l f thought" ( ( P i ) 197 6) i s an 
element i n t h i s understanding. Ramsey then adds: 
Here are suggestions which may r e c a l l f o r the 
reader the place I give to "disclosure", c l a i m i n g 
t h a t the understanding, f o r example, of many 
a s s e r t i o n s i n m o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n depends 
on t h e i r having a d i s c l o s u r e - b a s i s . (WG 11) 
Thus, although Ramsey's use of Wittgenstein's "seeing-as" i s 
ra t h e r d i f f e r e n t from Hick's, Ramsey may be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
t r e a t i n g "experiencing - a s " as a type of d i s c l o s u r e . 
Anders J e f f n e r claims that Ramsey may be understood, at l e a s t 
i n p a r t , as proposing a theory of r e l i g i o u s knowledge based 
on aur observations of ambiguous o b j e c t s , " o b j e c t s with an 
u n c e r t a i n G e s t a l t " ( J e f f n e r ( S R L ) 48 - 49) . We s h a l l note 
i n the next s e c t i o n that Ramsey does i n t e r p r e t Knowledge 
of g e s t a l t e n as dis c l o s u r e - b a s e d : the d i s c l o s u r e being a 
sp e c i e s of r e c o g n i t i o n disclosure,, 
Ramsey, l i k e H i c k , would admit t h a t when we 
exper i e n c e (see) a g o l d f i n c h we ex p e r i e n c e (see) an o b j e c t i v e 
fc>omething-or~other as a g o l d f i n c h . But t h e d i s t i n c t i o n made 
here between d i s c l o s u r e s o f o b j e c t i v i t y and r e c o g n i t i o n 
d i s c l o s u r e s would suggest t h a t Ramsey, u n l i k e H i c k , seems 
t o he w i l l i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h out an element w i t h i n e x p e r i e n c e 
i n which r e c o g n i t i o n i s not o p e r a t i v e . There a r e a number 
o f f a c t o r s , however, which appear t o b r i n g Ramsey and Hick, 
r a t h e r c l o s e r t o g e t h e r : 
( a ) H i c k d e s c r i b e s our expe r i e n c e o f an o b j e c t i v e , e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d as i t s e l f a form o f e x p e r i e n c i n g - a s . We i n t e r p r e t o ur 
sense-data, he argues, i n a r e a l i s t manner; f o r example we 
ex p e r i e n c e t h i s brown expanse as a t a b l e t o p ( c f . H i c k (AEG) 
110, (FK) 108 - 111). T h i s basic i n t e r p r e t a t i v e element i n 
p e r c e p t i o n has been c o n s t r u e d by o t h e r s as i n v o l v i n g an a c t 
o f i n t u i t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t mediated t h r o u g h o u r 
sense-data. ( c f . Owen (CKG) 125 - 128, Ewing (VR) 124 - 125). 
Our d i s c u s s i o n above would suggest t h a t Ramsey h o l d s t h a t 
when we " i n t u i t a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t " we a r e i n t e r p r e t i n g 
( d e s c r i b i n g ) our i n t u i t i o n o f raw o b j e c t i v i t y i n m a t e r i a l 
o b j e c t language. Thus a d i s c l o s u r e o f p h y s i c a l ( o b j e c t i v e , 
e x t e r n a l , s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l ) o b j e c t i v i t y i s i t s e l f a l r e a d y a 
r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e ; a d i s c l o s u r e i n which we r e c o g n i z e 
t h e "Something", t h e "Other", as a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t e n d u r i n g 
i n space. Ramsey may thus be v e r y c l o s e t o H i c k on t h i s 
p o i n t 8 
( b) We may n o t e t h a t H ick's e x p e r i e n c i n g - as, l i k e Ramsey's 
d i s c l o s u r e , i n v o l v e s a " g o i n g beyond" i n ex p e r i e n c e t o somethi 
"more" t h a n i s i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n t o t h e senses ( c f . H i c k 
(RPEA) 25 - 2 6 ) . T h i s "more" i s , however, mediated t h r o u g h 
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th e senses ( i b i d , 28 = 30; (FK) c l u ^ ) . But i s i! i n t i t i o n " t h e 
same as " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " ? ( c f . J . E . Smith (EG) 5"2 - 53 a n d Kunn 
(SSR) 123). H i c k h i m s e l f sees a p a r a l l e l between Ramsey's 
d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s and h i s own " s p e c i a l Key p o i n t s w i t h i n 
([human) e x p e r i e n c e which a c t as focuses o f r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e " 
((FK )216 , o f . i b i d , l o o t n o t e 1 ) . Such key p o i n t s " s e t g o i n g 
t h e tendency o f the mind t o i n t e r p r e t r e l i g i o u s l y . . . " ( i b i d . ) , 
T n i s i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h v i e w i n g e x p e r i e n c i n g - as as an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e process t h a t a r i s e s f r o m an i n t u i t i o n around 
a key p o i n t o f e x p e r i e n c e , H.P. Owen ((CKG) 152 n , l ) has 
argued t h a t h i s own i n t u i t i o n i s t r e l i g i o u s e p i s t e m o l o g y i s 
i n agreement w i t h t h a t o f H i c k f b ut can H i c k be d e s c r i b e d 
as an i n t u i t i o n i s t ? He c e r t a i n l y denies any " s i x t h sense" 
i n t u i t i o n o f God arunediated t h r o u g h t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d 
( o r r a t h e r tie denies i t o f t h e normal ( p r o p h e t i c - t y p e ) 
r e l i g i o u s experiences H i c k (SE) 243)0 H i c k ' s a n a l y s i s o f 
e x p e r i e n c i n g - as as i n v o l v i n g t h e " e x e r c i s e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e 
of r a t i o n a l i t y " i n an e s s e n t i a l l y " v o l u n t a r y a c t o f 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " ((FK) 120 - 121) appears t o p l a c e him i n 
o p p o s i t i o n t o Ramsey's a n a l y s i s o f d i s c l o s u r e s a s ( a p p a r e n t l y ) 
i n v o l v i n g e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l u n t a r y a c t s o f i n t u i t i o n . But 
t h e n H i c k argues f o r a spectrum o f c o g n i t i v e freedom i n 
e x p e r i e n c i n g - ass i t i s a t a minimum i n "sense e x p e r i e n c e " , 
and reaches a maximum i n " r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e " ( c i . (FK) 123 = 
128, (SB) 245). Tnus, a l t h o u g h man "nas an i n n a t e tendency 
t o i n t e r p r e t h i s e x p e r i e n c e r e l i g i o u s l y " and " t h e awareness 
o f God i s c o e r c i v e t o one who has i t i n t h e h i g h e s t degree", 
y e t t h a t tendency "can r e a d i l y be r e s i s t e d " and " t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
own f r e e receptivity..„plays a p a r t i n h i s dawning 
consciousness o f God"((SB) 246 - 248). I s h a l l argue below 
t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f ( w h e t h e r " r e l i g i o u s " o r 
o t h e r w i s e ) i s not under o u r v o l u n t a r y c o n t r o l , t h e r e are 
I n c l i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s which may be* I n which case i t may 
tie p o s s i b l e t o c l a i m t h a t H i c k and Ramsey a r e i n fundamental 
agreement i n t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s , 
( c ) I n Ramsey's e a r l y work he wrote o f " i n t e r p r e f e c t s " o r 
" o r g a n i z e d p a r t i c u l a r s " ( o f . SRCP 298) — "event - p a t t e r n s 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " 
(TJ-H A : "Reasonableness o f t h e C h r i s t i a n F a i t h " , I , p. 2) —• 
a r g u i n g t h a t t h e " f a c t s " o f mathematics, s c i e n c e , t h e o l o g y 
o r h i s t o r y are e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d ~ f a c t s . I n h i s paper 
"Tne A u t h o r i t y o f t h e Church Today" he u n d e r l i n e d t h i s 
r e j e c t i o n o f t h e concept o f "an i s o l a t e d , i ndependent, s e l f -
a u t h e n t i c a t i n g f a c t " . (AC 67'):9 a s s e r t i n g t h a t "Pacts have 
no a u t h o r i t y a p a r t f r o m t h e c o n c e p t u a l scheme w i t h which 
t h e y appear" ( i b i d e 68) . But here t h e " f a c t s " are 
" t a c t s ' as o r g a n i s e d i n an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e scheme", and must 
he d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " ' f a c t ' i n t h e sense o f o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e 
d i s c l o s e d around" such " f a c t s " (FD 132; c f . AC 70 - 71 ) ^ . 
However, Ramsey appears on occasions t o go even f u r t h e r 
t h a n t h i s , a r g u i n g t h a t o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e i s never a c t u a l l y 
d i s c l o s e d " n a k e d l y " , b u t always comes " c l o t h e d " i n some 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e language ( e x p r e s s e d i n terms o f sense-data o r 
m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , o r some " r a c t s and f e a t u r e s " o f t h e medium 
o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e ) . T h i s seems t o be an e s s e n t i a l element 
i n Ramsey?:s d i s c u s s i o n o f a u t h o r i t y : 
The f i n a l a u t h o r i t y f o r C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e , 
and t h e " g i v e n " i n t h a t sense, i s t h e a u t h o r i t y 
o f what i t i s i n such a s i t u a t i o n which s t r i k e s 
us, what c o n f r o n t s us as an a c t i v i t y b e a r i n g 
on our own. F u r t h e r , i t i s a l o g i c a l blunder, 
whose co s t i s meaninglessness, t o suppose 
t h a t someHing " g i v e n " and " a u t h o r i t a t i v e " 
c o u l d be so g i v e n as t o be a l t o g e t h e r p u r e , 
no 
u n s u l l i e d by any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n whatever; 
and i t i s a p l a i n l o g i c a l howler whose 
co s t i s b a r r e n c o n f u s i o n , t o suppose -
th e o p p o s i t e m i s t a k e - t h a t any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
can have t h e same s t a t u s as t h e a c t i v i t y o f 
d i s c l o s u r e i t s e l f , as t h a t which c a l l s f o r t h 
our C h r i s t i a n commitment, demanding by 
way o f response, l i f e - s o u l and all„<,8. 
( U - I n t e r Communion 15; 
T h i s l a t e s t remark ( t h e paper was w r i t t e n i n 1972) must be 
used t o i n t e r p r e t Ramsey's o t h e r comments on a u t h o r i t y , 
f o r example; 
What v/e must not do i s t o suppose t h a t when 
a p r i m a r y a u t h o r i t y i s g i v e n i n a d i s c l o s u r e , 
t h e r e comes w i t h i t a g i v e n l a b e l as w e l l , 
an e x p r e s s i o n whose i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s s e l f -
guaranteed. We must not confound i n s i g h t 
and t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h a t i n s i g h t ; we must 
d i s t i n g u i s h between a d i s c l o s u r e and o u r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what t h e d i s c l o s u r e d i s c l o s e s a 
(AC 74) 
Ramsey i s not d e n y i n g t h a t a l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
g i v e n a l o n g w i t h t h e d i s c l o s e d o b j e c t i v i t y , but o n l y t h a t t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i n f a l l i b l e . The d i s t i n c t i o n " ^ i s one which 
w i l l be examined i n d e t a i l l a t e r . Here we s i m p l y n ote t h a t 
Ramsey does o c c a s i o n a l l y r ecognize, what h i s language 
elsewhere o f t e n appears t o deny, t h a t what i s g i v e n i n a 
d i s c l o s u r e i s not " c o n t e n t l e s s " . 
We may conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Ramsey's d i s c l o s u r e 
o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y i s no more t h a n an a b s t r a c t i o n 
t h a t can be a n a l y s e d out o f t h e c o n c r e t e d i s c l o s u r e . 
For a d i s c l o s u r e always i n v o l v e s some element o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o r d e s c r i p t i o n - i„e„ o f " r e c o g n i t i o n " . Ramsey and H i c k do 
appear t o be a t one on t h i s i s s u e , 
( v ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f p a t t e r n , g e s t a l t , and isomorphy ( s p e c i a l 
Kinds o f r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e s ) 
P o l a n y i ' s a n a l y s i s o f "comprehension" was i t s e l f 
" c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f G e s t a l t psychology", 
which c l a i m s t h a t an o r g a n i s e d whole i s grasped t h r o u g h a 
s u b s i d i a r y awareness o f i t s p a r t s ( c f . P o l a n y i (PK)55, 
(FR) 239, (LT) 1 - 3 ) . I n a " r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e " we 
d i s c e r n something f o r what i t i s | a raw o b j e c t i v i t y i s 
r e c o g n i s e d as an o b j e c t i v e X. I n such a s i t u a t i o n we 
r e c o g n i z e an o b j e c t as a g o l d f i n c h as we survey i t s 
o b s e r v a b l e f e a t u r e s (plumage, s i z e , shape e t c . ) . I t i s 
c l e a r t h a t d i s c l o s u r e s o f p a t t e r n o r g e s t a l t a r e v e r y 
c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o such r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e s , and may 
be t r e a t e d as a t y p e o f r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e , 
Ramsey argues t h a t we d i s c e r n a p a t t e r n as we 
survey a number o f dots i n a c h i l d ' s p i c t u r e book ( F I 93 -
94)o We s i m i l a r l y r e c o g n i z e a g e s t a l t , which i s more t h a n 
t h e sum o f i t s p a r t s , as i t i s d i s c l o s e d t o us t h r o u g h our 
p e r c e p t i o n o f those p a r t s . Thus t w e l v e l i n e s on a 
b l a c k b o a r d d i s c l o s e a cube (RL 23 = 24, TG 8 0 ) ^ ? two 
z i g - z a g l i n e s w i t h i n t e r s e c t i n g s t r a i g h t l i n e s d i s c l o s e a 
s t a i r c a s e (RFT 27, CD 5)» and a s e r i e s o f c o n c e n t r i c 
c i r c l e s d i s c l o s e a cone viewed fro m above (MM 1 0 ) , I n 
these examples t h e p a t t e r n o r g e s t a l t i s "more t h a n " i t s 
c o n s t i t u e n t elements and t h i s "more" i s what i s r e v e a l e d 
i n a d i s c l o s u r e . 
A n o t h e r t y p e o f r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e which may b 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d i s t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f i s o m o r p h y ^ , Ramsey 
c l a i m s t h a t metaphors and models are " b o r n i n " (MM 5"2) 
d i s c l o s u r e s . Because o f some isomorphism between model and 
phenomena a d i s c l o s u r e o f s i m i l a r i t y i s evoked ( i b i d . 12, 1 
MDA 7, MMR 266 - 267). As Ramsey p u t s i t , " m e t a p h o r i c a l 
e x p r e s s i o n s occur when two s i t u a t i o n s s t r i k e us i n such a 
way as t o r e v e a l what i n c l u d e s them but i s no mere 
c o m b i n a t i o n o f them b o t h " ( i b i d . 5 ) . I t would appear t h a t 
a d i s c l o s u r e o f isomorphy - a d i s c l o s e d r e c o g n i t i o n o f 
isomorphy - i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c h o i c e o f a concept t o model 
a p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i f i c , s o c i a l o r t h e o l o g i c a l phenomenon. 
Thus V/,H. A u s t i n i s c o r r e c t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t " P e r c e p t i o n o f 
s i g n i f i c a n t isomorphy i s , f o r Ramsey, a d i s c l o s u r e " (W.H. 
A u s t i n (MMP) 47)» Hence t h e use o f t h e model-concept 
of t h e " f l o w " o f an e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t i s o n l y p o s s i b l e 
because t h e i s o m o r p h i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between e l e c t r i c i t y and 
f l o w i n g water has been d i s c l o s e d t o us ( i b i d § 3 ; c f , Medawar 57) 
S i m i l a r l y t h e model o f "Father" i s used o f God because we 
r e c o g n i s e i n a d i s c l o s u r e t h a t t h e r e i s isomorphy between 
t h e a c t i v i t y o f f a t h e r s and t h e a c t i v i t y o f God. 
J u s t as t h e use o f a c e r t a i n model i n t h e f i r s t 
p l a c e i s suggested by a d i s c l o s u r e ( o f i s o m o r p h y ) , so t h e 
c o n t i n u e d use o f t h e model = i t s adequacy as a model -
i s dependent on a f u r t h e r d i s c l o s u r e . T h i s i s t h e d i s c l o s u r e 
o f what Ramsey c a l l s " e m p i r i c a l f i t " . A passage i n Models 
and Mystery i l l u s t r a t e s t h e two d i s c l o s u r e s w e l l ; 
Take t h e case o f a p s y c h i a t r i s t p r e s e n t e d w i t h 
a p a r t i c u l a r p a t i e n t . He asks s u f f i c i e n t 
q u e s t i o n s t o be a b l e t o b u i l d up some s o r t o f 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s p a t i e n t ' s c o n d i t i o n ; t h e 
hope b e i n g t h a t what he hears w i l l have i t s 
echoes i n a p a r t i c u l a r model he has a v a i l a b l e , 
so t h a t f r o m h i s p r o f e s s i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f a c t s b e f o r e him t h e r e may 
occur a d i s c l o s u r e , whereupon he w i l l say, 
f o r example, "a m i l d d e p r e s s i v e " . (MM 38 - 39) 
He w i l l now t a k e t h e model as a p e r s u a s i v e 
p o s s i b i l i t y t o be f u r t h e r t e s t e d and t r i e d 
out i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e patient's whole l i f e . 
The p s y c h i a t r i s t w i l l now t e s t how adequate 
t h e model i s i n p r o v i d i n g an i l l u m i n a t i o n o f the 
p a t i e n t s t o t a l b e h a v i o u r , by s e e i n g how f a r i t 
f i t s n.th what t h e patient says as he now c o n t i n u e s 
t o speak f u r t h e r about h i m s e l f . ( i b i d , 39) 
I n t h i s way the concept " m i l d d e p r e s s i v e " 
has e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e hut i t i s never 
a b s o l u t e l y f a l s i f i e d o r c o m p l e t e l y v e r i f i e d . 
Circumstances a r e enumerated u n t i l i n a f l a s h 
o f i n s i g h t t h e model f i t s t h e person and t h e 
" f i t " i s t h e n examined i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
w i d e s t p o s s i b l e p a t t e r n o f h i s p e r s o n a l and 
s o c i a l l i f e . ( i b i d . 39 - 40) 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n i t i a l d i s c l o s u r e o f isomorphy and t h e 
l a t e r d i s c l o s u r e o f e m p i r i c a l f i t a re b o t h d i s c l o s u r e s 
r e v e a l i n g t h e same " t h i n g " - i . e . a s i m i l a r i t y o f s t r u c t u r e 
between t h e m o d e l - s i t u a t i o n ( " m i l d d e p r e s s i v e " ) and t h e 
e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n ( t h i s p a t i e n t ' s b e h a v i o u r ) . The f a c t 
t h a t t h e i n i t i a l use and t h e l a t e r t e s t i n g o f a model a r e 
b o t h based on t h e same s o r t o f d i s c l o s u r e - i . e . t h a t Ramsey 
"uses i n t u i t i o n t o j u s t i f y i n t u i t i o n " ( S c h e d l e r ( T h e s i s ) 
191 - 192) - i s one t h a t w i l l be t a k e n up a g a i n l a t e r . 
( v i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f i n v a r i a n t s 
I t has become apparent a l r e a d y how d i f f i c u l t i t i s 
t o draw h a r d and f a s t d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e ty p e s o f 
d i s c l o s u r e t h a t a r e t o be found a l o n g t h e spectrum o f 
Ramsey's examples. We have met t h e d i s c l o s u r e s o f m a t h e m a t i c a l 
i n v a r i a n t s under heading ( i i ) , but t h e y are d e a r l y c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d t o - and may be s a i d t o be dependent on -
d i s c l o s u r e s o f p a t t e r n . Tnus t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e i n v a r i a n t 
"TV seems on Ramsey's account ( e . g . F I 114) t o i n v o l v e t h e 
discernment o f a " p a t t e r n " i n a s e r i e s o f c i r c l e s o f 
i n c r e a s i n g d i a m e t e r : a p a t t e r n expressed i n mat h e m a t i c a l 
language as? 
c i r c u m f e r e n c e Constant ("TT ) d i a m e t e r 
S i m i l a r l y a number o f d o t s may f o r m a p a t t e r n ( i . e . we may 
d i s c e r n a p a t t e r n i n them) and such "a p a t t e r n . d i s c l o s e s 
'a s t r a i g h t l i n e ' " (ESCS 8 ) . 
a 
I n t h e case o f / s c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t , l i k e t h e 
b o i l i n g p o i n t o f water, t h e d o t s we are concerned w i t h a r e 
p o i n t s on a graph; 
Thermometer 
Readings 
l o l c 
loo . 
-i H -C 
Samples o f b o i l i n g w a t e r 
I f we now " l i n k t h e v a r i o u s d o t s t o g e t h e r i n a p a t t e r n , and 
we a s s o c i a t e t h i s p a t t e r n w i t h t h e one which d i s c l o s e s 'a 
s t r a i g h t l i n e ' " t h e n "we now r e g i s t e r t h e l i n e as 
s y m b o l i z i n g 100° C e n t i g r a d e " (RSCS 8 ) . S c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t s 
t h u s a r i s e "when a d i s c l o s u r e grows out o f a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n 
o f o b s e r v a t i o n s , e.g. water b o i l i n g , which oan t h e n be 
e x t r a p o l a t e d . t o c o n t i n u e t h e p a t t e r n " ( i b i d . 725 c f . RSP 79) 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t such d i s c l o s e d i n v a r i a n t s d i f f e r 
f r o m t h e d i s c l o s e d p a t t e r n s i'rom which t h e y a r i s e i n t h a t 
a l t h o u g h a p a t t e r n i s "more t h a n " t h e u n i t s t h a t make i t up, 
a p a t t e r n can s t i l l be a d e q u a t e l y expressed i n such u n i t s , 
A m a t h e m a t i c a l o r s c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t , on t h e o t h e r nand, 
" t r a n s c e n d s " even the p a t t e r n and cannot be a d e q u a t e l y 
expressed by t h e medium t h a t d i s c l o s e d i t , Tnus t h e pure 
mat h e m a t i c a l concept o f a s t r a i g h t l i n e i s not i n s t a n t i a t e d 
i n ( i n e x a c t ) p e r c e p t u a l " s t r a i g h t l i n e s " (cf.RSCS 8; a l s o 
K o r n e r 141* 158 - 171) and a s c i e n t i f i c c o n s t a n t i s something 
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more t h a n a p a t t e r n of i n s t r u m e n t r e a d i n g s . 
( v i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f U n i v e r s a l s 
Ramsey c l a i m s t h a t p r e d i c a t i v e u n i v e r s a l s are known 
i n d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s ; i t i s "when a sequence o f y e l l o w 
o b j e c t s o r good deeds has e f f e c t e d a d i s c l o s u r e and discernment 
t h a t people have begun t o speak o f ' Y e l l o w 1 . . . . . , , o f 'Good'... 
( P I 10b). We must postpone a d i s c u s s i o n o f Ramsey's v i e w 
o f the n a t u r e o f u n i v e r s a l s u n t i l we have t a c k l e d i n more 
depth t h e g e n e r a l problem o f o b j e c t i v i t y . 
( v i i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f v a l u e 
"Value a r i s e s . . " , Ramsey c l a i m s , "around t h e f a c t s 
and i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n " (PD 132; cf,EW55 - 156), We may 
d i s t i n g u i s h d i s c l o s u r e s o f ( a ) a e s t h e t i c v a l u e and ( b ) moral 
v a l u e : 
( a ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ; 
Ramsey w r i t e s o c c a s i o n a l l y o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f 
beauty which breaks i n on us as we l o o k a t a p a i n t i n g (RSCS 
14) or even a t a chemical f o r m u l a ( i b i d . 16 - 18; c f . BP I I 
194 n.j 200). Hence th e sense o f a e s t h e t i c wonder i s 
d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d (RL 72 = 7 3 ) . 
( b ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f moral v a l u e ; 
But Ramsey's most p r o l i f i c d i s c u s s i o n o f v a l u e i s 
t o be f o u n d i n t h e area o f moral awareness. A "moral c l a i m " 
o r " d u t y " i s r e v e a l e d t o us i n a moral d i s c l o s u r e t h r o u g h and 
around e i t h e r t h e e m p i r i c a l elements o f a s i t u a t i o n ( c f , 
MJGC 163, 166; RL 43; P I 42, 44; NL 38y) , o r the language 
o f prima f a c i e d u t i e s (cf.BP I I 185 - 186). Such a moral 
d i s c l o s u r e i s matched, Ramsey contends, by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
s e l f " d i s c l o s u r e ; a person "comes t o h i m s e l f " , a t t a i n s s e l f ~ 
Knowledge and r e a l i z e s h i s own personhood, as and when he 
d i s c e r n s an o b j e c t i v e moral challenge (cf.RSCS 42 - 43, P I 
37 - 38, PPMT 171). Thus " v a l u e a r i s e s . a r o u n d t h e f a c t s 
and i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n , and i n common w i t h o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e 
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c a t e g o r i e s i s s p e o i a l l y ooncerned not o n l y w i t h t h a t which 
c o n f r o n t s us o b j e c t i v e l y i n a d i s c l o s u r e , but w i t h t h e m a t c h i n g 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e as w e l l " (FD 132). Ramsey's f a v o u r i t e example 
o f a moral d i s c l o s u r e , and i t s c o r r e l a t i v e s e l f d i s c l o s u r e , i s 
t h e exchange between t h e p r o p h e t Hathan and K i n g David r e c o u n t e d 
i n 2 Samuel 12, I n t h a t e ncounter, " a t Nathan's 'Thou a r t 
t h e manj 1 David comes t o h i m s e l f , t h e 'penny drops' and t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e o c c u r s " (PPMT 167°, c f , RSCS 4 2 - 43, BP I 206| 
MMR 264). 
Such moral d i s c l o s u r e s r e v e a l t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e 
moral law, t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t moral c h a l l e n g e 
o f d u t y (AC YO, PA 189 = 190). For Ramsey a " f r e e " , 
" r e s p o n s i b l e " d e c i s i o n , one t o which a man can g i v e h i s 
p e r s o n a l b a c k i n g , i s s 
a response t o " o b j e c t s " and more. I t i s 
t h i s " t r a n s c e n d e n t " r e f e r e n c e which makes t h e 
c h a l l e n g e morals t o be aware o f such a 
c h a l l e n g e i s t o r e c o g n i z e a moral o b l i g a t i o n . 
" ( P I 331 o f . i b i d . 37) 
Now t h e "transcendence" o f moral v a l u e , t h e way i n which i t 
i s "more t h a n " t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l elements o f a moral s i t u a t i o n 
( o f . F I 44 - 45 ) s i s a d i f f e r e n t s o r t of transcendence f r o m 
those we have so f a r d i s c u s s e d . Here we have t h e transcendence 
o f "ought" over " i s " , o f moral w o r t h over e m p i r i c a l f a c t ; a 
transcendence t h a t i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between v a l u e s t a t e m e n t s and d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ( c f . 
FD 131 - 132). The "transcendence o f v a l u e " i s a n o t h e r problem 
t o which we must r e t u r n l a t e r . 
Ramsey c o n s t r u c t s what he d e s c r i b e s as a " m o d i f i e d 
v e r s i o n " o f R.M. ^Hare's t h e o r y of e t h i c s . Hare argued t h a t 
moral judgments are n o t o n l y d e s c r i p t i v e ( o f an e m p i r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n ) but a l s o p r e s c r i p t i v e o r e v a l u a t i v e , commending 
a c e r t a i n a c t i o n and p r e s c r i b i n g i t f o r o n e s e l f ( c f . h i s 
The Language o f M o r a l s ) . Ramsey accepts t h a t t h e language 
o f morals i s b o t h d e s c r i p t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e , but adds 
t h a t i t i s a l s o " r e s p o n s i v e " , f o r " t o e v a l u a t e i s t o 
respond t o a c l a i m " (MacQ 113; c f 0 PPMT 172). Ramsey views 
t h i s supplement t o Hare as a defence o f t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f 
m o r a l s , an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e c h a r a c t e r o f 
moral judgments: 
a "moral" c l a i m i s d i s c l o s e d around a p a t t e r n 
of b e h a v i o u r whenever t h i s becomes t h e t o p i c 
of a moral judgment, and i t i s t o such a 
d i s c l o s e d c l a i m t h a t t h e p r e s c r i p t i v i t y , 
o f which Hare speaks, a r i s e s as a response. 
(MacQ, 113; cf,MJGC 162 - 165) 
T n i s d i s c l o s e d moral c l a i m o r o b l i g a t i o n i s o u r " d u t y " i n a 
g i v e n s i t u a t i o n ( o f . RL 42 - 43, U-FMG B44 /157, BP I 43); 
i t i s " t h e p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n , s u i t e d t o those p a r t i c u l a r 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o f t h a t Duty which would r e c o n c i l e a l l 
p a r t i a l d u t i e s " ( F I 40)„ Here Ramsey notes a p a r a l l e l 
between h i s own view and t h e moral i n t u i t i o n i s m o f W.D. Ross 
( i b i d . , o f . RL 30 - 31)« Thus a moral d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n 
may p r e s e n t us w i t h m u t u a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g prima f a c i e d u t i e s , 
" w i t h tv/o c h a l l e n g e s which generate c o n f l i c t i n g responses". 
The o n l y way t o r e s o l v e t h i s s i t u a t i o n , Ramsey sugges t s , 
i s " t o develop the e m p i r i c a l d e t a i l s i n each case u n t i l 
t h e r e a r i s e s w i t h i n t h e one d i s c l o s u r e a s i n g l e c h a l l e n g e 
and response" (PPMT 171), T h i s w i l l be a d i s c l o s u r e whose 
o b j e c t may be l a b e l l e d " A b s o l u t e Duty" - "a m e t a p h y s i c a l 
c a t e g o r y " ( i b i d . . cf„ 172)„ 
( i x ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f Other Selves ( o t h e r I s ) 
The " I " of a n o t h e r person i s r e v e a l e d t o us, i n a 
d i s c l o s u r e , as more t h a n h i s d e s c r i b a b l e , o b s e r v a b l e , p u b l i c 
behaviour. "What has happened," asks Ramsey, "when we say 
on such occasions t h a t , e.g. {the o c u l i s t } now sees Jean as 
a 'person'; and t h e ' r e a l ' Jean now c o n f r o n t s him? The 
answer i s t h a t around Jean's eyes has been evoked a s i t u a t i o n 
t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l . . . " ( F I 98, c±'. OCR 4 - 5)> 
Such " s e e i n g " o f a person as "more t h a n " s k i n , h a i r , eyes 
e t c . - s e e i n g t h e I behind the eyes - i s one o f the h i n t s 
t h a t Ramsey takes over f r o m B e r k e l e y (see B e r k e l e y ( A ) , D i a l . 
I V , sec. 5; o f . PPM 170, F I y8, BPEM 24). 
V/hen such a d i s c l o s u r e occurs i m p e r s o n a l s i t u a t i o n s 
"come a l i v e " and persons are r e c o g n i s e d where b o d i e s s t o o d 
"before ( c f , RL 19 - 20, 146 - 147; RSCS 15; PF 335 - 336; 
TRT 50)« We may l a b e l such d i s c l o s u r e s as " p e r s o n a l 
d i s c l o s u r e s " ( w i t h G i l l ( I R ) 52, c r . RSCS 13), but i t i s 
wo r t h d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a d i s c l o s u r e o f an o t h e r I and 
a " r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e " o f a p e r s o n a l a t t r i b u t e such as 
l o v e o r honesty which may be a s s o c i a t e d v / i t h a n o t h e r I 
( o f . HG 212 - 213). I n t h e l a t t e r case two typ e s o f 
d i s c l o s u r e seem t o be i n v o l v e d on a p a r a l l e l w i t h Ramsey's 
account o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f p e r s o n a l purposiveness t h r o u g h 
a p a t t e r n (MDA 16, F I 127): where t h e p a t t e r n i t s e l f i s , 
presumably, t h e p r o d u c t o f an e a r l i e r d i s c l o s u r e . A f t e r 
a l l we c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , see "honesty", o r even " l o v e " , 
i n l e t t e r s w r i t t e n by a w e l l programmed computer. But t h e 
Knowledge t h a t we have t o do w i t h a n o t h e r person who i s 
the a u t h o r o f the l e t t e r s and t h e b e a r e r o f these q u a l i t i e s 
i s a n o t h e r m a t t e r a l t o g e t h e r , demanding a f u r t h e r i n t u i t i v e 
d i s c l o s u r e ( o r , as some would p r e f e r i t , an a d d i t i o n a l 
i n f e r e n c e : c f , RSCS 5"8), 
I n t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f a n o t h e r I we f i n d t h e b a s i s o f 
Ramsey's r e j e c t i o n o f a b e h a v i o u r i s t a n a l y s i s o f o t h e r people. 
F o r a n o t h e r s e l f i s a d i s t i n c t i v e l y t r a n s c e n d e n t "more"5 
ano t h e r person i s more t h a n t h e ob s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o u r he 
d i s p l a y s and we p e r c e i v e ( o f . PG 66, PPMT 164 - 171)- T h i s 
I i s a n o t h e r c e n t r e o f consciousness and a c t i v i t y s t a n d i n g 
over a g a i n s t us and t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e w o r l d o f o b s e r v a b l e s . 
I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t i n Ramsey's spectrum o f d i s c l o s u r e 
examples t h a t we meet f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e what we might 
c a l l a meiac-empirical o r m e t a p h y s i c a l e n t i t y ^ - a t r a n s c e n d e n t 
o b j e c t t h a t i s not open t o e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n . 
( x ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f God 
For t h i s study o f Ramsey as a r e l i g i o u s 
e p i s t e m o l o g i s t , t h e species o f d i s c l o s u r e t h a t i s o f p r i m a r y 
importance i s , o f course, t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f God. A l l t h e 
o t h e r d i s d o s u r e s must be seen as i n t i m a t i o n s , p a r a l l e l s 
o r a n a l o g i e s o f t h e r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e (CELCE 95, RL 19s 
c f . C a i r n s 191, Owen (PTR) 6 8 ) , 
Ramsey f r e q u e n t l y employs t h e phrase, "cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e " i n t h i s c o n t e x t ; but n e g l e c t s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
t o o f f e r any p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n o f i t . We may t a k e i t , 
nowever, t h a t t h e b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a "cosmic" 
d i s c l o s u r e i s t h a t i t " i n v o l v e s . . . i n some way t h e whole 
u n i v e r s e " (VM 100). A cosmic d i s c l o s u r e a r i s e s around 
" t h e cosmos, o r a t l e a s t some phenomenon c o n s i d e r e d as 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f phenomena g e n e r a l l y " (W.H. A u s t i n (MMP) 
43; c f . RL 73, MDA 3, 10), The cosmic n a t u r e o f a d i s c l o s u r e 
i s thus a f u n c t i o n o f t h e medium t h r o u g h which t h e d i s c l o s u r e 
o c c u r s ; t h i s medium b e i n g e i t h e r e m p i r i c a l ( c f , MDA 59 ~ 60, 
MM 16) o r l i n g u i s t i c ( c f . CD 7) . Such d i s c l o s u r e s are 
p o t e n t i a l l y , r a t h e r than a c t u a l l y , "cosmic"; f o r c l e a r l y 
no one c o u l d i n p r a c t i c e survey t h e U n i v e r s e i n i t s e n t i r e t y . 
Ramsey t h e r e f o r e d e s i g n a t e s a d i s c l o s u r e as "cosmic", i . e . 
" u n l i m i t e d o r a l l - i n c l u s i v e " (PG 65; cf.TTST 8 2 ) , i n so f a r 
as i t i s "a d i s c l o s u r e from which, i n p r i n c i p l e , n o t h i n g i s 
e x c l u d e d " (U-PE 15; c f . RSCS 73, MDA 4, RPT 29). He w r i t e s : 
theology.„,is founded i n o c c a s i o n s o f i n s i g h t 
and d i s c l o s u r e when,.the u n i v e r s e d e c l a r e s 
i t s e l f i n a p a r t i c u l a r way around some group 
of events which thus takes on a cosmic 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . (MM 58. emphasis added) 
We may assume t h a t Ramsey's p o i n t i s t h a t t h e medium o f a 
d i s c l o s u r e can he c o n s i d e r e d t o be o f "cosmic s i g n i f i c a n c e " 
because what i s d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h t h a t medium i s o f "cosmic 
s i g n i f i c a n c e " - i . e . o f u n l i m i t e d r e l e v a n c e and a p p l i c a t i o n . 
Donald Evans p o i n t s out t h a t Ramsey d e s i g n a t e s as 
"cosmic" a form o f " n e g a t i v e a l l - i n c l u s i v e n e s s " which 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s d i s c l o s u r e s o f p a r t i c u l a r d u t i e s , where 
"Whatever e l s e may be t h e case oVer . a l l t h e u n i v e r s e , X i s 
my duty i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n " , i . e . " N o t h i n g e l s e m a t t e r s except 
d o i n g X, my d u t y i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n " (Evans (IRTG) 131 - 132; 
o f . RL 30 - 3 1 , MDA 60, PG 6~9) 6 5 . But the a d j e c t i v e "cosmic" 
i s more a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p l i e d t o d i s c l o s u r e s , and concomitant 
commitments, t h a t are " p o s i t i v e l y a l l - i n c l u s i v e " - i n p a r t i c u l 
t o d i s c l o s u r e s o f God as th e "more" o f th e whole u n i v e r s e 
(MIR 265)0 Indeed Ramsey o f t e n uses "cosmic d i s c l o s u r e " as 
a synonym f o r a d i s c l o s u r e o f God ( e a g . MDA 3, RSCS 92) , 
d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s — e.g. d i s c l o s u r e s 
o f duty (MMR 265) and ma t h e m a t i c a l d i s c l o s u r e s (RL 32 - 33) -
may a l s o be cosmic i n scope. T h i s r a t h e r l o o s e usage i s 
c o n f u s i n g ; but Ramsey would j u s t i f y i t by h i s c o n t e n t i o n 
t h a t i n f i n e a l l d i s c l o s u r e s , as t h e y become cosmic, r e v e a l 
God, Thus a f t e r c i t i n g a d i s c l o s u r e o f d u t y as an example 
o f a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e , Ramsey w r i t e s ; " l g i v e t h e name God 
t o t h e s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f which we are a c t i v e l y aware 
i n a l l cosmic d i s c l o s u r e s " (U-Credo 3 ) . I s h a l l , however, 
a v o i d begging t h i s p a r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n and w i l l r e s t r i c t 
t h e term "cosmic d i s c l o s u r e " t o t h e more t e c h n i c a l usage 
o u t l i n e d above; spe a k i n g elsewhere o f " d i s c l o s u r e s o f God", 
Perhaps a word or two might be a p p r o p r i a t e a t t h i s 
p o i n t about Ramsey's vi e w o f g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i d e n c e 
t h e f i r s t = o r d e r and second-order a c t i v i t y o f God. The 
acknowledgment o f b o t h t y p e s o f a c t i v i t y i s regarded by 
Ramsey as d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d , f o r "God can&.lways be d i s c e r n e d 
i n t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s o f t h e U n i v e r s e , " (UP 19) as w e l l as i n 
th e p a r t i c u l a r events d e s c r i b e d as " m i r a c l e s " o r "answers 
t o p r a y e r " ( c f , RL 149 - 150"). The r e g u l a r i t i e s o f t h e 
u n i v e r s e , however, a r e best d e s c r i b e d i n s c i e n t i f i c , o b j e c t -
language; whereas m i r a c l e s r e q u i r e t h e language o f p e r s o n a l 
a c t i v i t y ( c f . M 22 - 23). And y e t t h e r e i s o n l y one 
a c t i v i t y , an a c t i v i t y t h a t i s d e s c r i b e d i n language a t two 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . The danger seems t o be t h a t , h a v i n g 
experienced a d i s c l o s u r e o f God around a p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t , 
r e l i g i o u s people w i l l n e g l e c t t o broaden t h e i r language and 
speak of a g e n e r a l a c t i v i t y o r p r o v i d e n c e o f God (UP 19 - 20, 
MM 19 - 22)o Such i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l have f a i l e d , we may 
suppose, t o r e c o g n i z e t h e "cosmic" n e t u r e o f t h e o r i g i n a l 
d i s c l o s u r e . 
I t s h o u l d a l s o be n o t e d t h a t , f o r t h e C h r i s t i a n , a 
d i s c l o s u r e o f God occurs p r e e m i n e n t l y "around t h e e m p i r i c a l 
Jesus o f Nazareth" (RE 405; c f . F I 144) and t h e events o f 
h i s l i f e ( o f . RSCS bO; CD 45, 59; DCCD 12, RFT 34). Such a 
" C h r i s t i a n d i s c l o s u r e " (RL 125) i s a "cosmic d i s c l o s u r e . 0 , . 
which i n one way o r an o t h e r a r i s e s around t h e person o f 
Jesus.. 0 " (TJ-WM 21). 
W i t h t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f God we have a r r i v e d , as i t 
were, a t t h e f a r end o f t h e spectrum o f transcendence. 
T h i s d i s c l o s e d "more" goes beyond a l l o t h e r d i s c l o s e d "mores". 
L i k e t h e s e l f and o t h e r s e l v e s i t i s a m e t a - e n i p i r i c a l 
e n t i t y , r a d i c a l l y t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e e m p i r i c a l medium t h r o u g h 
which i t i s d i s c e r n e d . But God i s a l s o "more t h a n " a l l o t h e r 
m e t a - e m p i r i c a l e n t i t i e s . For Ramsey: 
God n o t o n l y transcends t h e o b s e r v a b l e u n i v e r s e 
....hut a l s o transcends a l l t h e I ' s and o t h e r 
c e n t r e s o f pa r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y i n t h e 
universe.(Evans(IRTG) 217) 
( x i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f t h e s e l f ( i ) 
A t t e n t i o n has a l r e a d y been drawn, en passant, t o 
t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f I . For t h i s d i s c l o s u r e o f s u b j e c t i v e 
transcendence i s a p p a r e n t l y viewed by Ramsey as an i n v a r i a b l e 
c oncomitant o f a l l d i s c l o s u r e s o f an o b j e c t i v e "more"^, and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r o f d i s c l o s u r e s o f d u t y , o t h e r s e l v e s , and God. 
I n t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t o r y scheme i t has been p l a c e d l a s t 
a l t h o u g h i n im p o r t a n c e i t s h o u l d come f i r s t - f o r Ramsey 
views i t as a paradigm f o r a l l d i s c l o s u r e s . From anothe r 
p o i n t o f view, however, i t does not belong i n t h i s spectrum 
a t a l l , but s h o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d s e p a r a t e l y because o f i t s 
d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e as a d i s c l o s u r e of s u b j e c t i v i t y as 
opposed t o t h e many examples we have met o f d i s c l o s u r e s of 
an o b j e c t i v e o t h e r . 
For Ramsey, t h e n , our s e l f i d e n t i t y i s g i v e n i n a 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e : 
What " I " means breaks i n on us as we survey.. 
"a t r a i n o f d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i o n s " . We l o o k 
over a sequence o f d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i o n s and 
we come t o know o u r s e l v e s . I t i s i n such a 
d i s c l o s u r e t h a t we are aware o f " I " a l o n g 
w i t h , but more t h a n , any and a l l of I t s ' s c i e n t i f i c 
counterparts,(ESCS 42. o f . B P I I 183) 
The d i s c l o s u r e o f s e l f i d e n t i t y a r i s e s not o n l y t h r o u g h t h e 
medium o f our sense exp e r i e n c e o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , but 
a l s o t h r o u g h our e x p e r i e n c e o f our own be h a v i o u r : 
c o n s i d e r t h e k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n i n which I 
become aware o f m y s e l f as d i s t i n c t i v e l y " I " , 
as b e i n g a l l my ob s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o u r and 
more b e s i d e s , when i n e x e r c i s i n g some 
d e c i s i v e a c t i v i t y I d i s c e r n what i s more 
i n my a c t i v i t y t h a n t h e o b s e r v a b l e 
movement I d i s p l a y . Here i s a " d i s c l o s u r e " 
s i t u a t i o n which breaks i n on us.,when we 
survey our p u b l i c , o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o u r , 
(CE 182, o f . PR 215) 
The s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e p r o v i d e s Ramsey w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t 
reason f o r r e j e c t i n g behaviourism, even t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
" l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s m " of G i l b e r t R y l e ( o f . SEI, Emp.R., 
PPMT 164 " 172, CPCP 53 e t c . ) . The I which i s d i s c l o s e d 
t o a person i s more t h a n h i s o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o u r and, u n l i k e 
such b e h a v i o u r , cannot be ad e q u a t e l y accounted f o r i n 
p e r c e p t u a l terms. The I cannot be d e s c r i b e d , i t can o n l y be 
evoked. Thus t h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e which occurs around e m p i r i c a l 
f a c t s d i s c l o s e s . . . 
something which i s a l l those f a c t s and more, 
and i t i s not a more t h a t w i l l ever be covered 
by more o f t h e f a c t s . , i t i s a s u b j e c t i v i t y f o r 
which no s e t o f t h i r d - p e r s o n d e s c r i p t i o n s . . . 
no m a t t e r how many o r v a r i e d , can ever be 
e x h a u s t i v e c u r r e n c y (TL^; cf.MM 27, MBA 60) 
I n t h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e , t h e r e f o r e , we have our f i n a l 
s pecies o f d i s c l o s e d m e t a - e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y . S e l f - d i s c l o s u r e 
r e v e a l s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t I , " t r a n s c e n d e n t i n t h e sense t h a t 
i t i s not t o be c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e nor 
reduced t o terms w i t h i n such d i s c o u r s e " (HP 129). As t h e 
"paradigm f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l l d i s c l o s u r e s " (FRFI 355)» the 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i s c l e a r l y o f paramount importance i n a 
d i s c u s s i o n o f Ramsey's d i s c l o s u r e e p i s t e m o l o g y . We s h a l l 
analyse i t i n more d e t a i l below. 
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(C) The Types o f D i s c l o s u r e - I I 
Having o u t l i n e d above t h e wide r a n g i n g n a t u r e oi' 
Ramsey's spectrum o f d i s c l o s u r e s , i t i s necessary t o examine 
more c l o s e l y t h e s o r t s o f d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t can "be made between 
them. To h e l p c l a r i f y c e r t a i n i s s u e s i n Ramsey's e p i s t e m o l o g y 
I s^all draw on some aspects o f what p h i l o s o p h e r s i n g e n e r a l , 
and p h i l o s o p h e r s o f r e l i g i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r , have w r i t t e n 
on the s u b j e c t o f i n t u i t i o n . For, as we have a l r e a d y n o t e d , 
t h e discernment element i n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n may be 
i d e n t i f i e d as a n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l awareness o r i n t u i t i o n . 
I n h i s a r t i c l e on " I n t u i t i o n " i n Paul Edward's 
Enc y c l o p a e d i a o f P h i l o s o p h y , R i c h a r d R o r t y d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
t h r e e p r i n c i p a l meanings o f t h e term t h a t a r e o f importance 
i n p h i l o s o p h y . These a r e s -
( a ) " I n t u i t i o n as immediate knowledge o f t h e t r u t h 
o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , where 'immediate' means 'not preceded by 
i n f e r e n c e ' "5 
( b ) " I n t u i t i o n as immediate knowledge o f a concept. 
•Immediate knowledge' here means, r o u g h l y , 'knowledge which 
does not e n t a i l a b i l i t y t o d e f i n e t h e concept' "; and 
( c ) " I n t u i t i o n as a non p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge o f 
an e n t i t y , knowledge t h a t may be a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r , 
but i s n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h , i n t u i t i v e knowledge o f t h e t r u t h 
of p r o p o s i t i o n s about t h e e n t i t y " . ( R o r t y 204) 
Such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r a i s e s a number o f i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e s 
when a p p l i e d t o Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n o f d i s c e r n m e n t - d i s c l o s u r e . 
We may c o n v e n i e n t l y d i s c u s s these under t h r e e headings; 
12.6-
( i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f Concepts & D i s c l o s u r e s o f E n t i t i e s 
The ' Q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l d i s c l o s u r e " ( c f . RL 61 - 79 e t c . ) 
i s one o f Ramsey's f a v o u r i t e examples o f a d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n . He c l a i m s t h a t t h e q u a l i f i e r ( " i n f i n i t e " , " a l l " ) 
o f t h e model ("good", "wise") produces i n our minds a s e r i e s 
o f sub-models o f i n c r e a s i n g goodness o r wisdom, and t h a t 
t h i s r e s u l t s i n a d i s c l o s u r e of God "as ' i n f i n i t e l y good 1 " 
e t c . (cf.RL ? 0 ) , The 1'unction or t h e q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l i s t o 
evoke i n t h i s manner " t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i t u a t i o n i n which 
G od i s Known" (RL 8 0 ) . But i s i t i n f a c t God whom we 
i n t u i t i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n ? I t would seem more n a t u r a l t o say 
t h a t v/hat we come t o know as we survey a s e r i e s of 
i n c r e a s i n g l y wise o r good human "beings i s t h e meaning - i . e . 
t h e sense, n o t t h e r e f e r e n c e - o f t h e concept " i n f i n i t e l y 
w ise" or " i n f i n i t e l y good". What "breaks i n on us", what 
i s d i s c l o s e d t o us, i s not an " e n t i t y " but a "concept". 
For t h e purposes o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n we may accept 
the d e f i n i t i o n of a "concept" as "a c o n v e n i e n t a b b r e v i a t i o n 
f o r t h e c o n n o t a t i o n o r sense o f words o r phrases as such" 
(Heath 179). A concept i s t h u s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e n o t i o n 
or i d e a s i g n i f i e d by a c e r t a i n word o r phrase. 
" E n t i t y " , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , i s a somewhat more 
ambiguous word. I s h a l l t a k e i t t o he a word c o n n o t i n g a 
t h i n g t h a t has r e a l e x i s t e n c e : i . e . a r e a l i t y t h a t e x i s t s 
" o u t s i d e " people's minds ( u n l i k e a concept - which might be 
c a l l e d a "me«ntal e n t i t y " ) . 
The examples t h a t have been g i v e n above as 
d i s c l o s u r e s o f concepts ( e . g , " u n i t y " , ' p e r f e c t i o n " , " e t e r n i t y " 
e t c . ) are not so u n d e r s t o o d by Ramsey h i m s e l f . H i s view 
seems t o be t h a t such d i s c l o s u r e s r e v e a l t h e meaning o f t h e 
word i n q u e s t i o n "both by d i s c l o s i n g i t s sense ( " c o n n o t a t i o n " ) 
and by d i s c l o s i n g i t s r e f e r e n t ("nominatum " ) ^ . Thus i n h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e example o f " u n i t y " , Ramsey w r i t e s : 
We a r e p u z z l e d as t o what e x a c t l y t h e word 
means, so we t r y i t s o p p o s i t e . . . A c c o r d i n g 
t o t h i s t e c h n i q u e we approach t h e meaning 
of " u n i t y " . 3 . h 
i f anyone wishes t o Know what i s meant by 
p r e d i c a t i n g " u n i t y " o f God, t h e f i r s t t h i n g 
we have t o do i s t o evoice such a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
s i t u a t i o n , (RL 54£ emphasis added) 
Here Ramsey i s most n a t u r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d as v i e w i n g t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , as a d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e sense 
o f t h e word " u n i t y " . But such d i s c l o s u r e s a r e a t t h e same 
t i m e , f o r Ramsey, d i s c l o s u r e s o f t h e " o b j e c t s " t h a t these 
words d e s i g n a t e . I n such d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s , Ramsey 
c l a i m s , " t h e word 'God' i s p o s i t e d " (RL 58; o f , i b i d . 62, 
73 - 74): i«e, we suggest "God" as t h e a p p r o p r i a t e word 
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t o d e s i g n a t e v/hat i s d i s c l o s e d i n such a d i s c l o s u r e . 
Thus.although Ramsey s t r e s s e s t h a t " t h e r e can be no f o r m u l a 
guaranteed t o produce God f o r i n s p e c t i o n " (RL 79) 9 he does 
not deny t h a t q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s , t h r o u g h t h e sequences 
developed from them, do d i s c l o s e God h i m s e l f and n o t j u s t 
p a r t of t h e concept o f God (cf„ RL 79 - 80, TL8, MM 65) . 
Ramsey's examples o f mat h e m a t i c a l d i s c l o s u r e s , which 
l i e t r e a t s as s u i t a b l e " i l l u s t r a t i o n s " o f , o r " p a r a l l e l s " t o , 
t h e r e l g i o u s cases ( c f . OBSR 23, MDA 206)' , are most 
i n s t r u c t i v e . Ramsey arguess 
' I n f i n i t e goodness" has a s t r u c t u r e n ot a l l t h a t 
u n l i k e " i n f i n i t e sum" o r " i n f i n i t e p o l y g o n " , 
and i f we w i s h t o have some c l u e s as t o t h e 
l o g i c a l p l a c i n g o f t h e word "God", we may be 
hel p e d by r e f l e c t i n g on t h e r e l a t i o n between 
" c i r c l e " and t h e poly g o n s t o r i e s , o r "2" and 
t h e sequence s t o r i e s . 
12.$ 
J u s t as no p o l y g o n , however numerous i t s 
s i d e s i s a c i r c l e ; j u s t as no sum o f no 
s e r i e s , however many i t s terms i s p r e c i s e l y 
2; so God as " i n f i n i t e l y good" i s not on a l l 
f o u r s w i t h Long John S i l v e r o r even St* 
Barnabas. (EL 70) 
We may r e a d i l y agree w i t h t h e l a s t few words quoted, b u t 
t h e r e s t o f t h e passage seems l e s s e o n v i n c i n g . F or i n t h e 
case o f an i n f i n i t e sum s as t h e s e r i e s progresses we " j u s t 
see" t h a t t h e sum i s t e n d i n g towards a l i m i t t h a t ( i n Ramsey's 
u s u a l example) equals 2„ That i s "2" i s p o s i t e d as t h e 
" a r i t h m e t i c a l name" o f what i s d i s c l o s e d ( a c e r t a i n I n f i n i t e 
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Sum) i n t h e d i s c l o s u r e . S i m i l a r l y " c i r c l e " i s p o s i t e d 
as t h e " g e o m e t r i c a l name" o f what i s d i s c l o s e d (a c e r t a i n 
I n f i n i t e Polygon) i n the d i s c l o s u r e around a s e r i e s o f 
r e g u l a r polygons w i t h an i n c r e a s i n g number o f s i d e s . But 
t h e l a t t e r d i s c l o s u r e c o u l d occur even i f t h e r e were no 
such t h i n g s as c i r c l e s , e.g. i n a w o r l d i n w h i c h o n l y 
s t r a i g h t l i n e s c o u l d be drawn. I n such a w o r l d i t would be 
c l e a r t o us •= u n l e s s w i t h P l a t o we i d e n t i f i e d concepts 
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w i t h i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t i e s o r forms - t h a t what i s d i s c l o s e d 
i s t h e concept "Polygon w i t h an i n f i n i t e number o f s i d e s " : 
a concept t h a t corresponds, i n our w o r l d , t o an e n t i t y 
we c a l l a " c i r c l e " . T h i s r e v e a l s t h e l o g i c o f t h e 
ma t h e m a t i c a l case. The concept i s d i s c l o s e d and we know 
( i n d e p e n d e n t l y ) t h a t t h e concept i s , more o r l e s s adequately, 
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i n s t a n t i a t e d i n t h e r e a l w o r l d 0 
Ramsey admits t h a t t h e d i s c l o s u r e c o u l d occur even 
i f "we had never heard about c i r c l e s " (TG 91) and d i d not 
Know them i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e d i s c l o s u r e (MDA 64)» We might 
t h e n " C a l l what i s d i s c l o s e d 'X' ", and o n l y l a t e r - i f a t 
a l l - add " f o r 'X' rea d " c i r c l e ' " (MDA 64 - 65) . T h i s 
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' r e v i s i o n of t h e polygon analogy" (Evans (IRTG) 220) s a t i s f i e s 
Donald Evans a t l e a s t , b ut o n l y i n so f a r as what i s d i s c l o s e d 
i s a concept r a t h e r t h a n an e n t i t y , , For Evans w r i t e s : 
t h e r e l i g i o u s s e r i e s i s supposed t o h e l p us 
t o come t o un d e r s t a n d what "God" means and 
what " l o v i n g " means when a p p l i e d t o God. ( i b i d , , 219) 
I n t h e r e l i g o u s case 'X1 i s " I n f i n i t e Goodness", f o r i t i s 
I n f i n i t e Goodness t h a t i s d i s c l o s e d ( o f , i b i d . 220). But 
t h i s o n l y means t h a t t h e sense o f t h e phrase " I n f i n i t e 
Goodness" i s d i s c l o s e d t o us. We may d i s c o v e r l a t e r t h a t 
t h e r e does i n f a c t e x i s t some i n s t a n c e o f " I n f i n i t e Goodness"; 
t h a t t h e r e a c t u a l l y i s a nominatum, d e s i g n a t e d ( s i g n i f i e d ) 
by t h e word "God", which i n s t a n t i a t e s t h a t sense (meaning) 
t h a t has a l r e a d y been d i s c l o s e d . But Ramsey's d i s c l o s u r e s 
t h r o u g h q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s appear t o r e v e a l o n l y t h e sense 
e n t i t y r e f e r r e d t o b^, t h e word "God". 
But t h i s , o f cou r s e , i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m what must 
most o f a l l i n t e r e s t a r e l i g i o u s e p i s t e m o l o g i s t - d i s c l o s u r e s 
t h a t r e v e a l a r e a l e x i s t e n t e n t i t y . We s h o u l d agree t h a t 
".when we know what t h e phrase ' i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g 1 ' r e f e r s 
t o , we know God" (TL 8 ) . But we must add t h a t knowing what 
the phrase r e f e r s t o i s n o t t h e same as knowing t h e meaning 
of t h e phrase. And i t i s o n l y t h e l a t t e r t h a t a q u a l i f i e d -
model d i s c l o s u r e seems t o p r o v i d e , 
( i i ) D i s c l o s u r e s o f E n t i t i e s and D i s c l o s u r e s o f T r u t h s 
" I do n o t use d i s c l o s u r e " , Ramsey w r o t e , " i n what 
might be c a l l e d t h e newspaper sense o f d i s c l o s u r e , i . e . , a 
sense which c a r r i e s w i t h i t o v e r t o n e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n d i s c l o s e d " 
(FD 115). I n Ramsey's eyes what i s r e v e a l e d i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
t h e cone turn off e p t j o f , and not t n e nomina the 
no 
i s , g e n e r a l l y speaking, an e n t i t y ( o r - as we have argued above -
a c o n c e p t ) and not a t r u t h . There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t 
Ramsey b e l i e v e s t h a t we can have i n t u i t i v e knowledge o f an 
o b j e c t t h a t i s l o g i c a l l y independent o f t h e t r u t h o f any 
p r o p o s i t i o n s about t h a t o b j e c t . I n a Ramseyan d i s c l o s u r e 
we come t o have c e r t a i n t y " t h a t x i s " w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o 
do more t h a n t e n t a t i v e l y a f f i r m "what x i s " . T h i s i s t h e 
b a s i s o f Ramsey's o f t - r e p e a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n between i n c o r r i g i b l e 
experieBeand c o r r g i b l e language, Ramsey appears t o d e r i v e t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n from R u s s e l l ' s d e m a r c a t i o n between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n ; and i t i s t o an 
a n a l y s i s o f t h i s account o f knowledge t h a t we must now t u r n . 
B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l ' s e a r l y views on t h e d i f f e r e n t 
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t y p e s o f knowledge may be d i s p l a y e d t h r o u g h h i s own 
summary i n The Problem o f P h i l o s o p h y ; 
We nave f i r s t t o d i s t i n g u i s h knowledge of t h i n g s 
and knowledge o f t r u t h s . I n each t h e r e are two 
K i n d s , one immediate and one d e r i v a t i v e . Our 
immediate Knowledge o f t h i n g s , which we o a l l 
a c q u a i n t a n c e , c o n s i s t s o f two s o r t s , a c c o r d i n g 
as t h i n g s known are p a r t i c u l a r s or u n i v e r s a l s , . , 
Our d e r i v a t i v e knowledge o f t h i n g s , w h i c h we 
c a l l knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n , always i n v o l v e s 
b o t h acquaintance w i t h something and knowledge 
o f t r u t h s ? ? . Our immediate Knowledge o f t r u t h s 
may be c a l l e d i n t u i t i v e knowledge, and t h e 
t r u t h s so known may be c a l l e d s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s . 
Among such t r u t h s a r e i n c l u d e d those which 
merely s t a t e what i s g i v e n i n sense, and a l s o 
c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l and a r i t h m e t i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s and ( t h o u g h w i t h l e s s c e r t a i n t y ) 
some e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . Our d e r i v a t i v e 
Knowledge o f t r u t h s c o n s i s t s o f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t 
we can deduce f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s by t h e 
use o f s e l f - e v i d e n t p r i n c i p l e s o f d e d u c t i o n . 
( R u s s e l l (PP) 62 - 63) 
On R u s s e l l ' s view we have acquaintance w i t h something v/hen 
we have "a d i r e c t c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n t o t h a t o b j e c t " , when 
we are " d i r e c t l y aware o f t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f " (Russell(KAf<.B) 152). 
!3( 
On t h e o t h e r hand "we have d e s c r i p t i v e Knowledge o f an o b j e c t 
when we Know t h a t i s t h e o b j e c t h a v i n g some p r o p e r t y o r 
p r o p e r t i e s w i t h which we a r e a c q u a i n t e d " ( i b i d . 166). For 
R u s s e l l - a t t h i s stage - sense-data, u n i v e r s a l s and ( p o s s i b l y ) 
our s e l v e s a r e Known by acq u a i n t a n c e ; whereas p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s 
and o t h e r minds, f o r example, are o n l y Known by d e s c r i p t i o n s 
" t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s i n v o l v e d b e i n g u s u a l l y such as i n v o l v e 
sense-data." ( i b i d . 166 = 167)» Knowledge by acquai n t a n c e 
i s t hus Knowledge o f an e n t i t y r a t h e r t h a n knowledge o f a f a c t 
o r a t r u t h ; u n l i k e " k n o w i n g - t h a t " i t i s not a " p r o p o s i t i o n a l 
a t t i t u d e " . For R u s s e l l knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n i s Knowledge 
by i d e n t i f y i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s . We can be s a i d t o know a 
person o r a t h i n g ( i . e . an e n t i t y ) by d e s c r i p t i o n , b ut t h i s 
o n l y means t h a t "we Know t h a t a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n a p p l i e s 
t o something and t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y one t h i n g t o whioh i t 
a p p l i e s " ( P r i c e (B) 65) . Thus Knowledge o f x "by d e s c r i p t i o n " 
reduces t o Knowledge o f t r u t h s about x. 
T h i s a n a l y s i s of Knowledge was c l o s e l y t i e d up w i t h 
t h e problem o f t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f c e r t a i n t y . R u s s e l l h e l d 
t h a t "we may...be c e r t a i n o f a sentence o n l y i n t h e degree 
t o which we are a c q u a i n t e d w i t h i t s ' c o n s t i t u e n t s ' " (Danto 
210)„ For R u s s e l l and h i s f o l l o w e r s t h e fundamental o b j e c t 
o f such i n c o r r i g i b l e Knowledge by acquaintance was a sense-
datum. For I a n Ramsey, however, i t i s t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
Other, raw o b j e c t i v i t y , which may o r may not be d e s c r i b e d 
i n terms o f sense-data."This, and t h i s a l o n e , can be 
cla i m e d as c e r t a i n , basic, immediate, w i t h o u t i n f e r e n c e . . . " 
(FD 119). Ramsey w r i t e s o f " R u s s e l l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
Knowledge by acquai n t a n c e and Knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n " 
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t ; 
both o±' these a r i s e a t one and t h e same t i m e 
out o f t h e same s i t u a t i o n . Tnere i s an "immediate" 
d i r e c t i n c o r r i g i b l e f e a t u r e , and t h i s i s t h e 
o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e which i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n . 
There i s a l s o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the d e s c r i p t i o n s , 
t h e t a l k , and t h i s i s something which i s l e s s 
o r more r e l i a b l e . I t may be more vague o r more 
precises, but i t w i l l never have, indeed l o g i c a l l y 
i t c o u l d n o t have, f e a t u r e s t h a t belong o n l y t o 
d i s c l o s u r e s and never t o a s s e r t i o n s , ( i b i d . 122; 
cr.MMH 265) 
I n " F a c t , Metaphysics & God", Ramsey devotes some 
space t o an a n a l y s i s o f t h i s aspect o f R u s s e l l ' s t h e o r y o f 
knowledge. He argues t h a t R u s s e l l i s t r y i n g t o do two t h i n g s : 
( a ) t o i n d i c a t e a c e r t a i n s o r t o f d e t a i l e d datum 
v/hich can be a s o l i d b a s i s f o r knowledge. T h i s , 
he t h i n k s , would be " i t " , "x", a " c o l o u r e d p a t c h " , 
but a l s o 
( b ) I suggest he i s t r y i n g t o c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o 
a c e r t a i n c u r i o u s awareness which he c a l l s 
" a cquaintance"... (U-FMG 1/5/7) 
Ramsey agrees t h a t t h i s " c u r i o u s awareness" i s a f a c t o r i n 
a l l Knowledge ( i b i d . 1 / 1 0 / 1 2 ) , but p r e f e r s t o d e s i g n a t e i t 
a " c u r i o u s s i t u a t i o n " ( 1 / 6 / 8) o f " s u b j e c t - o b j e c t awareness" 
(1/10/12; cf.1 / 1 2 / 1 4 ) . Thus i t i s c l e a r t h a t what Ramsey 
c a l l s , some pages l a t e r , t h e " e m p i r i c a l o d d i t y " o f R u s s e l l ' s 
a o q u a i n t a n c e - e x p e r i e n c e i s c l o s e l y a k i n , f r o m Ramsey's 
v i e w p o i n t , t o t h e b a s i c element i n r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . 
Ramsey i s t h e r e f o r e w i l l i n g t o suggest t h a t "not even sense-
d a t a £ a r e 3 g i v e n w i t h o u t some k i n d o f numinous e x p e r i e n c e " 
(U-FMG 9 / 6 3 / 1 7 0 ) 7 8 . R u s s e l l ' s "acquaintance" t h e n , i s t h a t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between knower and known t h a t Ramsey u s u a l l y 
d e s c r i b e s i n terms o f d i s c l o s u r e and ( i n t u i t i v e ) d iscernment. 
However i s "a c q u a i n t a n c e " a fo r m o f knowledge,, as R u s s e l l 
contends? T h i s p o i n t has been much d i s p u t e d . C r i t i c s o f 
R u s s e l l have argued t h a t he has confused a ca u s a l c o n d i t i o n 
f o r knowledge w i t h a s p e c i a l t y p e o f knowledge. They contend 
t h a t our knowledge t h a t x i s ^  i s c e r t a i n l y caused by our 
s e n s a t i o n of x, but q u e s t i o n whether t h i s means t h a t t h e 
mere s e n s i n g o f x i s a d i s t i n c t s p e c i e s o f knowing. 
Knowledge by a c q u a i n t a n c e i s . . . 
. . p a r t o f t h e e m p i r i c i s t program o f f i n d i n g 
o b j e c t s o f ex p e r i e n c e o f which t h e r e i s no 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f doubt. Yet t h i s knowledge 
must be e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t e n t l e s s , s i n c e any 
a t t e m p t t o say what one knows must be t o 
go beyond t h e immediate ex p e r i e n c e and 
d e s e r t kno7/1 edge by acquaintance. I n t h i s 
sense, t h e r e f o r e , t h e concept o f knowledge 
by acquaintance i s b o t h u s e l e s s and m i s g u i d e d . 
There i s no such t h i n g as knowledge by 
acqua i n t a n c e i n t h i s sense, s i n c e what one 
knows must always be i d e n t i f i a b l e under a 
d e s c r i p t i o n and t h u s i m p l i e s knowledge by 
d e s c r i p t i o n s (Hamlyn (TK) 106; cf„ Pears 
(BRBTP) 126) 
A l b e r t H o f s t a d t e r i n h i s a r t i c l e , "Does I n t u i t i v e 
Knowledge E x i s t ? " , d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two d i f f e r e n t senses 
o f i n t u i t i o n s 
( 1 ) i n t u i t i o n as immediate awareness o r 
apprehension o f an o b j e c t , c o n t e n t , o r 
s u b j e c t m a t t e r , and 
(2 ) i n t u i t i o n as a mode of knowledge 
developed on t h e b a s i s o f immediate apprehension 
( o p . c i t . 81) 
I n t u i t i o n o f t y p e ( l ) i s not i t s e l f knowledge: " I t cannot be 
Knowledge, f o r t h e r e i s i n i t no a c t o f a f f i r m a t i o n o r d e n i a l 
no a t t r i b u t i o n o r i n f e r e n c e . I t cannot be s a i d t o be t r u e 
o r f a l s e . . . " ( i b i d . 82) , H o f s t a d t e r claims t h a t t h e r e 
can be no n o n - p r o p o s i t i o n a l , non-judgmental knowledge by 
ac q u a i n t a n c e . There can o n l y be " i n t u i t i v e knowledge" i n 
the sense o f "an act o f mind about, d i r e c t e d t o , or r e g a r d i n g 
yQ 
i m m e d i a t e l y apprehended s u b j e c t m a t t e r " ( i b i d 0 82) 0 
Other c r i t i c i s m s o f R u s s e l l ' s v i e w t h a t s e n s i n g i s a for m 
81 8 of knowing have'been v o i c e d by H.A. P r i t c h a r d , G i l b e r t Ryle 
H.L.A. H a r t , A.M. Q u i n t o n ^ and Don Locke . Such a wei g h t 
o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p i n i o n must c e r t a i n l y he t a k e n s e r i o u s l y , 
I would suggest, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t we t r e a t " a c q u a i n t a n c e " as 
a causal c o n d i t i o n f o r knowledge and not as i t s e l f a s pecies 
o f Knowledge, I n which case i t seems t h a t our i n t u i t i v e 
d iscernments cannot s t a n d a l o n e , but need t o be s p e l l e d 
out i n terms o f language ( t r u t h s ) . Thus i n t u i t i o n s must 
become "Knowledge-that" i n o r d e r t o bear t h e s t r a i n t h a t 
an epistemology l i K e Ramsey's would b r i n g upon them, 
( i i i ) The D i f f i c u l t Cases 
I f we are t o i n t e r p r e t Ramsey's i n t e n t i o n as t h a t 
o f p r e s e n t i n g an account o f d i s c l o s u r e s o f e n t i t i e s , t h e n 
we are f a c e d by t h e d i f f i c u l t cases of u n i v e r s a l s , 
86 
m athematical " e n t i t i e s " and v a l u e s . I n what sense are 
these " e n t i t i e s " ? Should we r a t h e r view them as d i s c l o s e d 
"concepts"? Or a r e such d i s c l o s u r e s more n a t u r a l l y 
c l a s s i f i e d as d i s c l o s u r e s o f t r u t h s ? Some account o f t h e 
n a t u r e o f such p r o b l e m a t i c o b j e c t s o f discernment must now 
be a t t e m p t e d , 
( a ) U n i v e r s a l s 
P r e d i c a t i v e u n i v e r s a l e ( i . e , p r o p e r t i e s and r e l a t i o n s 
o f t h i n g s j a r e u s u a l l y accounted f o r on one o f t h r e e t h e o r i e s ? 
( i ) "Realism" h o l d s t h a t u n i v e r s a l s are a b s t r a c t 
e n t i t i e s h a v i n g an e x i s t e n c e independent o f t h e human mind, 
P l a t o b e l i e v e d t h a t such s u b s t a n t i a l u n i v e r s a l s e x i s t e d ( o r 
s u b s i s t e d ) o u t s i d e space and t i m e ; whereas A r i s t o t l e 1 s v e r s i o n 
o f r e a l i s m argued t h a t u n i v e r s a l s were p r o p e r t i e s t h a t 
e x i s t e d o n l y i n p a r t i c u l a r s , , 
( i i ) " Conceptualism" r e g a r d s u n i v e r s a l s s i m p l y as 
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mind-dependent concepts , 
( i i i ) " N o m i n a l i s m " t a k e s a v a r i e t y o f forms. Extreme 
n o m i n a l i s t s contend t h a t o n l y p a r t i c u l a r s e x i s t and t h a t 
u n i v e r s a l s are s i m p l y g e n e r a l names, i , e , t h a t a l l t h a t a 
c l a s s o f t h i n g s has i n common i s t h e common name t h a t we use 
of them a l l . However a l e s s extreme v e r s i o n i s t o he f d u n d 
i n t h e S i m i l a r i t y ( o r Resemblance) Theory, which can be 
t r a c e d back t o Hobbes, T h i s t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t 
t h i n g s t o which a g e n e r a l p r e d i c a t i v e term a p p l i e s are 
r e l a t e d by resemblance . On such a view a u n i v e r s a l i s 
n e i t h e r a r e a l e n t i t y nor a concept, f o r t o say t h a t t h e r e 
i s a u n i v e r s a l x _ i s t o say o n l y t h a t t h e r e are p a r t i c u l a r s 
which resemble one an o t h e r i n x - ness ( i . e . " i n b e i n g x " ) . 
Thus when one says t h a t t h i n g s have a "common p r o p e r t y " 
one does n o t mean t h a t t h e r e i s one p r o p e r t y p r e s e n t i n 
them a l l , b u t t h a t t h e r e are r e a l s i m i l a r i t i e s between 
them which a r e s u f f i c i e n t f o r us t o use one word o f them a l l . 
Contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s u s u a l l y adhere t o some 
form o f nomin a l i s m , a r g u i n g t h a t "what makes a term g e n e r a l 
i s i t s b e i n g used t o mark r e c u r r e n t f e a t u r e s o f t h e w o r l d 
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and n o t i t s s t a n d i n g f o r a s p e c i a l s o r t o f a b s t r a c t o b j e c t " 
(Ayer(CQP) 207). R u s s e l l ' s c r i t i c i s m t h a t resemblance i s 
i t s e l f a u n i v e r s a l ( c f , e,g, R u s s e l l (PP) 55) i s o f t e n 
employed a g a i n s t t h e Resemblance Theory; i t has been 
co u n t e r e d by t h e d e n i a l t h a t two s i m i l a r i t i e s , even i f t h e y 
are " t h e same", must be i n s t a n c e s o f a u n i v e r s a l s i m i l a r i t y 
95 - 98; 
(Woozley/cf. S t a n i l a n d 60 - 66). A.M. Q u i n t o n , who accepts 
R u s s e l l ' s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e Resemblance Theory, proposes i n 
i t s p l a c e a t h e o r y based on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f " n a t u r a l c l a s s e s ' 
A c c o r d i n g t o Q u i n t o n , t o say t h a t t h e r e a r e p r o p e r t i e s i s 
t o say t h a t t h e r e a r e n a t u r a l c l a s s e s t o which c o n c r e t e 
t h i n g s may be as s i g n e d . "A p r e d i c a t i v e u n i v e r s a l " , t h e n , 
" i s what t h e members o f a n a t u r a l set.,have i n common " 
( Q u i n t o n (u) 381). 
But our q u e s t i o n must be,11 Where does Ramsey stan d 
i n t h i s debate? "< We must now r e t u r n t o h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n 
"F a c t , Metaphysics & God" o f R u s s e l l ' s account o f "Knowledge 
by a c q u a i n t a n c e " . R u s s e l l , a t l e a s t a t one t i m e , h e l d t h a t 
we are a c q u a i n t e d w i t h u n i v e r s a l s ( o f . R u s s e l l (PP) 28, 
62 - 62) which he viewed as s u b s i s t e n t e n t i t i e s ( i b i d . 57). 
We have a l r e a d y n o t e d t h a t Ramsey's d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n 
i s on a par w i t h R u s s e l l ' s s i t u a t i o n s o f "acquaintance". 
L a t e r i n " F a c t , Metaphysics & God" Ramsey no t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
t h a t u n i v e r s a l s o r " e t e r n a l i d e a s " f i n d t h e i r " e m p i r i c a l 
anchorage" i n d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s . He goes on: 
But a u n i v e r s a l would n o t t h e n be something 
br e d by i m a g i n a t i o n out o f p a r t i c u l a r s 
u n l e s s t h a t b r e e d i n g c o n t i n u e d u n t i l more t h a n 
p a r t i c u l a r s were evoked - i n f a c t t h e s i t u a t i o n 
i t s e l f . Nor i s a u n i v e r s a l a l o n g s t r e t c h o f 
c o l o u r l a i d up somewhere o r o t h e r i n an o c c u l t 
w o r l d as though an e t e r n a l i d e a were some 
s p e c i a l brand o f idea.(U-FMG B 56/169) 
I n Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y he notes once more t h a t u n i v e r s a l s 
are known i n d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s , and r e a f f i r m s t h a t t h e y 
are n ot " t h i n g s l a i d up i n some hea v e n l y r e g i o n " ( F I 106). 
But these apparent r e j e c t i o n s o f P l a t o n i c r e a l i s m are t o 
be balanced by t h e f a c t t h a t Ramsey goes on i n Freedom and 
I m m o r t a l i t y t o draw a c l o s e p a r a l l e l between t h e " e m p i r i c a l 
p l a c i n g " o f language about u n i v e r s a l s and t h a t o f t h e words 
" s o u l " and " s p i r i t " ( i b i d . ) . And a l t h o u g h Ramsey has been 
c r i t i c i z e d f o r a p p e a r i n g t o make t h e s o u l " i n no sense an 
e n t i t y " ( c f . Lewis ( F l ) 174) he has r o u n d l y d e n i e d t h a t 
t h i s i s what he i n t e n d s (FRFI 352). I t would seem t h a t 
Ramsey wishes t o renounce a l l t a l k t h a t c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d 
as c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s " a n o t h e r w o r l d " o f t r a n s c e n d e n t 
r e a l i t i e s t h a t a r e e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h i s w o r l d o f 
e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t i e s (of, CF 34). Thus, even i f Ramsey b e l i e v e s , 
as I s h a l l seek t o show t h a t he does, t h a t God, t h e s e l f and 
o t h e r s e l v e s are " e n t i t i e s " , t h e y a r e o n l y e n t i t i e s i n a 
t r a n s c e n d e n t , m e t a - e m p i r i c a l sense. They are n o t t o be 
t h o u g h t o f as d i f f e r i n g f r o m e m p i r i c a l e n t i t i e s s o l e l y i n 
degree,, 
I t may be, t h e n , t h a t Ramsey would accept some 
fo r m o f r e a l i s m w i t h r e g a r d t o u n i v e r s a l s , p r o v i d e d t h a t 
i t was of a s u f f i c i e n t l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d n a t u r e . We must now 
t a k e note o f h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f u n i v e r s a l s i n "Facts and 
D i s c l o s u r e s " , Here he once more r e f e r s t o R u s s e l l ' s account 
o f acquaintance w i t h u n i v e r s a l s , and comments; 
I n o t h e r words, i t i s as and when we see 
i n s t a n c e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r s e n s i b l e q u a l i t y 
t h a t t h e r e may break i n on us, sooner o r 
l a t e r , a d i s c l o s u r e , and we g i v e t h e name 
u n i v e r s a l t o t h i s o f which we are t h e n 
aware. But t h i s always t r a n s l a t e s bacK 
i n t o p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s o f t h a t which we 
speaK o f as t h e u n i v e r s a l , f o r example, c o l o u r . 
U n i v e r s a l words a r e no more, though no l e s s , 
t h a n words which bear w i t n e s s t o a d i s c l o s u r e 
reached i n a c e r t a i n way v i z . , by s u r v e y i n g 
a s e r i e s o f p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s „(FD 130) 
He t h e n adds, v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y , " C a t e g o r i e s l i k e substance 
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and u n i v e r s a l s are best seen as l a b e l s f o r d i f f e r e n t routes 
i n t o a d i s c l o s u r e o f t h a t which i s o t h e r t h a n m y s e l f " ( i b i d . ) 
I n t h i s paper, as we have seen, Ramsey i s d i s c u s s i n g a t 
l e n g t h t h e fundamental d i s c l o s u r e o f o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e ; 
T h i s i s an o b j e c t i v i t y which may bear many d i f f e r e n t l a b e l s 
r e l a t i n g t o " t h e d i f f e r e n t s t r a n d s o f d i s c o u r s e which p r o v i d e 
the s t o r i e s l e a d i n g t o a d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e one i n d i v i d u a t i o n , 
t h e one o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n t , what Locke c a l l e d 'something' " 
( i b i d . ) . A u n i v e r s a l word, t h e n , i s hut one - inadequate -
l a b e l f o r t h e o t h e r d i s c l o s e d i n a l l d i s c l o s u r e s . The 
problems r a i s e d by t h i s l a t e s t d i s c u s s i o n o f Ramsey's w i l l 
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be examined below . We may n o t e , however, t h a t here a g a i n 
Ramsey seems t o be t r e a t i n g a d i s c l o s u r e o f a u n i v e r s a l as 
a " d i s c l o s u r e o f an e n t i t y " , so t h a t c o n c e p t u a l i s m o r 
nominalism would n o t serve as an adequate account o f h i s 
own p o s i t i o n . A g a i n a s o p h i s t i c a t e d i'orm o f r e a l i s m m i g h t 
be n e a r e r t h e mark 9 
However, those who p r e f e r a v i e w o f u n i v e r s a l s based 
on resemblance between p a r t i c u l a r s o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f 
" n a t u r a l c l a s s e s " , might argue t h a t a d i s c l o s u r e o f a 
u n i v e r s a l i s a t y p e o f " r e c o g n i t i o n d i s c l o s u r e " . For a 
d i s c l o s u r e around p h y s i c a l p a r t i c u l a r s would enable us 
t o r e c o g n i z e t h e resemblances between them (and t h e r e f o r e 
t h e c l a s s e s i n t o which t h e y n a t u r a l l y f a l l ) . We may note 
t h a t M i c h a e l P o l a n y i i n t e r p r e t s our knowledge o f u n i v e r s a l s 
as a s p e c i e s o f "comprehension" ( P o l a n y i ( L T I ) 1 1 ) : and we 
have a l r e a d y remarked t h a t Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s such comprehension 
as a ( r e c o g n i t i o n ) d i s c l o s u r e . T h i s f a c t may be adduoedas 
evidence t h a t d i s c l o s u r e s o f u n i v e r s a l s c o u l d be subsumed 
under t h e same heading. 
( b ) M a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s 
The i'ormal u n i v e r s a l s o f mathematics may be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m p r e d i c a t i v e u n i v e r s a l s i n t h a t " w h i l e 
p r e d i c a t i v e u n i v e r s a l s can and u s u a l l y do have i n s t a n c e s , 
f o r m a l u n i v e r s a l s are r a t h e r i d e a l l i m i t s t o which a c t u a l 
t h i n g s more o r l e s s c l o s e l y approximate" ( Q u i n t o n (TJ) 581 )„ 
Such "abstract e n t i t i e s " include geometrical e n t i t i e s such 
as s t r a i g h t l i n e s , c i r c l e s , t r i a n g l e s etc. These are 
" i d e a l i z e d , complex concepts of whose a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o 
concrete t h i n g s we can never he sure" (Quinton (NT) 255). 
However, they could, i n p r i n c i p l e , be p r o p e r t i e s of concrete 
thingso 
We may t r e a t Ramsey's disc l o s u r e of a c i r c l e 
around a series of r e g u l a r polygons (cf„ RL 69 e t c ) as a 
di s c l o s u r e of such an " i d e a l i z e d , complex concept"% and 
t h i s does seem to be how he himself views the d i s c l o s u r e of 
a s t r a i g h t l i n e (cf„ RSCS 8 ) 0 We have already discussed 
the t h e s i s t h a t " f i r s t cause", " i n f i n i t e goodness" etc, are 
l i m i t i n g concepts of the same general ki n d . 
Geometrical " e n t i t i e s " , then, are best t r e a t e d 
as concepts,, Numbers, however, provide us w i t h a more 
d i f f i c u l t o n t o l o g i c a l problem, Plato espoused an 
e s e e n t i a l i s t or r e a l i s t view of a l l mathematical e n t i t i e s , 
proposing not only geometrical but also a r i t h m e t i c a l forms 
( i . e 0 mind-independent, e t e r n a l e n t i t i e s ) . However i t does 
not appear t h a t numbers could, even i n p r i n c i p l e , be 
p r o p e r t i e s of concrete t h i n g s . Modern philosophies of 
mathematics, t h e r e f o r e , have t r e a t e d them rather d i f f e r e n t l y . 
On the L o g i c i s t theory numbers have been t r e a t e d as classes -
the number 3? i'or example, being the olass composed of a l l 
classes having 3 members. Formalists, on the other hand, 
regard numbers as purely formal words ( d e f i n i t e q u a n t i f i e r s ) 
whose use involves no o n t o l o g i c a l commitment on the part 
of the mathematician ( c f , Korner passim, Ayer (CQP) ^07 - 208, 
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Quinton (NT) 255 - 257) , Ramsey i s s i l e n t on the issue , 
however, so perhaps we may f e e l f r e e to side w i t h the 
f o r m a l i s t s and t r e a t at l e a s t Ramsey's disclosures of 
mathematical l i m i t s as disclosures of "concepts". Thus when 
"11" i s disclosed as the l i m i t of a series ( o f , F I 120 - 122) 
we are not being confronted by some mathematical " e n t i t y " but 
by a formal concepts However i t may be even more appropriate 
t o argue that what we have here i s a disclosure of a 
mathematical t r u t h - i . e . the t r u t h t h a t the l i m i t of the 
series i s 1. I n a s i m i l a r way the disclosure of the 
i n v a r i a n t vT (3« 14159) m&y be t r e a t e d as the d i s c l o s u r e of 
the t r u t h , "there i s an i n v a r i a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
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circumference 4- diameter whioh equals 3 .14159"« 
( c ) Moral Values 
Ramsey may be broadly c l a s s i f i e d as a "moral 
i n t u i t i o n i s t " , f o r he believes t h a t we can Jcnow by i n t u i t i o n 
(discernment) whether a c e r t a i n a c t i o n or p r i n c i p l e of 
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a c t i o n i s r i g h t or wrong . Ramsey w r i t e s most f r e q u e n t l y , 
i n f a c t , o f the i n t u i t e d nature of "moral claims" (cf.MJGC 
160 - 168). H.P. Owen, another philosopher of religion who 
lays stress on the r o l e of i n t u i t i o n i n e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n , 
has defended the view th a t moral claims e x i s t ( o r s u b s i s t ) , 
independently of t h e i r instances, as a t t r i b u t e s of God 
( c f . Owen (MACT) e s p e c i a l l y chs. 1 and 3 ) . Thus: 
The form of the moral law as a c a t e g o r i c a l 
imperative i s the personal command of God 
and„the general precepts of t h i s law 
c o n s t i t u t e the content of h i s w i l l . ( i b i d . 68) 
Such a view seems t o bestow " r e a l existence" on Moral Values, 
but only i n so f a r as they are (somehow) grounded i n God 
( c f . Owen i b i d . 82; also K. Ward (EC) 76, 99, Ewing (VR) 
199 - 200) . 
Ramsey, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , o f f e r s us no e x p l i c i t 
ontology of values, But there are i n d i c a t i o n s i n h i s work 
t h a t he would he w i l l i n g t o accept something not u n l i k e the 
account described above. For despite h i s acceptance of the 
autonomy of ethics (MJGC 167» MacQ, 113)> Ramsey does w r i t e 
of the t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such terms as "Duty" 
and the "Moral Lav/" as a matter of s e t t i n g our everyday value-
claims " i n a wider context" (MJGC 167, of, PI 54 - 5 5 ) . 
I n t h i s way we may eventually, a l b e i t w i t h the r e q u i s i t e 
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curcumspection , use of them such phrases as "God's w i l l " 
or "God's command" ( i b i d , 170 ) o Thi3 "broadening of context" 
i s a q u i t e general element i n Ramsey's approach and r e l a t e s 
to h i s basic c o n v i c t i o n (discussed below) t h a t " i n every 
disclosure the object can eventually bear the name 'God' " 
(FRFI 355)o I n the case of moral o b l i g a t i o n the s t a r t i n g 
p oint f o r such "broadening" i s our prima f a c i e d u t i e s ; 
Start w i t h prima f a c i e duties. Next, note 
how a c o n f l i c t of duti e s may be resolved 
by broadening our range of relevant 
considerations u n t i l an "absolute" Duty 
emerges, or an "absolute" Value i s discerned, 
when we now have a cosmic disclosure: the 
empirical basis f o r b e l i e f i n God.(U-HA; 
"The T r a d i t i o n a l Arguments f o r the Existence 
of God (Contd)" H 65 , 1965',P»4) 
Thus, f o r Ramsey," a disciosureAabelled 'Absolute Duty' or 
'Absolute P e r f e c t i o n ' i s one which c l o s e l y resembles i n i t s 
character the d i s i o s u r e t o which t h e i s t s appeal when they 
speak of »God» " (PFMT 171), and "we should l i n k 'God' to 
an o b l i g a t i o n word l i k e 'Duty 1 by t a l k i n g i n terms of 'God's 
w i l l ' " ( F I 49)<> 
As a p o s t s c r i p t t o t h i s discussion i t should be 
noted t h a t Ramsey seems t o wish t o r e t a i n h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
between what i s disclosed and our language about what i s 
disclosed even when discussing values. He thus d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
"between a norm which, as a transcendent challenge, i s 
absolute, and a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h a t norm which may "be 
r e l a t i v e " (N 1521). As he has p r e v i o u s l y defined "a 
p r e s c r i p t i v e norm" as "an imperative, accepted by the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s some k i n d of i n t u i t i o n " ( i b i d , , 1520) , we 
may be f o r g i v e n f o r being somewhat perplexed as to what a 
" d e s c r i p t i o n " of such an imperative could be. Perhaps Ramsey 
i s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g here bstween the general, formal moral 
i n t u i t i o n , " I must do my duty" (as an imperative; "do your 
d u t y " ) , and the s p e c i f i c actions t h a t can give content to 
"doing one's duty". Thus he can w r i t e elsewhere; 
when men have spoken of Absolute Duty, 
Absolute Goodness, or Absolute P e r f e c t i o n , 
they have been searching f o r an appropriate 
l a b e l to a d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n i n which 
there was no p o s s i b i l i t y of any other than a 
s i n g l e unambiguous, unmistakable response. 
But i t would not seem t h a t t h i s i s ever the 
case w i t h formulations of duty a (PPlflT 171, 
of. OBSR 475 ~"~ 
We have returned here to the contrast between the c e r t a i n t y 
of our i n t u i t i o n s ( i n t h i s case our moral i n t u i t i o n s ) and the 
t e n t a t i v e nature of the language we use about such i n t u i t i o n s . 
But i n the case of moral i n t u i t i o n s , even more than i n 
other cases^ t h i s analysis faces us w i t h a d i f f i c u l t y . 
For i t seems redundant to analyse out a formal "contentless" 
i n c o r r i g i b l e i n t u i t i o n - even i f i t takes the form of 
some sort of d i r e c t "acquaintance" w i t h the moral nature of 
God - t h a t i s separate from the moral t r u t h s (or i m p e r a t i v e s ) , 
i , e . the moral language, t h a t can alone d i r e c t our actions 
i n any s p e c i f i c way. I f "moral" experience" i s a type of 
i n t u i t i o n then i t surely must i n v o l v e an i n t u i t i o n , i n the 
most general sense, of a t r u t h . 
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5« I n t u i t i o n i s m i n Epistemology 
(A) C r i t i c i s m s of I n t u i t i o n i s t Epistemology 
I t might he convenient at t h i s point to make some 
so r t of review and assessment of the r b l e of i n t u i t i o n i n 
epistemologioal t h i n k i n g i n general. We s h a l l then t u r n 
our a t t e n t i o n ( i n the next section) to the p a r t i c u l a r 
problems f a c i n g an i n t u i t i o n i s t r e l i g i o u s epistemology. 
Generally speaking, contemporary philosophers are 
less than happy w i t h appeals to i n t u i t i o n , Tney claim, 
f o r example, t h a t to say X knows p "by i n t u i t i o n " i s to 
o f f e r no r e a l explanation f o r h i s "knowledge", i t i s j u s t 
to hide behind a g r a t u i t o u s f a c u l t y psychology ( c f , Hudson 
(MMP) 103, Ayer (PK) 82, Hospers 137 - 139) , Another 
frequent c r i t i c i s m of i n t u i t i o n i s m i s d i r e c t e d at the 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s claim to i n f a l l i b i l i t y : 
The t r o u b l e w i t h i n t u i t i o n s of any sort i s 
t h a t they l a y claim to self-evidence, but 
cannot be proved. (Walsh (M) 95) 
A.J. Ayer voices the views of many when he contends th a t 
there cannot be "any mental states of i n t u i t i o n which are 
such t h a t t h e i r existence a f f o r d s an absolute guarantee 
tha t one r e a l l y i s . , .seeing what one t h i n k s one sees". 
For, on the contrary, " i t must always remain possible t h a t 
one i s mistaken" (Ayer (PK) 22: c f . also Aaron 266 - 268, 
Armstrong 15& e t c . ) . 
I t i s not doubted th a t there may be i n t u i t i o n s i n 
the sense th a t some things are known without proof, "the 
f o r c e of the word ' i n t u i t i o n ' " being " e x p l i c i t l y t o r u l e 
out the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r a t i o n a l e " (Hamlyn 82; c f . Ayer l o c . c i t . ) . 
But such benevolence i s u s u a l l y only shown to "vernacular 
i n t u i t i o n " which i s "psy c h o l o g i c a l l y " r a t h e r than " l o g i c a l l y " 
i n t u i t i v e . ( L o g i c a l l y i n t o t i v e b e l i e f s would oe j u s t i f i e d 
b e l i e f s t h a t do not r e q u i r e the support of other b e l i e f s 
i o r t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A ps y c h o l o g i c a l l y i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f , 
however, i s l o g i c a l l y i n f e r r a b l e from other b e l i e f s but i s 
(usually) accepted ;by a person as j u s t i f i e d without 
conscious inference: c f . Quinton (NT) ch.5.) 
I t may be tha t many apparently i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f s 
are i n f a c t "based on inference" i n some kind of i m p l i c i t 
manner. G i l b e r t Barman has argued t h a t " b e l i e f s may be based 
on inference even when they are not based on conscious 
inference", and i n such cases the inference i s "unconscious", 
while s t i l l serving i n some way as both the cause of and 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such beliei's (Harman 353 & passim), 
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W.T. Stace's account of these p s e u d o - i n t u i t i v e M i e f s 
explains t h a t they are reached " by some psychological process 
which i s not a process of reasoning" (Stace (PUB) 2 9 ) . Non-
r a t i o n a l , " merely psychological non-logical processes!', Stace 
claims, can lead t o t r u t h ( i j b i d . 35) - f o r such mental 
processes are guided by "associative thimcing" ("a crude 
Kind of i n d u c t i o n " : i b i d . 127) which may be described i n 
terms of conditioned r e f l e x e s . These " u n e x p l i c i t thought 
processes" (130) are u s u a l l y too r a p i d or too h a b i t u a l f o r 
t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s to be c l e a r l y distinguished from one 
another: 
Tne whole process i s apt to come i n what seems 
lii c e a single undivided act of thought- ( i b i d . 12y) 
When our reasoning becomes h a b i t u a l and automatic "we are .. 
moie or less unconscious of what we are t h i n k i n g , and the 
terms 4 judgments, and 'therei'ores' telescope" (132). Stace 
uses t h i s analysis t o e x p l a i n many kinds of " i n t u i t i v e " 
judgment, f o r example: 
(a) the judgments of perception made on the assumption of 
naive realism,which are a product of immediate apprehension 
of sense-data together w i t h u n e x p l i c i t i n d u c t i o n to 
physical o"bjeots (1 34) ; and 
(b) our b e l i e f i n other minds, which r e s u l t s from an 
u n e x p l i c i t act of analogical reasoning based on observation 
of people's behaviour (138). 
^3 t$J 
I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the defender of an 
i n t u i t i o n i s t epistemo'logy must face i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
problems of: 
( i ) the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n s ; 
( i i ) the extent to which i n t u i t i o n s may be "explained away" 
as unconscious inferences; and 
( i i i ) the usefulness of " i n t u i t i o n " as an explanatory concept. 
We may now consider these problems i n t u r n . 
( i ) The i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n s 
Contemporary p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c s of r a d i c a l l y 
i n t u i t i o n i s t epistemologies have presented a good case f o r 
saying t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l "Quests f o r c e r t a i n t y " - the 
searches f o r i n c o r r i g i b l e assertions - are p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
cul-de-sacs ( c f , e.g. J.L. A u s t i n (SS) ch.X, Danto ch . 7 & passim) 
But i s an i n t u i t i o n i s t epistemology i n e v i t a b l y wedded to the 
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view t h a t i n t u i t i o n s are i n c o r r i g i b l e ? . 
A„C. Ewing i s one B r i t i s h philosopher who has defended 
A 99 the r o l e of i n t u i t i o n i n epistemology i n recent years . Ewing 
defines i n t u i t i o n as an "immediate i n s i g h t " , a c o g n i t i o n 
t h a t i s ""both non-empirical and immediate", or a " d i r e c t 
awareness" (Ewing (NLP) 41 , 43; i b i d . (PQP) 6 5 ) . But he 
believes t h a t the advocate of t h i s form of c o g n i t i o n 
"can only defend h i s p o s i t i o n i f he makes one concession", i 0 e 0 s 
He must abandon the claim t o c e r t a i n t y and 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y which ha3 been commonly 
advanced f o r i n t u i t i o n i n the p a s t , w e 
cannot claim t h a t there i s a d i s t i n c t i v e 
state or act of mind, i n t u i t i o n , which 
has the property of being always right„(Ewing (NLP) 52) 
Of course, Ewing continues, the term " i n t u i t i o n " , l i K e the 
term "Knowledge", u s u a l l y connotes "not only t h a t our 
a t t i t u d e t o a p r o p o s i t i o n i s of a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , 
i t connotes also t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n towards which we have 
t h i s a t t i t u d e i s t r u e " ( i b i d . j ; c f . (VR) 43 - 44, also Boyce 
Gibson 2 5 ) ^ ^ . We should speak then of "apparent" ( p u t a t i v e ) 
i n t u i t i o n s or of "claims t o i n t u i t i o n " j u s t as we speak of 
"Knowledge claims", f o r such claims can be e i t h e r t r u e or 
f a l s e . I n t h i s essay, however, I s h a l l f o l l o w Ewing i n 
using the term " i n t u i t i o n " to cover both " r e a l " and "ostensible" 
(i„e„ both true and f a l s e ) i n t u i t i o n s ( c f . Ewing (VR) 126 -
127, (PQP) 49; also Schedler (Thesis) 186). 
I f we allow f o r the c o r r i g i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n s , 
the problem of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t u i t i o n s becomes transformed 
i n t o a problem about the t e s t i n g of i n t u i t i o n s . For only i f 
there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of " c h e c k a b i l i t y " can we embark 
on the road to knowledge ( c f . Walsh (M') 95 ~ 96 & K.Ward (MF))„ 
Ewing suggests t h a t an i n t u i t i o n may be tested i n several 
ways: (a) by i t s coherence w i t h other (accepted) b e l i e f s ; 
(b) by c r i t i c a l analysis both of the p a r t i c u l a r element 
believed t o be i n t u i t e d and of the whole subject-area i n 
which our i n t u i t i o n s a r i s e ; and (c) by "negative t e s t i n g " 
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l o r the in f l u e n c e of i n t e l l e c t u a l confusion or emotional 
prejudioe on the formation of the i n t u i t i o n ((NLP) 62 - 63, 
(PQP) 50 - 51; c f . also B a i l l i e (SPG) 55 - 5b, K.Ward (CG) 
66 - 67, Baelz (EB) 25 - 2 6 ) . I n shorts 
the primary c r i t e r i o n of the t r u t h of an 
i n t u i t i o n i s t h a t we must believe i t a f t e r 
an attempt at doubt, f o l l o w i n g carei'ul 
r e f l e c t i o n on i t and a l l i t involves. I f 
we cannot d i s b e l i e v e a f t e r t h i s there i s 
nothing l e f t but to accept i t as t r u e . (Swing (VR) 45) 
( i i ) Can " i n t u i t i o n " b e reduced to unconscious inference? 
Ewing believes t h a t the n o t i o n of (mediated) i n t u i t i o n 
i s required "throughout most or even a l l of epistemology" 
((VR) 125) . He p a r t i c u l a r l y stresses t h a t inference " i s 
q u i t e impossible without i n t u i t i o n " ((VR) 4 1 ) , f o r at some 
point i n our inference we must " j u s t see" t h a t A f o l l o w s 
from B ( c f . (NLP)j9). 
Ewing has developed t h i s argument i n a r e j o i n d e r 
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to the views of Stace and others t h a t equate " i n t u i t i o n " 
w i t h i m p l i c i t inference. He argues t h a t : 
t h i s i s no doubt t r u e of many pjrima f a c i e 
i n t u i t i o n s , but i t cannot possibly be t r u e 
of a l l . For even when a l l the i m p l i c i t 
inferences have been made e x p l i c i t and a l l 
the missing stages i n t e r p o l a t e d , . . . i t w i l l 
s t i l l be t r u e t h a t we must be able t o see 
how each stage i n the inference f o l l o w s 
from the preceding one„((VR) 43) 
Although Ewing agrees, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t "A conclusion which 
i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y immediate may not be l o g i c a l l y immediate", 
he adds, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , "but t h i s only puts the question 
f u r t h e r back" ((NLP)4 2 ) . 
W,.H, Walsh accepts t h i s p o i n t , but argues t h a t such 
an element of i n t u i t i o n " i s not of major s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r 
theory of knowledge". For "formal t h i n k i n g cannot lead to 
the discovery of genuinely new knowledge" (Walsh (RE) 5 9 ) . 
We may agree t h a t defending t h i s p a r t i c u l a r piece of ground, 
although i t reveals t h a t we have to allow f o r i n t u i t i o n at 
at l e a s t one po i n t i n our theory of knowledge, does not much 
ai d the i n t u i t i o n i s t s "battle over the wider f r o n t . 
Stace accepts unconscious inference as the 
explanation of our i n t u i t i o n s of m a t e r i a l objects and other 
minds, and even of our moral i n t u i t i o n s (Stace (PUB) 134 -
138). However he himself r e j e c t s t h i s explanation f o r our 
b e l i e f - t h a t m a t e r i a l objects e x i s t when they are not 
being perceived. The l a t t e r b e l i e f , he explains, "since i t 
cannot be proved by e x p l i c i t induction.„,cannot be reached 
by u n e x p l i c i t i n d u c t i o n " ( i b i d . 139) . I t serves, r a t h e r , 
as a type of "pragmatic" b e l i e f . But others would argue 
that there can be no v a l i d e x p l i c i t i nference, e i t h e r 
deductive or i n d u c t i v e , i n the other cases mentioned by 
Stace. For there are many areas of knowledge i n which there 
i s a l o g i c a l "gap" between the evidence and the conclusion, 
and i n order t o oppose the sceptic i n these areas the 
philosopher must t a c k l e the problem of " e s t a b l i s h i n g our 
r i g h t to make what appears to be a special s o r t of advance 
beyond our data" (Ayer (PK) 78, c f . Wisdom (PD) 66). Thus 
the evidence f o r our b e l i e f i n the existence of m a t e r i a l 
objects, other minds and God ( f o r example) appears to be 
data* or premises, th a t are on an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
o n t o l o g i c a l and epistemological l e v e l - i . e . sense-date, 
human behaviour and the Universe r e s p e c t i v e l y . We must 
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now examine the ways i n which t h i s gap can be bridged 
1 4 ? 
The b r i d g i n g of the epistemological gap 
Having d i s t i n g u i s h e d the two classes of epistemological 
object we may argue t h a t there are several d i f f e r e n t ways or 
t r e a t i n g the epistemological gap between them; 
(a) Scepticism 
The sceptic pronounces the gap unbridgeable. 
Statements about "objects of the transoending k i n d " (Quinton 
(NT) 113) do not f o i l ow deductively from statements about 
observable objects. Nor - since the transcending objects 
are not open to sense experience - can such statements 
f o l l o w i n d u c t i v e l y from statements about observables. 
Scepticism (agnosticism) i n the sphere of r e l i g i o n i s 
p a r a l l e l e d by scepticism of the same form about other 
minds, m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , the past, moral values, t h e o r e t i c a l 
s c i e n t i f i c e n t i t i e s etc. 
Tnis i s the most r a d i c a l approach to the problem 
of Knowledge; the other views o u t l i n e d below a l l seek to 
combat t h i s s c e p t i c a l account of knowledge of non-observables. 
(b) Seductionism 
The r e d u c t i o n i s t does not acknowledge t h a t there 
i s any epistemological "gap" to be bridged. He p r e f e r s to 
define the transcending object i n terms of observables, 
t r e a t i n g i t as a form of " l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n " from 
observable f a c t s ( c f . Gasking 192 - 193)- I n r e l i g i o n and 
e t h i c s t h i s approach i s described as "naturalism"; i n the 
theory of mind and the philosophy of perception i t r e s u l t s 
i n " l o g i c a l behaviourism" and "phenomenalism" r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
( c ) The S c i e n t i f i c Approach 
Those who take t h i s l i n e "accept the existence of 
15 O 
the gap between evidence and conclusion, but they hold t h a t 
i t can be bridged by a l e g i t i m a t e process of i n d u c t i v e 
reasoning" (Ayer (PK) 80). Evans describes t h i s as the 
"casual-explanation" v i e w ^ ^ , i n which an unobservable cause 
i s postulated as an explanation of observable e f f e c t s i n a 
way "which i s analogous to i n d u c t i o n " (Evans (PKCT) 12), 
Natural Theology (e.g. the argument from design) o f t e n 
f o l l o w s t h i s approach; as do those who argue f o r the 
existence of other minds on the basis of analogy and those 
who embrace the representative theory of perception. 
(d) The "complementar.y ~ d e s c r i p t i o n " view 
statements as complementary d e s c r i p t i o n s , i n d i f f e r e n t and 
unrelated language-games, of the same t h i n g . There i s no 
answer, on t h i s view, to the question, How do we know x? 
However, a study of the infor m a l l o g i c of ordinary discourse 
w i l l reveal t h a t we d£ know x - and on the basis of our 
Knowledge of observable f a c t s . This approach i s akin t o 
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Ayer's "Method of De s c r i p t i v e Analysis" , which allows 
us simply t o take the epistemological gap " i n our s t r i d e " , 
accepting the forms of inference we do employ i n disputed 
areas i n "a s p i r i t of n a t u r a l p i e t y " (Quinton (NT) 114, 
c f . Ayer (CQP) 107 - 108). The purpose of philosophy i s 
here presented as tha t of merely d e s c r i b i n g the ways i n which 
we use language. Once we c l e a r l y recognized these ways our 
epistemological problems w i l l disappear. 
(e) The "eva l u a t i v e - use" view 
This approach 'denies th a t the utterance which the 
sceptic questions i s a statement at a l l . . . R a t h e r . . i t i s a 
he ary view com c r i i o n 
This takes the "supporting" and "supported i i 104 
•value-judgement 1 11 (Evans (PKCT) 11). C l e a r l y t h i s i s a 
viewpoint t h a t i s most r e a d i l y a m i c a b l e to aesthetic and 
e t h i c a l knowledge, but i t may also be used i n the analysis 
of language about, f o r example, other minds and God. 
( f ) The Metaphysical Explanation view 
Here the transcending objects are "Known" as 
metaphysical ( r a t h e r than causal) explanations of observable 
f a c t s . Their existence renders " i n t e l l i g i b l e " the 
empirical f a c t s t h a t we know more d i r e c t l y . I n t h i s way 
10/ 
we might j u s t i f y realism as "making more sense o f " our 
t o t a l experience than does the i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n . 
S i m i l a r l y i t i s c l e a r t h a t God serves as a "Cosmos Explaining 
Being" i n the metaphysical system of the'ism; and the existence 
of other minds very r e a d i l y explains the observable 
behaviour of other b o d i e s ^ ^ . 
This approach tends to stress the o n t o l o g i c a l , as 
w e l l as the epistemological, gap between "supported" and 
"supporting" f a c t s . As Evans points out (op . c i t . 1 2 ) a 
philosopher may take up d i f f e r e n t approachsin h i s analysis 
of our knowledge of d i f f e r e n t epistemological objects. 
However i t seems l i k e l y t h a t the philosopher of r e l i g i o n w i l l 
f i n d t h i s p a r t i c u l a r viewpoint ( f ) one of the most a t t r a c t i v e . 
And i f i t proves t o be a u s e f u l , and d e f e n s i b l e , way of 
j u s t i f y i n g knowledge of God, he may be eager t o extend i t 
to other epistemological areas. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y 
to be the case when, as w i t h Ian Ramsey, i t i s combined 
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wi t h a form of i n t u i t i o n i s m i n which the transcending 
e n t i t y i s d i r e c t l y i n t u i t e d , as well as being recognized as 
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an adequate metaphysical explanation of how things are 
My own view i s t h a t , having r e j e c t e d scepticism, 
we s h a l l not remain s a t i s f i e d w i t h e i t h e r reductionism or 
the evaluative-use, approaches. For n e i t h e r of them taKe-s 
s e r i o u s l y enough our commonly accepted views on the nature 
of the transcending objects. On the other hand we s h a l l 
f i n d the S c i e n t i f i c Approach, w i t h i t s dependence on 
"an analogy t o i n d u c t i o n " , not at a l l easy to j u s t i f y i n 
many areas of Knowledge i n the face of the sceptic's 
attack. The complementary-description view, however, 
seems to solve epistemological problems only by i g n o r i n g 
them: so t h i s too we s h a l l wish t o avoid. I n which case 
we s h a l l f i n d ourselves holding t o approach (f),and/or 
r e t u r n i n g t o the only remaining s o l u t i o n t o the problem of 
the "epistemological gap": that of the i n t u i t i o n i s t , 
(g) I n t u i t i o n i s m 
This approach, l i K e reductionism = although i n a 
very d i f f e r e n t way, seeKs to a b o l i s h the gap by ho l d i n g 
t h a t there i s some so r t of d i r e c t access t o the transcendent 
object. Such objects (other minds, moral claims, physical 
o b j e c t s , God e t c ) are d i r e c t l y " i n t u i t e d " by the cognizing 
mind. Naive realism i s a theory of perception t h a t i s 
b a s i c a l l y i n t u i t i v e i n form. Ir/the f i e l d s of r e l i g i o n 
and e t h i c s , r e l i g i o u s and moral experience (or "sense") 
are also o f t e n understood as types of i n t u i t i o n . 
But the adoption of t h i s approach does r a i s e 
our f i n a l i'undamental problem: 
( i i i ) I s the appeal to i n t u i t i o n an explanation? 
The i n t u i t i o n i s t approach to epistemology has been 
condemned as " i n v o l v i n g mysterious special ways of knowing" 
(Gasking 192, of. Pole 26 - 27) which, being themselves 
i n e x p l i c a b l e 9 explain nothing, A c r i t i c i s m of t h i s nature, 
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made i n reference t o moral i n t u i t i o n i s m , has been met 
by Ewing i n the f o l l o w i n g manner; 
I t has been suggested th a t once we admit th a t 
no reason can be given i'or a moral p r i n c i p l e 
nothing i s added by saying t h a t we. i n t u i t i t . 
Since we can give no reason f o r the u l t i m a t e 
p r i n c i p l e s i n any case, a l l we need or can say 
i s t h a t we adopt them as our p r i n c i p l e s and 
leave i t at t h a t . But I submit t h a t i t makes a l l 
the d i f f e r e n c e i n the world. Why should I s t i c k 
t o my p r i n c i p l e s i f i t does not s u i t me unless 
they are judged by me to be morally binding 
and not merely a r b i t r a r i l y chosen? But I have 
the best of reasons i f I see them t o be t r u e , 
(Ewing (VR) 9 8 ) 1 1 1 
Further, i f anything i s to be known i n d i r e c t l y , something 
must be known d i r e c t l y . There must be some foundations 
to knowledge, and t h e r e f o r e some form of i n t u i t i v e awareness -
even i f i t i s only " e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n " ( c f , Quinton (NT) 
126, i b i d . (FK)), The r e l i g i o u s and moral (and a e s t h e t i c ) 
i n t u i t i o n i s t may be c r i t i c i z e d because h i s claims do not 
a t t r a c t the u n i v e r s a l agreement possessed by i n t u i t i o n s i n 
the realms of l o g i c a l and e m p i r i c a l knowledge. But t h i s 
f a c t merely reveals the more problematic nature of i n t u i t i v e 
claims about God and Values; i t by no means undermines the 
general importance of i n t u i t i o n i n epistemology. And w i t h 
regard to these disputed t o p i c s we may agree w i t h Ewing 
that an i n t u i t i o n which forms the baas of a whole department 
of knowledge should not be r e j e c t e d out of hand (Ewing (VR) 
46, c f , A t t f i e l d 337 - 338) , 
I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n t u i t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n ) can form a v a l i d basis of knowledge, and 
does i n f a c t serve as the only, or at l e a s t the l a s t , 
defence against the onslaughts of scepticism. An appeal 
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to i n t u i t i o n f a i l s "to exp l a i n how v/e know" only to those 
who have r e j e c t e d i n t u i t i o n as a basis f o r knowledge. But 
without some form of d i r e c t , i n t u i t i v e awareness no knowledge 
i s possible. 
(B) The RSle of I n t u i t i o n i n Religious Epistemology 
Having discussed the general problems f a c i n g an 
i n t u i t i o n i s t epistemology, I now t u r n t o look s p e c i f i c a l l y 
at the p o s i t i v e views taken of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n by some 
contemporary philosophers of r e l i g i o n . This w i l l r a i s e 
some f u r t h e r questions v/hich we must then ask of Ramsey's r e l i g i o u s 
epistemology. 
There has been a strong t r a d i t i o n i n recent 
philosophy of r e l i g i o n t h a t t r e a t s r e l i g i o u s c o g n i t i o n as 
a form of " c o g n i t i o n i n presence" (e.g. Hick (RPEA) 20, (FK) 
95 , (AEG) 116; c f . Helm (VB) ch . 8 ) or "acquaintance" w i t h 
the Divine R e a l i t y (e.g. B a i l l i e (OKG) 143, (SPG) 15 - 18, 
c f . 88 - 8 9 ) . Such an approach i s sympathetic t o the work 
of those theologians i n the Protestant t r a d i t i o n who t r e a t 
r e l i g i o u s knowing i n terms of a sense of "encounter" w i t h 
the d i v i n e , "a s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g d i r e c t awareness of God; 
a knowledge by acquaintance, from which a l l f a l l i b l e inference -
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steps are absent" (Hepburn (CP) 25) . These theologies 
and philosophers a l l answer Cook-Wilson's r h e t o r i c a l question 
w i t h a d e f i a n t "No": 
I f we t h i n k of the existence of our f r i e n d s ; i t 
i s the " d i r e c t knowledge" which we want - merely 
i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge seems a poor a f f a i r . , . 
We don't want merely i n f e r r e d f r i e n d s . Could we 
possibly be s a t i s f i e d w i t h an i n f e r r e d God? 
(Cook-Wilson, Statement and Inference Vol I I , 
p.853} i n N. Smart (HSPR) 453 - 454) ' 
To t r e a t our knowledge of God as being based on 
acquaintance i s c l e a r l y i'ar c l o s e r to the accounts of r e l i g i o u s 
knowing i n the B i b l e and devotional l i t e r a t u r e than i s any 
a n a l y s i s i n terms of i n f e r e n t i a l argument. Paul H elm 
w r i t e s , 
Knowledge by acquaintance...has a c l e a r 
necessary condition, becoming f a m i l i a r 
with by being i n the presence of and 
t a l k i n g to and being addressed by the 
one concerned, (Helm ("VB) 81) 
And t h a t , s u r e l y , i s what r e l i g i o n i s a l l about. 
I t i s , then, t h i s "acquaintance" with God that 
a number of t h i n k e r s have t r e a t e d i n terms of r e l i g i o u s 
i n t u i t i o n . They o f f e r an account of r e l i g i o u s knowing 
which may be i n t e r p r e t e d as defending a form of knowledge 
based on ( d e r i v i n g from) r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n or acquaintance, 
without our n e c e s s a r i l y having to defend the view that the 
i n t u i t i o n or acquaintance i s i t s e l f a form (type) of 
knowledge. But even with t h i s caveat, the notion of 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n r a i s e s some b a s i c problems f o r the 
philosopher of r e l i g i o n . We s h a l l consider j u s t three of 
these:-
( i ) The Problem of s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i o n 
Some t h e i s t s r e a d i l y accept that r e l i g i o u s awareness 
i s i n some way s e l f - g u a r a n t e e i n g (e.g. Trethowan (BB) 40 -
42, (AV) 67 - 79). But such claims to s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i o n 
f o r r e l i g i o u s experiences are thought by others to founder 
on the rock of c o n f l i c t i n g r e l i g i o u s experiences; i . e . the 
lac k of i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e agreement between d i f f e r e n t 
experients ( c f . Shepherd 7)- W.T. Blackstone contends: 
I f experience i s taken as a guarantee of i t s 
own v a l i d i t y , then there i s no way of 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g knowledge claims which are 
credihle from those which are not, 
(Blackstone (PRK) 143; cf . 156 - 157) 
Ronald Hepburn has complained that encounter theologians 
ignore the n e c e s s i t y of independent checking procedures, the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of which alone permits us to speak of an encounter 
experience as o b j e c t i v e r a t h e r than merely p s y c h o l o g i c a l : 
Genuine personal r e l a t i o n s c e r t a i n l y do have 
an immediacy, a d i r e c t n e s s , and uniqueness; 
but t h i s s o r t of immediacy i3 not s e l f -
a u t h e n t i c a t i n g , cannot i n f a l l i b l y answer the 
u e s t i o n ] , " i s there a person here or not?". 
Hepburn (CP)99; c f . a l s o Schmidt c h . V I I I ; 
C,B. Martin (RB) ch . 5 , (RWK)) 
But there i s , as we have seen, at l e a s t one champion 
of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n who i s w i l l i n g to forgo t h i s claim 
to the i n f a l l i b i l i t y of i n t u i t i o n s - A„C. Ewing. His view 
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of the phenomenon does leave room f o r "checking procedures" 
C l e a r l y these must be of r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t kinds from the 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d checks a v a i l a b l e i n normal sensory perception 
( c f . Ward (MF) 387, Glasgow 235). Quite apart from any 
other c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the r e l i g i o u s sense l i k e the moral or 
a e s t h e t i c sense, i s one sense. "Perceptual experience" 
("sense e x p e r i e n c e " ) , however, i s a term which covers f i v e 
very d i f f e r e n t senses, each of which may be checked against 
at l e a s t one of the others. Of course i t could be argued 
against t h i s u n i t a r y view of r e l i g i o u s experience, that 
there are a number of d i f f e r e n t " r e l i g i o u s senses" as w e l l . 
I n which case we could, f o r example, check the claims of 
" m y s t i c a l " experience a g a i n s t those of "prophetic" experience 
or "numinous" experienoe ( c f . Wainwright (MSP) 276). But 
those who r e j e c t the whole category of r e l i g i o u s experience 
\S1 
w i l l not be impressed by t h i s s o r t of " c h e c k a b i l i t y " . 
I w i l l argue l a t e r that the r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s t 
can agree with Hick that "a s u f f i c i e n t l y v i v i d r e l i g i o u s 
experience would e n t i t l e a man to claim to know that God 
i s r e a l " , f o r " i n h i s own experience of the presence of God 
he has a good, and compelling, reason to he sure of i t " 
(Hick (FK) 210). But th e i n t u i t i o n i s t does not need to 
claim f u r t h e r that such " u n a l t e r a b l e r a t i o n a l c e r t a i n t y 
of the v e r i d i o a l i t y of h i s v e r i d i c a l experience of God" 
(Oakes 315) i s l o g i c a l l y u n a l t e r a b l e : i . e . i n p r i n c i p l e 
u n a l t e r a b l e . I t may only be p r a c t i c a l l y u n a l t e r a b l e : 
i . e . nothing i n t h i s l i f e v / i l l i n f a c t change i t , although 
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i t remains ( i n p r i n c i p l e ) c o r r i g i b l e . Thus i t i s i n 
p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e that s o l i p s i s m i s tru e . Yet the " f e e l i n g 
tone" of my everyday, waking experiences of the world and 
of other people i s such tha t no argument or experience 
could ever make me a f f i r m i t . But i n any case I would 
contend that the "Quest f o r c e r t a i n t y " i s p o t e n t i a l l y as 
s t u l t i f y i n g i n theology as i t has been i n philosophy. 
R e l i g i o u s cognitions are not l o g i c a l l y i n c o r r i g i b l e , indeed 
i t seems i n general true that they are p a t e n t l y p r a c t i c a l l y 
' c o r r i g i b l e . Any defence of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s m ignores 
at i t s p e r i l t h i s p e r f e c t l y obvious f a c t ( o f . Root 75). 
( i i ) I s r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n mediated? 
I t seems to be g e n e r a l l y accepted among those who 
recognize the existe n c e of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n that such 
i n t u i t i o n s , although "immediate" i n the sense that they are 
n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l , are n e v e r t h e l e s s mediated through c e r t a i n 
e n t i t i e s or experiences. Thus Ewing d e s c r i b e s r e l i g i o u s 
c o g n i t i o n as " d i r e c t " (thus i n d i c a t i n g that i t i s not i n f e r r e d 
from i t s media) but "mediated". He w r i t e s ; 
To say that some toeing mediates God i s to say 
that a man may by c o n s i d e r i n g that being be 
put i n a i'rame of mind i n which he can catch 
a glimpse of God. (Ewing (VR) 123) 
T h i s i s true , he goes on to claim, not only of our knowledge 
of God (through nature, other people and v a r i o u s v i v i d 
experiences) but a l s o of our knowledge of p h y s i c a l things 
and other minds (through sense perception and bodily 
behaviour), of our Knowledge of the past, of our moral 
Knowledge and of our knowledge of u n i v e r s a l e . I n a l l these 
cases c o g n i t i o n "can use i t s media to acquire r e a l c o g n i t i o n 
of i t s object i n the absence of anything l i k e s t r i c t proof, 
and without being d i r e c t l y aware of the l a t t e r s i n t e r n a l 
nature or being face to face with i t i n a l l i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y " ( i b i d . 125). T h i s account of i n t u i t i o n , 
which i s shared by I l l t y d Trethowan (cf.(AV) 4« - A9, (MT) 
passim). Jonn B a i l l i e ( c f . (OKG) 178 - 183), H.P. Owen 
( c f . (CKG) 135) and H.D. Lewis ( c f . (OEG) 49 - 51), among 
others, has c e r t a i n i m p l i c a t i o n s that we must now consider. 
Before moving on to these p o i n t s , however, we 
should note that such a "mediated i n t u i t i o n i s m " would seem 
to demand some m o d i f i c a t i o n to our e a r l i e r account of the 
i n t u i t i o n i s t approach to the knowledge of transcending 
o b j e c t s . For, on the theory of Mediated i n t u i t i o n , i t i s 
not the case that we have d i r e c t access to God, other minds 
e t c , q u i t e independently of our knowledge of the "supporting 
f a c t s " of ordinary perception ( i 0 e . f a c t s about the world 
and human behaviour). Rather, such transcending o b j e c t s 
are "intimated through" the medium of observables. The 
d i f f e r e n c e between the two types of i n t u i t i o n i s m i s 
expressed i n the theory of perception i n the d i f f e r e n c e 
between N ai've ( i ( e , D i r e c t ) Realism (the view that we 
p e r c e i v e the e x t e r n a l world d i r e c t l y , as i t i s ) and " C r i t i c a l 
Realism" (the view that our perception of the e x t e r n a l world 
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i s mediated through our sense=data) 
( a ) Mediated i n t u i t i o n i s m i m p l i e s , as Ewing i n d i c a t e s , that 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s "a c o g n i t i o n not of God as he i s i n 
himself hut of God as he i s i n r e l a t i o n to us" ((¥R) 125). 
The i n t u i t i o n of God's own essence or nature has been 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e j e c t e d by C h r i s t i a n s as h e r e t i c a l ; as the 
heresy of "ontologism". So philosophers of r e l i g i o n are 
at pains to s t r e s s the mediated nature of the i n t u i t i o n s 
that they embrace ( c f . Lewis (GM) 230 - 232, (PR) 145; 
Trethowan (BB) 113 - 114; K a s c a l l (EA) 80, 8y - 90, ( M l ) 
73 - 75s> 91 ) • I t i s f o r t h i s reason that some - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those i n the C a t h o l i c t r a d i t i o n - p r e f e r such terms as 
"apprehension" ( i . e . "mediate but d i r e c t awareness of God"; 
Trethowan (BB) 63, c f . 78) or " c o n t u i t i o n " ( i . e . "the 
apprehension of the presence of the cause i n a perceived 
e f f e c t " : Mascall (Wl) 85) . 
(1) But what s o r t of things can serve as the medium f o r an 
i n t u i t i o n ? Ewing b e l i e v e s that God may be Known through 
c e r t a i n e n t i t i e s and experiences, but a l s o through "many 
kinds of symbols" (Ewing (NLP) 248). Owen a l s o l i s t s symbols, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c symbols, among the media f o r 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n (Owen (CKG) 140 - 141; c f . Urban 298, 
305). But do symbols serve as media f o r r e l i g i o u s c o g n i t i o n 
i n quite the same way as e n t i t i e s and experiences? T n i s i s 
an i s s u e of some importance i n the a n a l y s i s of Ramsey's 
thought. For although words (or p i c t u r e s ) can mediate an 
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i n t u i t i o n of God, they are c l e a r l y more "under our c o n t r o l " 
than things and (even) experiences. A f t e r a l l anyone can 
write a " B i b l e " or construct a theology or devotional essay 
f u l l of powerful symbolic imagery, and such language may indeed 
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mediate (evoke?) an i n t u i t i o n . But what s o r t of guarantee 
do we have that we are not being duped i n these cases? I f 
the i n t u i t i o n s that come through (our experience of) God's 
c r e a t i o n may be doubted, how much more the i n t u i t i o n s that 
are mediated by (our experience of) our own c r e a t i o n s ? 
( i i i ) Freedom and I n t u i t i o n 
I n h i s book, The Moral Argument f o r C h r i s t i a n Theism, 
H,P„ Owen commits himself to t h i s statement; 
We are immediately aware of c r e a t u r e s and 
c r e a t u r e l y a c t i v i t i e s . I t needs a d e l i b e r a t e 
a c t of w i l l to d i s c e r n God i n and beyond them 
as t h e i r constant ground, (op. c i t . 34) 
L i k e John Hick, then, Owen bel i e v e s that v/e have some " c o g n i t i v e 
freedom" i n our r e l i g i o u s perceptions. I s t h i s , however, a 
view that i s compatible with an i n t u i t i o n i s t r e l i g i o u s 
epistemology? Presumably there i s no room f o r such "freedom" 
i n our e m p i r i c a l or l o g i c a l i n t u i t i o n s . And we would f i n d 
i t d i f f i c u l t to defend the o b j e c t i v i t y of e t h i c s i f our 
moral i n t u i t i o n s were under our c o n t r o l . I s i t not the case 
that a l l i n t u i t i o n s "happen to us", that they are "forced 
upon us"? The r a t i o n a l mind c e r t a i n l y has a r o l e to play 
i n a c q u i r i n g knowledge, but i t i s not at t h i s point. We are, 
of course, f r e e to "put o u r s e l v e s i n t o a p o s i t i o n " i n order 
to r e c e i v e an i n t u i t i o n of God, as we are f r e e to open or 
c l o s e our eyes or move to a p o s i t i o n from which we can see 
an e m p i r i c a l object; but once we have committed ourse l v e s 
at t h i s preparatory l e v e l the i n t u i t i o n " j u s t comes" 
(or f a i l s to come) and we can nave no f u r t h e r say i n the 
matter. When the stage of i n t u i t i o n has passed, of course, 
we move i n t o another area of f r e e response; f o r we a l s o 
have the freedom to attend, or f a i l to attend, to the 
object i n t u i t e d . And we have some freedom of judgment i n 
the ways we i n t e r p r e t and seek to understand the i n t u i t e d 
datum. But the i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f can no more be avoided than 
we can "avoid" s e e i n g an object when we look at i t from 
c l o s e to i n a good l i g h t . A r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s t s 
therefore, should make c l e a r e x a c t l y which elements he 
takes to be w i t h i n our c o n t r o l i n the complex c o g n i t i v e 
process that we c a l l " r e l i g i o u s experience". He must be 
chary of embracing any r a d i c a l l y v o l u n t a r i s t i c a n a l y s i s 
of f a i t h . 
( i v ) The importance of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n 
One f i n a l word before we r e t u r n from t h i s d i g r e s s i o n 
among other philosophers and theologians to look again at 
the work of I a n Ramsey. I n an unpublished paper dating 
from about 19599 and found among Ramsey's papers, I l l t y d 
Trethowan wrote; 
I suggest that the question of an apprehension 
or i n t u i t i o n f o r c e s i t s e l f upon t b a s t s who do 
not accept s y l l o g i s t i c demonstrations of God's 
exi s t e n c e , Yfhat a l t e r n a t i v e i s there? 
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The i s s u e i s r a r e l y put i n so s t a r k a manner . But i f , 
as I b e l i e v e , a l l the t h e i s t i c arguments f a i l to prove God's 
exi s t e n c e , and God - although " e x p l a i n i n g " the Universe -
cannot be shown to be needed as an explanation f o r i t , then, 
indeed, what other a l t e r n a t i v e i s there f o r the t h e i s t ? 
Ewing has put the same point the other way round: 
The d i f f i c u l t y about i n t u i t i o n i n r e l i g i o n , 
we should a l s o emphasize, i s much diminished 
when we r e f l e c t t h a t , i f a benevolent God 
e x i s t s , we cannot but expect him to 
communicate i n some way knowledge of 
himself to us, and i f , as seems to be the 
case, l o g i c a l proof of the ex i s t e n c e and 
love of God i s l o g i c a l l y impossible, such 
Knowledge m.ight be we l l expected s u b j e c t i v e l y 
to take the form of i n t u i t i v e c o n v i c t i o n ; I 
do not see indeed what oiher form i t could 
take. (Ewing (VR) 123) 
Nor do I . Nor, I be l i e v e , did Ramsey. He r e j e c t e d the 
claims of the t h e i s t i c arguments "to supply t i g h t deductive 
proofs", r e i n t e r p r e t i n g them as providing " t a l k by which.„. 
a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e may be evoked f o r a pr o s p e c t i v e b e l i e v e r 
(CPCF 55; of. Sevan 345). Ramsey went to what some people 
considered to be i n o r d i n a t e lengths to r e v e a l the d i s c l o s u r e 
basis of any and every type of r e l i g i o u s a s s e r t i o n . T h i s 
could only be because he had come to accept: 
( i ) that r e l i g i o u s knowledge did as a matter of 
f a c t a r i s e b a s i c a l l y out of i n t u i t i v e r e l i g i o u s experience; 
and ( i i ) that the C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g i s t must take h i s 
stand on the only secure ground l e f t to himj i . e . the rock 
of i n t u i t i o n : 
Unless there i s such an experience as 
r e l i g i o u s experience.... there w i l l be no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a meaningful metaphysics 
i n general, or a meaningful theology i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . (U-FMG 90 /40 /H7) 
And i t i s to I a n Ramsey's own viewpoint that we must now at 
l a s t r e t u r n . 
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(C) I a n Ramsey as an I n t u i t i o n i s t 
We are now i n a p o s i t i o n to consider i n more d e t a i l 
I a n Ramsey's i n t u i t i o n i s t epistemology and the problems i t 
r a i s e s : 
( i ) The Mediated Nature of D i s c l o s u r e s 
I n Ramsey's view the epistemological object of a 
d i s c l o s u r e i s "given without i n f e r e n c e " (FD 119); he i s 
prepared to c a l l such knowledge "immediate" (e.g. FD 122, 
Enc, B r i t . 602), but the term " d i r e c t " would seem to be 
more appropriate ( c f . Review Trethowan 336). For Ramsey, 
l i k e the other r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s t s we have examined, 
thinks of the i n t u i t i v e c o gnition of the d i s c l o s e d "more" 
as mediated through the observable f a c t s and f e a t u r e s of 
the worlds 
The p l a i n f l a t situation.„„mediates something 
e l s e , r e v e a l s an "undercurrent". Around and 
out of the " p l a i n f a c t s " a d i s c l o s u r e occurs. 
(MJGC 166) 
For Ramsey, as f o r Berkeley ( c f . Review S i l l e m 8 5 ) , God i s 
met and known only "through the mediation of observables ( o f ) 
the s e c u l a r world" (U-ITR Evans 3 ) . 
We have a l r e a d y noted i n some d e t a i l the d i f f e r e n t 
media through which d i s c l o s u r e s occur, d i v i d i n g them broadly 
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i n t o the c a t e g o r i e s of " e m p i r i c a l " and " l i n g u i s t i c " 
However the point was made above that "symbols" (e.g. language) 
cannot be considered to have the same f u n c t i o n as that 
possessed by " e n t i t i e s " when they act as the medium of an 
i n t u i t i o n 0 The problem i s that a d i s c l o s u r e a r i s i n g s o l e l y 
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through the " medium" of language has as i t s medium some-
th i n g which i s e s s e n t i a l l y a human c o n s t r u c t i o n , and which 
I&4-
th e r e f o r e may, but e q u a l l y w e l l may not, represent the observable 
f a c t s of the world. But i f a d i s c l o s u r e takes place through 
the medium of an e x i s t e n t e n t i t y i n the world there i s at 
l e a s t that much j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n c a l l i n g i t a " d i s c l o s u r e of 
what i s the case". D i s c l o s u r e s through language, however, 
can only nave t h i s support i f the l i n g u i s t i c medium turns 
out to represent a c c u r a t e l y what i s the case. To take an 
example: a d i s c l o s u r e of a moral claim may a r i s e around a 
st o r y about a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n . But what i s d i s c l o s e d 
here would only be some person's 'duty" i f and when that 
s i t u a t i o n a c t u a l l y occurs. Even more obviously, we should 
not give much credence to any claim f o r a " d i s c l o s u r e of 
o b j e c t i v i t y " that took place around sensation-language, 
u n l e s s that language reported a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n s . I t does 
appear that Ramsey neglected to make t h i s c l e a r , i n h i s 
eagerness to recognise the r o l e of language i n the 
evocation of a d i s c l o s u r e . 
Now i n t u i t i o n s of God that take place through the 
medium of a B i b l e passage, a hymn, or a prayer, do not 
operate on the above model„ The hymn, f o r example, i s not 
intended to be a l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of e m p i r i c a l f a c t s about 
the world. Hence to describe both hymns and e m p i r i c a l f a c t s 
as "media" of d i s c l o s u r e s i s perhaps r a t h e r misleading. 
Language may evoke an i n t u i t i o n of God, but that i n t u i t i o n 
i s not "mediated through language". Rather - l i k e other 
i n t u i t i o n s of God - i t i s most l i k e l y to be mediated through 
(our experience o f) the world, and moral and a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e s . Language serves only as a s o r t of " c a t a l y s t " i n 
the evocation of such d i s c l o s u r e s . 
I t may be more appropriate, however, to speak of 
some l i n g u i s t i c d i s c l o s u r e s as "non-mediated" ( r e s e r v i n g the 
term "immediate" f o r the connotation "without i n f e r e n c e " ) , 
implying that the cognizing mind i n t u i t s the "more" i n such 
d i s c l o s u r e s v/ithout the medium of the observables of the 
ext e r n a l worlds T h i s l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may give r i s e 
to the c r i t i c i s m that i t i s f a l l i n g i n t o the heresy of 
ontologism ( c f . Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 74). But there w i l l always 
be one"medium"left, a medium that no form of co g n i t i o n 
can bypass; the human mind. Our minds, with t h e i r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s and concepts, are quite capable 
of forming as opaque a medium f o r our knowledge of God as 
does the e x t e r n a l world. I would suggest, therefore, that, 
i n a d d i t i o n to our d i r e c t ( i . e . u n i n f e r r e d ) knowledge of 
God that i s mediated through the world and through our 
mental apparatus, we can a l s o have a d i r e c t knowledge of 
God that i s not mediated through the world but only 
through our mental apparatus. 
But how would Ramsey re a c t to t h i s suggestion? 
We should note f i r s t of a l l that at l e a s t one of h i s more 
important types of d i s c l o s u r e i s noi-mediated i n t h i s sense, 
I r e f e r to the d i s c l o s u r e of I that takes place when we are 
e x e r c i s i n g our f r e e a c t i v i t y , or when we " r e a l i z e o u r s e l v e s " 
i n having an i n t u i t i o n of, e.g., a moral claim or God, 
Such a d i s c l o s u r e i s s u r e l y not "mediated" through the 
observables of the world, not even through our own sense-data 
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of the world or of our bodies . I t i s , r a t h e r , a non-
mediated d i s c l o s u r e . So Ramsey himself must allow f o r such 
a d i s c l o s u r e at one point i n h i s epistemology. 
But what about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a non-mediated 
d i s c l o s u r e of God? A f t e r a l l , i s i t not p o s s i b l e that we 
might be i n a d i r e c t c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p to God that 
takes the form of a "meeting of minds" and i s not mediated 
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through the m a t e r i a l world? Such a p o s i t i o n would be 
more a k i n to the " m y s t i c a l " form of r e l i g i o u s experience, 
whereas mediated d i s c l o s u r e s of God represent the "prophetic" 
element where God i s seen a t work i n the world and i t s 
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peoples , Western ( C h r i s t i a n ) m y s t i c s tend to speak of 
d i r e c t contact with God r a t h e r than i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with 
him, or absorption i n t o him, as i s common irythe E a s t ( c f . 
Lewis (OEG) 270, (PR) kd07, (CFRE) 79) . We may focus our 
a t t e n t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y on what has been c a l l e d the 
" i n t r o v e r t i v e " form of mysticism, as opposed to the 
" e x t r o v e r t i v e " form. Mystics who may be placed i n the 
l a t t e r category (and are sometimes c a l l e d "nature m y s t i c s " ) 
use t h e i r p h y s i c a l senses and per c e i v e "the m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of e x t e r n a l m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . . . m y s t i c a l l y t r a n s f i g u r e d so 
that the One, or the Unity, shines through them" ( S t a c e 
(MP) 61) . But the i n t r o v e r t i v e m y s t i c . . . 
...seeks by de l i t e e r a t e l y s h u t t i n g o f f the senses... 
to plunge i n t o the depths of h i s own ego. There.,, 
he p e r c e i v e s the One = and i s u n i t e d with i t -
not as a Unity seen through m u l t i p l i c i t y . . . . but 
as a wholly naked One devoid of any p l u r a l i t y 
whatever, ( i b i d . ) 
I n t h i s form of mysticism, the i n t r o v e r t i v e , a l l "awareness 
of the world and of m u l t i p l i c i t y ( i s ^ completely o b l i t e r a t e d " 
(ibido 122). 
We need not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w Stace any f u r t h e r , 
c e r t a i n l y not as f a r as h i s r a d i c a l t h e s i s that "the laws of 
l o g i c do not apply to m y s t i c a l experience" ( i b i d . 504)• Nor 
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do we need to accept Stace's argument that dualism i s "an 
undeveloped mysticism" which c o n t r a d i c t s the ultimate u n i t y 
or m y s t i c a l experience ( c f . 231 - 232), I would contend that 
the d u a l i s t i c accounts or mystios ( i . e . t h e i r b e l i e f that 
they have e s t a b l i s h e d contact, but not pure i d e n t i t y , with 
God) are nearer to the t r u t h of the matter than the accounts 
of m y s t i c a l experience that s t r e s s "the i d e n t i t y i n d i f f e r e n c e 
of God and the world ( i n c l u d i n g the mystic ^ " ( i b i d . 218), 
That t h i s l a t t e r view i m p l i e s the suspension of the laws 
of l o g i c i s s u r e l y s u f f i c i e n t condemnation; and reasons can 
be supplied to e x p l a i n why mystics have been tempted to 
i n t e r p r e t a s t r i c t l y d u a l i s t i c experience i n a monistic 
f a s h i o n ( c f . Lewis (EM) "3C-8, ( s i ) 189 - 193)« 
R.C. Zaehner notes that C h r i s t i a n mysticism i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y t h e i s t i c . I n t h e i s t i c mysticism "the soul 
f e e l s i t s e l f to be united with God by love", but the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s ego i s not a n n i h i l a t e d , nor i d e n t i f i e d with the 
Absolute or with God, but only "transformed and ' d e i f i e d ' " 
(Zaehner 29). Zaehner s t r e s s e s the prevalence of sexual 
imagery i n the accounts of t h e i s t i c m y s t i c s ; God, l i k e the 
male, both envelops and penetrates the so u l , which p l a y s 
the part of the female ( i b i d . 151 - 152). Here again, then, 
we note the element of dualism i n C n r i s t i a n mysticism; 
there i s a union with God, but i t i s a a i f f e r e n t i a t e d u n i t y 
and not a s t r a i g h t absorption or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . One r e c a l l s 
Ramsey's repeated emphasizing of the d u a l i t y - i n - u n i t y , 
the " I r 0", of experience ( c f . SRCP 296-297, SEI 200-201 ) . 1 2 5 
I a n Ramsey's own account of mysticism i s b r i e f . 
Yet he does not seem to discount the p o s s i b i l i t y of the non-
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mediated type of r e l i g i o u s experience that we have been 
d i s c u s s i n g . Rather, he devotes h i s a t t e n t i o n to a 
c r i t i c i s m of the monistic form of mysticism i n which the 
fundamental s u b j e c t - o b j e c t d i s t i n c t i o n i s l o s t ; a c r i t i c i s m 
that he a l s o makes of Hegel and Bradley, I n a review of 
W,T. Stace's work^ Ramsey wr i t e s ? 
I f once we deny the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t s t r u c t u r e of 
the i n t u i t i o n , how can ordinary language ever 
be used s i g n i f i c a n t l y about i t p s i n c e such 
language i s constructed on a presupposition 
about experience which the a l l e g e d f a c t 
denies? We may be the more s u r p r i s e d that 
Stace, a f t e r h i s vigorous campaign against 
l i t e r a l i s m i n the higher reaches, takes t h i s 
word " u n i t y " so " l i t e r a l l y " as to suppose 
that the experience which i t c h a r a c t e r i s e s 
must-feibenecessarily a uniform blank. 
On such a view the best theology w i l l be 
negative indeed; so negative as to say 
nothing whatever. (Review Stace 112; c f , JR6) 
I n Ramsey's eyes there are two c a r d i n a l s i n s r e l a t i n g to 
the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t d i s t i n c t i o n . One^which i s committed by 
both Hume and Ry l e , i s the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of the s u b j e c t . 
The other sin i s the one "the mystics commit when they 
s u b j e c t i f y the o b j e c t " (SE I 197; c f , a l s o Review Farmer 175). 
Ramsey b e l i e v e s , on the contrary, that "the model of personal 
interchange" (i„e, a d u a l i s t i c model) may be used to cover the 
mys t i c ' s claim as w e l l as the claims of other types of 
r e l i g i o u s experience (U~FMG 9 /50/157) 1 
The evocative f u n c t i o n of r e l i g i o u s language 
i s described by Ramsey i n terms that are very s i m i l a r 
to those used by some myst i c s . Thus Ramsey speaks of c e r t a i n 
words as having as t h e i r "main merit" the a b i l i t y to give a 
"kind of technique f o r mediation" (RL53: c f . CD 6r( - 71 , Evans 
(IRTG) 221). Even the ontologioal argument i s viewed as a 
"technique f o r inducing a 'sense of the i n f i n i t e ' " (U-FMG 
(2) 10/82/189), But Ramsey's f a v o u r i t e example i s the 
I £9 . 
language of prayer ( c f , MDA 37, UP passim). Ramsey a l s o 
speaks of s i l e n c e as that "towards which a l l theology must 
point, and from which a l l t h e o l o g i c a l e x p l i c a t i o n emerges" 
(TTST 85) . He i s prepared to draw a very c l o s e p a r a l l e l 
between a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e and the "meditative s i l e n c e " of 
a poem (CD 18: c f , BS ?1 - 52, U-NRL 4 - 5 ) . Theology 
ser v e s to provide us "with an i n f i n i t e number of strands 
which express and help us to understand that meeting between 
God and ourselves which occurs i n the ' s i l e n c e ' of every 
cosmic d i s c l o s u r e " (TTST 85; c f , CPCP 60, UP 21). C l e a r l y 
t h i s element i n Ramsey's thought i s a l s o r e l a t e d to the 
language of mysticism, to the mystic'a s i l e n c e before the 
mystery of God. For Ramsey i t i s a " c o n t e x t u a l i z e d " s i l e n c e 
(TJ-Credo 6 ) , "a s i l e n c e i n t o which va r i o u s models enter and 
from which various d i s c o u r s e o r i g i n a t e s " (TTST 84) , But i t 
s t i l l remains a s i l e n c e , marking the inadequacy of any 
language to adequately represent the nature of the transcendent 
God. 
<4» + *. « 
I w i l l add here a f i n a l note under the general 
heading of the mediated nature of d i s c l o s u r e s . I t might 
be argued that the whole notion of a mediated awareness i s 
unclear and r e l i e s on unexplained metaphors. As we have seen, 
Ramsey uses v a r i o u s p r e p o s i t i o n s - e.g. "through", "around", 
"out of" - to i n d i c a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a d i s c l o s u r e -
discernment and the " t h i n g s " which serve as i t s medium. 
However the use of such metaphorical language would seem 
to be i n e v i t a b l e . And we are, after^.11, quite content to 
speak i n everyday contexts of media of communication "through" 
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which information and experiences are conveyed. We see the Prime 
M i n i s t e r through the image on the t e l e v i s i o n screen; we hear 
our f r i e n d through the e l e c t r i c a l impulses transmitted down 
the telephone wires. I n both these c a s e s , of course, a 
number of d i f f e r e n t media are involved. Thus the media 
through which we see the Prime M i n i s t e r when he appears on 
t e l e v i s i o n includes the l i g h t r a y s from the T.V, set to our 
eyes, the v i s u a l image on the T„v"0 screen, the e l e c t r o n i c 
c i r c u i t r y and c u r r e n t s (bn the T.V. s e t , the electro-magnetic 
( r a d i o ) waves from the T.V. t r a n s m i t t e r v i a the medium of 
the aa-ial and w i r i n g to the T.V. s e t , the c i r c u i t r y and 
c u r r e n t s from (and w i t h i n ) the T.Y, camera to the t r a n s m i t t e r , 
and the l i g h t rays from the Prime M i n i s t e r to the T.V. 
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camera . Unless a l l these media (of widely d i f f e r e n t 
Kinds) are present, no communication w i l l occur. 
We may argue that the s i t u a t i o n i s the same with our 
mediated awareness of epistemological o b j e c t s of a more 
transcendent nature. I n "seeing" God through the world, or 
other minds through the behaviour of other bodies, our mediated 
cognition (of God, other s e l v e s ) i s s i m i l a r l y superimposed on 
our lower-order, mediated c o g n i t i o n of the world and 
human behaviour through our sense-data. T n i s concept 
of superimposed l e v e l s of c o g n i t i o n i s to be found 
i n a number of other a n a l y s e s of religious experience; 
e s p e c i a l l y those of John Hick ( c f . Hick (PK) ch„ 5) and 
J e r r y G i l l . G i l l has d i s t i n g u i s h e d between the "realm-
model" and the "dimension-model" of r e a l i t y and experience. 
On the realm-model we speak of t h i s world of every day 
e x i s t e n c e and experience, and "another world" of transcendent 
v a l u e s and metaphysical e n t i t i e s ( G i l l (PRK) 117 = 119). On 
the dimension-model, however, we view human experience "as 
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being comprised of f o u r main, simultaneously i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g 
dimensions: the p h y s i c a l , the moral, the personal and the 
religious....The basic r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g among these 
dimensions (beingj one of mediation" ( i b i d . 120) . Such 
a dimension-model i s c e r t a i n l y operative i n the epistemoiogy 
of Ian Ramsey ( c f . G i l l (TSEK) 5?0 - 552) . Ramsey f r e q u e n t l y 
discusses disclosures i n terms of our discovery of "depth" 
or "another dimension" i n a s i t u a t i o n ( c f . TL14,RL 28). I n 
a d r a f t t y p e s c r i p t f o r Words about God, he wrote: 
[Contemporary philosophy] would warn us against 
supposing t h a t theology i s concerned w i t h some 
other realm a l t o g e t h e r , some sort of counterpart 
world, a supernatural separated from the n a t u r a l 
by a great g u l f . For the cost of such a g u l f 
w i l l be i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y : we s h a l l p r i c e theology 
out of meaning. But ( i t might be said) where 
w i l l theology then discover i t s topic? For i t 
can n e i t h e r remain content w i t h m a t t e r - o f - f a c t 
language (when i t i s not genuine theology at a l l ) 
nor can i t t a l k i n t e l l i g i b l y of something 
alt o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t from e m p i r i c a l f a c t . . . 
My own answer would be t h a t theology gains i t s 
reference i n s i t u a t i o n s where around matters-
o f = f a c t i s disclosed another dimension, where 
the eye of d e t a i l i s supplemented by the eye of 
f a i t h . (U-^Gj d r a f t B, 4 - 5 ) 
I a n Ramsey, then, espouses a multi-dimensional, mediated 
i n t u i t i o n i s m . 
( i i ) The C e r t a i n t y of Disclosures 
The d i v i s i o n between disclosures and language, 
which i s im p l i e d by the d i f f e r e n t chapter headings i n t h i s 
t h e s i s , must not be overstressed. For i t i s at the j u n c t i o n 
"between the episteniological concept of the d i s c l o s u r e -
discernment and the whole issue of language and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
t h a t many of the most important problems i n Ramsey's 
epistemoiogy are to be found. One of these i s the problem 
of the " c e r t a i n t y " of disclosures. 
Ramsey's f a v o u r i t e "battle cry i s "Sure i n r e l i g i o n ; 
t e n t a t i v e i n theology". For Ian Ramsey r e l i g i o n i s about 
experiences of Godj, whereas theology i s a matter of 
attempting t o construct an ever more adequate, but always 
i n the end inadequate, language w i t h which to t a l k about 
what the r e l i g i o u s man experiences. So Ramsey w r i t e s : 
we can be sure of the reference of cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e s , of what i s disclosed i n a cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e , of what, when the word presides 
over the appropriate context, we c a l l "God". 
We begin to see perhaps, because of the 
i n a l i e n a b l e reference, why i t seems odd to 
t a l k of t a k i n g "God" away from a t h e i s t . But 
models of God can be and always are being taken 
away, c r i t i c i s e d , graded and ordered, and we 
are committed i n t h i s way to an endless 
e x p l i c a t i o n of what cosmic disclosure reveals. 
We can be sure about God; but we must be 
t e n t a t i v e i n theology, (CD 89; cf„ OBSR 23) 
Theology i s an attempt to "map a mystery" and the mystery 
of God i s a c e n t r a l d o c t r i n e f o r Ramsey. Such a doctrine 
implies a c e r t a i n " t h e o l o g i c a l h u m i l i t y " (CPCP 61), which i s , 
however, combined w i t h some element of c e r t a i n t y . The job 
of the apologist i s t o expand our v i s i o n " u n t i l we are 
c e r t a i n of one t h i n g - 'God1. I d e a l l y , indeed, God i s 
best communicated i n s i l e n c e . . . F a i t h w i l l always be cautious 
of i t s assertions - and the more d e t a i l e d , the more cautious" 
( i b i d . 60). So Ramsey d i s t i n g u i s h e s i n t h i s way between 
the spheres of r e l i g i o n and theology, pleading t h a t : 
we must d i s t i n g u i s h between the c e r t a i n t y and 
assurance of our v i s i o n and disclosure.„.and 
on the other hand the ever t e n t a t i v e , ever 
inadequate character of our C h r i s t i a n 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ^ Sermon ( 4 ) 61 = 6 2 ) . 
We may s t a r t our c r i t i c i s m of Ramsey's s u r e / t e n t a t i v e 
dichotomy w i t h t h i s l a s t q u o tation; t a k i n g f i r s t of a l l the 
not i o n of the c e r t a i n t y of r e l i g i o u s " v i s i o n " : i . e . 
d i s c e r n m e n t - i n t u i t i o n . What does i t mean to say tha t such 
an i n t u i t i o n i s "certain"? I n f a c t i t could mean very l i t t l e . 
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A l l experiences, a l l sensings, are c e r t a i n / t h e sense th a t 
when we have them v/e are c e r t a i n t h a t v/e have them. And 
a l l language can only he a t e n t a t i v e m i r r o r i n g of that 
experience; f o r the use of language involves reference to 
(comparison w i t h ) data outside the present s i t u a t i o n . 
John Hospers has put t h i s p o i n t c l e a r l y w i t h respect t o 
sense-datum r e p o r t s : 
I t i s c e r t a i n , of course, t h a t you sense what 
you sense, and tha t you. experience what you 
experience - hut t h i s i s a n a l y t i c ; the moment 
you t r y to describe the experience i n words, 
even using a simple sense-datum word l i k e "red", 
you are going beyond the momentary sense-datum 
tha t you are attempting t o r e p o r t . A p o s s i b i l i t y 
of e r r o r arises i n the very act of using language. 
(Hospers 542; c f . D.Locke 191 7 192, Vesey (P) 
42 - 44, Price (TC) 28 - 2 9 ) 1 2 6 
But, t o speak rather imprecisely, f o r Ramsey i t i s not j u s t 
the 
the i n t u i t i o n ( v i s i o n ) t h a t i s c e r t a i n , / " d i s c l o s u r e " also 
i s c e r t a i n . We can be sure of, c e r t a i n £f, what i s disclosed. 
I n a r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n we are not j u s t c e r t a i n t h a t we 
"have", or experience, the i n t u i t i o n as a psychological 
phenomenon. We are also c e r t a i n t h a t the i n t u i t i o n involves 
a discernment of a r e a l object. I n being sure of our 
r e l i g i o u s experience, we are sure of God0 
Here, however, Ramsey s t r i k e s a problem of which 
he does not seem to be s u f f i c i e n t l y aware. Let us take the 
" i l l u s t r a t i o n " t h a t Ramsey himself uses i n h i s book, On 
Being Sure i n R e l i g i o n (p.2 3 ) . The example i s one tha t 
he sees as suggesting the reasonableness of " t h i s union 
of r e l i g i o u s c e r t a i n t y w i t h t h e o l o g i c a l approximation" ( i b i d . ) . 
I t i s drawn (of course!) from mathematics: I f we construct 
a series of c i r c l e s of i n c r e a s i n g diameter "we may 'see' by 
means of t h i s sequence t h a t the circumference d i v i d e d by the 
diameters gives an i n v a r i a n t . I i ' so, we w i l l toe sure of 
\\ (OBSR 24). But i n expressing \\ i n "language" we never 
get beyond "numerical u n c e r t a i n t y " or approximation, 
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whether we suggest — or 3° 14159 ( i b i d . )„ However, " i n one 
good sense of the word", we knew TV a l l along (PI 115; 
c f . MM 6 5 ) . 
But what can t h i s mean? " I am sure of Tf " i s 
equivalent t o : (a) " I am sure th a t there i s an i n v a r i a n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the circumferences and the diameters 
of c i r c l e s " , and ( h ) " I am sure t h a t t h i s i n v a r i a n t i s 
approximately x" - where x may he, f o r example, the number 
"5 or a number range (say between 2 and 4 ) . However, 
Ramsey claims th a t the t e n t a t i v e nature of t h e o l o g i c a l 
t h i n k i n g i s p a r a l l e l e d by the numerical u n c e r t a i n t y , the 
approximate nature, of a l l f i g u r e s given f o r \\ . "We may 
be sure of H when the diagrams disclose i t , but we are 
always numerically approximate i n our understanding of i t " 
(OBSR 2 4 ) . And yet when we are "sure of U " we are not only 
sure t h a t there i s an i n v a r i a n t , \re are also sure t h a t t h i s 
i n v a r i a n t i s of a c e r t a i n nature ("approximately 3", or 
whatever). The nature, as w e l l as the existence, of the 
i n v a r i a n t i s disclosed to us. I f t h i s were not so 
mathematicians could say "There i s a constant f a c t o r here, 
but I have no idea what i t i s " , whioh i s surely absurd. 
I t i s as bad as saying, " I am convinced of God's existence, 
but I am r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n as to what he i s l i k e " . One 
surely must know something w i t h c e r t a i n t y about x before 
one can claim that x c e r t a i n l y e x i s t s . 
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Now Ramsey d i d admit, at l e a s t on one occasion, th a t 
some t h e o l o g i c a l assertions may he "so stable as t o be v i r t u a l l y 
i n c o r r i g i b l e " (ITR Owen 127) . He added, however, t h a t because 
"words and phrases i n theology l i v e i n a changing context.„„ 
though r e v e l a t i o n i s 'given', there i s nothing 'given* about 
the discourse which elucidates and i n t e r p r e t s i t " (ibid.)« 
Thus there i s another element i n the tentativeness of theology -
the f a c t t h a t "at each stage the t e n t a t i v e i s c o n t r o l l e d by 
the context to date" (OBSR 90 )« I take i t t h a t Ramsey means 
by t h i s t h a t we must be ready to modify our r e l i g i o u s 
language as the everyday s i t u a t i o n s and everyday language 
from which our t h e o l o g i c a l models are taken widens and 
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changes ( o f . CD 71 - 72) '. Of course the l o g i c a l context 
of a l l language i s l i a b l e to such change, although a t 
d i f f e r e n t rates depending on various h i s t o r i c a l and 
psychological f a c t o r s . 
Ramsey does suggest elsewhere that there i s a 
broad spectrum of "tentativeness" along which t h e o l o g i c a l 
assertions may be ranked; he does not pretend th a t a l l t h e o l o g i c a l 
language i s equally t e n t a t i v e . There i s , then, "an ordered 
array of models LwhichU of t e n characterize t h e o l o g i c a l 
discourse" and "the more d e t a i l e d our discourse i s about 
God, the closer our model i s t o the perimeter of the array, 
the more cautious we must be as we develop discourse from i t . 
Discourse about God i s the more r e l i a b l e the less d e t a i l e d 
i t i s e t , " (MM 23,). I propose the f o l l o w i n g as an i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of t h i s p o i n t . Consider the widening c i r c l e s or r i p p l e s caused 
by a stone being dropped i n t o a pond. The discernment-
i n t u i t i o n (the splash) gives r i s e t o various grades of 
language (the r i p p l e s ) , some of which serve as more 
"appropriate currency" ( o f . RL 5t>9 114 etc.) f o r the discernment 
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("being nearer t o the splash) than others. But a l l language 
( a l l the r i p p l e s ) are r e a l l y inadequate as currency f o r what 
i s discerned (the stone), simply because they are features 
of an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y or medium. I n t h i s 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , we can be c e r t a i n t h a t we experience the 
i n t u i t i o n (the splash) and may then commit ourselves t o the 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t there i s something th a t has caused the 
splash and t h a t i t must have c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (e.g. 
i t must be heavier than a i r and have f a l l e n through a 
minimum h e i g h t ) . But any more s o p h i s t i c a t e d attempt t o 
describe the nature of what i s disclosed (the stone) would 
be f r u s t r a t e d , e s p e c i a l l y i f the stone's nature was such 
tha t no language could adequat&y represent i t . And t h i s 
would be the case i f the object discerned were a transcendent 
mystery, e.g. God. 
However, our main question must be whether or not we do 
discern even an "o b j e c t i v e something" to which we l a t e r 
apply some t e n t a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s . We should note at t h i s 
point t h a t Ramsey uses the term " t e n t a t i v e " ("hesitant", "not 
d e f i n i t e " , "experimental") as a synonym of " c o r r i g i b l e " ("open 
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to c o r r e c t i o n " ) and as an antonym of " c e r t a i n " or " i n c o r r i g i b l e " 
( c f . CD 2b, CELCE y5 , ITR Owen 127, PPMT 17o" e t c . ) . 
Ramsey suggests on several occasions, however, t h a t 
"probable" might be a b e t t e r a d j e c t i v e than " t e n t a t i v e " , at 
le a s t when applied t o those basic assertions about God and 
ourselves" which can n e i t h e r be r i g h t l y regarded as 'absolutely 
o e r t a i n ' or 'wholly c o r r i g i b l e * 1 1 (PPMT 176) , These are assertions 
that combine an i n c o r r i g i b l e element (e. g. "J/exiaV, "God e x i s t s " ) w i t h 
a c o r r i g i b l e one (e.g. " . . w i t h a headache", "with such-and-
such a t t r i b u t e s " ) . The use of "probable" here i s derived 
from B u t l e r : "a sense which makes a 'probable' utterance 
completely determinative of one's t o t a l behaviour" ( i b i d . ) . 
Ramsey i s cla i m i n g t h a t we can be reasonably convinced of 
the existence of God, as B u t l e r claimed t h a t we could be 
reasonably (and s u f f i c i e n t l y ) convinced of our duty despite 
the elements of u n c e r t a i n t y i n d u t y - s i t u a t i o n s , "v/hile 
constantly e x p l o r i n g our t h e o l o g i c a l conclusions" (RFT 3 2 ) . 
I t i s a c e n t r a l plank of Ramsey's apologetic 
p l a t f o r m that a disclosure can have no "self-guaranteeing 
d e s c r i p t i o n " ( o f . Review Trethowan 336, CD 25)5 t h a t "no 
t h e o l o g i c a l conclusions f o l l o w i n c o r r i g i b l y from Q moment 
of v i s i o n " (CD 26)„ The mistake t h a t K a r l Barth makes, 
according to Ramsey, i s to collapse t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
netween a s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g d i s i o s u r e and the t e n t a t i v e , 
non s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g , language i n which i t i s expressed: 
Barth.„.supposes tha t w i t h a uniquely 
d i s t i n c t i v e and compelling r e v e l a t i o n -
" s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g " as he v/ould c a l l i t 
(and l e t us allow t h a t phrases l i k e t h i s 
may be apt la b e l s f o r the e x c e p t i o n a l l y 
p e c u l i a r r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n to which the 
C h r i s t i a n qua C h r i s t i a n males appeal) - there 
must necessarily go a unique and s e l f -
guaranteeing theology...in t h i s case we have 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a s i t u a t i o n i l l e g i t i mately 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o language. (PR 212: cf.Review Barth 137) 
Here, as elsewhere i n his w r i t i n g s (e.g. PI 48 , FRFI 3 5 4 ) , 
Ramsey uses the word " l a b e l " i n a qu i t e general sense. 
However, he of t e n uses i t to denote "an expression whose 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s self-guaranteed", "an i n f a l l i b l e a s s e r t i o n " 
which comes to us attached t o an a u t h e n t i c a t i n g d i s c l o s u r e 
(AC 74)o I * 1 "the area of language about God and the s e l f 
the term " l a b e l " thus acquires p e j o r a t i v e o v e r t o n e S j f o r 
there i t connotes an e m p i r i c a l l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d d e s c r i p t i v e 
account of what e s s e n t i a l l y .cannot "be described -
( c f , RL 165, RSCS 1 0 - 1 1 , OBSR 89, CD 44)0 
For Ramsey d e s c r i p t i v e language contains assertions 
("labels")"which guarantee t h e i r o b j e c t s " (CPCF 59). 
Ramsey means by t h i s t h a t " w i t h enough time and t r o u b l e 
complete understanding of these objects can be guaranteed" 
( i b i d , ) But he implies also t h a t we can "guarantee" success 
i n d i s p l a y i n g the object or stat e of a f f a i r s to which the 
ass e r t i o n r e f e r s , e.g. "copper sulphate turns white on 
heating" or "the cat s i t s on the mat". This i s not the 
much 
case, however, with/disclosure-based language because:-
(a) The disclosed-object i s e s s e n t i a l l y mysterious 
and transcendent and cannot t h e r e f o r e be understood completely 
i n s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ( u n q u a l i f i e d ) d e s c r i p t i v e language: 
the best examples we know of i n f a l l i b l e 
a ssertions, f o r example, "the cat i s on the 
mat", are, l i k e Russell's p r o t o c o l sentences, 
devoid of tha t very transcendent reference which 
i s needful t o make them r e l i g i o u s . (AC 78; c f . 
MDA 58) 
The problem of disclosures and language i s t h a t : 
the man of v i s i o n . .. never f i n d s words a i i t e d 
exactly to what he sees„,.tforO what he sees 
"passeth Knowledge". (CDOS 18) 
(b) The language which we use about a disclosed object i s 
i n part evocative rather than d e s c r i p t i v e ; and the "success" 
of t h i s evocative language cannot be guaranteed: 
we can't compel God to disclose Himself to 
people. S t i l l less t h i n k t h a t c e r t a i n 
language i s bound to do it.(U-NRL 7; cf« 
CD 68, CELCE 95) 
Tne theologian can o f f e r no guarantee t h a t the object of h i s 
ianguage w i l l be "displayed" as and when required. The 
scientist's success, on the other hand, depends i n a large 
part on j u s t such a guarantee. Tne "models" which make up 
r e l i g i o u s language are therefo r e only " s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g " 
i n the sense t h a t : 
e i t h e r ( i ) they serve to generate (evoke) a cosmic disc l o s u r e ; 
or ( i i ) a cosmic di s c l o s u r e " j u s t happens" which 
" h i g h l i g h t s a p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e w i t h i n " the disc l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n , and as a r e s u l t t h i s " f o c a l p o i n t " becomes a 
" s e l f - s e l e c t e d " model word ( c f . TG b8, MMR 268) . But 
theology i s not s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g i n any other,, more 
precise, sense,, 
We ought now to look more c l o s e l y at the argument 
i n Ramsey's paper, "On the P o s s i b i l i t y and Purpose of a 
Metaphysical Theology". I n t h i s essay Ramsey claims " t h a t 
we know something i n c o r r i g i b l y , to which c o r r i g i b l e 
d e s c r i p t i o n s are i n e v i t a b l y applied"(PPMT 176); contending 
that t h i s i s trueboth of assertions about ourselves and of 
assertions about God: 
as w i t h ourselves, so w i t h God, i n t u i t i o n and 
d e s c r i p t i o n go together, ( i b i d . ) 
" I e x i s t " and'God exists* 1 are s t r i c t p a r a l l e l s , both are 
i n c o r r i g i b l e and both are coupled w i t h c o r r i g i b l e d e s c r i p t i o n s 
(e.g. " . . . w i t h a headache", " . . . . w i t h omnipotent power"). 
I t would appear th a t Ramsey i s here t r e a t i n g both I and 
1 30 
God as l o g i c a l l y proper names without d e s c r i p t i v e content -
Thus Ramsey argues t h a t , although he i s "very w i l l i n g ... to 
allow degrees of c o r r i g i b i l i t y f o r d e s c r i p t i o n s " , he "cannot 
see t h a t i t w i l l ever reach zero, without a word changing 
i t s l o g i c a l character from a d e s c r i p t i o n t o a proper name" 
(PPMT 175 n . 2 ) 1 5 1 . 
A.J. Ayer has spoken of " I " as a " r e f e r e n t i a l 
expression" whose "use i s demonstrative and not d e s c r i p t i v e " 
(Ayer (PK) 187), and Ramsey accepts t h i s analysis ( c f , BP I I 
181 - 183). " I " i s a l o g i c a l l y proper name without any 
d e s c r i p t i v e content. So the I disclosed i n a s e l f -
disclosure i s contentless, u n i n t e r p r e t e d - i t i s not 
disclosed as a " t h i n k i n g substance", a "Pure Ego" or a 
"Bundle of perceptions", f o r these are a l l d e s c r i p t i o n s 
of I . Here i s one reason why we can agree w i t h Ramsey 
that " I e x i s t " i s i n c o r r i g i b l e . But there i s another 
reason also. For i n the case of the a s s e r t i o n " I e x i s t " , 
I am i n a p e c u l i a r l y p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n as the prime witness 
to i t s t r u t h . Indeed I oannot say or do anything and at 
the same time deny t h a t I e x i s t ; as Ramsey himself p o i n t s 
o u t , " I e x i s t " i s a l o g i c a l p r e r e q u i s i t e of our use of any 
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language at a l l . So we may allow t h a t " I e x i s t " i s 
i n c o r r i g i b l e . But the s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t w i t h the 
as s e r t i o n "God e x i s t s " . This i s an " o b j e c t i v e " claim; a 
claim f o r which we are not necessarily the prime witnesses 
but have, r a t h e r , t o take i n t o account c o n f l i c t i n g evidence 
and the counter-claims of other people. "God e x i s t s " i s 
not a presupposition of our t h i n k i n g or a c t i n g , as " I e x i s t " 
i s . And^nore i m p o r t a n t l y , God - u n l i k e I - i s not a (contentless) 
proper name, but a d e s c r i p t i o n . This t h e s i s , which has been 
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persuasively argued by Peter Geach , i n d i c a t e s that the 
p a r a l l e l between the l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n of " I " and "God" i s 
not as close as Ramsey believes. I f we want an o b j e c t i v e 
counterpart t o " I " we could use " t h a t " - another contentless 
demonstrative; but the r e l i g i o u s apologist would gain l i t t l e 
by arguing f o r the i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of " t h a t e x i s t s " , 
We should observe, however^hat Ramsey argues, over 
against Geach, t h a t "1032 me the term 'G od' would toe 
n e i t h e r £a d e s c r i p t i v e , predicable term} nor £a l o g i c a l l y 
proper name} but show, resemblances to both" (CD 83; cf . TL 
b - 9? Review Geach 292 - 293)• Elsewhere he w r i t e s ; 
"God" i s both l i k e (and u n l i k e ) a proper name... 
i n so f a r as a proper name could be i n c e r t a i n 
circumstances an exact l o g i c a l equivalent f o r 
"I", to t h i s extent we may regard God as a proper 
name, always r e a l i s i n g , however^ t h a t . . . the " I " 
u t t e r e d by God of h i m 3 e l f - b e i n g that f o r which 
God i s a proper name, i s not exactly s i m i l a r 
i n i t s l o g i c a l behaviour to the " I " of 
ourselves. (UFMG B 6 5 / l 7 8 c ) 
However, Ramsey i s aware t h a t i n normal circumstances the word 
"God" does have some d e s c r i p t i v e content and thus f u n c t i o n s , 
i n Russell's terminology, as . a grammatical, r a t h e r than a 
purely l o g i c a l , proper name. Indeed, as T i l l e y notes, 
without t h i s d e s c r i p t i v e content, without " c a r r y i n g some 
representational value", "'God' only r e f e r s to the 'other' 
encountered i n a s i t u a t i o n of cosmic d i s c l o s u r e ; i t simply 
means ' t h a t ' " ( T i l l e y (Tnesis) 153)- As soon as we give 
" t h a t " any content, indeed as soon as we a f f i r m t h a t i t i s 
an o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g " t h a t " , we have moved i n t o the area 
of ( c o r r i g i b l e ) language. 
I t i s necessary now t o take up the issue of the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of disclosures as i t r e l a t e s to the present 
problem; and here we must a n t i c i p a t e a l i t t l e the discussion 
of the next section. Ramsey's main point i s t h a t "the 
c e r t a i n t y of the reference only arises i n a disc l o s u r e and 
i s never t r a n s f e r a b l e t o the assertions themselves" (FD 121) . 
But the reference here i s what Ramsey c a l l s " o b j e c t i v e 
reference" or o b j e c t i v i t y " ( i b i d . ): t h i s i s the only 
" i n c o r r i g i b l e f e a t u r e " of the d i s c l o s u r e , a l l t a l k about i t 
can only be "less or more r e l i a b l e " ( i b i d . 122) . Disclosures 
can "guarantee o b j e c t i v i t y " , the o b j e c t i v i t y of the Other 
( o f . TG 6 8 ) , but they can guarantee no language about i t . 
I t i s t h i s disclosed o b j e c t i v e reference of which we can be 
c e r t a i n ; "One cannot doubt t h a t one i s being confronted by 
a r e a l o b j e c t i v e other" (Evans (IRTG) 137) . But even i f 
t h i s point i s granted, even i f we can be sure t h a t "there i s 
something there", t h i s something i s no more than raw 
o b j e c t i v i t y , a "something, I Know not what" (FD 128). And 
raw o b j e c t i v i t y i s an excessively t a s t e l e s s d i e t . To giv$ 
i t f l a v o u r we need t o give i t content: "Tnere i s no way of 
Knowing whether there i s an o b j e c t i v e content i n a disclosure 
which i s d i s t i n c t from what people a r t i c u l a t e about t h e i r 
d isclosures" (Gaskin 140; c f . Meynell (OBSR)). We need 
at l e a s t t o s p e l l out what type of o b j e c t i v i t y i t i s -
f o r Ramsey, as we s h a l l see, di s t i n g u i s h e s between d i f f e r e n t 
s p e c i e s of " o b j e c t i v i t y " . And these procedures n e c e s s i t a t e 
our moving i n t o the domain of t e n t a t i v e language; e s p e c i a l l y 
i f we are to conclude, a. l a Aquinas, th a t the being whom we 
Know i n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i s what a l l men c a l l "God" 
( c f , PPMT 176, PG 6 8 ) , 
I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i f Ramsey i s to uphold 
t h i s claim t h a t we can be " c e r t a i n of God", he cannot also 
claim that we are " t e n t a t i v e " i n a l l our t h e o l o g i c a l language. 
While he i s i n agreement w i t h h i s former teacher, A.C. Ewing, 
that i n t u i t i o n s ( i . e . i n the sense of the d e s c r i p t i v e content 
i n t u i t e d ) are c o r r i g i b l e ; he s t i l l wishes t o r e t a i n some 
i n c o r r i g i b l e reference. But as t h i s can only be an e s s e n t i a l l y 
"contentless" reference i t would not seem t o be worth arguing 
f o r . Perhaps Ramsey might have been w e l l advised t o avoid 
such t e c h n i c a l terms as " i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y " a l t o g e t h e r and 
defend the less extreme p o s i t i o n that we are " p r a c t i c a l l y " 
or " r e l a t i v e l y " c e r t a i n of the object of a d i s c l o s u r e , 
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r a t h e r than "absolutely" c e r t a i n op i t . That i s t h a t our 
disclosure-based t h e i s t i c confession may be i n d u b i t a b l e 
( i . e . we cannot r a t i o n a l l y doubt i t or r e j e c t ) , but i t i s not 
i n c o r r i g i b l e ( i . e . we may be i n e r r o r i n b e l i e v i n g i t ) . 
For sre do indeed hold many things t o be "beyond reasonable 
doubt" which are i n f a c t s t r i c t l y c o r r i g i b l e ( c f . Quinton 
(NT) 146 - 148). But Ramsey i s c l e a r l y c l a i m ing more than 
t h i s ; and i n claiming more I believe t h a t he i s wrong. 
6. Tne Objective Element of the Disclosure 
For Ramsey a disclosure comprises two components: 
a disclosure of the Self (a disclosure of s u b j e c t i v i t y ) and 
a disclosure of an Other ( a disclosure of o b j e c t i v i t y ) -
cf . CPL 246 etc. I n t h i s s e c t i o n the l a t t e r element 
w i l l be examined. 
I t would appear t h a t throughout Ramsey's w r i t i n g s 
h i s epistemology i s dominated by the b e l i e f t h a t , i n the end, 
a l l disclosures disclose the same object - i . e . God. This 
thesis i s expressed a l i t t l e h e s i t a n t l y at f i r s t s 
i f v/e are asked what a disclosure discloses, 
several answers are possible. A f i r s t answer 
might be, i n r e l a t i o n t o the examples 1 3 5 
we have given: "my wife's warning", "Robin 
Hood", "nis son's l e t t e r " . But f o r the 
t h e i s t a l l these phrases would be brought 
i n r e l a t i o n to the answer which supplements 
them a l l , without r e p l a c i n g any, v i z , "God". 
So the t h e i s t would speak ( f o r example) of 
seeing God i n a f r i e n d , f i n d i n g God i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s and so on. 
I f the t h e i s t sponsors any doc t r i n e of 
c r e a t i o n , he need not apologize f o r u l t i m a t e l y 
r e l a t i n g every dis c l o s u r e to God.,„(PPMT 1 72 n . 2 ) 
The proposal here seems t o be t h a t some so r t of metaphysical 
c o n s t r u c t i o n can be made which r e l a t e s a l l disclosed objects 
t o the term "God". Thus the disclosed objects are "brought 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the answer which supplements them a l l " . But 
i n a l a t e r a r t i c l e , Ramsey puts the point r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t l y 
- and more s t a r k l y - cl a i m i n g t h a t the disclosed objects 
themselves may ap p r o p r i a t e l y be designated by the word "Godw-
i n every disclosure the object can eventually 
bear the name "God".(FRFI 355) 
Elsewhere a less extreme, but c l o s e l y a l l i e d , view 
comes to the surface: the view t h a t a l l cosmic disclosures 
disclose but one r e f e r e n t i . e . "God": 
I give the name God to the single i n d i v i d u a t i o n 
of v/hich v/e are a c t i v e l y aware i n a l l cosmic 
disclosures. (U-Credo $) 
V/ithout some contextual s e t t i n g , the word "God" 
p l a i n l y means nothings on the other hand^if the 
word "God" Had a completely adequate contextual 
s e t t i n g i t would be the name whose reference was 
the whole universe, and i t i s t h i s , I believe, 
which j u s t i f i e s us meanwhile i n claiming t h a t 
the reference of any and every cosmic d i s c l o s u r e , 
i . e . a di s c l o s u r e v/hich i s r e s t r i c t e d to no 
f i n i t e p a t t e r n of spatio-temporal events as 
i t s centre, i s the same, v i z . God„(CD 82) 
There are several issues t h a t may be discerned 
here:-
( i ) Do cosmic disclosures disclose one God or many? 
A cosmic disclosure i s a s o r t of u.niversalizable, " a l l -
i n c l u s i v e " d isclosure ( c f . MMR 265)? a disc l o s u r e "v/hich i s 
r e s t r i c t e d to no f i n i t e p a t t e r n of spatio-temporal events" 
(CD 82). I t i s the "c osmic" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of these 
disclosures t h a t Ramsey takes as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t one and 
the same object i s disclosed by them a l l . He w r i t e s : 
Now because of the cosmic character of such a 
disc l o s u r e , because of i t s all-embracing range, 
because i n i t the whole Universe confronts us, 
I t h i n k we are e n t i t l e d t o speak of there being 
a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a t i o n expressing i t s e l f i n each 
and a l l of these disclosures. I n other words, 
from any and every cosmic disclosure v/e can 
claim to believe i n one x (where x f o r the moment 
remains to be elucidated) p r e c i s e l y because we 
t a l k of there being "one world". (TG 87) 
Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s t h i s argument i n part as "an appeal to the 
c r i t e r i o n of s i m p l i c i t y " : " i f a cosmic dis c l o s u r e i s genuinely 
"cosmic" why should we suppose that i t has more than one 
ob j e c t i v e reference i n t o t o " (U-ITR Evans 3 ) . 
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Such a claim f o r the u n i t y of God i s "based on a prior 
claim f o r the u n i t y of the world; and t h i s "one world" 
' 156 claim, according t o Ramsey, i s shared by G i l b e r t Ryle 
( o f . M 20, TL 8, U-TLIE 2, U-FMG 3 / 2 / 4 0 ) . But, as Kai 
Nielsen points out (Nielsen (S) 84 - 87; c f . Evans (IRTG) 
225 - 2 2 6 ) , Ramsey gives no reason e i t h e r f o r the "one world " 
t h e s i s or f o r the "one God" claim raised upon i t s basis. 
I t seems, i n f a c t , that the argument i s so obvious to Ramsey 
th a t he does not t r o u b l e to set i t out i n d e t a i l ( c f . MM 66), 
I t i s based on his understanding of a "cosmic" d i s c l o s u r e , 
and may be analysed thus: 
( i ) A cosmic disclosure discloses a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l 
"object"; and, ( i i ) The medium of t h a t disclosure i s some part of 
the world t h a t i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the universe as a 
whole: t h i s indeed i s our reason f o r c a l l i n g the d i s c l o s u r e 
"cosmic"; Therefore, ( i i i ) Any two separate "cosmic disclosures" 
reveal the same object. 
I n a s i m i l a r way we might have two disclosures of 
another person ( s e l f ) t h a t take place at d i f f e r e n t times 
around ( i ) his a f f e c t i o n a t e behaviour and ( i i ) his v i o l e n t 
behaviour; but we assaame t h a t i t i s the same s e l f t h a t has 
been disclosed on both occasions, and we t r e a t the two behaviour 
patterns as two parts or aspects of a l a r g e r u n i t a r y behaviour 
p a t t e r n . I t may be t h a t such an analogy i s at the back of 
Ramsey's mind when he propounds the t h e s i s we are considering. 
But i s t h i s analogy close enough? A person's p a t t e r n of 
behaviour, or his physical body, i s more r e a d i l y recognizable 
as a u n i t y than i s the Universe. The Universe i s the sum 
t o t a l of those e n t i t i e s which we recognize as " i n d i v i d u a l s " 
i n t h e i r own r i g h t - i . e . " t h i n g s " and "persons", but i n what 
sense i s the whole Universe an i n d i v i d u a l ? To speak of 
"one world" i s already to commit oneself to a basic pre-
supposition about the u n i t y of th i n g s . Presumably the same 
physical laws operate i n f a r d i s t a n t galaxies as operate 
i n our own and such galaxies are composed of the same 
fundamental p a r t i c l e s and complex molecular s t r u c t u r e s 
as we know from the world around us, But i d e n t i c a l points 
could be made about two human bodies and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , 
without any suggestion t h a t when they serve as media f o r 
disclosures they d i s c l o s e one and the same s e l f . Ramsey's 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c a l l i n g a disclosure "cosmic" seems to 
be fraught w i t h problems. 
Perhaps a b e t t e r approach would be to concentrate 
on what i s disclosed r a t h e r than on the medium of the 
disclosure. Could we not argue th a t at l e a s t one reason 
f o r polytheism developing i n t o monotheism was t h a t people 
began to recognize t h a t i t was one and the same God who was 
discerned i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s experiences<-whether 
these experiences were mediated through the sea, the 
reproductive cycle of Nature, thunder and l i g h t n i n g ; o r 
whatever? The argument i s not " A i l cosmic disclosures 
reveal one God", but " A l l disclosures of d e i t y reveal one 
God"; f o r a l l such disclosures have a common object r a t h e r 
than a common medium. Of course other p r i n c i p l e s also 
operate i n the t r a n s i t i o n from polytheism t o monotheism. 
People recognized t h a t what was revealed i n a r e l i g i o u s 
experience was an u l t i m a t e , unconditioned being who could 
not be j u s t one god among may. Further, monotheism 
provided a simpler metaphysical schema than did polytheism 
(where e n t i t i e s appear to be m u l t i p l i e d beyond necessity),. 
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and one which was more e a s i l y made coherent and comprehensive , 
( i i ) The Oo n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n of God 
I n Models f o r Divine A c t i v i t y Ramsey sums up h i s views i n 
t h i s manner: 
cosmic disiosures occur around models, and 
we might mark the o b j e c t i v e reference of 
every cosmic d i s c l o s u r e , since there i s 
only one i n d i v i d u a t i o n , "by the symbol X. 
X would then be contextualized i n the 
discourse which the generating model 
suggested, and i n due course X would be 
context u a l i z e d i n a multi-model discourse,, 
I t might then happen th a t we chanced on a 
book of theology t a l k i n g of God and love 
and purpose and a c t i v i t y and so on, f a t h e r , 
shepherd, fisherman - indeed a B i b l e ; 
and we might see t h a t , on the one hand, so 
to say, where we read X, on the other hand 
we read the word God. We could then say 
again: f o r "X" read "God".,,. 
I agree t h a t the word "God" by i t s e l f "may 
seem of l i t t l e use; unless i t i s contextualized 
i t i s a w e l l - n i g h empty name. But i t i s a 
us e f u l way of p o i n t i n g t o the one cosmic 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n , I n one sense when we have 
Known the cosmic i n d i v i d u a t i o n even on the 
f i r s t occasion, we have known God. But i n 
another sense we have nearly everything t o 
le a r n . (MDA 65; cf.TG 91 - 92) 
Thus the unspecified o b j e c t i v e reference of a cosmio 
discLosure p "X", may be t a l k e d about " i n terms of any model which 
the various routes t o a cosmic disclosure had provided" 
(TG y l ) . One could then b u i l d up "the most consis t e n t , 
comprehensive, coherent, and simple discourse from as many 
models as possible" and the word "God" then "derives i t s 
meaning i n use as and when i t i s contex t u a l i z e d i n multi-model 
discourse" ( i b i d a 92; of. CD 7 0 ) - Elsewhere Ramsey w r i t e s 
at another l e v e l of the "technique-providing contexts" 
behind the models used f o r God (CD 71; cf.MDA 34 , CD 41 n l ) 1 5 9 . 
Knowing about such model-situations i s part of the process of 
c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n , of coming t o know how to use the word "God" 
(cf.RPT29) 
Hencejto the question, "Can we be sure t h a t i t i s 
God who i s disclosed", Ramsey answers: 
We s h a l l reasonably claim t h a t "God" ( i n a 
c e r t a i n context) has disclosed himself i n so 
f a r as our X context resembles the God context.. 
(MMR 266) 
Therefore, t o make the claim " f o r X read God" we have t o 
do some theology - we have t o use language and begin to 
represent X as " l o v i n g f a t h e r " , "good Shepherd", "omnipotent 
King" etc. We then note t h a t t h i s theology i s the same as 
th a t found i n Scr i p t u r e and C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n ; and only 
then can we proceed to the claim t h a t our disc l o s u r e reveals 
(the C h r i s t i a n ) "God". Here again we note t h a t the 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a disclosure reveals God involves us i n 
c o r r i g i b l e language: a point which c o n f l i c t s w i t h Ramsey's 
other t h e s i s t h a t we can be c e r t a i n only of God, and not 
of language about him. 
Cert a i n points of relevance t o the present discussion 
arise at t h i s j u n c t u r e : 
( i ) I f a l l cosmic disclosures have one object ( x ) , 
we may "c o n t e x t u a l i z e " X to read "God" and the r e f o r e claim 
t h a t a l l cosmic disclosures reveal God; 
( i i ) The models we use i n t h i s process of 
c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n are r e l a t e d t o disclosures i n one of two 
ways ( c f . MMR 265 -l&7)% 
E i t h e r (a) they evoke"the disclosure of X, a c t i n g as a 
" l i n g u i s t i c medium" of the di s c l o s u r e (e.g. t a l k about l o v i n g 
f a t h e r s evokes a cosmic disclosure of God as f a t h e r ) ? 
Or (b) a disc l o s u r e of isomorphy occurs between c e r t a i n 
model-situations and c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s i n the Universe, a 
disclosure which at the same time discloses X (e.g. l o v i n g 
patterns of f a t h e r l y conduct, together w i t h patterns of the 
world "baring" f o r us, disclose God as Father). 
C l e a r l y , however, d i f f e r e n t models w i l l he associated 
w i t h d i f f e r e n t disclosures of the "same obje c t " ; the God who 
i s Father i s also the God who i s Judge, King, Redeemer etc. 
So we can widen the context of our God-talk by b r i n g i n g i n 
other models r e l a t i n g t o other disclosures of God. But 
there i s a f u r t h e r i m p l i c a t i o n here t h a t brings us back to 
the main t o p i c of t h i s section. For the way of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g 
between the objects of disclosures i s to use language (models) 
about them, and according to Ramsey these models are t i e d 
to the context of the disclosures. And i t i s a short step 
from acknowledging t h i s t o claiming t h a t i f we "widen the 
context" of any o b j e c t i v e disclosure s u f f i c i e n t l y , we s h a l l 
end up eventually with a disclosure of God, Ramsey takes 
t h i s stepo 
( i i i ) The widening of the context of a disclosure 
What i s t h i s "widening of context"? Regrettably, Ramsey 
nowhere makes t h i s very clear. He w r i t e s of the t h e o l o g i c a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of value-claims as s e t t i n g them " i n a wider 
context" (MJGC 167) . And he argues i n the f o l l o w i n g fashion 
i n response t o a c r i t i c i s m of H.D. Lewis: 
I agree t h a t there i s a c e r t a i n a r b i t r a r i n e s s 
about the way i n which we t a l k about what such 
a disc l o s u r e discloses. To mention some of my 
f a v o u r i t e examples, we may speak of the object 
of a disc l o s u r e which i s reached by means of 
regular polygons of ever-increasing sidles as a 
' c i r c l e " . For other disclosures we may speak 
of "persons" being disclosed when they cease 
to be mere o f f i c i a l s ; we may speak of Duty, 
Absolute Value, or God. I n t h i s way, t a l k 
about the object of a disclosure always comes 
w i t h i n a contextual s e t t i n g , from which i t w i l l 
also derive what j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be given to i t . 
59/ 
But because with a l i m i t e d , r e s t r i c t e d route 
what i s disclosed has some p l a i n evident name, 
i t does not f o l l o w t h a t i t cannot hear a l t e r n a t i v e 
l a b e l s as the context i s widened. For such names 
as we f i r s t give the objects of disclosures only 
represent f i r s t - s t a g e t a l k i n g about these objects. 
As we broaden the contexts i n which the d i s c l o s u r e -
y i e l d i n g language i s set, then some other phrase 
as w e l l may become currency f o r what i s o b j e c t i v e l y 
disclosed.... So while I agree t h a t from the stand-
point of f i r s t stage discourse disclosures disclose 
"anything", t h a t does not preclude us from g i v i n g 
wider and wider i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , f r o m supplying 
supplementary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to characterize 
the object of the disclosure more r e l i a b l y , as 
the context i s progressively extended .(FRFX 355) 
I t i s a f t e r t h i s e x p l i c a t i o n t h a t Ramsey roundly declares, 
" i n every di s c l o s u r e the object can eventually bear the 
name 'God' " ( i b i d , ). 
The only way I am able t o understand Ramsey's 
argument here i s by assuming t h a t when he w r i t e s of the 
broadening of the "context" of a d i s c l o s u r e , he means a. 
broadening of the medium of th a t d i s c l o s u r e . His argument 
i n "Facts and Disclosures" c e r t a i n l y implies t h a t the medium 
of a disc l o s u r e provides the language i n which we may 
express t h a t which i s disclosed ( o f , FD 127, 129 - 130) . Hence, 
as the medium i s widened, and more of the "more" i s disclosed, 
so our l i n g u i s t i c expression of the disclosed object widens 
correspondingly. But as the medium of the disc l o s u r e i s a 
part of the e m p i r i c a l world ( o r language representing the 
empi r i c a l w o r l d ) , the widening of the medium r e s u l t s i n a 
disclosure becoming t r u l y "cosmic". I n t h i s "widening" 
process more and more of the world i s included as the medium 
of the disc l o s u r e u n t i l the di s c l o s u r e occurs "around the 
Universe" and must then be a disclosure of the God of the 
Universe. Hence Ramsey can claim t h a t i f the context (medium) 
of any disclosure i s widened s u f f i c i e n t l y the object 
disclosed may eventually bear the name "G od"s 
Categories l i k e substance ([ancQ universals are 
best seen as l a b e l s f o r d i f f e r e n t routes i n t o a 
disclosure of that v/hich i s other than myself. 
My conclusion then i s that the o b j e c t i v e reference 
given i n a disclosure to which, f o r example, s t o r i e s 
about t h i n g s , or universals have l e d , cannot be 
f u r t h e r characterized except as the One disclosed 
i n and through the Many, or a " r e a l i t y " disclosed 
through "appearances". But f o r some i t has been 
l a b e l l e d Absolute, and f o r others God, though 
these words only gain a meaning i n use i n so f a r 
as they hold together the d i f f e r e n t strands of 
discourse which provide the s t o r i e s leading t o 
a disclosure of one i n d i v i d u a t i o n , the one 
o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n t , what Looke c a l l e d "something",, 
(PD 130) 
A view l i k e t h i s , of course, has profound o n t o l o g i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s , Cynthia Cohen has described Ramsey's p o s i t i o n 
as one of "disclosed pantheism i n v/hich a l l disclosed f a c t 
i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y identical w i t h God" (Cohen (Thesis) 260, 
c f . Smart (SELR) 37)• Ramsey denies the charge of pantheism 
on the grounds t h a t "God" i s an "index word 1" and index 
words do not p i c t u r e f a c t (CCP 264 - 265 ) , Cohen r e j o i n s , 
and here I must agree w i t h her, t h a t t h i s defence i s 
ir r e l f l f a n t - f o r the problem i s one of ontology and not 
one of language: 
I f the object of a f i n i t e d i s c l o s u r e and a 
cosmic disclosure i s the same, although i t 
may bear a l t e r n a t i v e designations w i t h i n 
subordinate and index languages, ?/e are 
forced t o the conclusion t h a t yellowness, 
p i and persons are obscured manifestations 
of the s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a t i o n , God „(loc.cit,» 
c f . (IRE) 15 - 16) 
And t h i s i s very close t o the view of Absolute Idealism 
that the Absolute i s the t o t a l i t y of i t s experiences. 
Such a t h e s i s may be termed "disclosed pantheism" or even 
"disclosed monism" f o r i t i s the One disclosed through the 
many tha t c a r r i e s the name "God". Apparently Ramsey has 
not e n t i r e l y escaped the dominating v i s i o n of h i s e a r l i e r 
I d e a l i s t days. 
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Can such a p o s i t i o n be defended? The present w r i t e r 
f i n d s Ramsey at h i s most obscure when he i s r e v e a l i n g h i s 
I d e a l i s t p r e d i l e c t i o n s . Y/hat can i t mean to suggest t h a t a l l 
disclosed objects are r e a l l y (.parts--of) one and the same o b j e c t , 
and that t h a t "object" i s God? Ramsey may have o f f e r e d us 
a h i n t e a r l i e r when he mentioned the do c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n 
(PPMT 172 n . 2 ) . Disclosed objects, persons, moral values, 
uni v e r s a l s and even mathematical e n t i t i e s may a l l depend 
on God i n one way or another: e i t h e r d i r e c t l y i n t h e i r 
dependence on h i s act of c r e a t i o n or i n d i r e c t l y by t h e i r 
dependence on the (created) human mind. And one might say 
that when one discerns a God-dependent object one i s i n 
some way enjoying a mediated discernment of God .himself 
( c f . Hascall (HWl)ch. V I I ) . But i t must not be f o r g o t t e n 
th a t a l l these e n t i t i e s are on an o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l t h a t 
i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of God, f o r they are a l l 
contingent created beings. 
I f Ramsey mea;ns only t h a t God can be disclosed 
through the objects of other disclosure-discernments 4 
i . e . that the disclosure of God may occur through various 
o n t o l o g i c a l and epistemological l e v e l s or dimensions, then 
he i s r i g h t . But i t i s very misleading to move, as Ramsey 
seems to move, from "Tne disclosure ©f physical object , 
another s e l f etc. may serve as a medium f o r a disclosure 
of God" to "The disclosed physical o b j e c t , other s e l f etc., 
i s (though only p a r t i a l l y and inadequately) God himself". 
Ramsey would have done f a r b e t t e r t o have kept the 
d i f f e r e n t types of i n t u i t i o n separate from one another, 
t r e a t i n g them a l l , at l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , as mediating 
the i n t u i t i o n of God. Instead he chose to collapse the 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between them, ending up w i t h only one k i n d of 
disclosed object - raw o b j e c t i v i t y - which could be analysed 
as anything from a mathematical e n t i t y to the transcendent 
God, Not only does t h i s make the whole scheme appear considerably 
less p l a u s i b l e , e s p e c i a l l y to those without I d e a l i s t leanings, 
but i t raises serious questions about the nature of God and 
the extent t o which he i s t r u l y transcendent over hi s 
cr e a t i o n * 
/95 
(B) The O b j e c t i v i t y of Disclosures 
We have at l a s t a r r i v e d at a poi n t where we can 
asic what must he our most important question of Ian Ramsey's 
epistemology. "Do disclosures disclose ( i . e . i n discernments do we 
discern) r e a l objects?" Ramsey's answer i s an emphatic 
"Yes", hut others have responded i n a much more s c e p t i c a l 
manner ( c f . e.g.j Hephurn (MM) 22 , Hehhlethwaite 6"44j Ferre 
(LLG) 141, Gaskin 139 - HO, Smart (ICBC) passim. Lewis (PR) 
108). 
( i ) " A l l experience i s of something" 
According to Ramsey, something can only he designated 
an "experience" i f i t has an object. He i s the r e f o r e 
unable t o understand what a " s u b j e c t i v e experience" could 
be (RL 2 7 ) . " I am..„quite unrepentant", he wrote i n 19^7» 
"a bout saying t h a t every experience being 'of something' 
i s ' o b j e c t i v e , though ^ r e a d i l y admit of course that there 
are countless types of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what i s other than 
myself" (MMR 268; of. RL 24, 28). N a t u r a l l y t h i s analysis 
applies also to the "experiences" of discernment-disclosure: 
i f they occur they have an o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n t . We may be 
c e r t a i n that there i s t h i s o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n t , but we can 
be only t e n t a t i v e i n our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . Some 
" o b j e c t i v i t y " i s th e r e f o r e always assured: but the "type" 
of o b j e c t i v i t y concerned i s open to dispute. 
Ramsey's general argument that " a l l experience i s 
of something" suggests t h a t he has not c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
between two types of o b j e c t j t h a t i s : 
( i ) "phenomenological" or "epistemological" objects -
i . e . the "objects" of experience and knowledge; and 
( i i ) " r e a l " , " o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g "objects - i . e . 
e n t i t i e s t h a t e x i s t independently of human experience and 
Knowledge (see Quinton (BP I I ) 197 - 198, Cohen (IRE) 14 - 15, 
Evans (IRTG) 1295 oi*. also Owen (CKG) 184, Bfcelz (CTM) 102) , 
A " r e a l " object may be e i t h e r a spatio-temporal e n t i t y ( l i k e 
a t a b l e ) , or a meta-empirical e n t i t y ( l i k e God), But an 
"epistemological" object i s no r e a l e n t i t y at a l l , only "an 
object before the mind". The shibboleth, "Every experience 
has an object" i s t r u e only of t h i s l a t t e r species of object. 
Sense data, dieams, h a l l u c i n a t i o n s etc. are a l l epistemological 
objects - they are a l l objects of people's experience; but 
they are not objects i n any stronger sense. 
This b l u r r i n g of the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a l 
objects and epistemological objects i s ra t h e r s i m i l a r to 
Ramsey's c a v a l i e r treatment of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
concepts and e n t i t i e s . I suggested e a r l i e r t h a t many of 
the examples which Ramsey adduces:can serve only as examples 
of disclosures of part of the concept of God, and not as 
disclosures of God himself, I have also i n d i c a t e d the 
d i f f i c u l t y of assigning some of Ramsey's disclosure; examples 
e i t h e r t o the category of disclosure of e n t i t i e s or t o the 
category of disclosures of concepts (e,g, «.niversals and 
"mathematical e n t i t i e s ) . For Ramsey, however, these problems 
do not a r i s e , f o r he seems t o t r e a t both concepts and e n t i t i e s 
as equally "objective". He even goes so f a r , on one occasion, 
as t o speak of an " o b j e c t i v e element" i n a de t e c t i v e novel 
"when the penny drops we suddenly 'see' the c u l p r i t , when 
the s o l u t i o n forces i t s e l f upon us" (PPMT 169) . 
( i i ) Types of O b j e c t i v i t y 
Anyone who, l i k e Ramsey, i s very f r e e i n h i s use 
of the a d j e c t i v e " o b j e c t i v e " , i s bound to be faced by a 
serious problem. As he i s w i l l i n g t o c a l l a l l experience 
" o b j e c t i v e " , he must now d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t 
"types" of o b j e c t i v i t y . Ramsey recognizes the necessity 
l o r t h i s . Thus he d i s t i n g u i s h e s , as we s h a l l see below, 
'between the o b j e c t i v i t y of h a l l u c i n a t i o n s and the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of v e r i d i c a l sense perceptions. And he draws 
a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n between both kinds of o b j e c t i v i t y 
and the " o b j e c t i v i t y of what declares i t s e l f " . He also 
acknowledges tha t God i s not " o b j e c t i v e " i n any s c i e n t i f i c , 
p u b l i c l y t e s t a b l e , sense ( c f . BPEM20, U-FMG ( 2 ) 1 0 / 8 4 / 1 9 1 ) . 
The o b j e c t i v i t y of God i s , r a t h e r , a "transcendent 
o b j e c t i v i t y " (DCCD 1 3 ) . 
(a) The Problem of I l l u s i o n s 
Ramsey recognizes th a t "the ' f e l t o b j e c t i v i t y ' 
of the numinous must be di s t i n g u i s h e d from the ' f e l t 
o b j e c t i v i t y ' of what i s generally c a l l e d a 'subjective 
i l l u s i o n ' " (Review Baelz 170)- The problem of i l l u s i o n s , 
of course, i s one th a t i s to be met throughout the theory 
of knowledge. A sense-datum t h e o r i s t can e a s i l y deal w i t h 
i l l u s i o n s and h a l l u c i n a t i o n s because he can speak e i t h e r 
of sense-data - the immediate "objects" of our sense experience 
or of physical objects. Ramsey's approach i s ra t h e r d i f f e r e n t 
i n t h a t he speaks generally of the " o b j e c t i v i t y " of both 
i l l u s o r y and v e r i d i c a l perceptions, but d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between 
the languages t h a t are used to t a l k of t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y . I f 
sense-datum language alone i s used, we have to do wit h an 
" i l l u s i o n " ; i f m a t e r i a l object language i s employed, however, 
the experience i s not " i l l u s o r y " . Ramsy di s t i n g u i s h e s two 
senses of the word " o b j e c t i v e " as i t i s used of physical 
o bjects: 
The one sense of " o b j e c t i v e " would t a l k of 
something which i s " o b j e c t i v e " as being 
independent of p a r t i c u l a r observers, but t h i s , 
I would suggest, characterizes no "t h i n g s " , 
but r a t h e r the language t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r 
observers use. On the other hand there i s 
something " o b j e c t i v e " i n the sense of being 
other than ourselves, and t h i s sense of 
otherness characterizes the perceptual 
experience we have. I t i s c l e a r l y a mistake 
to t r a n s f e r the independent sort of o b j e c t i v i t y 
which belongs to language, to things invented 
to s u i t i t 5 and then to suppose t h a t t h i s i s an 
adequate analysis of the o b j e c t i v i t y which 
characterizes perceptual experience. When we 
t a l k of the "independency" of physical objects 
then, we are claiming: 
(a) the p u b l i c i t y of physical object language 
(which i s recognised and admitted by i t s success)and 
(b) some sense of " o b j e c t i v i t y " = other than 
ourselves. Here i s what has been c a l l e d the 
" n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l awareness" present i n perceptual 
experience,,,, (TJ-FMG (3 ) 11/11/203 -
(3 ) 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 4 ) 
I n t h i s account physical object language i s viewed as expressing 
the discerned o b j e c t i v i t y i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. But what 
of i l l u s i o n s ? 
I would say that i n some i l l u s i o n s , there i s no 
disclosure at a l l - j u s t a p l a i n mistake i n 
supposing t h a t the hot tarmac sad on a sunny 
day had a covering of water. I n other cases of-
i l l u s i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y i n dreams, there 
c e r t a i n l y may be a disclosure. I n tha t case, 
there would c e r t a i n l y be an ob j e c t i v e reference. 
The problem of dreams and i l l u s i o n s i s then 
how to i n t e r p r e t r e l i a b l y the "something" which 
i s disclosed i n t h i s way.,,it needs something 
as complicated as a s c i e n t i f i c theory i n the 
case of i l l u s i o n s , or something as complex as 
the account given by Freud or Jung ( t o say 
nothing of Joseph or Daniel) to s p e l l out 
r e l i a b l y what i s disclosed i n a dream a(FD 130 - 131) 
Thus, f o r Ramsey, 
to c a l l a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n i l l u s o r y i s r e a l l y 
to recommend that i t be i n t e r p r e t e d at the 
sense-datum l e v e l r a t h e r than t h a t of physical 
objects. (TJ-FMG Draft 6 /15) 
I n an exchange with Niaian Smart ( c f . Smart (ICBC) 
33 - 3 5 )j Ramsey argues t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y of the 
i n e b r i a t e ' s pink r a t s i s "more r e l i a b l y t a l k e d of i n terms 
of (say) the excess of alcohol i n the d i g e s t i v e system r a t h e r 
than i n terms of animals who eat corn and get chased by f o x 
t e r r i e r s " (ITR Smart 109 - 110). Because " a l l experience i s 
subject-object i n s t r u c t u r e " Ramsey argues th a t "even pink 
r a t s have some o b j e c t i v i t y , some o b j e c t i v e reference" ( i b i d . 109) . 
But he add s: 
any claim f o r o b j e c t i v i t y stands or f a l l s w i t h 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the conceptual scheme i n terms 
of which the " o b j e c t " i s t a l k e d about; and the 
claim f o r o b j e c t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n to,cosmic 
disclosures, stands or f a l l s on the r e l i a b i l i t y 
of what those disclosures enable us to say 
about God. ( i b i d . 1 1 0 ) 1 4 0 
For Smart such a p o s i t i o n , i n making conceptual schemes so 
determinative, i s "heading f o r subjectivism" (Smart (LE) 3 5 2 ) . 
We should recognize the force of t h i s c r i t i c i s m . I s h a l l 
argue l a t e r t h a t Ramsey's various canons of assessment of 
metaphysical and r e l i g i o u s language ( i . e . " e m p i r i c a l f i t " : 
coherence, comprehensiveness, and s i m p l i c i t y ) are too vague 
and all-embracing to serve as p r a c t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i a 
f o r the use of such language. I n which case we are forced 
back to the r e l i g i o u s experiences - the discernments -
themselves, i f we do wish t o d i s t i n g u i s h between f a c t and 
i l l u s i o n i n r e l i g i o n . 
I n the case of perceptual h a l l u c i n a t i o n s we categorize 
language about (say) pink r a t s as "language about h a l l u c i n a t i o n s " 
f o r two reasons; 
( i ) pink r a t s , though open to s i g h t , cannot be 
touched; 
and ( i i ) pink r a t s do not behave l i k e other r a t s 
(when, f o r example, we aim a drunken blow at them). 
I t i s , then,a widening of our o r i g i n a l experience that 
confirms our suspicions t h a t the p a r t of our experience 
presently under consideration i s i l l u s o r y : t h a t pink r a t s are 
"not r e a l l y there". I n the case of our experience of God, 
however: 
( i ) our r e l i g i o u s experience may be u n i t a r y , i n 
which case we cannot check by " s p i r i t u a l touch" what we t h i n k 
we know by " s p i r i t u a l s i g h t " ; 
and ( i i ) the standard "behaviour" ("nature?") of the 
r e a l God i s much more a matter of dispute than i s that of 
r a t s . 
I d e a l l y , then,one would wish to discover some element w i t h i n 
the o r i g i n a l r e l i g i o u s experience i t s e l f that can assure us 
of i t s o b j e c t i v i t y . Perhaps Ramsey i s f e e l i n g a f t e r such 
an element when he speaks of the o b j e c t i v i t y "of what declares 
i t s e l f " , 
(b) The o b j e c t i v i t y of what declares i t s e l f 
According to Ramsey, the o b j e c t i v e reference of a 
disclosure i s safeguarded i n so f a r as "the object declares 
i t s o b j e c t i v i t y by a c t i v e l y c o n f r o n t i n g us" (MM 58, c f , TG 88), 
The discerned object thus declares i t s e l f t o us and makes an 
impact on us ( c f , ITR Smart 109) . Most commentators on 
Ramsey regard a l l disclosures as being disclosures of an object 
th a t " 'declares i t s e l f to us i n a way t h a t i s s i m i l a r to 
a personal encounter" (Cohen (IRE) 5; c f , Evans (IRTG) 129 - 130) 
Donald Evans can thus argue very generally t h a t "the "more1 
i s o b j e c t i v e i n t h a t i t i s a r e a l i t y which i s an a c t i v e 
o r i g i n a t o r of e x p e r i e n c e " ( i b i d . 129 ) . Both Cohen and Evans 
thus assume t h a t Ramsey uses such language about a l l 
disclosures. And, indeed, a large number of examples may 
be c i t e d of d i f f e r e n t types of disclosed objects "declaring 
themselves", i n c l u d i n g "the Universe":"^ 1 c f . RSCS 23, CD 5, 
PG 66 , TG 87, PA 196. 
Elsewhere, however, Ramsey seems to claim that the 
" o b j e c t i v i t y of what declares i t s e l f to us" i s a fe a t u r e of 
disclosures of other persons, duty and God, but i s not a 
feature of ( f o r example) disclosures of physical o b j e c t i v i t y 
or the o b j e c t i v i t y of dreams: 
Tne claim f o r " o b j e c t i v i t y " - " o b j e c t i v e reference" 
- i s grounded i n the sense I have of being 
confronted, of being acted upon, i n the discernment 
I have of some claim impinging on me. I r e a d i l y 
grant that t h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r sense of 
o b j e c t i v i t y : i t i s not p r e c i s e l y the " o b j e c t i v i t y " 
(which people are o f t e n moved to deny) which 
belongs to dream images; i t i s not even p r e c i s e l y 
the o b j e c t i v i t y (which people only too o f t e n take 
as a paradigm of o b j e c t i v i t y ) which characterizes 
physical objects. I t i s not p r e c i s e l y the 
o b j e c t i v i t y which belongs to other people as the 
to p i c of s o c i a l studies. I t i s b e t t e r suggested 
by the o b j e c t i v i t y of what declares i t s e l f t o us -
challenges us i n a way t h a t persons sometimes do. 
(MM 61 - 62 ; c f . CD 68) 
Ramsey himself glosses the p a r a l l e l passage i n C h r i s t i a n 
Discourse w i t h the words, " I f i s i n t h i s sense that 
disclosures reveal o b j e c t i v i t y " ; and t h i s might be taken t o 
imply t h a t a l l disclosures have the o b j e c t i v i t y of what 
declares i t s e l f . But the argument i n h i s l a t e r paper 
"Facts and Disclosures" f o r the disclosure-basis of our 
and 
Knowledge of physical objects (FD 119)/dream images (FD 131) 
c o u l d be taken to i n d i c a t e t h a t , by then. Ramsey d i d 
d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h i n the category of the di s c l o s u r e between 
the o b j e c t i v i t y "of what declares i t s e l f " and other types 
of disclosed o b j e c t i v i t y . And t h i s does seem to be the 
more p l a u s i b l e p o s i t i o n t o adopt; f o r there _is something 
d i s t i n c t i v e about our i n t u i t i o n s of other people, moral 
claims and God, I n these areas we f e e l that we have to do 
wi t h an other t h a t a c t i v e l y impinges on us and reveals 
i t s e l f to us; and we i n t e r p r e t t h i s a c t i v i t y i n terms of 
another " w i l l " ( c f . RL 2 6 - 2 7 , MMR 264, PI 42 e t c . ) . 
VJhat Ramsey seoms t o have done i n some of the 
examples c i t e d , i s extend t h i s element of a c t i v i t y from i t s 
paradigm cases to a l l types of disclosure ( c f . MM 5 8 ) . 
According t o Ramsey, even the conclusions of mathematical 
and l o g i c a l arguments " s t r i k e us" (MM R ^65) , and the 
Universe i n a l l i t s mystery "declares i t s e l f " t o us (CD 5"). 
As Evans puts i t , i n a l l such cases " 'The penny drops'; we 
do not make i t drop" (Evans (IRTG) 130) . Or as Ramsey 
himself puts i t , " i f the l i g h t dawns there i s obviously 
an o b j e c t i v e reference" (U-PMG B42 /155) . I n the next two 
sections we s h a l l look more c l o s e l y at two aspects of t h i s 
c e n t r a l c o n v i c t i o n , keeping i n mind the question,"HajRamsey 
i l l e g i t i m a t e l y extended t h i s analysis to cover a l l 
disclosures?". 
( c ) The di s c l o s u r e of a c t i v i t y 
For Ramsey a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e involves "God's 
i n i t i a t i n g a c t i v i t y meeting our responsive a c t i v i t y " (MDA 33; 
c f . i b i d . 23, PG 6 7 ) . And "because we are aware of an 
a c t i v i t y meeting and matching our own, there i s a sense i n 
which the o b j e c t i v i t y of God, h i s being something other than 
ourselves, i s guaranteed" (UP 9; cf» MDA 2 3 ) . Tne same 
may r e a d i l y be allowed of disclosures of other, r e c i p r o o a l l y 
a c t i v e , selves (RSCS 14, c f . RL 19 - 20). And " a c t i v i t y " may 
surely only 
also be a p p r o p r i a t e l y - though/analogically- predicated of 
20$ 
a disclosed moral claim ( PG 69-* c f . MDA 62, MJGC 1oy). 
I n a l l ; these cases We. are confronted by an active._agent, 
or at l e a s t something c l o s e l y analogous to an agent, who 
challenges and commands us. But Ramsey again seems to wish 
t o extend t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o a l l cases of disc l o s u r e 
( c f . RFT 28, MM 58). He avers q u i t e generally; 
i n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n (as tha t general term 
" d i s c l o s u r e " i t s e l f r i g h t l y i m p l i e s ) we are 
o r i g i n a l l y r e l a t i v e l y passive.... we are 
confronted "by something other than ourselves, 
something/someone whose a c t i v i t y hears on 
our own, though the aotive "objects" of 
d i f f e r e n t disclosures have d i f f e r e n t kinds 
of l o g i c a l s t a t u s . (U°Credo 2 temphasis added; 
c f . Enc, B r i t . <503,PG 67, TG 
But here the f i n a l clause i s the important one. I n t h i s 
discussion of the a c t i v i t y of a d i s c l o s u r e , as w i t h h i s 
account of the o b j e c t i v i t y of dreams and i l l u s i o n s , Ramsey 
appears t o give w i t h one hand and take back w i t h the other. 
A l l disclosed objects are " a c t i v e " . But there are,: prima f a c i e , many 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of a c t i v e object and presumably, t h e r e f o r e , 
many d i f f e r e n t kinds of disclosed a c t i v i t y . And i n order 
to discover ( i ) whether we may predicate of a disclosed 
object the " a c t i v i t y " of another person, a moral claim 
or God; or ( i i ) whether we may use t h a t term only i n a 
rather d i f f e r e n t , more e t i o l a t e d , sense (when applying i t 
to the universe or the objects of mathematical i n t u i t i o n ) \ 
we must see how " a c t i v i t y " can be used of the disclosed 
object i n question. I n other words,to discover the sense 
of the term " a c t i v i t y " i n a p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n we must 
again move i n t o the domain of language. For the Universe 
"confronts us" and "comes a l i v e " i n a way t h a t i s surely 
only remotely analogous to the way i n which John Doe 
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"confronts us" and "comes a l i v e " 
^04: 
So here again we f i n d Ramsey f o l l o w i n g h i s usual 
l i n e of concentrating on the s i m i l a r i t i e s betv/een disclosed 
objects of d i f f e r e n t types (arguing t h a t they are a l l " a c t i v e " ) , while 
apparei^acknowledging at the same time t h a t some d i f f e r e n t i a 
must be rec o g n i z e d — i f we are to c l a s s i f y them as disclosed objects of 
d i f f e r e n t ' t y p e s . Unless we. accept Ramsey's "disclosed monism1^ I t must be 
that the 
/ a c t i v i t y shown by such objects v a r i e s from one to another. 
Perhaps we should seek to understand, however, 
what i t i s t h a t a t h e i s t l i k e Ramsey f i n d s so a t t r a c t i v e 
about the claim t h a t disclosures reveal an a c t i v e Other. 
For the discovery of an a c t i v e agent c o n f r o n t i n g one i s 
indeed an encounter; and an encounter w i t h quasi-numinous 
overtones. When there i s a knock at the door, or a r i n g from 
the telephone, our hearts race - f o r there i s Someone Else 
there. We are a t t r a c t e d by t h i s mysterious other, f a s c i n a t e d 
t o discover "who?" and "why?". But et the same time we f e e l 
a c e r t a i n f e a r , even dread, about the possible encounter. 
And when we a c t u a l l y meet, these two notes of the numinous 
experience ( c f . Otto (IH) chs. IV & V l ) are o f t e n s t i l l 
present. I am fascinated by the other, but^-in a way - dread 
him„ The ghost s t o r y o f f e r s U3 a secular analogy. For i t s 
most e f f e c t i v e point i s when the hero discovers something 
s e l f - a c t i v e , and therefore unpredictable and u l t i m a t e l y 
mysterious, i n h i s o r d e r l y world. He c r i e s w i t h dread 
"there i s something there" - i . e . "something a c t i v e " . 
We know too t h a t our hearts "miss a b e a t " ^ ^ when we hear 
the r u s t l i n g i n the undergrowth t h a t speaks of another's 
a c t i v i t y . Although i t i s only the a c t i v i t y of some mammal 
or b i r d , some of the emotions appropriate to the sensing 
of the presence of another person are aroused i n us. The 
•<d03T 
r e v e l a t i o n s of the two kinds of a c t i v i t y have a great deal 
i n common. I t may be t h a t Ramsey i s simply appealing to 
an extension of t h i s f a c t i n his implied claim t h a t a l l 
disclosures disclose the a c t i v e Holy God himself. 
Ramsey's remarks on a c t i v i t y are t a n t a l i z i n g . 
He recognizes t h a t a c t i v i t y may carry e i t h e r a personal or 
an impersonal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( c f . U-HA " T r a d i t i o n a l Arguments 
f o r the Existence of God" 1965, P«2; cf.CDb4, ITR Owen 1 2 6 ) , 
presumably because v/e speak sometimes of the a c t i v i t y of 
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m a t e r i a l objects or machines . But i t i s personal a c t i v i t y , 
the a c t i v i t y of s p i r i t ( c f . NI £ 8 ) , " a c t i v i t y which has my 
personal backing" (TW 82 - 8 5 ) , t h a t dominates Ramsey's 
understanding of the term. I t i s the a c t i v i t y of persons 
tha t "challenges" us (CD 8 9 ) 0 I n t h i s sense " a c t i v i t y i s a 
word which cannot be given an adequate o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s " 
(U-TLIE 15)? f o r " a c t i o n - l o g i c i s not event l o g i c " and needs 
to be " r e l a t e d t o the p e c u l i a r i t y of ' I ' - l o g i c " (SEI 202). 
The decisive a c t i v i t y of persons, of selves, i s an " o n t o l o g i c a l 
p e c u l i a r " not reducible t o spatio-temporal objects or events 
(PI 28, FRFI 351). This means tha t temporal categories 
cannot be a p p r o p r i a t e l y applied to a personal a c t i o n as a 
whole (FRFI 551) . And a f o r t i o r i i n the case of God the model 
of " a c t i v i t y " must be f u r t h e r q u a l i f i e d (U-FMG B 64 /177 , c f . 
up 9 ) 1 4 6 . 
Ramsey believes t h a t " I am a c t i v e " can be used 
"merely...to bear witness t o t h a t part of a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e 
which i s an i n v a r i a n t " , the word " a c t i v e " having no d e s c r i p t i v e 
element (PPMT 176) . He d i s t i n g u i s h e s between a man's " a c t i o n " 
and h i s "behaviour": 
I take a c t i o n to be t h a t which embodies a 
man's whole p e r s o n a l i t y ; i n being "active", 
a man i s "being most d i s t i n c t i v e l y himself. 
Behaviour on the other hand i s the external 
expression of t h i s a c t i v i t y ; behaviour i s 
what a c t i v i t y y i e l d s f o r study. (BP I I 200) 
Per s o n a l i t y i s to "be analysed " i n terms of a d i s t i n c t i v e 
a c t i v i t y " , "an i n t e g r a t i n g a c t i v i t y , an a c t i v i t y expressed, 
embodied and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y understood i n terms of i t s 
genetic, biochemical and endocrine, e l e c t r o n i c , n e u r o l o g i c a l 
and psychological manifestations" (HP 128, c f , i b i d . 146) . 
Presumably Ramsey would apply t h i s same argument 
to the r e s t of the universe, God could be presented then 
as one showing an " a c t i v i t y " t h a t i s expressed i n the 
"behaviour" of the world. Behaviour i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y 
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observable, but a c t i v i t y must be disclosed . The 
behaviourist neglects the l a t t e r element i n h i s survey of 
persons; the a t h e i s t has not discerned i t i n the cosmos. 
Their opponents, however, see a l l t h a t they see - but 
acknowledge something "more" besides. 
However Ramsey* s attempts (cf. RSCS ch 1) to i n t e r p r e t 
a 
the nature of science as being open to such/personalist 
a n a l y s i s , i n which the universe i s regarded as i n "rapport" 
or "opposition" to us ( i b i d . 21), seem to be r a t h e r 
far-±'etched. Most s c i e n t i s t s would be unhappy w i t h such 
anthropomorphic language. I n any case don't these attempts 
a c t u a l l y concentrate our a t t e n t i o n too r i g i d l y on the world? 
A f t e r a l l the world i s only the medium through which God i s 
known. I f the universe "opposes us" does t h i s give us 
grounds f o r saying t h a t God i s a c t i v e ( i n opposition?) 
towards us? Tnere i s a general problem here of the r e l a t i o n 
•^ 07 
between the medium and the subject of a dis c l o s u r e t h a t we 
must examine l a t e r , 
we may admit here t h a t 
However,/there i s some sort of r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
medium and disclosed o b j e c t , even i f we do not accept Ramsey's 
account of i t . Thus our sense-data must be of such and such 
a nature f o r them to disclose an o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l world. 
S i m i l a r l y a person's body and behaviour must show c e r t a i n 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r us to i n t u i t another I through them. 
By analogy we might say t h a t the universe must be of such 
a nature (showing "rapport" or "opposition") before i t can 
disclose the C h r i s t i a n God. But on an i n t u i t i o n i s t 
epistemology we only discover t h i s , as i t were, r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y . 
Having i n t u i t e d the external world and the cre a t o r God, we 
may hypothesize that sense^data th a t were not s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
r e l a t e d , or a world without l a w - l i k e r e l a t i o n s between i t s 
events, could not serve as media f o r the disclosures we 
have had. Having disc overed God through t h i s world, 
we can guess what sort of world would not reveal t h i s sort 
of God, S i m i l a r l y , having discovered personal a c t i v i t y 
through another's behaviour,we are i n a p o s i t i o n to recognize 
the types of behaviour t h a t might not lead t o such a di s c l o s u r e , 
Tne d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t i n the l a s t case we can check our 
conclusions. For we can observe cofnatose, moronic or 
grossly psychotic human behaviour and discover whether we 
QO have a disclosure of another s e l f i n such cases. But 
the case of God and the world i s d i f f e r e n t : f o r there i s 
only one cosmos. 
I t does seem that there are some d i f f i c u l t i e s here 
f o r the place Ramsey assigns to a c t i v i t y i n our disclosures 
of God. One major problem i s th a t the God:worldul:body analogy 
i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y close. I n the case of persons we do 
not simply i n t u i t a c t i v i t y through a person's spatio-temporal 
behaviour, f o r a statement about that behaviour i t s e l f serves 
as a part of our statement that the person i s a c t i v e . Human 
selves are embodied selves, hence there are l i n k s other 
than j u s t i n t u i t i v e ( n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l ) l i n k s between assertions 
about bodies and assertions about persons. But i s t h i s the 
case when we t u r n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and the world 
A c l a s s i c a l t h e i s t would claim t h a t the "more" of the world 
i s transcendent overthe world i n ways that my "more" i s 
not transcendent over my body - not l e a s t because God created 
the world whereas I ai d not create my body. I t i s the 
panentheist who i s w i l l i n g to argue f o r there being a close 
analogy between the body/self and the world/God r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
Some aspects of Ramsey's thought do seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t he 
i s w i l l i n g t o move i n the d i r e c t i o n of partentheism. He speaks, 
f o r example, of the universe being a c t i v e , and t r e a t s t h i s 
as synonymous with God being a c t i v e through the universe 
( c f . UP 9 ) . I n wajs l i k e t h i s Ramsey tends t o reduce God 
to the l e v e l of another (embodied) s e l f . 
Ramsey's p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of disclosures i n terms of the a c t i v i t y of the 
disclosed object r e s u l t s i n some r a t h e r s t r a i n e d language. 
How are we to understand the claims t h a t mathematical e n t i t i e s , 
patterns i n the world, and conclusions of arguments are 
a c t i v e l y c o n f r o n t i n g the cognizing mind?. I n what sense are 
such th i n g s " a c t i v e " r a t h e r than "passive" when we discern 
them? I t i s surely evident that the category of o b j e c t i v e 
e n t i t i e s i s wider than the category of ac t i v e e n t i t i e s . I n 
which case i t i s - reasonable to t r e a t the l a t t e r as a 
sub-class of the former, r a t h e r than vice-versa. And t h i s 
argument also applies i n the case of God. People do speak 
of experiences of "encountering", or "being i n the Presence 
of " , God; experiences i n which we i n t u i t simply t h a t "he i s 
there" - without d i s c e r n i n g t h a t he i s "doing" anything. 
Ramsey himself accepts the value of impersonal language i n 
our t a l k about God: God i s "Rock" as wel l as "Shepherd". 
Even such an (apparently) i n a c t i v e God may be o b j e c t i v e l y 
r e a l . 
Tnere i s an argument i n Ramsey's paper "A Personal 
God" which r e l a t e s the di s c l o s u r e of an a c t i v e God not only 
to h i s argument about "safeguarding the o b j e c t i v i t y " of God, 
but also to h i s claim t h a t only one object i s disclosed i n 
a l l cosmic disclosures. Ramsey r e f e r s t o C.C.J. Webb's 
analysis of in t e r - p e r s o n a l r e c i p r o c i t y i n a c h i l d ' s act of 
o f f e r i n g sweets to an e l d e r l y f r i e n d , Ramsey comments: 
the child's claim to a dis c l o s u r e on a p a r t i c u l a r 
occasion may be mistaken; i t may not be a genuine 
person. Even so that very p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t very 
d i s t i n c t i o n between "person" and (say) a r e c i p r o c a l l y 
a c t i v e machine, between "genuine person" and paste-
board sweet-giver, determines t h a t some cases w i l l 
be genuine. I n the case of God, however, I t h i n k 
there i s a more d i r e c t c e r t a i n t y . For here there 
i s a cosmic - i n f i n i t e , a l l i n c l u s i v e - dis c l o s u r e ; 
and I do not see on what grounds there could be 
the k i n d of mistake possible i n the c h i l d ' s case; 
f o r I do not see on what grounds we could deny the 
"otherness" - the c o n f r o n t i n g a c t i v i t y , or even 
p o s i t a v a r i e t y of r e f e r e n t s r a t h e r than a s i n g l e 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n . (PG 68) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t the argument Ramsey uses here 
to a f f i r m t h a t we cannot be mistaken i n the case of a 
disclosure of God i s s i m i l a r to the argument th a t some 
sceptics use to show t h a t God-claims are without meaning 
( i . e . "There are no c r i t e r i a f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
v e r i d i c a l and i l l u s o r y cases"). So the argument cute both ways 
i t provides us wi t h no reason e i t h e r i'or a f f i r m i n g , or f o r 
denying, t h a t we have been duped i n our r e l i g i o u s experience. 
C e r t a i n l y many have acknowledged the existence of 
" r e l i g i o u s experience" - as a psychological phenomenon - but 
have gone on to produce grounds f o r denying the otherness 
or o b j e c t i v i t y of the p u t a t i v e object of tha t experience 
( c f , Hepburn (CP), Miles (HE), Nielsen (CPRE) e t c . ) . Further 
Ramsey's account does not take note of the f a c t that t h e i s t s 
themselves do not have cosmic disclosures every time they 
look out on the world. And i f the world f a i l s to reveal 
God to me on one occasion then i t remains possible t h a t I am 
mistaken on the occasions ©n which i t does seem to reveal 
liim . I n a s i m i l a r way I can only recognize my "mistake" 
i n talcing a s o p h i s t i c a t e d humanoid robot to be a person i f 
on some occasion I do not have a disc l o s u r e of another 
s e l f when I survey i t s behaviour. On an i n t u i t i o n i s t 
epistemology we are u n l i k e l y to remain content w i t h an 
i s o l a t e d i n t u i t i o n , however "cosmic" i t may appear. As i n 
c e r t a i n perceptual situations,we need to check our i n t u i t i o n 
by repeatedly " l o o k i n g again". But i n the case of our 
i n t u i t i o n s of God, u n l i k e most perceptual s i t u a t i o n s , 
nowever hard and however o f t e n we "look", we can not 
guarantee that we s h a l l "see". 
(d) Revelation and Disclosure 
One of the features of Ramsey's epistemology t h a t 
has seemed to many to be most sympathetic to C h r i s t i a n 
thought i s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of disclosures as "revelations' 
The epistemological object i s not simply passively i n t u i t e d 
or discerned, i t a c t i v e l y reveals or discloses i t s e l f . 
"Disclosure" and " r e v e l a t i o n " , " d i s c l o s e " and "reveal" , are 
used lay Ramsey as synonyms ( c f . RL 79 , RSCS 84, TL 4) „ 
I n a r e l i g i o u s context, of course, t h i s i s e n t i r e l y 
appropriate. God makes himself known to h i s c h i l d r e n ; they 
do not j u s t come to know him on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e . As 
Ramsey puts i t ; 
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Revelation i s sometimes contrasted w i t h discovery , 
the former being said to r e l a t e to a passive 
subject, the l a t t e r to an a c t i v e subject, but the 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s l a r g e l y one of emphasis. (Enc. B r i t . 602) 
According to Ramsey, the one who receives a disc l o s u r e i s 
" r e l a t i v e l y passive"; although the l a t e r Ramsey r e t a i n s h i s 
e a r l i e s t understanding of the I - Other r e l a t i o n i n experience 
as being one of mutual a c t i v i t y . But the point under 
s c r u t i n y here i s th a t we do not j u s t f i n d God, we f i n d 
the God who i s already a c t i v e l y r e v e a l i n g himself to us. 
There can only be a "disclosure", however, when we ourselves 
discern the Revealer, 
Such a p o s i t i o n i s commonplace i n theology; but 
Ramsey seems t o stress God's " i n i t i a t i v e " (RB 189) more than 
do many theologians. I n any given s i t u a t i o n , according to 
Ramsey, the medium of the disc l o s u r e may be present, but 
yet no disclosure occurs, God cannot be coerced, his 
r e v e l a t i o n cannot be taken f o r granted. Apparently he has 
the freedom e i t h e r t o disclose himself or not to disclose 
himself ( c f , , e.g,,RL 79, 129, OCR 15, CELCE 95 , CD 6 8 ) . 
Nov; t h i s p o s i t i o n i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from the p o s i t i o n of 
those theologians who claim t h a t , although God takes the 
i n i t i a t i v e i n r e v e l a t i o n , he i s always t a k i n g that i n i t i a t i v e , 
and doing so f o r everyone. On the l a t t e r analysis our 
" a c t i v i t y " i n dis c e r n i n g the Revealer becomes determinative. 
But on Ramsey's account whether or not there i s a r e v e l a t i o n 
seems to he dependent upon God's p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , as w e l l 
as ours. And i f , as I have argued, the c e n t r a l act of 
i n t u i t i v e discernment i s not i n any case under our f r e e 
c o n t r o l , then God becomes even more responsible f o r h i s 
r e v e l a t i o n s . Although t h i s p o s i t i o n i s perhaps closer to 
that of the B i b l e and C h r i s t i a n t h i n k i n g i n general, i t 
does r a i s e the problem of God's " f a v o u r i t i s m " i n r e v e l a t i o n : 
a problem which Ramsey nowhere discusses. 
While on the t o p i c of r e v e l a t i o n , we may note 
b r i e f l y t h a t Ramsey sides w i t h the contemporary emphasis 
i n Protestant theology on r e v e l a t i o n as "non-propositional" 
( c f 0 Enc B r i t 602). I t i s God himself who i s revealed, 
not abody of t r u t h s about him ( c f . Hick (PR) ch. 5? Dulles 
175 - 180, B a i l l i e (IRRT), Buber ( i - T ) 110 e t c 0 ) . Knowledge 
of God i s p r i m a r i l y by acquaintance w i t h him and only 
secondarily by d e s c r i p t i o n of him. We have already noted 
that such a viewpoint must be tempered by the f a c t t h a t 
r e l i g i o u s knowledge, l i k e a l l knowledge, i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
knowledge of t r u t h s ; and tha t our acquaintance - experience 
of God must be tr a n s c r i b e d i n t o p r o p o s i t i o n s about him i f 
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we are to give any content t o h i s r e v e l a t i o n of himself , 
I n any case I do not see any r e a l o b j e c t i o n to the no t i o n of 
God r e v e a l i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s about himself - perhaps through 
a process akin to telepathy ( c f , Lewis ( S i ) 171 - 174) . 
I do not believe t h a t such a p o s i t i o n implies t h a t our 
understanding or recounting of such propos i t i o n s would be 
i n f a l l i b l y guaranteed, even i f we happened to be the authors 
of S c r i p t u r e , I t i s c e r t a i n l y c l e a r t h a t God i s o f t e n 
described i n the Bi b l e as r e v e a l i n g himself i n language -
both p r o p o s i t i o n a l language and the language of imperatives. 
Theophardes, on the other hand, are rare and shrouded i n 
mystery. I t i s the prophetic or p r i e s t l y word th a t serves 
as the everyday r e v e l a t i o n of God to I s r a e l . And i t i s the 
teaching of Jesus,as much as h i s a c t i v i t y , that reveals 
the f a t h e r to the f i r s t d i s c i p l e s . I t i s surely a mistake 
always to attempt to i n t e r p r e t these p r o p o s i t i o n a l 
r e v e l a t i o n s i n terms of (something l i k e ) a non-propositional 
theophany, t r e a t i n g r e l i g i o u s language as nothing more than 
a medium of such a theophany. 
I t might be argued t h a t r e l i g i o u s epistemology, 
l i k e the theory of perception, has suffered from the 
predominance of a "visual" understanding of sensing 
( o f . C l i f f o r d 367 - 368, Llacmurray c h . 5 ) . Ramsey, l i k e many 
r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r s , speaks of r e l i g i o u s experience as a 
Now i t i s tr u e t h a t 
" v i s i o n " . / our sense of hearing may t e l l us l i t t l e about 
the presence of another person. But i f th a t person 
chooses to disclose himself i n words our ears can t e l l 
us, not only of h i s existence, but also a great deal more 
about him than can our eyes. I t i s the deaf man, not the 
b l i n d man, who has the most d i f f i c u l t y i n " g e t t i n g to know" 
other people. The champions of intuiti-orism i n r e l i g i o n , 
which by i t s very nature t r e a t s r e l i g i o u s awareness as 
analogous t o seeing, should not neglect t h a t there may w e l l 
be other ways i n which we come to Know God. ( i t may be argued 
that the locus classicus f o r the view that r e l i g i o u s 
c o g n i t i o n i s analogous to sight ra t h e r than " > hearing i s 
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to be found i n Job 42 ; 
" I nad heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, 
but now my eye sees the^ 
t h e r e f o r e I despise myself, 
and repent i n dust and ashes." 
But t h i s passage a c t u a l l y contrasts "hearsay r e l i g i o n " 
( o r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f based on a u t h o r i t y ) and "encounter 
r e l i g i o n " . I t does not contrast "hearing God" and "seeing 
God'! And the s i t u a t i o n t h a t evokes t h i s confession from 
Job i s presented i n terms of a speech of Yahweh;. there i s 
i n the t e x t no d e s c r i p t i o n of a theophany i n terms of 
v i s u a l imagery.) 
We have been speaking of disclosures of God; but 
Ramsey, as usual, i n t e r p r e t s a l l disclosures i n the same way. 
A l l disclosed o b j e c t s , he claims, are a c t i v e . They a l l 
reveal themselves to us. Unless we are w i l l i n g t o go 
along w i t h Ramsey's o n t o l o g i c a l speculations about the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and other disclosed o b j e c t s , 
these claims w i l l not make much of an impact on us. 
Another person may a c t i v e l y reveal himself to us; but 
can a u n i v e r s a l do so? Or T C ? Or a Gestalt pattern? 
And even i n the case of other people I have; argued t h a t 
a person reveals himself to us e s s e n t i a l l y through the 
words t h a t he speaks - through h i s statenents and avowals 
and commands and so on. I f B i l l i s standing i n the corner 
and I look at him from across the room and see him, I am not 
l i k e l y t o claim t h a t he has "revealed himself" to me. I t i s 
only when he comes over and t e l l s me the secrets of h i s 
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neart t h a t the phrase becomes appropriate . Ramsey i s 
r i g h t t o stress the importance of r e v e l a t i o n i n r e l i g i o n , 
but he i s wrong to t r y and analyse t h i s s o l e l y i n terms of 
an i n t u i t i v e awareness analogous t o the sense of s i g h t , and 
he i s wrong to t r y t o include a l l types of Knowledge 
under tne heading of r e v e l a t i o n , A f t e r a l l the term 
"discovery" does also seem to have a use i n r e l i g i o n ! 
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(C) The Disclosures of Meta-empirical E n t i t i e s 
I n our analysis of the d i f f e r e n t types of disc l o s u r e 
we categorized c e r t a i n disclosed objects as "meta-empirical 
e n t i t i e s " . On the o b j e c t i v e side of the d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n 
there are such e n t i t i e s as other selves and God. On the 
subjective side the e n t i t y disclosed i s the individual's 
own s e l f / t h i s w i l l be discussed i n s e c t i o n 7 below. 
( i ) The disc l o s u r e of other selves 
Ramsey makes much of the analogy between God and 
I , t r e a t i n g "the word 'God' as a s o r t of o b j e c t i v e counter-
part to >I> " ( P I 4 8 ) . This i n t e n t i o n to "model 'God' on 
I J I ii (ppjjr 173) i s expressed b a s i c a l l y i n the analogical 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s : 
Is my body God ; world . 
Ramsey's p o s i t i o n i s perhaps most c l e a r l y t o be seen i n a 
passage from h i s Cambridge periods 
God stands t o the t o t a l e xternal world i n a 
way i n which each i n d i v i d u a l person only 
stands to a p a r t , v i z : to h i s body and 
immediate environment. (U-CI 11; cf, RPT 30 
This analogy r e l i e s on f o u r p o i n t s : -
( i ) Just as I i s a transcendent "more", not exhausted by the 
observables of my body and i t s behaviour, so God i s the 
transcendent "more" of the Universe. Tnus n e i t h e r the 
existence of I nor the existence of God are i n p r i n c i p l e 
d i r e c t l y v e r i f i a b l e by sense experience. Further, both 
"God" and " I " are, from the point of view of empirical 
language, l o g i c a l l y "odd" words. Tneir l o g i c a l behaviour 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t they are not to be used l i k e words l a b e l l i n g 
observables ( c f . CL 337, Mffi 2 6 9 ) 1 ^ 2 . 
( i i ) Both God and I are a c t i v e agents whose a c t i v i t y i s 
expressed through the ohservables of the spatio-temporal 
world. The a c t i v i t y of (my) I i s revealed through my body; 
the a c t i v i t y of God i s revealed through h i s world ( c f . 
Homage 117 - 119» 1 2 5 ) « 
( i i i ) Both God and I are known i n a disclosure. Indeed, 
they are o f t e n known i n the same (cosmic) a i s c l o s u r e , 
which has both a subjective and o b j e c t i v e aspect = r e v e a l i n g 
both the transcendent subject ( i ) and the transcendent 
object (God). Neither God's existence nor the existence 
of I can be i n f e r r e d from the world or my body. Only an 
a l o g i c a l act of i n t u i t i v e discernment can carry us across 
the epistemic gap between the spatio-temporal world and 
these t r a n s e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t i e s ( c r . PPMT 174, 176; RSCS 73 , 
BPEM 22). 
( i v ) Both "God" and " I " f u n c t i o n as " i n t e g r a t o r words" 
l i n k i n g together various d e s c r i p t i v e assertions about the 
world and myself r e s p e c t i v e l y . Just as " I e x i s t " i s 
en t a i l e d by a l l kinds of s c i e n t i f i c assertions about my 
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body and behaviour but e n t a i l s none of them ; so "God 
e x i s t s " i s e n t a i l e d by, but does not e n t a i l , v e r i f i a b l e 
language about the cosmos ( c f . PPMT 174, RSP 89 - 90, RSCS 73 
74) < 
The God/l analogy has been defended by various 
other philosophers of r e l i g i o n on s i m i l a r grounds - c f . High 
179 - 182, Poteat (GPl), (BSDC), and G i l l (PRK) 220 - 223, 
I t has, however, been c r i t i c i z e d , u s u a l l y on the grounds 
tha t i t presupposes a ghost-in-the-cosmos metaphysic which 
as 
is/unacceptable, post-Ryle, as a ghost-in-the-machine theory 
of the s e l f ( o f . Schedler (GCGI.'l), McLain (FOTGT), (OTM)). One 
of the advocates of the God/l analogy, however, has c r i t i c i z e d 
Ramsey f or oorEentrating on i t at the expense of the r e l a t e d , 
and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y more s i g n i f i c a n t , analogy between God 
and another I ( c f . High 182). I t i s clear t h a t , because God 
i s other than ourselves, the claim t h a t needs to be defended 
i s t h a t our knowledge of God i s analogous to our knowledge 
of other selves ( c f . N. Kemp Smith (IDEC) 120 - 122, G, Dawes 
Hicks (PET) 145 - U 7 , Owen (CKG) 1 3 5 ) 1 I t i s t h e r e f o r e 
r a t h e r remarkable t h a t Ramsey says comparatively l i t t l e 
about the disclosure of other selves. I t i s t h i s l i t t l e , 
an 
however, that must serve us a s / i n d i c a t i o n of the closest 
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analogy we can have t o the d i s c l o s u r e of God . 
As we observe another body and i t s behaviour we 
discern, through t h i s medium, another I c o n f r o n t i n g us 
(PI y7 - 98, PPMT 170 - 171, RL 19 - 20; c f . AC 7 1 ) . Such 
a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i s g r a p h i c a l l y described by Ramsey 
i n h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n of a v i s i t to an engineering e x h i b i t i o n . 
Both f i g u r e s at the Rolls-Royce stand appear to be made of 
wax; but what i f one of them,.. 
suddenly springs to l i f e and r i s e s to shake us by 
the hand? - a disclosure indeed! Further, suppose 
th a t a f t e r the handshake, as we go to inspect the 
engine on display at the stand, he moves wi t h us. 
Here i s undoubted rapport. When we u t t e r some 
p a r t i c u l a r words, he hands us pamphlets - here i s 
p o s i t i v e harmony, but when we have f a i l e d to 
press the clutch-pedal down, he prevents us from 
t r y i n g the gears - here i s opposition. I n these 
three ways the claim of our disclosure to reveal 
a person, to reveal personal interchange, i s 
j u s t i f i e d . With the man we nearly knocked over, 
who was indeed wax and powder, there was no 
d i s c l o s u r e , nothing came a l i v e . Tnere was 
n e i t h e r rapport, nor p o s i t i v e harmony, nor 
opposition. (RSCS 14) 
At f i r s t glance Ramsey seems t o be i m p l y i n g here t h a t our 
evidence t h a t we have to do w i t h another I i s e n t i r e l y a 
matter of the other body's sophisticated, r e c i p r o c a l a c t i v i t y . 
But the point i s r a t h e r t h a t such a c t i v i t y serves as the 
medium of a disclosure t h a t reveals another s e l f . I n the 
case of sop h i s t i c a t e d robots, presumably, we do not have 
these disclosures. R e c i p r o c i t y s i m p l i c i t e r , one notes 
again, i s not enough: 
personal r e c i p r o c i t y r e l a t e s to a d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n characterized by and a r i s i n g out of a 
behaviour p a t t e r n d i s p l a y i n g mutual v a r i a t i o n s . 
I know personal r e c i p r o c i t y i n a s i t u a t i o n where 
there i s a mutually v a r y i n g behaviour p a t t e r n , 
a s i t u a t i o n i n which I am a c t i v e l y engaged w i t h 
another person whom tha t v a r y i n g behaviour p a t t e r n 
mediates, a situation'^Vhich I , as a person, 
r e a l i z e myself i n a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e as not 
r e s t r i c t e d to the mutually v a r y i n g behaviour I 
display.(PG 64; c f . RL 26) 
I n other words, i t i s as and when I "come a l i v e " as a 
person, over against t h i s other body and i t s behaviour, 
that t h i s other "comes a l i v e " t o me as another I . 
Developing these points * we might argue t h a t i n 
Arth u r C, Clarke's 2001 £he astronauts become aware of 
being 
themselves as/i n a personal r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Robot "Ha.l" 
as (a) they recognize personhood i n Hal ; and 
(b) they themselves become more f u l l y persons. 
I t would seem, however, t h a t Ramsey implies that i n such a 
s i t u a t i o n the astronauts must have been duped i n t h e i r 
disclosures. For Ramsey appears to a f f i r m , although h i s 
argument i s by no means c l e a r , t h a t a machine could have 
"nothing of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y personal experience, no 
s u b j e c t i v i t y " (RSCS 62) and could d i s p l a y no "genuine, i . e . 
s e l f - d i s c l o s e d , ownership" ( i b i d . 59)} i n which case a 
machine could not be " i n an important way, l i k e myself" 
( i b i d . ; c f , Review Geach 2 9 2 ) . I t i s not cle a r to me, 
however, what grounds Ramsey has f o r denying th a t a machine 
might have a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . How could anyone possibly 
know one way or the other? I f our only knowledge of other 
selves derives from a disclosure of a "more" through other 
"bodies, what grounds do we have f o r r e j e c t i n g the evidence 
of such a disclosure when i t occurs around a man-made 
"body"? Perhaps Ramsey would argue th a t i n such a case 
our knowledge t h a t the "body was man-made would prevent our 
having a disclosure around i t . As a matter of psychological 
f a c t he i s probably c o r r e c t ; and the actua l occurrence of 
a disclosure i s ; i n the end, a matter of contingent, psychological 
f a c t (as i s the occurrence of sense perceptions). But what 
about the more "bizarre example of an encounter ( or "encounter") 
w i t h an e x t r a - t e r r e s t r i a l "being? Such a being might be 
so strangely constructed t h a t i t i s not cle a r whether or not 
i t (he?) i s an a r t e f a c t . And such a being would not have 
been formed, or would not have been observed not to have 
been formed, before our eyes. V/e should simply have to 
wait and see whether we had a "disclosure of another s e l f " 
when we were i n contact w i t h i t . No i n t u i t i o n i s t w i t h 
regard to other minds can pretend to decide such cases a p r i o r i . 
Of course i t i s another question a l t o g e t h e r whether 
we can accept a n y " I n t u i t i v e Theory" of our knowledge of 
other minds (cf„ Price (OM) 425) . The esseitial d i f f e r e n c e 
between our knowledge of other selves and our knowledge of 
God i s tha t i n the former case we have a p r i o r knowledge of 
a s e l f - i . e . of our own s e l f . Can we not, t h e r e f o r e , 
simply construct an argument by analogy from.our own case 
and apply i t to other peoples bodies and behaviour? 
&an we not . argue t h a t such an i n f e r e n t i a l step i s 
the unconscious basis of our knowledge of other minds?. 
The i n d u c t i v e type of argument by analogy to other minds 
has been ably defended ( c f . Ayer (CP) ch.4, (OKOM)j 
Hampshire (AF); Slote ch.4C, c f . also Thomson (AA)) i n the 
-face of some strenuous c r i t i c i s m ( c f . Schlesinger, 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ( P l ) ^ 9 3 - 295, 303 e t c . ) . But i t may be 
most appropriate t o view b e l i e f i n other minds r a t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t l y : as the best "explanation" there i s of other 
people's behaviour ( c f . Ayer (CQjP) 132 - 136, Ewing (VH) 
63, Lewis ( S i ) 131). I n t h a t case i t would f a l l 
predominantly under s o l u t i o n ( f ) , r a t h e r than (:) or ( g ) , 
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i n the analysis given e a r l i e r . 
( i i ) The disc l o s u r e of God 
This p a r t i c u l a r d i s c l o s u r e , of course, has been the 
main focus of i n t e r e s t i n a l l our study of Ramsey's epistemological 
t h i n k i n g . I n p a r t i c u l a r v/e have already considered Ramsey's 
claim t h a t a l l disclosures ( u l t i m a t e l y ) reveal God, We 
have also t r e a t e d h i s account of the way vie come to know 
God i n an i n t u i t i o n mediated through the world? as w e l l as 
considering the proposal t h a t Ramsey1s view i s compatible 
w i t h some form of non=mediated, " m y s t i c a l " i n t u i t i o n of God, 
Here two f u r t h e r aspects of the disc l o s u r e of God w i l l he 
examined, 
(a) Religious Experience 
The "discernment" aspect of a " d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n " 
i n which God i s known r e f e r s , i n Ramsey's terminology,to what 
i s more t r a d i t i o n a l l y described as the element of " r e l i g i o u s 
experience" i n a s i t u a t i o n of " r e v e l a t i o n " ( c f t J e . g . , Webh 
(RE) 29). However Ramsey does not r e f e r t o a l l r e l i g i o u s 
discernments as r e l i g i o u s experiences. Instead he 
dis t i n g u i s h e s between what I have c a l l e d "qualified-model 
disclosures" (cosmic disclosures generated by models which 
have been q u a l i f i e d i n c e r t a i n ways) and cosmic disclosures 
th a t " j u s t happen". I t i s the l a t t e r type of s i t u a t i o n t h a t 
provides "the case of what used to be c a l l e d ' r e l i g i o u s 
experience' " (TG 88); and i n such a case the s i t u a t i o n 
i t s e l f supplies a model by h i g h l i g h t i n g some p a r t i c u l a r 
f e a t u r e . 
Ramsey gives examples of these d i f f e r e n t types of 
disclosure i n "Models and Mystery: a Reply", pp. 265 - 267° 
F i r s t of a l l he argues that God as l o v i n g Father may he 
disclosed e i t h e r by t a l k i n g about f a t h e r s ( l o v i n g f a t h e r s , 
very l o v i n g f a t h e r s , exceedingly l o v i n g f athers,,. etc.) 
u n t i l the di s c l o s u r e comes; or by " b r i n g £ing] l o v i n g 
patterns of f a t h e r l y conduct - c a r i n g ; p r o v i d i n g and so on, 
alongside c e r t a i n patterns i n the Universe" u n t i l God i s 
revealed through a disc l o s u r e of isomorphism (MMR 266). 
I n both these cases, Ramsey claims, "the disclosure has 
been generated by a p a r t i c u l a r strand of discourse" (MMR 265) 
I n what he elsewhere c a l l s " r e l i g i o u s experience", however, 
there i s no generating discourses and i n such a case the 
model f o r God i s not provided by us but "given as the s e l f -
selected f e a t u r e of the disclosure s i t u a t i o n " ( i b i d . ) , Thus 
a disclosure of God may occur around an ac t u a l f a t h e r , or 
a f a t h e r - l i k e a c t i v i t y , and " f a t h e r " would then be a 
" s e l f - selected" model, "some ki n d of f o c a l p o i n t " f o r the 
disclosure s i t u a t i o n (TG 88, c f . MM 59). Thus i n what 
Ramsey c a l l s " r e l i g i o u s experience" the i n i t i a t i v e i s even 
more i n God* s court than i t i s i n other disclosures of God, 
For r e l i g i o u s experiences " j u s t happen" (TG 88), they are 
not dependent on the evocative power of our r e l i g i o u s 
language. Such disclosures occur without planning. They 
are 'cosmic disclosures which have not been d e l i b e r a t e l y 
evoked whether by c a t a l y s t s , or q u a l i f i e d models or otherwise 
(U-HA: "The T r a d i t i o n a l Arguments f o r the Existence of God, 
Contd," H65, 1965, p.5). 
I n h i s published work Ramsey says l i t t l e under the 
e x p l i c i t heading of " r e l i g i o u s experience". There i s , 
however, a s u b s t a n t i a l discussion of the subject i n "Fact, 
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Metaphysics and God" and i n the summaries of Ramsey's l e c t u r e s 
at Oxford and elsewhere. One of the tasks he set f o r himself 
i n these w r i t i n g s was to take examples from James' The 
V a r i e t i e s of Religious Experience„ Whitehead's Science and 
the Modern Y/orld and Otto's The Idea of The Holy i n order " t o 
show how the language which these diverse philosophers used 
to t a l k of r e l i g i o u s experience matched i n various ways the 
Kind of s i t u a t i o n we have c a l l e d a di s c l o s u r e " (U-HA: 
" I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Philosophy of R e l i g i o n " , Colgate-Rochester 
l e c t u r e s , 1963? P o l l ) . Thus r e l i g i o u s experience has been 
spoken of as a "sense of the unseen" or a "sense of presence" 
and t h i s t i e s i n wit h a s i t u a t i o n of disc&Eure-discernment 
i n which "the r e l i g i o u s object i s not i n f e r r e d but 'given' 
' d i r e c t l y ' " (U-FMG 9/47/154). S i m i l a r l y Whitehead's claim 
that " r e l i g i o n i s the v i s i o n of something which stands beyond, 
behind, and w i t h i n the passing f l u x of immediate t h i n g s " 
(Whitehead (SMW) 227) i n d i c a t e s t h a t r e l i g i o u s experience 
"while being p a r t l y sense experience, i s more" (TJ-FMG 9/48/155; 
c f . also CD 66 - 68). And t h a t , of course, i s Ramsey's 
d e f i n i t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n of discl o s u r e . As we s h a l l see 
s h o r t l y , Ramsey p a r t i c u l a r l y stressed the f a c t t h a t r e l i g i o n 
i s not concerned simply and s o l e l y w i t h what i s beyond 
("something e n t i r e l y separate and s u i g e n e r i s " ) , f o r i f 
i t were i t would be " l o g i c a l l y i n e x p r e s s i b l e " (U-FMG l o c . c i t . ) . 
Ramsey's formula f o r the e x p r e s s i b i l i t y of r e l i g i o u s 
experience i s t h a t i t i s i n part sense experience - although 
not reducible to sense experience alone: "while enclosing 
sense p a r t i c u l a r s , r e l i g i o u s experience extends beyond them" 
(U-FMG (2) 10/65/172). This i s Ramsey's device f o r b u i l d i n g 
meaning i n t o r e l i g i o u s assertions. These assertions can 
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u t i l i z e e m p i r i c a l language as the experiences/which they 
are based are mediated through the emp i r i c a l world. The 
models used l o r God are j u s t i f i e d i n so f a r as r e l i g i o u s 
experience occurs "around" them. 
We may now consider Ramsey's treatment of the 
discussions by three famous theologians of the t o p i c of 
r e l i g i o u s experience: 
F.D.E. Schleiermacher 
Ramsey says very l i t t l e about Schleiermacher's work. 
I n a d r a f t f o r "Pact, Metaphysics and God", however, he 
mentions Schleiermacher's d e s c r i p t i o n of the basic r e l i g i o u s 
i n t u i t i o n as a k i s s or embrace - "an o r i g i n a l ' u n i t y ' which 
passes subsequently i n t o two people i n ordinary r e l a t i o n s h i p s " 
( U-FMG Dra f t 5/24, of. Enc. B r i t . 594 & Schleiexmacher 
(OR) 43 - 44). Ramsey expresses "sympathy" w i t h Schleiermacher's 
"almost Bradleyan-like" ( s i c ) account. He goes on,however, 
to add: 
Schleiermacher 1s mistake was to give as a 
h i s t o r i c a l or psychological succession what i s 
l o g i c a l l y permanent. What we have been 
concerned t o suggest...is that u n i t y and 
subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n £are3 always 
there i n a l l awareness.. (U-FMG Dra f t 5/24). 
Schleiermacher's " f e e l i n g " , then, "can never be less than a 
' subject-objec.t f e e l i n g 1 " ( i b i d . ) ; although Ramsey notes 
tha t the phrase " f e e l i n g of absolute dependence" i s , i n 
speaking of the I - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n , "at another l e v e l of 
language a l t o g e t h e r " and theref o r e "doomed to inadequacy 
from the s t a r t " ( i b i d . 5/25). But at the l e v e l of the 
basic feeling-experience Ramsey considers th a t Schleiermacher 
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i s working along the r i g h t l i n e s 
d2% 
Rudolf Otto 
Ramsey i s less c e r t a i n , however, about the approach 
of Schleiermacher's "E i i s h a " , Rudolf Otto ( c f . Otto (RE) V I I I , 
Macquarrie (TAG) 164 - 165)- Otto's "numinous f e e l i n g " , the 
experience or i n t u i t i o n of the holy, i s - l i k e i t s object -
sui generis. The r e l i g i o u s form of c o g n i t i o n "does not 
r e l y on the evidence of the senses", f o r i f i t d i d i t would 
be transformed i n t o "a mere sorry empirical knowledge" 
(Otto (IH) k!26). Ramsey's es s e n t i a l q u a r r e l i s not w i t h 
Otto's phenomenologioal analysis of the numinous experience 
and i t s associated f e e l i n g - s t a t e s . Nor does he spare 
more than a passing comment f o r Otto's "Kanti&n" analysis 
of the holy as an a p r i o r i category and his account of the 
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process of " s G h e m a t i z a t i o n " . Ramsey concentrates h i s 
a t t e n t i o n instead on Otto's claim t h a t r e l i g i o u s experience 
i s s u i generis; " i n t h i s matter", Ramsey w r i t e s , "we would 
very much part company". For "Otto i s so keen to argue f o r 
the f u r t h e r t e r r i t o r y of ' r e l i g i o u s experience' that he 
severs i t a l t o g e t h e r from t h a t nearer home" (U-FMG 9/51/158) 0 
Ramsey's basic c r i t i c i s m i s , "How can we t a l k about 
the numinous i f i t has s u i generis i s o l a t i o n ? " ( i b i d , y/52/159); 
and i f we cannot t a l k about i t , then "how do we d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
between the 'spooky' and the ' r e l i g i o u s ' " ( i b i d . 9/53/ 160). 
Otto has set up f o r himself an "epistemological gap" 
between r e l i g i o u s experience and sense experience "which 
makes i t q u i t e impossible f o r him to answer the central 
question.,: How can we do j u s t i c e to and use language.,, 
oddly enough about the f a c t s and experience t o which 
r e l i g i o u s people r e f e r ? " ( i b i d , 9/55/162 - 9/56/163). 
Ramsey claims t h a t r e l i g i o u s experience cannot be suigeneris 
i n the sense of being " l o g i c a l l y and o n t o l o g i c a l l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from sense experience" ( i b i d . ) . 
Tnere i s c e r t a i n l y something i n Ramsey's c r i t i c i s m 
h e r e o f i t i s the case t h a t i n a mediated i n t u i t i o n the 
nature of the medium which a c t u a l l y reveals the meta-
empirical object i s some i n d i c a t i o n to us of the nature 
of that object. But does not Ramsey himself make the 
opposite e r r o r t o tha t of Otto? For on Ramsey's account 
r e l i g i o u s experience does not appear to be d i s t i n c t i v e 
enough. Although Ramsey di s t i n g u i s h e s r a d i c a l l y between 
perceptual experience and experience of what i s more than 
perceptual, w h i l s t maintaining t h a t the l a t t e r sort of 
experience i s given w i t h the former, he i s too ready to 
b l u r the l i n e s of demarcation between experience of God and 
experience of other "mores"', Otto's analysis does seem to 
r i n g true t o the r e l i g i o u s experient as an analysis of the 
d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of that s t a t e of awareness and f e e l i n g t o 
which he appeals. Ramsey's account, however, i n i t s attempt 
to explain r e l i g i o u s awareness i n terms of (supposedly) 
cognate forms of awareness i n perception, mathematics, 
personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s and m o r a l i t y , seems at times to deny 
to the r e l i g i o u s person what he holds most dear. These 
other forms of c o g n i t i o n may be remotely analogous to the 
r e l i g i o u s way of knowing, but the analogy ijs remote. As 
remote, I would suggest, as the analogy between t h e i r 
objects and the object of r e l i g i o u s knowledge. The 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans confronts us, and i s known 
i n such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , i n a way tha t i s d i s t i n c t i v e ; even 
our experience of other people i s not exactly 'of the same k i 
Ramsey's concern i s to analyse r e l i g i o u s experience 
i n such a way t h a t we may use of God c e r t a i n mundane models, 
derived from sense experience. His way of doing t h i s i s to 
t r e a t the world, and model-situations w i t h i n i t , as a 
medium f o r the disc l o s u r e of God. But may. we not also 
postulate a non-mediated awareness of God^ ?/hich involves 
no element of sense experience? We could then apply mundane 
analogies to the God so revealed simply on the grounds th a t 
t h i s "being appears to he " F a t h e r " - l i k e , " K i n g " - l i k e , 
" l o v i n g " , "powerful" etc, I do not t h i n k t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l 
to the use of such model language th a t the object to which 
i t i s applied should be cognized through the medium of 
the model (or the model language) i t s e l f 
F.R. Tennant 
Ramsey detects i n Tennant an attempt t o d i s c r e d i t 
" r e l i g i o u s experience" as bearing a l l the marks of abnormality 
and going beyond sense experience only " i n the way tha t may 
na t u r a l phenomena do, i . e . by being 'unbalanced' and 
'abnormal' " (U-HA:''Religious Experience and i t s Significance", 
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c. 1953-5. p»1) • Tennant, however, does accept that 
r e l i g i o u s experience might confirm a t h e o l o g i c a l map, but 
" i t could never be the foundation from which such a map 
was b u i l t " (U-FMG 9/51/158) , I n response to the f i r s t 
claim, Ramsejr counters w i t h the a s s e r t i o n t h a t "no views are 
f a l s e because of t h e i r o r i g i n s " (U-HA: o p . c i t . ) . A l l geniuses 
even r e l i g i o u s geniuses - may be "odd", but t h i s does not 
r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r possessing greater i n s i g h t 
i n t o the t r u t h than those w i t h a "normal" psyche. 
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Tennant's second c r i t i c i s m of r e l i g i o u s experience 
seems to be based on h i s b e l i e f t h a t sensation alone "rurnishes 
the e s s e n t i a l core of the primary meaning of r e a l i t y " (Tennant 
(PT I ) 306). Tennant continues: 
Pieligious b e l i e f s and t h e o l o g i c a l doctrines 
also, according t o such science of knowledge, 
can only be derived i n d i r e c t l y from study of 
the sensible world, man's aoul and human 
h i s t o r y . ( i b i d . ) 
Thus: 
Religious experience, i t i s generally agreed, 
contains no ul t i m a t e elements t h a t do not enter 
i n t o n on-religious experience, save the alleged 
data which seem to be derived r a t h e r than 
immediately apprehended, and to be read i n 
ra t h e r than read off.(Tennant (NB) 85 - 86) 
... when the mystic believes he i n t u i t s God v/ith 
sense-like immediacy, he i s perhaps but 
causally i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s e l a t i o n , peace, etc. 
by a i d of a concept already t o hand.(Tennant 
(PTj) 318) 
Tennant i s wedded to an i n f e r e n t i a l view of r e l i g i o n and a 
"narrow" empiricism w i t h regard t o the nature of experience: 
" f o r Tennant the only epistemological givenness i s found 
wi t h sensation" (U-FMG y/63/170). Ramsey's work i s 
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devoted to the denial of both these p o s i t i o n s . However, 
Ramsey can "Agree wi t h Tennant to the extent t h a t a l l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of r e l i g i o u s experience must a r i s e from 
sense experience which i s i t s public baas" (U-HA : , vReligious 
Experience & I t s S i g n i f i c a n c e " a 1953-5, p.2). But Ramsey 
adds h i s own c o n v i c t i o n t h a t "not even sensation i s 
without i t s ' r e l i g i o u s experience' " (U-FMG 9/63/170) -
f o r even sense perception involves disclosures. I have 
already i n d i c a t e d my own reasons f o r sharing Ramsey's view 
t h a t n a t u r a l theology must be e x p e r i e n t i a l and not (as w i t h 
Tennant) i n f e r e n t i a l . 
(b) Disclosures of God and Disclosures of the concept of God 
I c r i t i c i z e d Ramsey above f o r not d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
adequately between disclosures of some aspect of the God-
concept and disclosures of God himself. However, although 
the two are not t o be equated, i t does seem tha t there i s an 
inti m a t e connection, on some occasions, between coming t o 
know the concept of God and coming to know God. The p r a c t i c e 
of r e l i g i o n , a f t e r a l l , i s i n part the sharing of concepts, 
images and ideas. I t involves g e t t i n g people to see what 
i s meant, and what i s not meant, by the word "God". And i s 
i t not tr u e t h a t f o r many people "the penny drops" and "the 
l i g h t dawns", i n such a way that they are forced down on to 
t h e i r knees, when they come to grasp the meaning of " i n f i n i t e 
goodness" or " t h a t than which no greater can be conceived"? 
Indeed i s there not some r e l i g i o u s impulse behind the 
notorious o n t o l o g i c a l argument and i t s claim t h a t the 
l a t t e r concept i s necessarily i n s t a n t i a t e d : " i f you were 
only t o understand i t properly you would see tha t i t has 
(must have?) an instance"? There i s here a type of r e l i g i o u s 
discovery which i s very l i k e l e a r n i n g the ( r e a l ) meaning of 
"love" or " i n t e g r i t y " from a novel, or seeing the point of 
a poem or parable. 
And sometimes, f o r some people, t h i s may be the 
way i n which they come to know God: by f i r s t of a l l coming 
to know ( i . e , t o understand) the concept of God. Learning 
the meaning of "God" might put them i n t o the p o s i t i o n where 
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they can come t o discover him, or be discovered by him 
This i s not j u s t a matter of being able t o recognise God 
as God, as I can "recognise" Jim when I l e a r n t h a t Jim i s 
bald and has a hooked nose. For i n the l a t t e r case I have 
been able t o see Jim a l l along. But i n r e l i g i o u s c o g n i t i o n 
we might sometimes have to know what to look f o r before we 
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can "see" i t at a l l . Perhaps l e a r n i n g r e l i g i o u s language i s 
our way of p u t t i n g ourselves l i n g u i s t i c a l l y (or psy c h o l o g i c a l l y ? ) 
i n t o a p o s i t i o n to receive God's r e v e l a t i o n of himself. 
Moses had to do the same t h i n g geographically by climbing 
Mt. S i n a i . 
This may be the element of t r u t h i n the claim t h a t 
i n t u i t i o n s of God can be mediated through a l i n g u i s t i c 
or conceptual medium. For, generally speaking, people do 
not j u s t i n t u i t a God who i s otherwise t o t a l l y "unknown" 
to them; they come to know a God who f i t s the concept of 
God t h a t they have already acquired at second-hand. Of 
course t h a t concept may be - indeed u l t i m a t e l y i t must be -
inadequate, and i t w i l l be transcended when the r e a l God i s 
Known, But there w i l l be symbols and images and models to 
hand to i n t e r p r e t the nature of the God who discloses 
nimself. And f o r some i t may be t h a t an understanding of the 
complex of concepts t h a t makes up "the meaning of God" 
i s i t s e l f a necessary, though not a s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n 
f o r i n t u i t i n g God himself. The disclosure of the concept of 
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God may thus lead to a disc l o s u r e of i t s r e f e r e n t . 
The explanation of t h i s may be broadly psychological 
rather than epistemological, f o r i t may be t h a t some people 
can only come t o an awareness of God i f they are "favourably 
disposed" towards the concept of God, Richard Hanson's 
paper on "The A t t r a c t i v e n e s s of God" i s a f r a n l confession 
of the way i n which the a t t r i b u t e of fascinans of the 
mysterium tremendum may be determinative i n a persons 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f : 
I want to believe i n God and I do believe i n 
God because I cannot r e s i s t the a t t r a c t i o n 
which such b e l i e f holds f o r me.,.,I believe 
i n God because I want to believe i n God , 
(Hanson 1 - 2) 
We choose God, not out of a s t e r n sense of 
duty nor i n a s p i r i t of cool c a l c u l a t i o n 
of expediency, but because God makes himself 
sweet to us. We cannot r e s i s t the a t t r a c t i o n 
of h i s goodness... The motive power of 
C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i s the a t t r a c t i o n of God's 
love. ( i b i d . 8) 
Of course such an analysis i s open to the charge of w i s h f u l 
t h i n k i n g ; but t h i s i s an almost i n e v i t a b l e response to any 
attempt to j u s t i f y people's b e l i e f i n a l o v i n g God. There 
are, i n any case, a number of c r i t e r i a which we can use to 
d i s t i n g u i s h r e l i g i o u s f a n t a s i s i n g from genuine r e l i g i o u s 
awareness. These c r i t e r i a are derived p a r t l y from the 
nature of r e l i g i o u s experience i t s e l f and p a r t l y from post-
e x p e r i e n t i a l f a c t o r s such as coherence w i t h other b e l i e f s . 
Other c r i t e r i a are based on our p r i o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
psychological make - up of the person holding a r e l i g i o u s 
is 
b e l i e f : I s t h i s , orjfchis not, the so r t of person who would 
be a v i c t i m of w i s h - f u l f i l m e n t ? I s he credulous, e a s i l y 
duped? Oyobes he - i n other areas of b e l i e f - reveal a 
c r i t i c a l mind and a w i l l i n g n e s s to take i n t o account o b j e c t i ' 
t o h i s b e l i e f s ? These questions can be answered without any 
recourse to independent evidence as to whether, i n the case 
of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , the object of h i s a f f e c t i o n s 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s . Harry Williams has remarked 
Because I want something, even very badly, i t 
does not necessarily f o l l o w t h a t i t does not 
e x i s t . Because I am madly i n love w i t h Betty 
and want desperately to marry her, i t does not 
f o l l o w that she i s al t o g e t h e r a figment of my 
imagination,... So the God I want i s not a 
t o t a l i l l u s i o n simply because I want Him. 
(H.A. Williams 171; c f . Hanson 2) 
I 1 argued e a r l i e r that there i s l i t t l e room f o r 
the exercise of our freedom i n i n t u i t i v e knowledge, as the 
c e n t r a l i n t u i t i v e act of awareness i s outside our c o n t r o l . 
But there c e r t a i n l y are many f a c t o r s t h a t serve e i t h e r to 
encourage ( t o tend to evoke) or t o discourage ( t o tend to 
prevent) t h a t i n t u i t i o n . Tnus i n the cognate moral i n t u i t i o n 
of the wrongness of an a c t i o n several f a c t o r s " i n f l u e n c e " 
the i n t u i t i o n t h a t we have. These f a c t o r s include the way 
i n which we "meditate on" the a c t i o n ; the p a r a l l e l (or 
c o n t r a s t i n g ) examples, storjes or i l l u s t r a t i o n s t h a t we " b r i n g 
alongside" i t ; the a t t e n t i o n we give to c e r t a i n aspects of 
the s i t u a t i o n at the expense of other aspects; the extent t o 
which we have sympathy w i t h the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the moral 
s i t u a t i o n ; and so on. And at l e a s t some of these f a c t o r s 
are under our f r e e c o n t r o l . We can, f o r example, f r e e l y 
choose whether or not we get to know the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
i n a s i t u a t i o n , thus a l l o w i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of our 
developing sympathy w i t h them. Therefore, although the 
moral i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f i s not under our f r e e c o n t r o l , we can -
to some extent - determine whether or not we put ourselves 
i n t o a p o s i t i o n to receive i t . 
My point here i s t h a t to open ourselves to the 
compulsive a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the concept of God^by p o s i t i v e l y 
seeking to understand i t , may be to put ourselves f r e e l y i n t o 
a p o s i t i o n to receive the r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n which i s , 
of i t s e l f , outside our c o n t r o l . I s n ' t t h i s what happens when 
people are "converted by reading the B i b l e " (or even by 
l i s t e n i n g to sermons!)? Some at l e a s t must understand i n 
order to b e l i e v e ^ n something understandable , but also 
because f o r them understanding r e s u l t s i n b e l i e f . There are 
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no close p a r a l l e l s here i n other forms of knowledge. The 
s i t u a t i o n , indeed, i s almost exactly opposite t o the one 
which i s f r e q u e n t l y o f f e r e d as a parable of r e l i g i o u s 
c o g n i t i o n - the r e c o g n i t i o n of colour by the exceptional 
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person i n the country of the c o l o u r - b l i n d . For i n tha t 
account a person cannot understand what colour i s u n t i l he 
sees i t . On my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however, a person may not see 
God u n t i l he understands who he i s . But there do seem to be 
one or two c o g n i t i v e s i t u a t i o n s which show some analogy to 
t h i s . For example, one may have t o exp l a i n t o a person 
"what he i s l o o k i n g f o r " before he can "see" a p a t t e r n i n 
an ambiguous puzzle picture., Perhaps one could also argue 
that the "morally b l i n d " can only come to "see" t h e i r duty 
i n any s i t u a t i o n a f t e r they have come to understand the 
concept of duty, I do not pretendjhowever, th a t these 
examples o f f e r anything more than very remote analogies 
to the s i t u a t i o n i n r e l i g i o n . For God _is d i f f e r e n t from 
every other object of knowledge: and to recognize t h a t may be 
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already to be on the way to recognizing him, 
7. The Snb.ieoti-g-e Element of the Disclosure (the disclosure of the s e l f ) 
Ramsey o f f e r s us two reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n a 
transcendent personal "more" or : ((A ) and (B) below) :~ 
(A) " I " i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e of a l l experience and language 
The f i r s t piece of evidence i s "a l o g i c a l argument 
i n favour of a transcendent ' I ' " (HP 129), to the e f f e c t 
t h a t i t i s "the presupposition of a l l language and experience 
th a t there i s an i r r e d u c i b l e 'I' " (RSCS 61, c f . CPCF 53). 
There appear to be three elements i n the argument: 
( i ) The existence of objects presupposes the existence of a 
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c o r r e l a t i v e s u b j e c t ; 
whatever i s observed i m p l i e s an observer who i s 
a presupposition of the r e s u l t a n t d i s c o u r s e and 
cannot be netted w i t h i n i t . . . a l l £third person 
a s s e r t i o n s ^ are wit h i n i n v i s i b l e quotes, so 
that a l o g i c a l l y complete a s s e r t i o n i s always 
i n the f i r s t person. (HP 129, c f . BP I I 199, CPL 245 - 246) 
The f a c t that there are any " o b j e c t s " , Ramsey cl a i m s , i m p l i e s 
the e x i s t e n c e of at l e a s t one ( l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t ) " s u b j e c t " 
as a matter of l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y , "as a c o n d i t i o n of our 
t a l k i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y about obriects at a l l " (PF 333). 
A l l experience i s s u b j e c t - o b j e c t i n s t r u c t u r e ; a l l language 
presupposes the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t d i s t i n c t i o n ( c f . TL4, RSCS 40, 
60, Review Stace 112). Language i s only language f o r language 
u s e r s ! and language use r s are the s u b j e c t s who make a s s e r t i o n s 
about o b j e c t s . V/e cannot get r i d of - or ignore - the 
exis t e n c e of such s u b j e c t s and s t i l l continue to use t h e i r 
language ( c f . RSCS 41, BPII 180). I n short, 
There i s a l o g i c a l need to preserve the subject 
which a l l t h i r d person a s s e r t i o n s about objects 
l o g i c a l l y demand«(MDA 60) 
D a l l a s M. High has made the same point? and i t i s , I b e l i e v e , 
one t h a t we cannot gainsays 
I n the i n s t a n c e of the f i r s t - p e r s o n personal 
pronoun " I " the existe n c e of the subje c t does 
not of l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y f o l l o w from the 
subjec t term i t s e l f . However, i t can be s a i d 
that i t i s a form of outrage to language to 
con t r a c t the subject and su b j e c t term out of 
language, f o r the pronoun " I " and i t s r e f e r e n t 
are i n t e r n a l to the p o s s i b i l i t y of language 
having a use or being used. T h i s again does 
not f o l l o w of l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y but of n e o e s s i t y 
p r i o r to the formulation of l o g i c a l or r u l e 
n e c e s s i t y that there be an " I " who claims and 
makes use of speech. (High 184; c f . Davie 36 - 37) 
( i i ) I t i s a ba s i c mistake, t h e r e f o r e , to " o b j e c t i f y the 
s u b j e c t " : 
To o b j e c t i f y the subject i s to deny ourselves the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of ever t a l k i n g sense. (SE I 197) 
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T h i s f o l l o w s as a g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n f r o m ( i ) , f o r t h e r e 
must "be one s u b j e c t i f t h e r e a r e t o be " o b j e c t s " a t a l l . 
But Ramsey i s a l s o s a y i n g t h a t i n any p a r t i c u l a r case t h e a t t e m p t 
t o reduce t h e s u b j e c t t o t h e l e v e l o f an o b j e c t - t o 
" t r a n s l a t e " a f i r s t - p e r s o n a s s e r t i o n i n t o t h i r d - p e r s o n 
terms - commits a v e r y s e r i o u s e r r o r : 
t h e r e i s ^ S u b j e c t i v i t y which each of us r e a l i z e s 
f o r h i m s e l f which i s n o t , and l o g i c a l l y c o u l d not 
be, exhausted by any number o f t h i r d - p e r s o n 
d e s c r i p t i o n s , however f a r t h e y went and however 
v a r i o u s t h e y were. ( T L 4 ; c f . RSCS 40, RSP 1 5 0 ) 
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The fundamental e r r o r o f Hume and R y l e was t o i g n o r e t h e 
r a d i c a l s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t and at t e m p t t o d e s c r i b e 
i t e n t i r e l y i n o b j e c t i v e language about p e r c e p t i o n s and 
behav i o u r . Such a t t e m p t s commit " t h e l o g i c a l b l u n d e r of 
o b j e c t i f y i n g t h e s u b j e c t " (RSCS 5 7 ) ; 
i f per i m p o s s i b i l e we c o u l d g i v e our i d e n t i t y 
d e s c r i p t i v e l y or i n d i v i d u a l i t y would have 
disa p p e a r e d , Tne s u b j e c t would have been 
o b j e c t i f i e d . (PPMT 1 6 6 ) 
Ramsey has an important p o i n t h e r e , though by t h e 
v e r y n a t u r e o f t h e t o p i c he sometimes f i n d s d i f f i c u l t y i n 
e x p r e s s i n g i t . An a n a l y s i s o f t h e s e l f l i k e t h a t o f Hume and 
Ryle does seem t o leave us w i t h a p u r e l y o h j e c t i v e s e l f which 
cannot serve as an adequate account e i t h e r o f our exper i e n c e 
or o f t h e language we use t o express i t . The e l u s i v e n e s s o f 
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I must remain, r e s i s t a n t t o a l l r e d u c t i v e analyses 
( i i i ) The l o g i c o f the pronoun " I " i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
f r o m t h e l o g i c o f "he" ( o r "me"): 
" I " - u n l i k e "he" - r e s i s t s t o t a l a b s o r p t i o n i n 
an i m p e r s o n a l and c o m p l e t e l y v e r i f i a b l e p r e d i c a t e . 
(PRFI 353? c f a l s o Lewis (EM) 1 5 1 , 1 5 9 , 2 0 9 ) 
T n i s c l a i m , which f o l l o w s f r o m ( i i ) above, e x p l a i n s a t l e a s t 
p a r t o f t h e l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t y o f the a s s e r t i o n " I am dead" » 
"Death" means t h e end of ob s e r v a b l e behaviour, b o t h 
s o c i e l o g i c a l and p h y s i o l o g i c a l ( F I 6 4 - 6 5 ) . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e a term which may be used o f obs e r v a b l e e n t i t i e s 
( e . g . "he i s dead"), But i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e as a 
p r e d i c a t e i n a sentence whose s u b j e c t ( i ) i s - o r i n c l u d e s 
an unobservable "mere". For t h e n "the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e 
p r e d i c a t e seems t o deny the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the s u b j e c t " 
(FRFI 3 5 3 ) . Thus " I am d e a d " , l i k e " I am a s l e e p " , i s a 
l o g i c a l b l u n d e r ; f o r " I " - u n l i k e "dead" and "asleep" -
cannot be r e s t r i c t e d t o what i s s p a t i o - t e m p e r a l . 
For s i m i l a r reasons Ramsey d i s a g r e e s w i t h 
A.G.N. FJew's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t i s l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e 
("or a t least,.„is v e r y f a r f r o m b e i n g a l o g i c a l l y 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d m a t t e r " ) t o w i t n e s s one's own f u n e r a l 
(Flew (CMWF) 2 4 6 ) . Flew would say 
t h a t "my f u n e r a l " equals an event i n v o k i n g 
a l l t h a t i s t h e n l e f t o f me, and t h e r e f o r e 
I cannot w i t n e s s i t , V/e would say t h a t 
w h i l e "my f u n e r a l " i s an event which 
c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e s my body, n e v e r t h e l e s s 
our p r e s e n t s e l f - a w a r e n e s s y i e l d s a 
s i t u a t i o n not w h o l l y r e d u c i b l e e i t h e r t o my 
body o r t o any p u b l i c o b j e c t s , o r t o a n y t h i n g 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l , ( P F 3 3 7 ; c f . F I « 5 - 87 and 
the s i m i l a r account i n P o t e a t (IWD)) 
V/e s h a l l c o n s i d e r Ramsey's arguments f o r i m m o r t a l i t y 
i n more d e t a i l l a t e r . They a l l reduce, however, t o t h e 
c l a i m t h a t " I " denotes something which i s o b s e r v a t i o n a l l y 
e l u s i v e , w h e r eas "he" ( o r "me") "denotes something as 
p u b l i c as anyone would w i s h " (M 1 5 ; c f , PPMT 165 - 1 6 7 , 
PR ^6, - 2 1 5 , BS 4 7 , TJ-WM 8 - 1 3 ) . But t h e l a c t t h a t I am 
more t h a n any o b j e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s about me can r e l a t e , 
s u r e l y does not d e s t r o y a t a s t r o k e t h e s c e p t i c a l a s s a u l t s 
of those who deny t h a t " I " w i l l s u r v i v e "my" death. I t 
may not be l o g i c a l l y i n o r d e r t o say " I am dead", but i t 
does seem prop e r t o p r e d i c t " I w i l l d i e " . And whatever o t h e r 
u sers o f language may be r e f e r r i n g t o , when my d o c t o r says 
"he i s dead" he does not j u s t mean " h i s body i s dead". He 
means a l s o t h a t "he i s no l o n g e r a conscious c e n t r e o f 
experience and a c t i v i t y ( a t l e a s t i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s body 
h e r e ) " . So i t i s not t h e case t h a t "he" can o n l y be analysed 
i n terms of a body and i t s b e h a v i o u r ( c f . Smart (PR) 2 2 7 , 
Strawson ( i ) c h . 3 ) . 
( 8 ) I i s d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n 
T h e ' l o g i c a l argument" o u t l i n e d above i s one t h a t 
Ramsey takes v e r y s e r i o u s l y . But be b e l i e v e s a l s o t h a t t h e 
" l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r o f ' I * " i s i t s e l f "grounded i n a 
d i s c l o s u r e " (PR 2 1 5 )» We can know by argument t h a t t h e r e 
must be a t r a n s c e n d e n t I , b ut i t i s o n l y t h r o u g h a s e l f -
d i s c l o s u r e t h a t "we g a i n access t o t h i s which makes us 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y o u r s e l v e s " (HP 1 2 9 ) . 
Ramsey h o l d s t h a t a l l d i s c l o s u r e s i n v o l v e a 
s u b j e c t i v e ( i ) r e f e r e n c e as w e l l as an o b j e c t i v e ( o t h e r ) 
not 
r e f e r e n c e . A s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e , t h e r e f o r e , i s / a d i s t i n c t 
and s e p a r a b l e species o f d i s c l o s u r e . I t i s , r a t h e r , t h e 
i n e v i t a b l e c o n comitant o f each and every o b j e c t i v e d i s c l o s u r e , , 
I t i s a m i s t a k e , t h e r e f o r e , t o t r e a t t h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e 
as j u s t one more example w i t h i n t h e c a t e g o r y of d i s c l o s u r e . 
For a l l the o t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s are d i s c l o s u r e s of some 
" o b j e c t " , t h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e alone i s l t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f a 
s u b j e c t . I n a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e I become aware of m y s e l f 
( a t t h e same t i m e as I become aware o f some o t h e r ) , but 
my s e l f i s not an o b j e c t which d i s c l o s e s i t s e l f p r e c i s e l y 
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i n t h e way t h a t o t h e r o b j e c t s d i s c l o s e themselves 
I t i s r a t h e r t h a t we a r e i n t u i t i v e l y aware o f b e i n g s u b j e c t s : 
c e n t r e s of consciousness and a c t i v i t y . And t h i s awareness 
comes t o us w i t h t h e f o r c e o f a r e v e l a t i o n , so t h a t Ramsey 
can c l a i m t h a t the s u b j e c t d i s c l o s e s i t s e l f (BPI 4 0 ) ; t h a t 
we are t h e rec i p i e n t s o f a " s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e " (BPI 4 1 , MM 2 7 , 
BPEM 1 7 e t c . ) . T h i s "self-awareness" ( c f . SEI 2 0 3 ) i s a l s o 
d e s i g n a t e d by Ramsey as:-
an " i n s i g h t i n t o o u r s e l v e s " (MM 2 6 ) ; 
"a d i s c l o s u r e o f our s u b j e c t i v i t y " (U-HA " I n t r o d u c t i o n 
t o t h e P n i l o s o p h y o f R e l i g i o n " A , 1 9 6 3 ; p . 5 ) ; 
and a " d i s c l o s u r e o f o u r s e l v e s " i n which a man "becomes 
aware o f h i s p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y " (BPI 4 1 ) . 
Ramsey contends t h a t : 
the s u b j e c t i v i t y which each o f us knows i n h i m s e l f 
i s something which breaks i n on us when we come t o 
o u r s e l v e s - when a s t o r y i s t o l d which e f f e c t s 
t h i s s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n and d i s c l o s u r e . Such s u b j e c t i v i t y 
. . . i s t h a t o f which I am aware when I Know an a c t i o n 
as p e c u l i a r l y "mine" - when i t breaks i n on me 
(as w i t h D a v i d b e f o r e Nathan) t h a t "I'm t h e man" 
whom a l i s t o f d e s c r i p t i v e m a t e r i a l o b j e c t 
p r e d i c a t e s r e f e r s t o but which no l i s t o f such 
p r e d i c a t e s ever exhausts,. „,Such a s i t u a t i o n 
d i s c l o s e s my s u b j e c t i v e transcendence, what I am 
besides my o v e r t b e h a v i o u r ....what I am i n and 
f o r myself,(CPCP 5 3 ) 
Such s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e s serve as "moments o f v i s i o n i n which 
each of us f i n d s freedom, s p o n t a n e i t y and f u l f i l m e n t " (HP 1 31). 
Ramsey f r e q u e n t l y uses language about a person's " s e l f -
r e a l i z a t i o n " i n t h i s c o n t e x t (e.g. BP I I 206, HP 1 3 2 , 
TW 04? ITR Owen 126),, He seems t o employ t h e phrase b o t h i n 
the sense t h a t a man re c o g n i a e s h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t s u b j e c t i v i t y 
and i n t h e sense t h a t he becomes h i s t r u e s e l f s f r e e , 
r e s p o n s i b l e and a c t i v e ( c f . PPMT 168). Thus5 
i n a moment of d e c i s i o n t h e r e i s d i s c l o s e d t h e 
" t r a n s c e n d e n t " c h a r a c t e r o f a man's p e r s o n a l i t y . 
I t i s i n making such a d e c i s i o n t h a t he r e a l i z e s 
he i s not l i m i t e d t o t h e o b j e c t i v e b e h a v i o u r he 
d i s p l a y s . i n a c e r t a i n k i n d o f d e c i s i v e a c t i o n 
a man r e a l i z e s h i m s e l f as something more t h a n . , . 
a l l o f these s t o r i e s - be they o f b i o c h e m i s t r y , 
economics, psychology, and so on - t a l k about. ( P I 2 6 ) 
Where the l a t t e r t y p e o f ' s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ' occurs 
i n response t o a moral c l a i m Ramsey says t h a t t h e person 
concerned "comes t o h i m s e l f " (WM 28, RSCS 4 3 , BP I I 206, 
TS 1 6 8 ) . However t h i s phrase i s a l s o used more g e n e r a l l y o f 
o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s ( c f . PR 215, CPCP 5 3 ) . Ramsey a l s o uses 
the phrase "(£ubjectively) coming a l i v e " as a synonym f o r 
" r e a l i z i n g " our s u b j e c t i v i t y ( c f . HP 1 2 9 , PA 1 9 4 ) . He 
cl a i m s f u r t h e r t h a t the w o r l d "comes a l i v e " o b j e c t i v e l y i n 
a d i s c l o s u r e as we " r e a l i z e " (= i n t u i t ) i t s "more" and "are 
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h an a c t i v i t y m atching our own" (RFT 2 8 ) , 
For Ramsey t o say t h a t t h e ?;orld "comes a l i v e " i s t o use a 
phrase t h a t i s more t h a n a mere metaphor. For a l l d i s c l o s u r e s 
r e v e a l o b j e c t i v e " a l i v e n e s s " ( a c t i v i t y o f an o t h e r ) a t t h e 
same t i m e as th e y r e v e a l s u b j e c t i v e " a l i v e n e s s " ( a c t i v i t y 
o f t h e s e l f ) . I t should a l s o be no t e d t h a t t h e s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n 
t h a t i s an a c t i v i t y corresponds t o t h e element of commitment . 
And t h i s occurs i n response t o t h e d i s c e r n m e n t - d i s c l o s u r e , 
which i s i t s e l f a s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n i n t h e sense of a "becoming 
aware " ( c f . MDA 6 0 ) . 
Ramsey g i v e s a wide range o f examples of t h e 
d i s c l o s u r e o f I , but we must not be m i s l e d i n t o t r e a t i n g them 
as e n t i r e l y s eparate i n s t a n c e s . Tnus t h e I which i s d i s c l o s e d 
i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f our f r e e , r e s p o n s i b l e , moral a c t i v i t y 
( F I chS. I & I I passim. FRFI 3 5 5 , CE 182 5 c f . F I 6 6 , RSCS 3 6 ) 
i s i n t u i t e d as we come t o d i s c e r n our d u t y o r our God (BP I I 
185, F I ch I I passim, 7 6 , PG 6'7,RSCS 4 2 - 4 3 ) . And as d u t y 
and God are d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h t h e medium of ( o u r sense 
p e r c e p t i o n s o f ) the w o r l d , we should not be s u r p r i s e d t o 
l e a r n t h a t t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f I can a l s o occur "around'* our 
sense p e r c e p t i o n s (BPEM 18, BP I I 183, SEI 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 ; o f . 
PF 3 3 5 ) . T h i s l a s t f e a t u r e may tempt us t o speak o f 
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s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e as "mediated", but t h e word i s b e t t e r a v o i ded 
i n t a l k i n g o f the d i s c l o s u r e o f the s e l f . We come t o know I , 
as we survey our p e r c e p t i o n s of the w o r l d , as the I t h a t 
i n t e g r a t e s those p e r c e p t i o n s and g i v e s us our s e l f - i d e n t i t y . 
But my " I " - my p e r s o n a l "more" - i s not d i s c l o s e d t o me t h r o u g h 
t h e medium o f my p e r c e p t i o n s i n t h e same way t h a t o t h e r 
"mores" are d i s c l o s e d . For " I " am not a t t h e " f a r s i d e " o f 
the medium r e v e a l i n g m y s e l f t o mysel f " t h r o u g h " i t . I t i s 
o e t t e r t o view t h e s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e - as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r -
as a"hon-mediated" d i s c l o s u r e ^ i . e . a d i s c l o s u r e t h a t i s 
not mediated by the w o r l d and our experience o f t h e w o r l d . 
Ramsey h i m s e l f seems confused over t h i s q u e s t i o n . For he 
w r i t e s o f a person's s e l f - a w a r e n e s s as "a s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n 
o f such a k i n d t h a t he r e c o g n i z e s t h e d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i o n 
t o be ' h i s 1 , becomes aware a t the same t i m e o f what i t i s 
t o be h i m s e l f , t h e same s e l f f becomes aware o f h i s p e r s o n a l 
i d e n t i t y " (BP I I 183). But he t h e n goes on t o add; 
"The d i s c l o s u r e o f o u r s e l v e s occurs around a c e r t a i n s e t 
o f circumstances o r o t h e r , which t h e n c o n s t i t u t e s , by way 
of d e s c r i p t i v e terms, a d e s c r i p t i v e a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f what 
i t i s t h a t has been d i s c l o s e d t o us" ( i b i d . , c f . i b i d . 190). 
However I can become aware o f I i n a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e t h a t 
occurs around my p e r c e p t i o n s o f ( s a y ) an e l e p h a n t . But 
n e i t h e r t h e e l e p h a n t , nor my sense-data o f t h e e l e p h a n t , 
can serve as a " d e s c r i p t i v e a p p r o x i m a t i o n " f o r I . What 
Ramsey r e a l l y i n t e n d s t o denote by t h e phrase above i s 
e i t h e r ( a ) t h e p e r c e p t i o n s a n o t h e r person may have o f me, 
or (b) my perceptions o f my own body and i t s b e h a v i o u r ( c f . 
CE 182). But t h e fundamental d i s c l o s u r e o f my s e l f as a 
s u b j e c t o f experiences can come t o me whatever t h e o b j e c t 
( c o n t e x t ) of those e x p e r i e n c e s might be, and i t i s d i s t i n c t i v e 
f o r me as the one who has those e x p e r i e n c e s . Compare SEI 199-200, 
BPEM 23, B P I I 4 1 , RSCS 42 e t c . 
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(C) The Nat u r e o f t h e S e l f 
Ramsey's account o f t h e s e l f , t o g e t h e r w i t h a f u l l y 
adequate c r i t i c i s m and development o f t h e problems i t r a i s e s , 
c o u l d occupy an e n t i r e t h e s i s . Here I can o n l y s k e t c h t h e 
main elements. 
"When a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n o c c u r s " , Ramsey w r i t e s , 
"we do not f i n d our s u b j e c t i v i t y l a i d b e f o r e us as an o b j e c t " 
(HP 129) . " ' I ' has a l o g i c a l s t a t u s a l l o f i t s own and i s 
not a p e r c e p t i o n word" (U-FMG (3) 11/10/202) , f o r we do not 
" g i n access t o C t n a " t ) which makes us d i s t i n c t i v e l y o u r s e l v e s 
...by o b s e r v a t i o n " (HP 129). I t i s t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o 
f o r g e t t h i s c e n t r a l f a c t t h a t l e a d s , Ramsey b e l i e v e s , t o t h e 
p a r a d o x i c a l and b e w i l d e r i n g t h i n g s t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s have 
s a i d about t h e s e l f . 
I n r e p l y t o a request f r o m H.P. Owen t h a t he sh o u l d 
" i n d i c a t e c l e a r l y and more f u l l y h i s a t t i t u d e t o t h e v a r i o u s 
t h e o r i e s o f mind and s e l f h o o d t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s have o f f e r e d " 
(Owen (PTR) 7 2 ) , Ramsey comments: " I am sure t h a t I ought 
t o say much more t h a n I do about t h i s s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l 
element ( i n human p e r s o n a l i t y ^ " He goes on, however } t o 
make two p o i n t s t h a t are w o r t h q u o t i n g i n f u l l : 
( i ) I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e a l i z e t h a t we c o u l d n ot 
( l o g i c a l l y c o u l d n o t ) On my view d e s c r i b e t h i s 
element f u r t h e r , and we c o u l d n o t d e s c r i b e i t s 
r e l a t i o n t o a s s o c i a t e d phenomena. The s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l 
element i s r a t h e r something t o be r e a l i z e d when we 
spontaneously and a c t i v e l y respond t o something 
which i n s p i r e s us. The s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l element i n 
human p e r s o n a l i t y i s t h e s u b j e c t of a s e l f -
d i s c l o s u r e t o each of us. I n one sense we can 
on l y know what t h i s s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l element i s , 
and how i t i s r e l a t e d t o i t s a s s o c i a t e d phenomena, 
by coming t o know t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n an act o f 
s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , an a c t i v i t y whose m a t c h i n g 
d i s c o u r s e w i l l be i n p a r t p e r f o r m a t i v e and not 
merely d e s c r i p t i v e . 
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( i i ) I t i s p e r f e c t l y t r u e t h a t phrases l i k e " t h e 
t i m e l e s s s e l f " o r " t h e r e a l s e l f " o r " s o u l " or 
" s p i r i t " m ight he thought t o say more about t h i s 
s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l element, and t h a t we might speak 
of i t , t o use a phrase of CD. Broad'a, i n terms 
of the " u n i t y of c e n t r e " . But a l l these words 
and phrases c o u l d be no more t h a n p o i n t e r s t o 
what i s r e v e a l e d i n an a c t of s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . 
We Know t h e s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l element when we 
r e a l i z e o u r s e l v e s i n an a c t i v i t y which i n t e g r a t e s 
a l l t hose s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l phenomena which can 
v a r i o u s l y be d e s c r i b e d as my b o d i l y events and 
my mental events, Tne s u p r a - e m p i r i c a l element 
i s t h a t which each o f us knows i n an a c t of 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e which h o l d s t o g e t h e r , i n a 
g i n g l e common ownership, our mental events and 
b o d i l y events. They are "mine" i n so f a r as they 
f a l l w i t h i n such an i n t e g r a t i n g a c t i v i t y . 
(ITR Owen 125 - 126) 
Ramsey i s i n p a r t i c u l a r e x c e e d i n g l y chary of accounts 
of t h e s e l f t h a t t r e a t i t as a mental substance whose mode 
of e x i s t e n c e and b e h a v i o u r i s s t r i c t l y analogous t o those o f 
m a t e r i a l substance. I t was j u s t such a n o t i o n o f a g h o s t l y 
" c o u n t e r p a r t " t o t h e body which K y l e ' s c r i t i q u e s e t o u t t o 
d e s t r o y , and Ramsey c e r t a i n l y t o o k t h e c r i t i c i s m t o h e a r t : 
"the s o u l " must not d e s c r i b e some g h o s t l y s o r t o f 
" t h i n g " d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s 
m a i n l y i n not b e i n g seen.(Emp R 162; c f . CCP 
255 - 256, F I 104 - 106) 
However Ryle had proposed i n i t s p l a c e " t h e e x t r o v e r t par 
e x c e l l e n c e " (CPCF 53) ; by t r e a t i n g mental concepts s o l e l y i n 
terms of o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o u r , he p r o v i d e d a g r o s s l y 
inadequate concept o f t h e mind ( c f . CCP 258, SEI p a s s i m ) . 
Ramsey agrees w i t h B e r k e l e y t h a t we have a " n o t i o n " , 
hut not any " i d e a " , of our own a c t i v i t y (WI 68 - 6 9 ) . 
A c t i v i t y has an "odd l o g i c " compared w i t h t h a t o f our 
everyday, e m p i r i c a l language (BPEM 20). And f o r Ramsey 
a c t i v i t y i s t h e key t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e l f : 
the one u n i f y i n g concept, d e f i n i t i v e o f p e r s o n a l i t y , 
i s not s o u l nor mind nor body. There i s no k i n d o f 
u n d e r l y i n g c u s h i o n t o which a l l our "bodily and 
mental events and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are a t t a c h e d 
as p i n s ; and any ba s i c p e r s o n a l i t y m a t r i x i s 
not s t a t i c . Rather i s p e r s o n a l i t y t o be analysed 
i n terms o f a d i s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y , d i s t i n c t i v e 
i n b e i n g owned, l o c a l i z e d , p e r s o n a l i z e d . . . . . 
Wnat we c a l l human be h a v i o u r i s an e x p r e s s i o n of 
t h a t e f f e c t i v e , i n t e g r a t i n g a c t i v i t y which i s 
p e c u l i a r l y and d i s t i n c t i v e l y o u r s e l v e s . 
(HP 127 - 128) 
Ramsey a t t e m p t s a d e f i n i t i o n of t h e terms "mind" and " s p i r i t " 
a l o n g t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : 
What.,.,is t h e mind? No c o u n t e r p a r t o b j e c t . 
We can most e a s i l y answer t h a t q u e s t i o n by 
s a y i n g " I t i s myse l f as t h i n k i n g " , o r 
"Myself as remembering", o r "Myself as 
s o l v i n g t h e problem", when we t h i n k away 
the b o d i l y aspects of t h a t e x e r c i s e . . . . . 
S p i r i t a g a i n i s not some " t h i n g " ; i t i s t h a t 
u n i t i n g a c t i v i t y w i t h a t r a n s c e n d e n t God-
g i v e n r e f e r e n c e ' 5 w h i c h makes body and mind 
- and I und e r s t a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h ese a r e 
not c o u n t e r p a r t s - "mine". I t makes my 
t h i n k i n g mine and my l y i n g o n t h e grass min<£; 
the one done by t h e s o - c a l l e d body, t h e o t h e r 
done by t h e s o - c a l l e d mind. My body and my 
mind are e x p r e s s i o n s o f me, o f my a c t i v i t y . ^ 7 4 
(TW 81 - 82) 
"At death", Ramsey c o n t i n u e s , "my a c t i v i t y ceases t o De 
expressed t h r o u g h t h a t organism and b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n " . But 
"t h e C h r i s t i a n v i e w i s t h a t t h i s a c t i v i t y which i s d e f i n i t e l y 
o u r s e l v e s i s t h e n expressed elsewhere and i n o t h e r c o n t e x t s . , . 
(TW 8 2 ) . 
Now Ramsey i s r i g h t t o s t r e s s t h e importance o f 
a c t i v i t y i n our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e l f ( c l ' . Campbell 
(SG) ch V I I I ) . He i s r i g h t a l s o t o r e f u s e t o v iew t h e s e l f 
as a " t h i n g " , a " g h o s t l y c o u n t e r p a r t " o f t h e body ( c r . P I 
111 - 112, RSCS 2 8 ) . He i s f u r t h e r c o r r e c t t o a v o i d t h e 
more extreme views o f those d u a l i s t s who t r e a t mind and body 
as a "dichotomy", i g n o r i n g t h e " u n i f i e d p e r s o n a l i t y " o f t h e 
"whole man" (U-WM 28, cf. TW passim). But can a c t i v i t y a l o ne 
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serve as an adequate c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e " e l u s i v e I " 
(U=\7M 10)? Am I not more t h a n my a c t i v i t y ? Where, f o r 
example, do consciousness and memory f i t i n t o t h e p i c t u r e ? 
I am s u r e l y t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t p e r c e i v e r and knower as w e l l as 
the t r a n s c e n d e n t a c t o r . Can these o t h e r human a t t r i b u t e s 
be a d e q u a t e l y a n a l y s e d i n terms of " a c t i v i t y " ? F u r t h e r m o r e , 
a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s no space t o argue t h e p o i n t f u l l y h e r e , i t 
does seem t o me more r e a l i s t i c t o speak of my s e l f , t h e 
s u b j e c t of my consciousness and e x p e r i e n c e s , as my mind. 
r a t h e r t h a n as some n e u t r a l element which "has" both a mind 
and a body. As H.D. Lewis p u t s i t : " I n an i m p o r t a n t sense 
our t h o u g h t s and experiences are what we a r e , t h e y 'belong' 
. . . i n a v e r y d i s t i n c t i v e and i r r e d u c i b l e way" (Lewis ( S i ) 
193, c f . i b i d . (EM) 151, 159). I n s peaking o f t h e s e l f 
s o l e l y i n terms o f a c t i v i t y , Ramsey i s open t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
t h a t he views t h e s e l f ( i n these l a t e r w r i t i n g s a t any r a t e ) 
as a s e r i e s o f events, r a t h e r t h a n (as i n t h e s o - c a l l e d 
" t h e o r y of agency": c f . S h a f f e r (PM) 85 - 88) as an e n t i t y 
i n which a c t i v i t y o r i g i n a t e s . 
However a t an e a r l i e r s t age Ramsey i s t o be heard 
i n s i s t i n g t h a t h i s view does not make the s e l f " i n no sense 
an e n t i t y " (FRFI 352) a comment, i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, 
p r o v o l s d by a c r i t i c i s m from H.D. L e w i s : ( F l ) 174). And he 
was c o n t e n t t h e n t o speak o f t h e " i m m o r t a l i t y " o f I ( c f . F I 
104, 112) and even o f i t s " p r e - e x i s t e n c e " ( F I 136 - 140) -
a l t h o u g h these doctrines were not t o be i n t e r p r e t e d a l o n g 
t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s . Many students o f Ramsey have been p u z z l e d 
by t h i s a m b i g u i t y i n h i s work on t h e s e l f . Cohen suggests 
t h a t he i s ( i n t e n t i o n a l l y ? ) a l t e r n a t i n g between two d i f f e r e n t 
v iews: 
( i ) The s e l f as a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y which i s o n l y 
c o n t i n g e n t l y l i n k e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r body; 
and ( i i ) The s e l f as "more a p o e t i c d i s c l o s e d concept 
t h a n an e n t i t y " (Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 113). 
H.D. Lewis has suggested t h a t Ramsey may be i n 
danger 'bf s u b s t i t u t i n g h e l p f u l metaphor f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
a n a l y s i s " (Lewis ( F l ) 174). Schedler argues t h a t t h e "more" 
o f a person may be viewed s i m p l y as "a connexion o r p a t t e r n 
o r pro-.ject v/hich c h a r a c t e r i z e s human phenomena" but t h a t 
i n h i s own a n a l y s i s Ramsey "wants an e n t i t y , not a connexion 
as the ground f o r t h i s k i n d of t a l k " ( S c h e d l e r ( T h e s i s ) 259; 
c f . a l s o Lewis (EM) 325). A g r e a t d e a l seems t o hang on how 
f a r Ramsey's views are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s e l f b e i n g a 
d i s t i n c t e n t i t y i n i t s own r i g h t , an e n t i t y capable e i t h e r 
o f s u r v i v i n g d eath i n a disembodied s t a t e o r o f r e c r e a t i o n 
i n an embodied s t a t e . I n comparison w i t h such a view t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e l f as an " a c t i v i t y " d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h 
t h e p a t t e r n o f our b o d i l y b e h a viour ( c f . HP 128) seems somewhat 
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r e d u c t i o n i s t . The "more" t h a t i s " I " i s s u r e l j ^ more t h a n 
my a c t i v i t y - as t h e "more" which i s God i s more th a n h i s 
( c f , K i n g 65 and passim). 
We may m e n t i o n a t t h i s p o i n t Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n o f 
t h e terms " s o u l " , " t i m e l e s s s e l f " and "pure ego". He t r e a t s 
" s o u l " as "a synonym f o r ' I ' or 'person", where 'person' 
d e s c r i b e s t h e whole l i v i n g b e i n g - °objects' and more" ( F I 1 1 0 ) 0 
We sho u l d a v o i d a l l t a l k t h a t t r e a t s t h e s o u l as some q u a s i -
o b j e c t , a c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e body ( F I 101, c f , Cleobury (CRPA) 
3 7 ) ; r a t h e r " t h e word ' s o u l ' can o n l y be j u s t i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n 
t o c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s where what i s more about human p e r s o n a l i t y 
t h a n i t s o v e r t b e h a v i o u r , i s d i s c l o s e d " ( B P I I 1 7 8 ) . S i m i l a r l y 
t h e terms "Pure Ego" and "Timeless S e l f " a r e r e l a t e d t o s i t u a t i o n s 
o f s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e , though i n these cases t h e phrases are 
t r e a t e d as q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s : 
we t a k e as our model t h e " s e l f " o r the "ego", 
meaning by these words t h a t which i s p u b l i c 
about m y s e l f t o everyone i n c l u d i n g m y s e l f . . . . 
"Timeless" and "pure" are b o t h o f them 
q u a l i f i e r s f o r such a model, u r g i n g us so 
t o t a l k about our t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and p u b l i c b e h a v i o u r as t o make more e v i d e n t 
- i n a d i s c l o s u r e - "what i s t h e case" besides. 
( F I 9 7 , c f . E 4 6 ) 
T h i s t r e a t m e n t o f such terms as e s s e n t i a l l y e v o c a t i v e o f a 
s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e enables Ramsey t o a v o i d some o f t h e problems 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h an over l i t e r a l view o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n as 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e s e l f ( o f . F I 2 0 , 1 0 3 ; FRFI 3 4 8 ) . But, 
as v/e s h a l l see, Ramsey accepts elsewhere t h a t q u a l i f i e d -
model language does have some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n . So 
he ought t o be w i l l i n g t o accept t h a t i n t h i s case t h e 
t e r m i n o l o g y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n can serve as v a l i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
o r e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e n a t u r e o f I ( c f . E 4 6 - 4 7 ) . A l t h o u g h 
Ramsey wishes t o a v o i d t h e use o f t r a d i t i o n a l substance 
language about t h e s e l f ( c f . NI 6 8 ) , he does h i n t a t a p o s s i b l e 
d i s c l o s u r e - b a s i s a,s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such m e t a p h y s i c a l 
language i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e concept o f m a t e r i a l 
substance (U-FMG B 5 1 / 1 6 4 - B 5 3 / 1 6 6 ; c f . FD 1 2 9 , RL 159 - 1 6 0 ) . 
I t may be, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Ramsey's vi e w o f t h e s e l f i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y open i n i t s o n t o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s t o a l l o w 
f o r a more t r a d i t i o n a l "pure ego" or "mental substance" 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - p r o v i d e d t h a t i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y dynamic 
Ramsey c l a i m s t h a t he i s " o f t e n accused of w a n t i n g b o t h t o o 
much and too l i t t l e " i n h i s account of t h e s e l f (RSCS 6 1 ) . 
I would s i d e w i t h those c r i t i c s who f i n d Ramsey's t h e o r y 
inadequate. C e r t a i n l y t o speak o n l y of " a c t i v i t y " ijs t o want 
too l i t t l e i n an account o f t h e I . 
(D) Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y 
Ramsey's arguments are summarised as f o l l o w s : 
what i s c a l l e d "an act o f w i l l " i s an e m p i r i c a l 
oddity, of which each of us "becomes aware, e.g.., 
when s t o r i e s h a v i n g been t o l d o f prima f a c i e 
d u t i e s ( w h i c h themselves may c o n f l i c t ) , t h e r e 
emerges the Duty o f a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , 
which s i t u a t i o n has t h e n the c h a r a c t e r o f an 
o b l i g a t i o n - r e s p o n s e ; and i n which we speak o f 
r e s p o n d i n g " f r e e l y " . The odd c h a r a c t e r o f 
such d e c i s i v e b e h a v i o u r may l i k e w i s e be r e a l i s e d 
by c o n t i n u a l l y c o u n t e r i n g s t o r i e s of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y 
o r u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y (as t h e case may be) u n t i l 
t h e i r inadequacy s t r i k e s us: o r by d e v e l o p i n g 
s t o r i e s o f o c c u r r e n t c a u s a t i o n u n t i l t h e y f a i l 
t o s a t i s f y . (U-HA: "Tne Problem o f F r e e w i l l " 
Because of t h e s u b j e c t i v e transcendence which 
each o f us knows i n s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e , we can 
l e g i t i m a t e l y t a l k o f our " i m m o r t a l i t y " , our 
e x i s t e n c e beyond death. For t h e " l i f e " we 
know now, b e i n g not r e s t r i c t e d t o , b e i n g a l r e a d y 
more t h a n , t h e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n we d i s p l a y , i s 
not ended w i t h t h e c e s s a t i o n of these b e h a v i o u r 
p a t t e r n s a t death; though t o t a l k about p o s t -
death e x i s t e n c e w i t h l o g i c a l adequacy one 
must always p r e d i c a t e some be h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s . 
(U-HAs " I n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e P n i l o s o p h y o f 
Ramsey b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e c l a i m s f o r " f r e e - w i l l and " i m m o r t a l i t y " 
are e s s e n t i a l l y ojje and t h e same: i . e . " t h a t t h e r e are occasions 
o f human a c t i v i t y which w i l l not be e x h a u s t i v e l y unpacked 
i n s c i e n t i f i c language, however f a r t h e s e languages go" 
(RL 29) . As I am more t h a n o b s e r v a b l e s , and as i t i s o b s e r v a b l e 
- s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l o b j e c t s - t h a t are " determined" and " m o r t a l " , 
Ramsey concludes t h a t we may a p p r o p r i a t e l y make t h e c l a i m t h a t 
I am b o t h " f r e e " and " i m m o r t a l " ( c f . PF 534, BP I I 197, F I 26) . 
He w r i t e s : 
So t o j u s t i f y "freedom"by a p p e a l i n g t o d e c i s i o n -
s i t u a t i o n s which exceed p u b l i c b e h a v i o u r , . . . i s , 
a t t h e same time t o j u s t i f y b e l i e f i n i m m o r t a l i t y . 
For t o do e i t h e r shows t h a t we a r e not r e s t r i c t e d 
( B ) , c . 1955) 
R e l i g i o n " M/66, 1966, p. 2) 
or c o n f i n e d t o those f e a t u r e s o f our e x i s t e n c e 
which are i n space and t i m e . Because we a r e i n 
t h a t sense " f r e e " , i n t h a t sense we are " i m m o r t a l " . 
( F I 66) 
The f r e e - w i l l c l a i m i s t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e r e i s 
something more t o me t h a n t h e b e h a v i o u r t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t 
can observe, what Ramsey c a l l s my " p e r s o n a l b a c k i n g " (BP I I 
177, F I 22 e t c . ) . "The freedom o f t h e w i l l " , Ramsey argues, 
" i s a c l a i m f o r t h e uniqueness o f t h e s u b j e c t , known i n 
occasions of a c t i v i t y i n which t h e s u b j e c t 'comes a l i v e ' 
and r e a l i z e s h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y as t h a t which cannot be 
reduced t o t h e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s and f a c t s - i . e . t h e 
o b j e c t s - o f t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l s c i e n c e s " (Enc. B r i t 602) 
The c l a i m f o r i m m o r t a l i t y i s a c l a i m of a v e r y s i m i l a r 
n a t u r e and t h i s a l s o a r i s e s i n s i t u a t i o n s o f s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e 
we are i m m o r t a l i n so f a r as we know a s i t u a t i o n 
which transcends space and t i m e . ( F I B9) 
When t h e r e has been a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e of 
transcendence, o f what cannot be c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
i n space and t i m e , one cannot say t h a t any s e l f 
so d i s c l o s e d e n t i r e l y comes t o an end. I n t h i s 
sense, t h e r e i s an argument f o r p e r s o n a l 
i m m o r t a l i t y , though one can o n l y t a l k s e n s i b l y 
about i t by e x p r e s s i n g i m m o r t a l i t y i n terms o f 
c o n t i n u i n g p e r s o n a l l i f e . I n C h r i s t i a n i t y 
t h i s becomes speech about t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n of 
t h e body, and i n Hinduism i t becomes speech 
about r e i n c a r n a t i o n i n t h i s w o r l d or i n t h e 
u n i v e r s e a t l a r g e . A l l d e t a i l e d t a l k about a 
f u t u r e l i f e , whether i n C h r i s t i a n i t y o r o t h e r 
r e l i g i o n s , i s o n l y a way o f s p e l l i n g out and 
p o i n t i n g back t o t h a t e x p e r i e n c e o f man's 
transcendence here and now, i n terms o f language 
t h a t expresses t h e c l a i m t h a t such a t r a n s c e n d e n t 
element i s not a n n i h i l a t e d by death. (Enc, B r i t , 602) 
Language about freedom and i m m o r t a l i t y , t h e n , i s j u s t i f i e d 
o n l y i n so f a r as i t r e l a t e s t o a s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e i n which 
the m y s t e r i o u s , t r a n s c e n d e n t I r e v e a l s i t s e l f as more th a n 
body-and-behaviour. 
Tnus Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s freedom and i m m o r t a l i t y 
as d o c t r i n e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p e r s o n a l "more" 
i n t h e here and now. T h i s may he an a p p r o p r i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r t h e c l a i m t h a t I am .now f r e e , but c l a i m s about i m m o r t a l i t y 
a r e o f a somewhat d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s . For what reason i s 
t h e r e f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e "more" o f my p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e 
w i l l s u r v i v e t h e death o f my body? Ramsey's argument here 
i s r a t h e r a p r i o r i ; the "more" i s not an e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t , 
t h e r e f o r e i t cannot d i e ; f o r o n l y e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s d i e . 
But t h e f a c t t h a t we o n l y observe t h e death of bodies does 
not i m p l y t h a t o n l y bodies d i e , f o r the p e r s o n a l "more" -
b e i n g o b s e r v a t i o n a l l y e l u s i v e - c o u l d not have an obse r v a b l e 
demise. Yet i t may be t h a t even t r a n s c e n d e n t I s d i e . 
We a r e c o n f r o n t e d here by t h e d i f f i c u l t y posed by 
Ramsey's wide spectrum o f "mores". I f t h e I i s i m m o r t a l 
because i t i s ( a t l e a s t i n p a r t ) more t h a n o b s e r v a b l e ^ 
can we a p p l y t h e same argument t o , f o r example, a G e s t a l t 
p a t t e r n ? Does i t _ s u r v i v e t h e "death" ( t h e d e s t r u c t i o n ) of 
the o bservables t h r o u g h which i t i s d i s c l o s e d ? Such a 
s u g g e s t i o n i s absurd. Simply b e i n g more t h a n o b s e r v a b l e s 
cannot guarantee i m m o r t a l i t y . The s e l f must be a "more" 
which i s r a t h e r more independent o f i t s r e l a t e d o b s e r v a b l e s 
t h a n i s a G e s t a l t p a t t e r n , i f .we are t o p r e d i c a t e s u r v i v a l 
( l e t alone i m m o r t a l i t y ) o f i t . 
V.'e have note d a l r e a d y something o f Ramsey's t r e a t m e n t 
of t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e body. He views 
i t as "complementary" t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e i m m o r t a l i t y 
of t h e s o u l i n our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e meaning o f " t h e 
i m m o r t a l i t y o f I " : 
The one d o c t r i n e - t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n of t h e body -
reminds us t h a t t o understand what "my i m m o r t a l i t y " 
t a l k s about, p u b l i c b e h a v i o u r s t o r i e s w i l l be 
r e l e v a n t and necessary; t h e o t h e r d o c t r i n e - t h e 
i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l - reminds us t h a t such 
s t o r i e s w i l l never themselves be adequate. 
( P I 107 - 108) 
R e s u r r e c t i o n - t a l k , l i k e s o u l - t a l k , evokes and a r t i c u l a t e s 
t h e b a s i c s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e on which a l l our b e l i e f s about 
our transcendence a r e based. But t h e f o r m e r t y p e o f language 
serves m&iily as "an e x p r e s s i o n of t h e p o i n t t h a t 'personal 
a c t i v i t y ' w h i l e not exhausted by t h e l o g i c o f s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l 
events i s n e v e r t h e l e s s and n e c e s s a r i l y , i n p a r t , worked 
a c c o r d i n g t o i t " (U-HA: " I m m o r t a l i t y " (B ) .C . 1 9 5 2 , p.3)* 
Ramsey i s here t r e a t i n g such language i n t h e f o r m a l mode 
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r a t h e r t h a n t h e m a t e r i a l mode . His r e f u s a l t o i n d i c a t e 
what f u t u r e s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h e r e may be t o which t h e 
d o c t r i n e r e f e r s l e a v e s one v e r y d o u b t f u l as t o what he 
b e l i e v e s t h e d e s t i n y o f man r e a l l y i s , A s i m i l a r problem 
a r i s e s w i t h r e g a r d t o Ramsey's t r e a t m e n t o f p r e - e x i s t e n c e . 
While a d m i t t i n g t h a t " t h e o l d d o c t r i n e o f p r e - e x i s t e n c e i s 
j u s t about as n a i v e and m i s t a k e n as t h e o l d d o c t r i n e o f 
f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e " , Ramsey c l a i m s t o be e q u a l l y happy w i t h 
them b o t h , p r o v i d i n g " t h e y are l o g i c a l l y complex enough t o 
be c u r r e n c y f o r t h a t k i n d o f d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i n which 
our ' i m m o r t a l i t y ' i s known" ( P I 140). T h i s e n t a i l s , o f course, 
t h a t p r e - e x i s t e n c e s h o u l d not be t a k e n as " s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y 
d e s c r i p t i v e " ( c f . PR 199)- But Ramsey does not i n d i c a t e 
how - o r how f a r - we may use t h e phrase as a v a l i d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f what i s i n f a c t t h e case. 
g o Commitment 
(A) Types o f Commitment 
Ramsey'3 account o f r e l i g i o n i s by no means e n t i r e l y 
a s t o r y o f exp e r i e n c e and knowledge. R e l i g i o n , f o r Ramsey, 
i n v o l v e s b o t h "a f u l l e r d i s c e r n m e n t " and "a t o t a l commitment" 
(RL 18); and some element o f commitment i s t o be found i n 
a l l s i t u a t i o n s of d i s c l o s u r e . T h i s element i s a l s o 
d e s c r i b e d as an "acknowledgment", a "response", an " o p t i o n " 
(TJ-FMG B45/158), a " d e v o t i o n " ( P I 17, 3 7 ) , and a " c o n v i c t i o n " 
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(RPT 23, OBSR 28) „ Ramsey ranks commitments i n some s o r t 
o f o r d e r so as t o b r i n g out t h e d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of t h e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s : 
( i ) M a t h e m a t i c a l / S c i e n t i f i c commitment 
M a t h e m a t i c a l r e a s o n i n g , f o r example i n geometry, 
i n v o l v e s a commitment t o v a r i o u s axioms, " p o s i t s " o r 
" o p t i o n s " which we t a k e up t h r o u g h a f o r m o f mathematical 
i n t u i t i o n (RL 32 - 33)• T h i s s o r t o f commitment, however, 
i s a t a low l e v e l : 
A f t e r h a v i n g a morning w i t h E u c l i d you can 
have t h e a f t e r n o o n w i t h Lobatchewsky o r 
Riemann or someone e l s e . (EFT 23 , c f . RL 33) 
On t h e o t h e r hand a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s n ' t much "depth" i n 
mathematical commitment, a l t h o u g h m a t h e m a t i c a l p o s i t s 
"express o n l y a l o o s e o r p a r t i a l commitment" fthey do have a 
" u n i v e r s a l use" (RL 3 4 ) . M a t h e m a t i c a l "commitment" i s 
u n i v e r s a l because our mathematics, once c o r r e c t , i s c o r r e c t 
everywhere, "Here t h e n i s a p a r t i a l commitment e x t e n d i n g t o 
the whole u n i v e r s e " ( i b i d . ) : i t covers t h e whole w o r l d , but 
doesn't serve t o o r g a n i z e a persons whole l i f e . 
S c i e n t i f i c language w i t h i t s "extended p e r s p e c t i v e 
but h i g h l y a b s t r a c t i v e c h a r a c t e r " , a l s o i n v o l v e s a p a r t i a l 
commitment t o t h e whole u n i v e r s e (CCP 2 6 6 ) . The s c i e n t i s t , 
qua s c i e n t i s t , must s i t f a i r l y l o o s e l y t o h i s e x p l a n a t o r y 
schemes. 
( i i ) P e r s o n a l commitment 
"Personal commitment" i s one way o f c h a r a c t e r i z i n g 
t h e "response which i n v o l v e s our whole p e r s o n a l i t y " - t h e 
e x e r c i s e of our f r e e w i l l (RL ^ 9 ) » T h i s i s expressed 
p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o f o u n d l y i n s i t u a t i o n s o f moral d e c i s i o n 
(" ' d e c i s i v e ' commitment": RL J1) or i n l o y a l t y t o a s c h o o l , 
c o l l e g e or n a t i o n ( i b i d . ) . I n s i t u a t i o n s o f l o v e t h e r e i s 
a " d o m i n a t i n g l o y a l t y " , "a t o t a l commitment", "a f i n a l 
o p t i o n , which o r g a n i z e s t h e whole of a man's l i f e " (RL 3 9 ) . 
I t i s such an element o f t o t a l commitment - of "depth" 
(RL 36) - which marks out p e r s o n a l commitment. Yet i t i s 
of i t s v e r y n a t u r e "a t o t a l commitment t o a v e r y small p a r t 
of the U n i v e r s e " (CGP 2 6 6 ) . We d o n ' t , a f t e r a l l , f a l l i n 
181 
l o v e w i t h everyone . T o t a l commitment i s a l s o p r e s e n t , 
however, i n a man's " d e v o t i o n " t o h i s pastime or h i s s h i p , 
Ramsey c a l l s 3uch examples of commitment " q u a s i - p e r s o n a l " 
I n p e r s o n a l commitment we are " g r i p p e d " or "dominated" by 
something o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s t o ?;hich we respond. We a r e , 
m o r e o v e r p " c o n v e r t e d " t o the o b j e c t o f our commitment. We can 
o n l y l o s e such a commitment a t t h e cos t of a p e r s o n a l r e v o l u t i o n , 
a " c o n v e r s i o n t o i n f i d e l i t y " (RL 36 - 37, o f . de Maulde 181). 
These elements are a l s o t o be found i n our t h i r d t y p e o f 
commitment: 
ve r 
(RL 3 5 ) , f o r ; 
t h e s h i p i s h i s l i f e . , . . t h e s h i p i s p e r s o n a l i z e d 
- "she" - so t h a t i t comes t o be p a r a l l e l e d w i t h 
our t o t a l commitment t o someone we l o v e . (RL 34 - 35) 
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( i i i ) Religious Commitment 
R e l i g i o u s commitment „, „ combines t h e t o t a l 
commitment t o a past i m e , t o a s h i p , t o a 
person, w i t h t h e "breadth o f ma t h e m a t i c a l 
commitment. I t combines t h e "depth" o f 
p e r s o n a l o r q u a s i - p e r s o n a l loyalty.„. 
w i t h t h e range o f ma t h e m a t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c 
d e v o t i o n . (EL 35 - 36) 
R e l i g i o u s commitment, t h e r e f o r e , i s "a t o t a l commitment t o 
t h e whole u n i v e r s e " (RL 37)• Here i s " t h e response of s o u l , 
l i f e and a l l " ( R L 87) which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f r e l i g i o n . 
I t i s a response t o the "whole u n i v e r s e " because d i s c l o s u r e s 
o f God, l i k e m a t h e m a t i c a l d i s c l o s u r e s , are " a p p l i c a b l e " 
everywhere - t h e y r e v e a l a "more" o f u n i v e r s a l r e l e v a n c e 
and they may a r i s e around a n y t h i n g and e v e r y t h i n g . I n 
Ramsey's l a t e r t e r m i n o l o g y they a r e "cosmic" i n scope. 
"Commitment t o t h e whole u n i v e r s e " i s an a p p r o p r i a t e way 
o f e x p r e s s i n g our commitment t o t h e God who i s r e v e a l e d 
i n and t h r o u g h t h e v/hole u n i v e r s e . Such a " u n i t a r y cosmic 
l o y a l t y " (U-PE klO) i s : 
a t o t a l response t o what i s d i s c o v e r e d when 
on some oc c a s i o n , t h e u n i v e r s e or some p a r t 
of i t becomes t h e o c c a s i o n of a cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e expressed i n and around but c e r t a i n l y 
t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e p e r c e p t u a l f e a t u r e s o f such 
an oc c a s i o n . (GS 4 ) 
Tnus t h i s " f u l l commitment" o r " i ' u l l l o y a l t y " i s a response 
t o a f u l l e r discernment o f o b j e c t s of sense and more ( c i * . 
RB 190 - 1 9 1 ) . I t may be d e s c r i b e d , t h e n , as "a commitment 
which goes beyond what i s seen" - as d i d the A p o s t l e Thomas' 
c o n f e s s i o n "L'ly L o r d and my God" ( i b i d . 1 8 9 ) . I t i s i n such 
a " t r a n s c e n d e n t commitment" t h a t "each o f us r e a l i z e s what 
he i s more than a t o p i c of combined s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s " 
(OCR 2). Here - i n commitment, l o y a l t y , d e v o t i o n , expressed 
i n f r e e and d e c i s i v e a c t i o n - we "come t o o u r s e l v e s " , 
becoming what we r e a l l y a r e : persons. Such a commitment 
may be termed " f a i t h " , t h e f a i t h o f a C h r i s t i a n which i s 
" c a l l e d f o r t h by a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e around Jesus o f Nazareth" 
(GS 4)0 
Tnere a r e problems w i t h any a n a l y s i s o f r e l i g i o u s 
commitment t h a t seeks t o d e f i n e i t o t h e r t h a n i n terms o f 
i t s d i s t i n c t i v e o b j e c t . K e i t h Ward argues t h a t Ramsey 
appears t o i m p l y t h a t " A n y t h i n g c o u l d be a r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e 
i f i t i n v o l v e d t o t a l commitment and was a l l embracing" (K.Ward 
(CG) 6 9 ) . C e r t a i n n e o - V / i t t g e n s t e i n i a n t h e o l o g i a n s seem t o 
adopt t h e view t h a t t h e t e n a c i t y w i t h which r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s 
are h e l d i n t h e f a c e o f c o n f l i c t i n g evidence i s t h e f a c t o r 
t h a t makes such b e l i e f s r e l i g i o u s . S i m i l a r l y , we might 
argue, Ramsey tends t o d e f i n e r e l i g i o u s commitment i n terms 
of the f o r m a l c r i t e r i a o f " b r e a d t h " and "depth" r a t h e r t h a n 
by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e n a t u r e o f i t s d i s t i n c t i v e o b j e c t o r t o p i c . 
Roger T r i g g remarks: 
I t i s no a c c i d e n t t h a t f o r both Ramsey and 
W i t t g e n s t e i n t h e r e i s no room f o r doubt i n 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , s i n e i r eyes doubt 
must be a weakening of commitment. ( T r i g g 80) 
He r e f e r s t o RL 130 i n support o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
Ramsey. There Ramsey c l a i m s t h a t "no one can be d o u b t f u l about 
the ' R e s u r r e c t i o n * as we may be d o u b t f u l about e m p i r i c a l 
events" ( e . g . t h e Empty Tomb). But Ramsey o n l y means t h a t 
R e s u r r e c t i o n b e l i e f is"More t h a n "Empty Tomb b e l i e f , because 
R e s u r r e c t i o n b e l i e f i s t i e d t o a s i t u a t i o n of d i s c e r n m e n t -
commitment. "To d i s b e l i e v e t h e R e s u r r e c t i o n " , t h e r e f o r e , 
" i s . . . t o be c o n v e r t e d t o i n f i d e l i t y " (RL 130 - 131) - f o r 
i t i s t o l o s e t h e discernment which i s r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 
and t h e r e s p o n s i v e commitment which i s r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . 
But i t i s by no means c l e a r t o me t h a t Ramsey views 
commitment as "an ' a l l or n o t h i n g ' - a f f a i r , w i t h a s t a r k 
c h o ice "between ' i n f i d e l i t y ' and ' f u l l commitment' "^as 
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T r i g g m a i n t a i n s ( o p . c i t . 80) . For t h i s would be t o make 
r e l i g i o u s commitment s u i g e n e r i s , and Ramsey i s most 
u n w i l l i n g t o a l l o w t h i s i n t h e case of t h e c o r r e l a t i v e 
r e l i g i o u s d i scernment. However, " r e l i g i o u s " doubt i_s r a t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t f r o m merely " e m p i r i c a l " doubt such as doubt about 
t h e emptiness of Jesus' tomb, a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r may 
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c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e f o r m e r . " R e l i g i o u s " doubt proper i s 
doubt about a r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e and t h e r e a l i t y of i t s 
d i s c e r n e d o b j e c t . I t i s not j u s t doubt about o b s e r v a b l e s , 
though t h e y may serve as a medium f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
d i s c l o s u r e i n q u e s t i o n . I f , as i n t h e case o f God, t h a t which 
i s doubted i s t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e "more" t h a t i s d i s c l o s e d 
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a b l e s , t h e n t h e i s s u e becomes t h e f a m i l i a r one 
o f t h e importance o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b s e r v a b l e - medium o f 
a d i s c l o s u r e . The b u r n i n g bush, t h e a r k o f the covenant, 
even t h e f i g u r e of Jesus, a r e o n l y media f o r t h e d i s c l o s u r e 
of God. God i s d i s c l o s e d "around" them as one who i s "more" 
t h a n them. Such media are not p a r t of t h e b e i n g o f God; he 
i s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t "more'!, n o ^ ^ e medium - and - t h e -
"more". Tnus the p a r t i c u l a r medium i n t h i s case i s not 
c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t , f o r God may be d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h any 
p a r t o f h i s c r e a t i o n . Hence we may doubt p a r t i c u l a r media 
r e p o r t e d i n t h e B i b l e ( t h e b u r n i n g bush perhaps, or the 
p a r t e d Red sea) and s t i l l n ot doubt God, p r o v i d e d t h a t we 
accept t h a t t h e r e must be some e m p i r i c a l medium f o r h i s 
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d i s c l o s u r e .. But i n some cases t h a t which we doubt i s 
not j u s t a "more" but i s , by i t s v e r y n a t u r e , a medium-plus-
a-"more", And i n such cases i f we doubt t h e medium we a r e 
d o u b t i n g something which i s a p a r t of t h e whole e n t i t y o r 
event. To t a k e t h e obvious example, i n my mundane l i f e I 
am my-body-and-more. The more may be t h e " r e a l " I , as we saw 
above, but t h e man who doubts t h e e x i s t e n c e o f A s t l e y ' s body 
doubts t h e (mundane) e x i s t e n c e of A s t l e y . And t h e man who 
t h i n k s t h a t my body i s seven f e e t t a l l ; o r b l a c k e r l e p r o u s , 
i s m i s t a k e n about A s t l e y . Now " t h e R e s u r r e c t i o n o f Jesus" 
( i . e . "Jesus b e i n g r e n r r e c t e d " ) may be a s t a t e of a f f a i r s 
o f t h e same l o g i c a l k i n d , i . e . o b s e r v a b l e s - and - more 
r a t h e r t h a n a "more" alone . Tnus t o doubt t h e observable 
element i n the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s t o doubt an i n t e g r a l 
p a r t o f t h e concept o f Jesus' r e s u r r e c t i o n . For "Jesus i s 
r i s e n " = "The tomb i s empty" + more ( e . g . 'Jesus appears t o 
n i s d i s c i p l e s " , "ne i s no l o n g e r l i m i t e d by space", "he i s 
ascending t o t h e F a t h e r " , "ne has conquered death" e t c . ) . 
Of course i t i s open t o us so t o i n t e r p r e t t h e R e s u r r e c t i o n 
as t o deny t h i s e q u a t i o n , and t h i s i s what i s done by 
t h e 
those who deny t h a t /emptiness of t h e tomb i s r e l e v a n t t o 
b e l i e f i n Jesus' r i s i n g from t h e dead. For them "Jesus 
i s r i s e n " = t h e more a l o n e ; t h e y have immunized themselves 
a g a i n s t t h e ravages of one f o r m of doubt - e m p i r i c a l , 
empty-tomb doubt. 
Our e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m o f Ramsey's v i e w o f commitment, 
we should now c o n f e s s , was perhaps a l i t t l e u n f a i r . For we 
i m p l i e d t h e r e t h a t Ramsey was d e f i n i n g r e l i g i o u s commitment 
( i n terms of b r e a d t h and depth) r a t h e r t h a n j u s t d e s c r i b i n g 
a commitment which he would d e f i n e u l t i m a t e l y i n terms o f 
i t s o b j e c t . I t i s p r o b a b l y t h e case t h a t Ramsey does not 
say enough about r e l i g i o u s commitment f o r us t o decide which 
p o s i t i o n he a c t u a l l y does h o l d . 
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(B) The D i s c l o s u r e - Commitment R e l a t i o n s h i p 
Commitment, a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey, goes w i t h d i s c l o s u r e : 
"The b a s i s o f C h r i s t i a n b e h a v i o u r " , he w r i t e s , " i s t o be foun d 
i n a d i s c l o s u r e situation,„. " (U-UBMD 2 ) . He c r i t i c i z e s 
t h o s e t h i n k e r s l i k e R.B, B r a i t h w a i t e who a t t e m p t - or so i t 
seems t o Ramsey - t o t r e a t r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f e n t i r e l y i n terms 
of commitment and i g n o r e t h e element o f o b j e c t i v e d i s c l o s u r e 
( R E passim, CPL 248 - 249, WG 12 -- 13, TTST 78: c f , B r a i t h w a i t e 
( E R B ) ) O But what p r e c i s e l y i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
d i s c l o s u r e and commitment? 
There i 3 much i n Ramsey's w r i t i n g s which c o u l d be 
ta k e n as i m p l y i n g t h a t commitment always f o l l o w s from 
d i s c l o s u r e . Thus Ramsey w r i t e s o f " t h a t odd discernment 
w i t h which r e l i g i o u s commitment, when i t i s not b i g o t r y 
or f a n a t i c i s m , w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be a s s o c i a t e d " (RL 4 7 ) ; 
"VJhenever a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e o c c u rs. . . . I respond w i t h 
a commitment" (I.IDA. 60 ; emphasis added). The odd r e l i g i o u s 
discernment " i f evoked, provokes a t o t a l commitment" (RL 50) 
- a p p a r e n t l y as i t s s l i f f i o i e n t cause. 
And y e t Ramsey a l s o uses t h e language o f "response", 
o f t e n i n t h e c o n t e x t of t a l k about f r e e - w i l l , i n h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e element o f commitment ( c f . RL 29 , 3 7 9 4 9I 
P I 3 3 , 36; PPMT 172; IvIJGC 162 - 163; PA 194; TL 1 2 ) 1 8 6 , 
He i s w i l l i n g t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h i s i n t o a d e f i n i t i o n o f 
" d i s c l o s u r e " as "a discernment t o which t h e r e l i g i o u s man 
responds w i t h an a p p r o p r i a t e commitment" (PR 2 1 1 ) . T h i s 
use o f "response" - language, though i t might suggest t h e 
unavoidable "response" of a s t i m u l u s - r e s p o n s e r e f l e x a c t i o n , 
seems t o c a r r y more of t h e c o n n o t a t i o n of something non-
a u t o m a t i c , something which i s g i v e n f r e e l y . The p r e c i s e 
meaning o f t h e word i s a c r u x i n the exegesis o f Ramsey's 
account of t h e disclosure-commitment r e l a t i o n s h i p . I would 
contend, however, t h a t t h e i s s u e can he c l e a r l y decided by 
t h r e e p i e c e s o f evidence: 
( i ) Ramsey speaks, a l b e i t o n l y on one o c c a s i o n , 
o f r e l i g i o u s commitment as "a f r e e and spontaneous response 
t o a d i s c l o s u r e " (Sermon ( 4 ) 6 1, emphasis added). 
( i i ) Ramsey a l s o speaks o f moral b e h a v i o u r i n terms 
o f p e r s o n a l commitment. He i s i n s i s t e n t t h a t such moral 
b e h a v i o u r , which " p r e - e m i n e n t l y occurs i n a response t o a 
d i s c l o s u r e " i n v o l v e s our f r e e and r e s p o n s i b l e d e c i s i o n 
(BP I I 189, c f , F I 26 e t c . ) . 
( i i i ) Ramsey f u r t h e r argues i n R e l i g i o u s Language: 
Such a ( r e l i g i o u s } commitment w i t h o u t any 
discernment whatever i s b i g o t r y and i d o l a t r y ; 
t o have t h e discernment w i t h o u t t h e commitment 
i s t h e worst of a l l r e l i g i o u s v i c e s . I t i s 
i n s i n c e r i t y and h y p o c r i s y . ( R L 18) 187 
Presumably Ramsey b e l i e v e s t h a t d i s c l o s u r e w i t h o u t commitment 
v/ould be " i n s i n c e r i t y and h y p o c r i s y " because i t would i n v o l v e 
our c o n s c i o u s l y , f r e e l y and r e s p o n s i b l y d e c i d i n g not t o 
make t h e a p p r o p r i a t e response o f d e v o t i o n t o t h e God 
d i s c l o s e d i n r e l i g i o u s e xperience. But I wish o n l y t o draw 
a t t e n t i o n here t o t h e f a c t t h a t d i s c l o s u r e and commitment 
are viewed as s e p a r a b l e elements, and t o the f a c t t h a t 
Ramsey condemns d i s c l o s u r e - w i t h o u t - c o m m i t m e n t as m o r a l l y 
r e p r e h e n s i b l e . Both p o i n t s s u r e l y i n d i c a t e t h a t he t r e a t s 
commitment as a f r e e response t o a d i s c l o s u r e . 
However, many commentators i n t e r p r e t Ramsey 
as h o l d i n g t h a t t h e disclosure-commitment r e l a t i o n s h i p 
a l l o w s f o r no f r e e responsiveness on our p a r t . Some are 
c o n t e n t w i t h such a p o s i t i o n ( e.g. T i X l e y ( T h e s i s ) 236 - 2 3 9 )9 
o t h e r s are l e s s happy ( e . g . Dunbar 104, B r a i t h w a i t e (ivIMR) 253 
254, c f . i b i d . (CECP) 9 3 ) - T i l l e y c l a i m s t h a t "Trie 
discernment and commitment disappear t o g e t h e r (when we " f a l l 
out o f love'l) because t h e y are l o g i c a l l y connected" ( T i l l e y 
( T h e s i s ) 235; c f . RL 36 - 37) He goes on; 
I f one had no discernment of God as " i n f i n i t e l y 
l o v i n g " , one would not have t h i s s o r t o f u l t i m a t e 
commitment; i f one d i d not have t h i s s o r t o f 
u l t i m a t e commitment, one c o u l d not d i s c e r n God 
as " i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g " . . ( i b i d . 236) 
Other s t u d e n t s o f Ramsey have t o y e d w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t 
the d isclosure-commitment c o n n e c t i o n may be necessary i n some 
form ( c f . McClendon & Smith (IRM) 4 2 1 , Hudson (DS) 440 - 4 4 3 ) . 
But I b e l i e v e t h i s approach t o be f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s t a k e n -
even i t i f were a f a i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Ramsey's p o s i t i o n . 
I t may be t r u e t h a t I n e c e s s a r i l y cease t o " l o v e " X when 
I cease t o d i s c e r n i n h e r t h e l o v e a b l e q u a l i t i e s which I 
nave "seen" b e f o r e . But I can s t i l l "commit m y s e l f " t o her. 
I can - i n my a c t i o n s - s t i l l ..be "devoted" t o her. The 
example t h a t T i l l e y chooses i s p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y because i n 
i t t h e discernment ('being i n l o v e " = (my) v i s i o n o f ( h e r ) 
l o v e a b l e n e s s ) i s expressed i n t h e same terms as t h e commitment 
('being i n l o v e " = (my) a c t i v i t y o f " l o v i n g " - i . e . c a r i n g , 
c h e r i s h i n g , s e e k i n g her good e t c . ) . But i n t h i s case, and 
i n t h e case o f God, i t i s s u r e l y p o s s i b l e t o have t h e 
discernment w i t h o u t t h e commitment. We are a b l e t o see God , 
even t h e i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g God, and s t i l l r e j e c t him. The 
same s i t u a t i o n a l s o o b t a i n s i n moral d i s c l o s u r e s ; 
f o r we can "apprehend" ("acknoiiedge") a moral c l a i m w i t h o u t 
n e c e s s a r i l y commi t t i n g o u r s e l v e s t o i t ( c f . K. Ward (EC) 
65 - 6 6 ) . 
And now one f i n a l p o i n t . W.A. de P a t e r c l a i m s t h a t 
Ramsey's l a t e r p o s i t i o n on t h e q u e s t i o n o f commitment was 
t h a t : 
Commitment i s t h e r e from the beginning,,.speech 
about God goes back t o experi e n c e s i n which one, 
and i n d e e d every person, i s spoken j t o , and t o 
which one r e p l i e s out o f a p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
(de P a t e r 165 s o w n t r a n s l a t i o n ) 
T h i s may be compared w i t h Hudson's remark: 
r e l i g i o u s d i s c e r n m e n t , l i k e a l l forms o f e x p e r i e n c e , 
i n v o l v e s c o n c e p t u a l commitment, which i s l o g i c a l l y 
p r i o r t o t h e discernment v/hich i t c h a r a c t e r i s e s , 
(Hudson (DS) 443) 
C e r t a i n l y Ramsey's discernments do not come t o an e x p e r i e n c e r 
who stands naked o f any s o r t of p r i o r commitment. But i t 
i s a l s o c e r t a i n t h a t our commitment - and our " c o n c e p t u a l 
schemes" - may be s h a t t e r e d by t h e new discernment we have 
and t h e new commitment we g i v e t o i t . T h i s a f t e r a l l i s 
what i s i n v o l v e d i n c o n v e r s i o n . And c o n v e r s i o n s d o - a f t e r 
a l l - happen ( c f . Enc. B r i t . 593) -
*6.| 
CHAPTER I I I : 
L A N G U A G E A N D M E T A P H Y S I C S 
I have f e l t i t necessary t o expound and c r i t i c i z e 
Ramsey's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f ex p e r i e n c e and d i s c l o s u r e a t some 
l e n g t h . I n any a t t e m p t t o analyse h i s r e l i g i o u s e p i s t e m o l o g y 
these areas are of fundamental impor&nce, and they do seem 
t o have been t r e a t e d r a t h e r b r i e f l y by o t h e r commentators 
on Ramsey's work. The area which has m a i n l y a t t r a c t e d t h e i r 
a t t e n t i o n i s t h a t o f r e l i g i o u s language, and i t i s t o t h i s 
t o p i c - and t h e r e l a t e d s u b j e c t o f metaphysics - t h a t I -too 
must now t u r n . 
"Experience and D i s c l o s u r e s " i s concerned w i t h what 
Ramsey c a l l s " i n s i g h t " . "Language and Metaphysics",on t h e 
ot h e r hand, i s concerned w i t h " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " . These two 
t o p i c s must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , but they must a l s o be h e l d t o g e t h e r : 
I n s i g h t w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g would be t h a t 
b l i n d enthusiasm condemned i n t h e e a r l y Church 
as Montanism,... But u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o u t 
i n s i g h t - a modern heresy - i s . . . " h o l l o w " t a l k . 
(MM 56; c f . Sermon ( 4 ) 61 - 6 2 ) . 
I t i s Ramsey's t h e s i s t h a t t h e o l o g y and a l l o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l 
d i s c i p l i n e s "combine i n s i g h t and d i s c u r s i v e r e a s o n i n g , 
mystery as w e l l as u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (MM 56; c f . PPMT 176, 
CP 35 , TG 97 , Enc. B r i t . 5 9 5 ) . The d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n i s 
marked by " a p p r o p r i a t e language i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h t h e ex p e r i e n c e " 
(Piowden 23; c f . CELCE 95 - 9 6 ) . 
i s 
Ramsey confesses t h a t he/concerned i n a l l h i s books 
w i t h " u n d e r s t a n d i n g a mystery" (MMR 263; cf. TL l e c t u r e I ) , 
i n t h e sense o f a t t e m p t i n g a p a r t i a l , r a t h e r t h a n - per 
i m p o s s i b l e - a complete, u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e m y s t e r i o u s 
n a t u r e o f God and h i s u n i v e r s e . The v a r i o u s d i s c l o s e d "mores" 
a r e , as we have seen, a l l m y s t e r i o u s t o a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r 
degree ( c f , PF 332, CE 184 n. 2 4 ) . For th e y a l l elude sense-
p e r c e p t i o n , and t h e y t h e r e f o r e a l s o e l ude d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h e 
language of o b s e r v a b l e s . R e l i g i o u s m y s t e r i e s , l i k e r e l i g i o u s 
paradoxes ( c f , b e l o w ) , are i r r e d u c i b l e ( c f , Locke 17, PR 218). 
For t h i s reason t h e o l o g y - and t h e i s t i c metaphysics - must 
have t h e h u m i l i t y "which w h i l e i t s t r i v e s e n e r g e t i c a l l y t o 
b u i l d . , , t h e best t h e o l o g i c a l map i t can, r e c o g n i z e s t h a t i t 
w i l l never succeed i n 'embodying' t h e Mystery" (OBSR 90? 
c f . LEP 542, CPCF 6 l ) , As we s h a l l see s h o r t l y , i t i s by 
the use o f models t h a t a l l d i s c i p l i n e s , i n c l u d i n g s c i e n c e 
but e s p e c i a l l y t h e o l o g y , e n a b l e us t o achieve a p a r t i a l 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what i s u l t i m a t e l y m y s t e r i o u s and e l u s i v e 
( c f . MM 2 0 - 2 1 , MMR 263, TL 1 2 ) . 
1„ Ramsey's g e n e r a l approach t o r e l i g i o u s language 
Ramsey wishes t o be ranked w i t h those who stan d i n 
th e t r a d i t i o n o f " l i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y " ( c f , RL 123, P0 266, 
PPMT 1 5 9j OCR 1 6 ) . That i s t o say he i s concerned t o produce 
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a c l e a r and a c c u r a t e account o f t h e l o g i c o f people's 
r e l i g i o u s ( o r s c i e n t i f i c o r m o r a l ) speaking, w r i t i n g and 
t h i n k i n g . For Ramsey r e l i g i o u s man i s e s s e n t i a l l y a r e l i g i o u s 
language-user, and Ramsey views such a person's language as 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e of h i s r e l i g i o n . I t i s , a f t e r a l l , a man's 
r e l i g i o u s language which evokes and expresses what i s a t t h e 
c e n t r e of h i s r e l i g i o n - t h e d i s c l o s u r e of God. 
Ramsey i s not j u s t concerned w i t h t h e s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
and a p p r a i s a l of concepts f r o m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l language of 
t h e o l o g y . He gi v e s a g r e a t d e a l of space t o a n a l y s i n g 
t h e l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s language o f r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e , worship and commitment. Thus t h e read e r i s 
i n v i t e d t o study not o n l y t h e f i n e r p o i n t s o f C h r i s t o l o g i c a l 
and s o t e r i o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e ( e . g . RL 168 - 1 7 19 CD c h . I l ) , 
but a l s o t h e language of hymns, p r a y e r s and passages of 
S c r i p t u r e ( e . g . CD 6 - 8 , 72 - 73 , TL 17, RL ch. I I I ) . 
F or Ramsey b e l i e v e s t h a t " r e l i g i o n " and 'theology" share 
common l i n g u i s t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and problems. 
I n f a c t Ramsey tends t o use t h e phrase " r e l i g i o u s 
language" i n i t s w i d e s t c o n n o t a t i o n , so as t o i n c l u d e 
t h e o l o g i c a l language as a sub-category. T h i s has i n c l i n e d 
some ( c f . Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 6) t o accuse Ramsey of c o n f u s i n g 
t h e o l o g y and r e l i g i o n ( i n i t s more narrow c o n n o t a t i o n ) . 
However, t h e r e i s p l e n t y o f evidence i n Ramsey's w r i t i n g s 
t h a t he t r e a t s t h e o l o g y as "a k i n d o f second o r d e r language, 
r e f l e c t i n g on i t s f i r s t o r d e r language" (FL 5 0 ) , and b e l i e v e s 
t h a t no one s h o u l d "confuse t h e ' o r d i n a r y language' o f t h e 
r e l i g i o u s man a t wo r s h i p w i t h t h e second o r d e r language of 
the s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g i a n , who i s a l r e a d y something of a 
p h i l o s o p h e r " (Review F e r r e 9765 he accuses F e r r e here o f 
i g n o r i n g t h e importance o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n Language, 
L o g i c & God). Ramsey i s conscious t h a t "The h i g h l y 
developed language of a t e c h n i c a l t h e o l o g y may o n l y t o o w e l l 
conceal t h e d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r e l i g i o n " (Review Evans -
P r i t c h a r d 2 4 4 ) . The g r e a t danger, as f a r as he i s 
concerned, i s t h e development o f a " t h e o l o g y w i t h o u t r e l i g i o n " 
( F I 102; c f . i b i d . 133, PR 216, RSCS y 4 ) ; and he s t r e s s e s 
t h a t i t i s r e l i g i o u s language which i s most d i r e c t l y and 
most e x p l i c i t l y grounded i n t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f God (CPL 2 4 7 ) -
F u r t h e r , i n h i s concern t o d i s t i n g u i s h between " t e n t a t i v e " 
t h e o l o g y and " c e r t a i n " r e l i g i o n , Ramsey i s s u r e l y o p p o s i n g 
any tendency t o confuse t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g w i t h r e l i g i o u s 
f a i t h ( c f . McCluskey 180), I t h i n k t h a t we can c l a i m , on t h e 
"basis o f a l l t h i s evidence, t h a t Ramsey would be more t h a n 
w i l l i n g t o agree w i t h Don C u p i t t ' s a s s e r t i o n : 
Theology can t o y f a c e t i o u s l y w i t h t h e n o t i o n 
o f God, but o n l y r e l i g i o n can a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t 
him. ( C u p i t t 42) 
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The t a s k o f s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g y i s r e c o g n i z e d by 
Ramsey as t h a t o f " s y s t e m a t i z i n g . t h e r i o t o u s m i x t u r e o f 
phrases" which c h a r a c t e r i z e s r e l i g i o u s language (RL 156; 
c f . U-FMG B 6 4 / 1 7 7 ) . The s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g i a n must "grade 
t h e models" thrown up i n everyday r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e "on 
th e b a s i s of t h e range and r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e d i s c o u r s e 
t o which a model l e a d s " (TL 30; t h i s i s t h e "problem o f 
p r e f e r e n c e s " d i s c u s s e d b e l o w ) . The s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g i a n 
must a l s o u n i t e t h e d i f f e r e n t s t r a n d s o f d i s c o u r s e , w i t h 
t h e i r d i f f e r e n t dominant models, which a r i s e i n t h e language 
of C h r i s t i a n e x p e r i e n c e . He does t h i s e i t h e r by a t t e m p t i n g 
" t o t r a c e t r a n s v e r s e c o n n e c t i o n s " o r by s e a r c h i n g f o r "a 
y e t more dominant model" (TL 28). T h i s would appear t o be 
an a c t i v i t y which i s much f u r t h e r removed from r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e t h a n are our a t t e m p t s t o s t r u c t u r e r e l i g i o u s 
language so t h a t i t evokes and expresses r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c l o s u r e s . However Ramsey i s i n s i s t e n t t h a t "even 
s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g y e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y must always 
make t h e d i s c l o s u r e r e f e r e n c e c l e a r " (TL 3 0 ) . 
Ramsey c l a i m s t o pr e s e n t us w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
way i n which people a c t u a l l y use r e l i g i o u s language. H i s 
a n a l y s i s i s t h u s of t h e t y p e l a b e l l e d by Anders J e f f n e r as 
" D e s c r i p t i v e 1" ( J e f f n e r (SRL) 1 6 ) . Thus Ramsey i n s i s t s t h a t 
P h i l o s o p h y w i l l t a k e t h e language o f t h e B i b l e , 
o f the Gospels, o f d o c t r i n e , o f l i t u r g y , as i t 
stands and t r y t o e l u c i d a t e i t s p o i n t and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . ( C P L 249? c f GS 5) 
However Ramsey does accept t h a t c e r t a i n o f h i s p o i n t s about 
r e l i g i o u s language may appear t o some t o be " h i g h l y a r t i f i c i a l " 
and he admits t h a t h i s account does not " d e s c r i b e what always 
happens i n t h e case o f r e l i g i o u s p e o p l e " (RL 7 4 )• But 
Ramsey would c e r t a i n l y n ot wish t o be c o n s t r u e d as o f f e r i n g 
what J e f f n e r c a l l s a " D e s c r i p t i v e 2" a n a l y s i s - i . e . an 
a n a l y s i s o f how people t h i n k t h a t t hey are u s i n g r e l i g i o u s 
language. He does not argue t h a t t h e w r i t e r s o f hymns o r 
B i b l i c a l n a r r a t i v e s have c o n s c i o u s l y and e x p l i c i t l y c o n s t r u c t e d 
t h e i r w r i t i n g s so as t o produce t h e l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e ( f o r 
example o f q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s ) which Ramsey d i s c e r n s i n them 
( c f . RL 91 - 93 , 154 - 155; Review Pike 237; TL 17; OBSR 9 ) . 
But he would c l a i m t h a t h i s t h e o r i e s p r e s e n t a reasonable 
a n a l y s i s o f what " c o u l d happen" when r e l i g i o u s language 
i s used (RL 7 4 ) , and he c l e a r l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such language 
does n o r m a l l y o p e r a t e a c c o r d i n g t o h i s a n a l y s i s . 
At any r a t e Ramsey does not i n t e n d p r i m a r i l y t o 
pre s e n t a " c o n s t r u c t i v e " t h e o r y of how r e l i g i o u s language 
shoul d be used ( b u t i s n ' t ) ^ . However he does have a tendency 
t o mix c o n s t r u c t i v e i n s i g h t s w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s , i f 
o n l y because he acknowledges t h a t some uses o f r e l i g i o u s 
language - f o r example as p i c t u r i n g language - are not 
i n f a c t r e l i g i o u s , J e f f n e r argues t h a t Ramsey " s t a r t s from 
a d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r y based on a d e f i n i t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s 
language t h a t i s not a n a l y t i c a l l y n e u t r a l " : 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t he s t i p u l a t e s which s i t u a t i o n s 
are r e l i g i o u s i n a way which f i t s h i s a n a l y s i s . 
( J e f f n e r 49 & n. 42) 
There seems t o be an element of t r u t h i n t h i s c r i t i c i s m . 
Having developed a t h e o r y which seems t o e x p l a i n t h e 
f u n c t i o n of some ty p e s of r e l i g i o u s language, Ramsey a p p l i e s 
i t across t h e whole range of such language. Yet he a l s o 
i n s i s t s t h a t r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e i s v e r y v a r i e d , and t h e r e f o r e 
s h o u l d be more wary than he i s o f p o u r i n g i t a l l i n t o t h e 
same l i n g u i s t i c mould^. We may, however, v i e w Ramsey's work 
as an a n a l y s i s of c e r t a i n forms of r e l i g i o u s language. 
We need not r e j e c t i t out o f hand because i t does not seem 
t o be a p p l i c a b l e r i g h t across t h e board. 
•2*7 
2» The " L o g i c a l Oddness" o f R e l i g i o u s Language 
Ramsey c l a i m s t h a t a l l forms of r e l i g i o u s language, 
many 
and indeed o f / o t h e r " d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d " languages, have a 
complex and "odd" l o g i c . I t i s t h e death o f r e l i g i o n t o t r e a t 
i t s language as s i m p l e and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , f o r "what i s not 
v e r b a l l y odd i s v o i d o f d i s c l o s u r e power" (MM 6y, c f . RL 48) . 
Thus " C h r i s t i a n e d u c a t i o n " , a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey, "must evoke 
d i s c l o s u r e s and t r a i n us t o have an eye f o r l o g i c a l 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s , and t o he s u s p i c i o u s o f a l l t o o p l a i n and 
e v i d e n t grammatical forms" (DCCD 14), I t i s o n l y by 
r e c o g n i s i n g t h e c o m p l e x i t y and oddness of r e l i g i o u s language 
t h a t i t s r e a l meaning and purpose w i l l become c l e a r . So 
Ramsey's e x h o r t a t i o n i s - "Let us never take t h e o l o g y o r 
b i b l e - n a r r a t i v e a t i t s f a c e - d e s c r i p t i v e v a l u e " (OCR 13), 
Ramsey argues t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i v e l o g i c o f 
r e l i g i o u s language d e r i v e s from " t h e odd k i n d of s i t u a t i o n " 
f r o m which i t stems and t o which i t l e a d s . R e l i g i o u s 
language i s " s u i t a b l e c u r r e n c y " f o r r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n s 
(RL 3 8 ) ' . And as t h e r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n i s i t s e l f 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y and o n t o l o g i c a l l y odd, we can expect t h a t 
i t s l i n g u i s t i c c o u n t e r p a r t w i l l have i t s own ( l o g i c a l ) "oddness" 
( c f . RB 188). Unless r e l i g i o u s language i s s u i t a b l y odd, 
" i t w i l l not t e l l o f t h e k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n which can be 
p r o p e r l y c a l l e d ' r e l i g i o u s ' " (RL 96). But i n what does 
t h i s "oddness" l i e ? 
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , r e l i g i o u s language i s " o b j e c t i v e 
language and more, i . e . o b j e c t language which has been g i v e n 
v e r y s p e c i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , o b j e c t language which e x h i b i t s 
l o g i c a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s , l o g i c a l i m p r o p r i e t y " (RL 38). 
C l e a r l y t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s i s t h a t r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n s 
are c h a r a c t e r i z e d "by t h e "odd discernment" which i s 
" p e r c e p t u a l and more"-an i n t u i t i o n which espies t h e meta-
e m p i r i c a l "more". 
I n t h e second p l a c e , r e l i g i o u s language seeks t o be 
c u r r e n c y f o r t h e " t o t a l commitment" which i s a n o t h e r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e o f r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n s . R e l i g i o u s 
commitment, as " t o t a l commitment t o the whole u n i v e r s e " 
(RL 37)> demands a s u i t a b l e odd f o r m o f language as an 
app i c p r i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( c f . RE 404). I n t h i s case, 
however, t h e "oddness" o f r e l i g i o u s commitment language -
i n so f a r as i t expresses t h e a c t u a l commitment r a t h e r t h a n 
t h e discernment from which i t a r i s e s - i s l a r g e l y a 
f u n c t i o n o f t h e " s i g n i f i c a n t t a u t o l o g i e s " i t c o n t a i n s 
(RL 40, 44). I n i t s commitment a s p e c t , t h e r e f o r e , 
r e l i g i o u s language i s as "odd" as moral language, and 
l o r s i m i l a r reasons. Ramsey argues; 
"God i s l o v e " . . . i s a s i g n i f i c a n t t a u t o l o g y 
p l e a d i n g " l o v e " ( o r "God") as a commitment 
word.(RL 47) 
Thus words l i k e "God", "Love", "Duty" e t c . a r e key words 
which p o i n t t o t h e r e a l i t i e s which a r e t h e o b j e c t s of 
commitment. The t a u t o l o g i e s o f r e l i g i o u s language, e.g. 
"God i s Love", express t h e l o y a l t y and commitment t h a t f o r m 
a major p a r t of r e l i g i o n . Such a phrase, Ramsey c l a i m s , i s 
a " s i g n i f i c a n t t a u t o l o g y l a b e l l i n g a commitment" (RL 4 b ) , 
I t i s a l o n g such l i n e s t h a t Ramsey t r a c e s the f u n c t i o n o f 
r e l i g i o u s language i n r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e commitment element i n 
the r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n . 
But language can o n l y be d e s c r i b e d as "odd" o r 
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"unusual" by comparison w i t h some o t h e r f o r m of language. 
R e l i g i o u s language, Ramsey contends, i s "odd" when compared 
w i t h our most f r e q u e n t use o f language - i t s " o r d i n a r y " use 
t o d e s c r i b e s t r a i g h f o r w a r d l y e m p i r i c a l ( p e r c e p t u a l ) s i t u a t i o n s 
( c f , PR 213; RL 38, 62, Emp R 162, OCR 2, Mi 69). Thus 
r e l i g i o u s language, l i k e the r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n out o f 
which i t a r i s e s , i s "odd from t h e p o i n t of view o f o b j e c t s 
o f sense" (RB 188). T h i s use o f "odd" language, as we have 
a l r e a d y n o t e d , i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o r e l i g i o n . I t i s t o be 
found i n a l l d i s c i p l i n e s t h a t a t some p o i n t "go beyond" 
o b s e r v a b l e s , even the s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s themselves ( c f , 
RL 4.8, MM passim). I t i s t o be found perhaps most 
o b v i o u s l y i n p o e t r y ( c f . RL 135 - 136, MM 55), 
Paul Helm cl a i m s t h a t Ramsey's n o t i o n o f l o g i c a l 
oddness i s u n c l e a r and i s open t o a t l e a s t f o u r p o s s i b l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s (Helm (VB) 53 - 59). He concludes: 
Ramsey may mean t h a t f o r t h e r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e v e r e i t h e r c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s do 
not have s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e m p i r i c a l t r u t h -
c o n d i t i o n s ; o r t h a t they i n v o l v e a 
s u b j e c t i v e b l i k on the f a c t s ; o r t h a t t h e y 
have t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e 
t o c o n c e i v e ; o r t h a t t h e y make p e c u l i a r 
moral demands on t h e b e l i e v e r s , ( i b i d . 59) 
But t h i s c r i t i c i s m (which i s based s o l e l y on an a n a l y s i s 
o f a few passages from R e l i g i o u s Language) seems t o miss 
t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t . For Ramsey's bas i c i n t e n t i o n i n u s i n g 
t h e phrase i s t o p o i n t to t h e f a c t t h a t r e l i g i o u s language 
i s "more t h a n " e m p i r i c a l language. R e l i g i o u s language i s 
" q u a l i f i e d " e m p i r i c a l language; i t i s t h e r e f o r e "odd" ay 
comparison w i t h l i t e r a l , d e s c r i p t i v e language about what 
i s o b s e r v a b l e . 
2 7 0 
Ramsey wages t o t a l war a g a i n s t t h e i d e a t h a t t h e 
language of r e l i g i o n f u n c t i o n s as a " d e s c r i p t i o n " of t h a t 
v/hioh i s d i s c l o s e d , i n t h e way t h a t s t r a i g h f o r v m r d e m p i r i c a l 
language d e s c r i b e s t h a t which i s observed, "Let no one 
b l i n d h i m s e l f " , he w r i t e s , " t o t h e sheer atheism t o which 
a ' p l a i n and l i t e r a l ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e o l o g y may l e a d 
us" (OBSR 65, c f , BS 44 - 46) . For " r e l i g i o u s language 
can h a r d l y be l i t e r a l and do i t s j o b of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
m y s t e r y " (TL 3)« Because t h e r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e s 
a d i s c l o s u r e which r e v e a l s a t r a n s c e n d e n t m e t a - e m p i r i c a l , 
"more", t h a t s i t u a t i o n and i t s d i s c l o s e d o b j e c t cannot be 
" d e s c r i b e d " or l a b e l l e d " ( c f . RL 167, CE 182, LEP 544, CD 44)o 
Thus, " R e l i g i o u s a s s e r t i o n s must not be t a k e n as p l a i n 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of f a c t " , Ramsey exclaims i n i t a l i c s (OCR 1 ) . 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e l i g i o u s person can " a r t i c u l a t e " h i s f a i t h 
( c f . TL ch I I passim, MM 15, HDA 19 - 20), t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n 
i s a m a t t e r of " s i g n i f i c a n t s t u t t e r i n g " , " t h e o l o g i c a l 
stammering" (LEP 542, MMR 263). I t i s not t h e smooth 
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a r t i c u l a t i o n of l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n . 
We may pause here t o c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t t h a t Ramsey's 
p l e a f o r t h e "oddness" - t h e n o n - l i t e r a l n e s s or n o n - d e s c r i p t i v e 
n a t u r e - of r e l i g i o u s language i s a move i n the o p p o s i t e 
d i r e c t i o n from t h a t provoked by h i s concern f o r i n t e l l i g i b l e 
t h e o l o g y , Ramsey c l a i m s t h a t r e l i g i o u s language combines 
mystery and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t may be odd by comparison,with 
e m p i r i c a l language; but i t does "embrace" e m p i r i c a l language. 
I t s f o u n d a t i o n i s o r d i n a r y , d e s c r i p t i v e language about t h e 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d . Ramsey combines h i s two concerns, 
of course, i n h i s account o f models and q u a l i f i e r s . The model 
i s t h e element which bestows i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y f a r t i c u l a t e n e s s " — 
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cf„ TG 88) on r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e , f o r t h e model-word s t a n d i n g 
alone i s a p i e c e o f l i t e r a l , d e s c r i p t i v e , " e m p i r i c a l " language 
(cf„ Review KcPnerson 111 - 112, TL 9, MM 4 - 5, ITR Owen 126). 
But t h e o t h e r element i n a r e l i g i o u s phrase, w i t h o u t v/hich 
t h e phrase would not he r e l i g i o u s , i s t h e q u a l i f i e r . I t i s 
q u a l i f i e r s which "gear i n t o models" and r e s u l t i n d i s c l o s u r e s 
o f t h e "more" (TL 9)« And i t i s q u a l i f i e r s which m o d i f y t h e 
l i t e r a l , d e s c r i p t i v e n a t u r e of model-language and make i t 
" a p p r o p r i a t e c u r r e n c y " i o r what i s not obse r v a b l e and can 
never be l i t e r a l l y d e s c r i b e d ( c f . CPCF 59, TG y6)„ We must 
now t u r n t o a f u l l e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e n a t u r e and 
f u n c t i o n s of these models and q u a l i f i e r s . 
3. Models and Q u a l i f i e r s 
(A) The Model 
t h e word "model" i n o r d i n a r y use s p e c i f i e s 
something e a s i l y understood, by which we t r y 
t o u n d e r s t a n d something e l s e which i s not so 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y u n d e r s t o o d . (U-FMG B 51/164; 
c f . TL 7, fflffi 265, VM 99) 
Ramsey uses t h e word "model" both o f " t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h 
which we a r e f a m i l i a r " (RL 61; c f , MMR 264) and o f t h e word 
which s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y " s p e c i f i e s " t h i s s i t u a t i o n . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e some times necessary t o d i s t i n g u i s h between "model-
s i t u a t i o n s " and "model-words ( l a n g u a g e ) " , 
Ramsey p r e f e r s t o speak o f "models", r a t h e r t h a n 
o f "images", "symbols", "myths", " p a r a b l e s " e t c . He does so 
because t h e concept o f t h e model i s " l o g i c a l r a t h e r t h a n 
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p s y c h o l o g i c a l " , and because i t i s a l r e a d y much used i n 
s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e and i s t h e r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a " p a r t i a l 
y e t r e l i a b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h a t about which i t t a l k s " 
(TTST 8 2 ) . 
be 
By i t s v e r y n a t u r e a model w i l l / u l t i m a t e l y inadequate 
f o r a complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h a t which i t models. As 
Ramsey puts i t : 
I.Iodels a r e models, and we s h o u l d expect 
a r t i c u l a t i o n f r o m any model t o generate 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y somewhere., „A model "by i t s 
v e r y c h a r a c t e r villi never g i v e us t h e f u l l 
s t o r y . (CD 44; c f . TRT33, TGS8, U-TLIE 11, 
U-FKG y/49/l56) 
Because o f t h i s , "we,...need t o balance one model w i t h i t s 
a s s o c i a t e d c o n t e x t a g a i n s t a n o t h e r model w i t h i t s a s s o c i a t e d 
c o n t e x t " ( T L $; c f . CPCF 58). T h i s " m i x i n g " , " p i l i n g up" o r 
" j o s t l i n g " o f models ( c f . RL 154, TL 10, MBA 42) r e s u l t s i n 
"m u l t i - m o d e l d i s c o u r s e " (TRT 53, IJDA y, MMR 266), e n s h r i n e d 
i n a "many-stranded" o r " m u l t i p l e " t h e o l o g y (H 225, CF 351 
Sermon (5) 12; c f . F a r r e r ( F l ) 4 0 ) . 
Such a view of t h e o l o g y goes t o t h e h e a r t o f 
Ramsey's i n t e r e s t s as an a p p l i e d t h e o l o g i a n . For i t enables 
him b o t h t o s e r v e as an i r e n i c m e d i a t o r between op p o s i n g 
t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s (a most v a l u a b l e q u a l i t y i n a 
chairman o f t h e Church o f England D o c t r i n e Commission!) and 
t o be e c l e c t i c i n h i s search f o r a contemporary t h e o l o g y 
among t h e most d i v e r s e t r a d i t i o n s and schools o f t h o u g h t . 
He w r i t e s : 
On t h e view I have been o u t l i n i n g , a l l t h e o l o g y 
begins f r o m what we c o u l d c a l l , do c a l l , r i g h t l y 
c a l l a g i v e n r e v e l a t i o n , a g i v e n d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n . There i s the a u t h o r i t y , t h e r e i s 
what i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r a l l i s s u e s , t h e o r e t i c a l 
o r p r a c t i c a l , t h e r e i s what i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
f o r a l l a s s e r t i o n s and a l l b e h a v i o u r . But t h a t 
r e v e l a t i o n i s n o t a d e q u a t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n one 
s i n g l e t h e o l o g i c a l s t r a n d , s t i l l l e s s i n terms 
of a s i n g l e d e d u c t i v e system, A g i v e n r e v e l a t i o n 
does not r e s u l t i n a m o n o l i t h i c , s i n g l e - s t r a n d e d , 
s i m p l e t h e o l o g y , A g i v e n r e v e l a t i o n r e s u l t s i n 
a v a r i e g a t e d , many s t r a n d e d , m u l t i p l e t h e o l o g y . 
(U-TM 3) 
Ramsey c o n t r a s t s t h i s w i t h a " f e u d a l view o f 
t h e o l o g y " ( i b i d . ) as "a s u b j e c t a p a r t , m o n o l i t h i c , and 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e of c o n c l u s i o n s i n a l l o t h e r s u b j e c t s " (TAE vi)„ 
I t i s Ramsey's approach t o t h e o l o g y which serves t o j u s t i f y 
h i s " l i b e r a l " views on E d u c a t i o n ( c f , TE 141) 9 Intercommunion 
( c f . U-Intercommunion 14 - 17) and t h e o l o g y i n g e n e r a l 
( c f . Sermon ( 5 ) , CF 25; Owen(PTR) 7 2 ) . The a l t e r n a t i v e 
approach, which Ramsey speaks o f p e j o r a t i v e l y as " p r e s c r i p t i v e 
" a p r i o r i " , o r " d e d u c t i v e " t h e o l o g y ( c f . CF 23, MM 67, TECF 
214, U-TM 13, OBSR 8 8 ) , was t i e d up w i t h a b e l i e f i n an 
i n e r r a n t p r o p o s i t i o n a l r e v e l a t i o n which c a r r i e d t h e f u l l 
a u t h o r i t y o f God h i m s e l f ( c f , CF 23). Ramsey's account o f 
th e t e n t a t i v e and m u l t i p l e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o l o g y , on t h e 
o t h e r hand, accords w i t h h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e o l o g y i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a human response t o God's d i s c l o s u r e o f h i m s e l f . 
Such a t b s l o g y i s bo t h " e m p i r i c a l " ( i . e . a r i s e s f r o m 
d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s and can be checked by " e m p i r i c a l f i t " 
- c f . BP I I 203) and " e x p l o r a t o r y " ( i . e . always s e a r c h i n g 
f o r more adequate model-language - c f , OBSR 89, WT 14, RFT 
36, PG 7 0 ) * t h e p i o n e e r i n g o f a v i s i o n " (TE 147, of.CSC 52). 
I t i s t h i s s o r t o f t h e o l o g y which i s r e f l e c t e d , f o r example, 
i n a C h r i s t i a n s o c i a l p o l i c y which i s " e m p i r i c a l - e x p l o r a t o r y " 
r a t h e r t h a n " l i n e a r - s y s t e m a t i c " ( c f . OBSR c h . I I , U-UBMD passim) 
Here a t l a s t i s a t h e o l o g y t h a t does not " p r e s i d e over a 
h i e r a r c h y o f subjects,,,„prescribing t h e l i m i t s and t h e most 
ge n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s which might be reached" (MM 67). I t 
w i l l i n s t e a d g r a t e f u l l y t a k e up models s u p p l i e d by o t h e r 
d i s c i p l i n e s i n o r d e r t o h i n t a t the " f u r t h e r dimension" i n 
th e w o r l d . A w o r l d t h a t a l l d i s c i p l i n e s a t t e m p t t o map on 
t h e i r own, two d i m e n s i o n a l , p r o j e c t i o n s (MM 67 - 68). 
I n t h e m u l t i - m o d e l d i s c o u r s e o f t h e o l o g y God i s 
spoken of by t h e use o f a host of models - Tower, Rock, F a t h e r , 
K i n g , Shepherd and so on ( c f . TG passim, CP CF 58). S i m i l a r l y 
t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e about t h e Church has used t h e models 
of t h e Body and B r i d e o f C h r i s t , t h e new Jerusalem,the 
Remnant e t c . ( c f . TL 27 - 30), I n cases l i k e t h ese we must 
never, i f we a r e t o be wise t h e o l o g i a n s , "remain c o n t e n t 
w i t h any one model" (TG 84). That i s t h e m i s t a k e of t h e 
h e r e t i c , who always ends up by p r e s s i n g h i s f a v o u r i t e model 
too f a r ( c f , RL 170 - 171, Enc. B r i t . 595, U-WM 2 8 ) . 1 1 
However, a m u l t i - m o d e l t h e o l o g y r a i s e s a problem: 
what Ramsey c a l l s t h e problem o f " p r e f e r e n c e s " (CD 57, TG 8 8 ) . 
How do we express p r e f e r e n c e s between models? " I s i t p o s s i b l e 
t o f i x on a 'best model 1..? M(CD 57). T h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r 
d i f f i c u l t y f o r Ramsey because he commits h i m s e l f t o t h e v i e w 
t h a t a n y t h i n g can be a model l e a d i n g t o a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e ; 
any word may be a "model" by means o f which a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s s i t u a t i o n can be 
evoked. A l l words, i f s u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d , can 
l e a d t o such a s i t u a t i o n . ( R L 80; c f . E 48, TG 87, 89) 
We may note t h a t Ramsey's p o s i t i o n here i s i n 
accord w i t h h i s g e n e r a l t h e s i s t h a t : 
( i ) d i s c l o s u r e s a r e mediated t h r o u g h ( s i t u a t i o n s i n ) 
t h e w o r l d , and such s i t u a t i o n s t h e n serve as models f o r what 
i s d i s c l o s e d ; 
and ( i i ) cosmic d i s c l o s u r e s , which r e v e a l God, are a l l -
i n c l u s i v e : t h e i r media are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e w o r l d as 
a whole. 
As God has t h e freedom t o d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f as and when he sees 
f i t , and as he i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r - and i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d 
t o - every aspect of h i s c r e a t i o n , t h e n a n y t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d 
can serve as a medium f o r the d i s c l o s u r e of God. Hence 
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a n y t h i n g can serve as a model f o r t h e God who i s thus d i s c l o s e d . 
T h i s r a t h e r extreme p o s i t i o n has been w i d e l y 
c r i t i c i z e d ( c f . H a r r i s (MQ) 87 - 89, Cohen (LRL) 154, Smart 
(PR) 225); t h e main c r i t i c i s m b e i n g t h a t i t i s p a t e n t l y 
obvious t h a t o n l y c e r t a i n models are used, or can be used, 
i n t h e o l o g y . However much you q u a l i f y "dung" i t serves n e i t h e r 
t o evoke a d i s c l o s u r e o f God nor t o h e l p us understand t h e 
d i s c l o s e d God. Ramsey h i m s e l f c o n s i d e r s t h e q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l 
" i n f i n i t e l y e v i l " and admits t h a t t h i s may evoke a d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n , but one i n which t h e word " d e v i l " , and not t h e 
word "God", i s p o s i t e d (RL 80 - 8 1 ) . However we would t h e n 
have two "key words" - i . e . an u l t i m a t e m e t a p h y s i c a l d u a l i s m , 
\/e must t h u s s u b o r d i n a t e one of them by c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
t h e o d i c y , i f we a r e t o be t r u e t o "our r e l i g i o u s commitment 
expressed i n terms of God "which i s "a t o t a l l o y a l t y t o 
the whole u n i v e r s e " (RL 8 1 ) . 
But v/hy not p r e f e r " d e a l " as our s i n g l e key word, 
remain t r u e t o our sabanic commitment and seek an e x p l a n a t i o n 
of " t h e problem of good" i n s t e a d ? The answer must i n p a r t 
r e f e r t o t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i o n o f e m p i r i c a l f i t ( c f , 
below). But t h e whole problem would be g r e a t l y eased i f we 
were t o d i s a l l o w Ramsey's c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e 
( e m p i r i c a l ) medium o f a d i s c l o s u r e and t h e model t h a t i s 
used t o express what i s d i s c l o s e d . Y/e c o u l d t h e n agree 
t h a t the c r e a t o r - God may indeed d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f t h r o u g h 
th e medium o f dung, but argue t h a t he does not d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f 
t h e r e - o r anywhere - as t h e d u n g - l i k e God. The t e l e v i s i o n 
or t e l e p h o n e which serves as t h e medium by which I come t o 
"see" o r "hear" a n o t h e r person i s not i n any way l i k e t h a t 
p e r s o n 1 2 1 v/e may argue t h a t a medium i s a medium, n o t h i n g 
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more, i t i s not t h e "message" nor does i t have t o serve as 
a model f o r t h e messenger. On such a view t h e medium t e l l s 
us something about God, but o n l y n e g a t i v e l y and r e t r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
I t t e l l s us t h a t God must be o f such- and-such a n a t u r e 
consonant w i t h h i s b e i n g d i s c l o s e d t h r o u g h t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
medium. But t h i s means o n l y t h a t God must be t h e s o r t of 
God who can be r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h t h i s w o r l d , and t h r o u g h 
every p a r t of i t j t h a t t h e r e must be something about God. 
t h a t " r e l a t e s " him t o t h e w o r l d i n a l l i t s expansive d i v e r s i t y , 
as a n o t h e r person i s " r e l a t e d " t o t h e medium of t h e 'phone 
o r t e l e v i s i o n , o r as another mind i s " r e l a t e d " t o t h e medium 
of a n o t h e r body. A r a d i c a l l y d e i s t i c God, a p p a r e n t l y , w i l l 
not do. A c r e a t o r / s u s t a i n e r - G o d , h o w e v e r , f i t s t h e b i l l 
q u i t e a d e q u a t e l y . But we can say l i t t l e more about him by 
s t u d y i n g t h e media of h i s r e v e l a t i o n s a l o n e . I t i s t h e 
r e v e l a t i o n s themselves t h a t must be examined. I know t h a t 
G od i s x and y because he d i s c l o s e s h i m s e l f t o me, because 
I d i s c e r n him, as x and y; t h e medium o f such d i s c l o s u r e s may 
be more or l e s s i r r e l e v a n t . Such a p o s i t i o n would contend 
t h a t Ramsey's account both o f t h e use of model-language o f 
God, and of t h e n a t u r e of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n s , i s g r e a t l y 
f l a w e d by h i s a t t e m p t s t o combine t h e two i n one a l l - e m b r a c i n g 
t h e o r y o f t h e o r i g i n o f r e l i g i o u s language and r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e . 
But t h i s p o s i t i o n i s v e r y much out o f s t e p w i t h t h e 
u s u a l accounts o f mediated i n t u i t i o n ( c f . Owen (CKG) ch.6, 
Ewing (VR) ch.6, J.E. Smith (EG) ch. I I I ) . John E.. Smith 
w r i t e s : 
. I t i s t h e f u n c t i o n of a medium o f r e v e l a t i o n t o 
d i s c l o s e God by b e a r i n g t h e d i v i n e presence but 
not by t a k i n g t h e p l a c e o f G od i n t h e process. 
To p e r f o r m i t s f u n c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , a medium 
must recede i n order to/disclose the r e a l i t y 
to which i t points. And yet the medium i s not 
merely an occasion e x t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to the 
r e a l i t y d i s c l o s e d ; i f that were so, the nature 
of the medium would make no d i f f e r e n c e to 
i t s meaning. I n shor t , the medium must not, 
through i t s own nature, "become a s u b s t i t u t e 
f o r i t s meaning, and yet that nature cannot 
be e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t to i t s meaning, 
(op.oit. ?9 - 80) 
Smith appeals to C h r i s t the obedient servant as providing 
"the s o l v i n g idea", f o r he i s "A s e l f - n e g a t i n g medium that 
r e v e a l s God i n the very a c t of s e t t i n g i t s e l f a s i d e " ( 8 0 ) . 
I n C h r i s t ; 
the nature of the medium.becomes i d e n t i c a l 
with G od without c e a s i n g to be the means 
whereby God i s made known to man. ( i b i d . ) 
T h i s would seem to mean that C h r i s t i s both the 
supreme medium f o r God's r e v e l a t i o n and the supreme model 
f o r God's nature (as i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to u s ) . T h i s i s 
s i m i l a r to the way i n which, on a mediated i n t u i t i o n i s t 
account of our knowled&ej^other s e l v e s , the s e l f "expresses 
i t s e l f i n and through the media" of a c t i o n s , f a c i a l expressions 
language e t c . ( i b i d . 86; c f . Owen (CK@) 132 •=• 133). 
Both i n Ch r i s t o l o g y and the theory of mind the connection 
between the medium and what i t r e v e a l s i s of c e n t r a l 
importance. C h r i s t c l e a r l y r e v e a l s the nature of God because 
he chooses to do so: h i s w i l l i s obedient to h i s Father; or 
he r e v e a l s God because God i s somehow present i n him. And 
a body r e v e a l s a mind because man i s a psychophysical u n i t y . 
But the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and (a) the c r e a t i o n i n 
general, or (b) human beings i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s s u r e l y not 
of the same kind. Not l e a s t t h i s i s because such a r e l a t i o n s h i 
i s a u n i v e r s a l one: God i s r e l a t e d to the whole of c r e a t i o n 
by h i s c r e a t i v e a c t . I t i s t h e r e f o r e s u r e l y simply b i z a r r e 
t o suggest t h a t any and every p a r t o f c r e a t i o n can serve as 
a model f o r i t s maker ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e case o f those 
p a r t s of t h e human c r e a t i o n who a r e d i s o b e d i e n t t o h i s w i l l ) . 
To e x t r i c a t e o u r s e l v e s f r o m t h i s dilemma we s h a l l have t o 
admit: 
E i t h e r ( a ) (as i n t h e e a r l i e r argument a g a i n s t Ramsey) 
t h a t a medium of God's r e v e l a t i o n , l i k e some o t h e r everyday 
"media", i s no more th a n a medium - and does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
serve as a model f o r what i s r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h i t ; 
Or ( b ) t h a t God r e v e a l s , h i m s e l f o n l y t h r o u g h c e r t a i n 
s e l e c t e d media; i . e . those media which "by t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e 
can express h i s n a t u r e "by s e r v i n g as a p p r o p r i a t e models f o r 
him, Tnus Smith argues t h a t ; 
I n p r i n c i p l e , any r e a l i t y may serve as a 
medium o f t h e d i v i n e presence, .. (WO 
I n f a c t , r e v e l a t i o n . i s s e l e c t i v e and 
e x c l u s i v e , ( J . E , Smith (EG) 77). 
I t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e i s something t o be s a i d f o r b o t h 
p o s i t i o n s : God does d i s c l o s e h i m s e l f (sometimes) t h r o u g h 
dung; but he more c l e a r l y (and more o f t e n ) d i s c l o s e s h i m s e l f 
t h r o u g h l o v i n g f a t h e r s . A t any r a t e I f i n d m y s e l f unable t o 
accept Ramsey's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t media always serve as models, 
w h i l s t a d m i t t i n g t h a t t hey may u s u a l l y do so. 
But we must r e t u r n t o t h e problem of p r e f e r e n c e s . 
One c l u s t e r o f c r i t e r i a t h a t may be used t o judge models i s 
the f o r m a l and m a t e r i a l j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i a o f s i m p l i c i t y , 
comprehensiveness, c o n s i s t e n c y , coherence and " e m p i r i c a l f i t " 
( c f , TG yO, MDA 62). These w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h e next 
c h a p t e r . The o t h e r c r i t e r i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e t h a t Ramsey 
suggests i s a model's " r e l a t i v e dominance" i n r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c o u r s e (TG 90). Ramsey w r i t e s : 
One model, f o r example, P r o t e c t o r , i s b e t t e r t h a n 
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anot h e r , f o r example, Laundress, i f i t s d i s c o u r s e 
i s more w i d e l y r a n g i n g . A model l i k e person i s 
b e t t e r t h a n , say, slspherd or p o t t e r , because i t 
can say a l l t h a t these o t h e r models can say and 
more besides; i n t h i s way i t can absorb t h e 
d i s c b u r s e f r o m two or more models. ( i b i d . ) 
Such a model i s c a l l e d a "dominant model". I t i s a model 
i n terms of which a p a r t i c u l a r brand of d i s c o u r s e i s best 
a r t i c u l a t e d ( c f . CD 58): 
One model i s more dominant t h a n another when i t 
p r e s i d e s over t h e g r e a t e r language spread; when 
i t enables us t o be r e l i a b l y a r t i c u l a t e over a 
g r e a t e r range of d i s c o u r s e . (CD 20) 
These "major, dominant models" ( c f . TL 28, MM 66, MBA 44) o r 
"supermodels" ( c f . TL 30, RL 85, CD 84) i n c l u d e w i t h i n 
themselves the themes o f v a r i o u s "minor models" ( c f . TL 28) 
o r "submodels" ( c f . TL 30). " I n each case a dominant model 
i s more comprehensive t h a n i t s s u b o r d i n a t e s and b i n d s them 
t o g e t h e r " (Evans (IRTG) 224). Ramsey remarks: 
I would say t h a t t h e "dominant models" were 
presupposed by t h e " l o w e r " models i n so f a r as 
a one-sided r e l a t i o n o f e n t a i l m e n t c o u l d be 
e s t a b l i s h e d between d i s c o u r s e o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m 
the one model and f r o m t h e o t h e r , (u-ITR Evans 3) 
A dominant model w i l l combine t h e need f o r "minimal q u a l i f i c a t i o n . . . 
so as t o i n d i c a t e t h e transcendence o f God", w i t h "maximal 
r i c h n e s s of meaning" (Evans (IRTG) 224). Thus "Love" and 
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"Person" come h i g h e r i n t h e h i e r a r c h y o f models t h a n "King" 
o r "Judge" o r "Power" ( c f . TL 9, TG 84 - 85). 
I t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t Ramsey a c t u a l l y seems 
t o a l l o w another c r i t e r i o n f o r p r e f e r e n c e among models, 
a l t h o u g h he does not d e s c r i b e i t as such. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f 
a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e problem o f p r e f e r e n c e s he r e c o r d s h i s 
account o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m u l t i - m o d e l d i s c o u r s e so as 
t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e "X" r e v e a l e d i n a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e . T h i s 
d i s c o u r s e f i t s " c l o s e r and c l o s e r t o t h e language which a 
^80 
"believer uses about God" (TG y1 - 92)« We can o n l y conclude 
" f o r X read God", when t h e models we use about X a r e seen t o 
be t h e same ( o r v e r y s i m i l a r ? ) t o t h e models a l r e a d y used -
i n B i b l e and C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n - about God. Ramsey has 
noted here an i m p o r t a n t check on our t h e o l o g i z i n g . We must 
always ask o u r s e l v e s , "Are my_ models, d e r i v e d as they are 
from d i s c l o s u r e s , a c t u a l l y i n use a l r e a d y i n the Church's 
t a l k about God?"^ I f not then prima f a c i e I have a problem, 
and I s h a l l have t o b r i n g i n t o p l a y t h e o t h e r c r i t e r i a o f 
p r e f e r e n c e i n o r d e r t o d i s c o v e r whose t h e o l o g y (mine or t h e 
that of 
Church's - o r , i n d e e d , / d e n o m i n a t i o n A,B o r C) i s t h e best 
a r t i c u l a t i o n . V/e should never u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e importance 
of t h e Church's t r a d i t i o n i n our use o f models f o r God. For 
no one can l i g h t l y d i s r e g a r d t w e n t y c e n t u r i e s o f o t h e r people's 
assessment o f t h e r e l a t i v e importance o f t h e d i f f e r e n t models 
of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e . On t h i s c f , a l s o Smart (SFT) 
111 and passim, and K. Ward (CG) 78 - 79 . 
(B) P i c t u r i n g models and D i s c l o s u r e models 
As i n d i c a t e d above, models are used as models 
because t h e y serve as e i t h e r t h e l i n g u i s t i c o r t h e e m p i r i c a l 
media o f d i s c l o s u r e s ( c f . TG 88, MMR 264): models are 
"born i n d i s c l o s u r e s " (TL 38). For Ramsey t h e r e i s no 
independent access t o t h a t which t h e model models, and no 
way t h e r e f o r e of comparing t h e o r i g i n a l w i t h t h e model 
(TG 85 - 86, MMR 265). Ramsey expresses t h i s by speaking 
o f " d i s c l o s u r e models" (TC- 8 9 ) , " w i t n e s s i n g t o t h e d i s c l o s u r e 
on t h e one hand and e n a b l i n g us t o be a r t i c u l a t e on t h e 
o t h e r " (TL 2 8 ) . The o r i g i n a l i s known o n l y i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
which p r o v i d e s us a t t h e same t i m e w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
" d i s c l o s u r e model". 
Ram3ey acknowledges h i s i n d e b t e d n e s s , i n h i s w r i t i n g s 
on the themes of metaphors and models^to the work o f Max B l a c k 
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and, t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , I . A . R i c h a r d s . Bl a c k t o o k over 
f r o m R i c h a r d s an " i n t e r a c t i o n " view o f metaphors: our t h o u g h t s 
about t h e metaphor and t h e l i t e r a l e x p r e s s i o n i n t e r a c t 
p r o d u c i n g a new meaning t h a t i s a r e s u l t a n t of t h a t 
i n t e r a c t i o n ( c f . B lack (MM) 38 - 44, R i c h a r d s chs. V & V l ) , 
A metaphor, t h e r e f o r e , i s no d e c o r a t i v e s u b s t i t u t e f o r a 
l i t e r a l e x p r e s s i o n ; nor i s i t a condensed or e l l i p t i c a l 
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3 i m i l e ( B l a c k (iffli) 31 - 37) • " I n t e r a c t i o n " metaphors are 
"not expendable", f o r any e q u i v a l e n t l i t e r a l e x p r e s s i o n w i l l 
f a i l " t o g i v e t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t h e metaphor d i d " and t h e r e 
w i l l be "a l o s s o f c o g n i t i v e c o n t e n t " ( B l a c k (MM) 4 6 ) f 
Ramsey accepts t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and develops from 
i t h i s own view " t h a t metaphors, l i k e models, are r o o t e d i n 
d i s c l o s u r e s " (KM '50): 
m e t a p h o r i c a l expressions occur when two s i t u a t i o n s 
s t r i k e us i n such a way as t o r e v e a l what i n c l u d e s 
them b o t h , (iJlid« 53) 
When someone d e s c r i b e s Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y as a 
"powerhouse of l e a r n i n g " i t may be because t h e metaphor 
was i n s p i r e d by a d i s c l o s u r e ( o f isomorphism) between t h e 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l f e a t u r e s o f powerhouses and t h e l i b r a r y b u i l d i n g 
( i b i d , 51)• Tnere has been a " t a n g e n t i a l meeting o f two 
d i v e r s e c o n t e x t s " ; and t h e m e t a p h o r i c a l e x p r e s s i o n "A i s 
B" i s a c l a i m t h a t : 
( i ) A and B i n c o n t a c t have generated a 
d i s c l o s u r e r e v e a l i n g some o b j e c t ' and 
( i i ) what i t i s t h a t has been d i s c l o s e d 
demands d i s c o u r s e which i n f i l t r a t e s B 
i n t o A. ( i b i d , 5~2) 
Ramsey means by t h e meeting of two " c o n t e x t s " e i t h e r t h a t two 
"languages'*meet (e.g. i b i d . 52) o r t h a t two " p i c t u r e s " meet 
28 2, 
(U-NRL 2 ) . However "both languages and. p i c t u r e s (images) must 
correspond t o e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i f we are s e e k i n g t o 
d e v i s e a m e t a p h o r i c a l language t h a t we can u n d e r s t a n d which 
i s about o b j e c t s o r events t h a t we know. I f we a r e u s i n g 
metaphors o f God, however, one o f these s i t u a t i o n s w i l l be 
known i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t d i s c l o s u r e and not d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h 
t h e senses ( c f . J e f f n e r (SEL) 53 - 54, and b e l o w ) . 
Ramsey t r e a t s a model, as Black does, as "a s u s t a i n e d 
and s y s t e m a t i c metaphor" ( B l a c k (MM) 236; quoted w i t h 
a p p r o v a l by Ramsey-MM 50j c f . H u t t e n 289, 293, Barbour (MMP) 
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149) . B l ack speaks of " s c a l e models" - e.g. t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l 
m i n i a t u r e s , more o r l e s s t r u e t o s c a l e ( B l a c k (MM) 219). He 
uses the t e r m t o cover " a l l l i k e n e s s e s of m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , 
systems and processes... t h a t p r e s e r v e r e l a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s " 
( i b i d . 220) •, and d i s t i n g u i s h e s these f r o m "analogue models": An analogue model i s some m a t e r i a l o b j e c t , 
system o r process designed t o reproduce as 
f a i t h f u l l y as p o s s i b l e i n some new medium 
th e s t r u c t u r e o r web o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n 
an o r i g i n a l . , . 
The c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two types o f 
models i s i n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g methods o f 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Scale m o d e l s . . . r e l y markedly 
upon i d e n t i t y : t h e i r aim i s t o i m i t a t e t h e 
o r i g i n a l , except where the need f o r 
m a n i p u l a t i b i l i t y e n f o r c e s a d e p a r t u r e from 
sheer r e p r o d u c t i o n . And when t h i s happens t h e 
magnitudes i n t h e o r i g i n a l are s t i l l r e p r oduced 
though w i t h a c o n s t a n t change of r a t i o . On t h e 
o t h e r hand the making o f analogue models i s 
guided by t h e more a b s t r a c t aim o f r e p r o d u c i n g 
the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r i g i n a l , ( B l a c k (MM) 222; 
c f . Apostel15 - 16, H u t t e n 285) 
There i s an "isomorphism", an i d e n t i t y of s t r u c t u r e , between 
th e analogue model and i t s o r i g i n a l and " i d e n t i t y o f s t r u c t u r e , 
i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e w i d e s t v a r i e t y of c o n t e n t " ( B l a c k (MM) 
223)° Thus analogue models model an o r i g i n a l i n a d i f f e r e n t 
medium, as i n t h e case of h y d r a u l i c models of economic systems. 
B l a c k develops h i s view of analogue models i n a d i s c u s s i o n 
of mathematical models and the t h e o r e t i c a l models of science, 
arguing t h a t "Those who see a model as a mere crutch are 
l i k e those who consider metaphor a mere decoration or 
ornament" ( i b i d . 2 J 6 ) . On the contrary, Black claims, models 
have an important r o l e to play i n s c i e n t i f i c research and 
understanding. On t h i s see Excursus I below. 
Ramsey re-names Black's "scale models" as " p i c t u r i n g 
models" (.Mil 2 ) and remarks th a t they are a/en more l i m i t i n g i n 
theology than they are i n science ( i b i d , 6 - 7 ) . V/hat i s 
needed i n both d i s c i p l i n e s i s the "analogue model", which 
Ramsey c a l l s a "disclosure model" ( i b i d , 9 - 1 1 ) . These 
models a r i s e "not as p i c t o r i a l r e p l i c a s , hut w i t h s t r u c t u r a l 
echoes "between model and phenomena t h a t lead to a 
disclosure ( i b i d . 1 0 ) . I t i s worth quoting Ramsey i n 
f u l l here: 
There must be something about the universe and 
man's experience i n i t which, f o r example, 
matches the behaviour of a l o v i n g father....-, 
there must be something about c e r t a i n cosmic • 
s i t u a t i o n s which matches those s i t u a t i o n s 
i n v/hich men f i n d themselves i n the presence 
of a judge or a king. I n other words, there 
are on the one hand c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which we f i n d ourselves, c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s 
of a cosmic character, which i n v i r t u e of 
some feature or other echo, chime i n w i t h , 
are isomorphouswith other s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
we speak, f o r example, of strong towers, of 
kingship, of f a t h e r s and sons, and the two 
together, because of the common f e a t u r e , 
generate i n s i g h t . Likewise i t i s i n s i g h t which 
o r i g i n a t e s a p a r t i c u l a r model such as t h a t of 
personal a f f e c t i o n or slave release i n r e l a t i o n 
to the " f a c t s " of the C h r i s t i a n l i f e - a model 
which i s then used f o r the b e t t e r understanding 
and commending of doctrines of Grace and 
Atonement.... Once again, as i n the s c i e n t i f i c 
case, a d i s c l o s u r e arises around and embraces »^ 
the phenomena and the associated model. (MM 1 6 ) 
Despite Ramsey's concluding sentence, there i s 




and the t h e o l o g i c a l cases. Ramsey claims that the model 
(or "metaphor" i n i t s undeveloped form) of the "flow" of 
e l e c t r i c i t y i s derived from " t a n g e n t i a l connexion between 
e l e c t r i c i t y and f l o w i n g water". Thus, presented diagrammatically: 
E l e c t r i c a l 
:B 
Phenomena 
when "seen together" 
give r i s e to 
C: a discl o s u r e o\ isomorphism, „ „ 
D: . , i n which i t i s revealed 
tha t e l e c t r i c i t y "flows" 
( o f . MM 1 1 , 5 2 - 5 5 ) 
This i s the s c i e n t i f i c case. Let us, however, take a 
t h e o l o g i c a l example - the discl o s u r e which provides us v/ith 
the model of "Father" f o r God, I n t h i s case A = "Father 
Pnenomena" (e.g. f a t h e r s l o v i n g , and ca r i n g f o r , t h e i r 
c h i l d r e n ) , and D = the r e v e l a t i o n that God i s " F a t h e r " - l i k e . 
For the t h e o l o g i c a l case to be a s t r i c t p a r a l l e l t b ' the 
s c i e n t i f i c case, B must now = "God Pnenomena" (e.g. God 
ca r i n g f o r h i s " c h i l d r e n " ) . B cannot simply be "World 
Phenomena" (e.g. The Red Sea being bbwn back by the wind, the 
mist c l e a r i n g when I am about to f a l l down the c l i f f ) , I t 
must be World-Phenomena - i n t e r p r e t e d - i n - t h e i s t i c -
terms. And, on Ramsey's epistemology, t h i s means t h a t 
"context B" must i t s e l f be derived from a disc l o s u r e around 
such World Phenomena, I t i s not alv/ays c l e a r t h a t t h i s 
i s the case from Ramsey's own accounts ( c f , MM 1 6 , MMR 2 6 6 -
2 6 ? ) 2 0 . 
I n "Talking about God" pp.80 - 83 (= TRT 50 - 52) 
Ramsey analyses the s i t u a t i o n r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t l y . For there 
the two "patterns" - human and cosmic - t h a t match one 
another, are t r e a t e d e n t i r e l y at the l e v e l of observable 
"behaviour"„ To t a l k o f a "Father" (or "husband" or " f r i e n d " ) 
i s already t o have gone beyond such an observable p a t t e r n 
of human behaviour i n a disc l o s u r e of what i s "more". 
Ramsey claims t h a t then: 
the human case acts as c a t a l y s t f o r the cosmic 
case, to generate a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e . The 
cosmic p a t t e r n chimes i n wi t h the human 
p a t t e r n ; the human p a t t e r n has already 
l e d to a f i n i t e d i s c l o s u r e - of persons -
and t h e i r matching then evokes a cosmic 
di s c l o s u r e around n a t u r a l events such as 
seed-time and harvest. I t i s as and when 
a cosmic disclosure i s thereby evoked t h a t 
we are able to speak of God - what the cosmic 
di s c l o s u r e discloses - i n terms of the models tui-tk 
which the f i n i t e s i t u a t i o n s have supplied us t(TG 81) 
There are two disclosures here: 
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Pattern" '{Medium of oC/ 
(Human body/behaviour 
- Pnenomena) 
when seen together when sesn alone 
wit h the " c a t a l y s t " - gives r i s p t o 
the medium of disclosure 
c C-gives r^se to , 
a disclosure of the a disclosure of 
a c t i v i t y of the " f a t h e r - a f a t h e r ' s a c t i v i t y 
l i k e " God 
\ disclosure (3 j aisclosure cC 
I t appears t h a t the disc l o s u r e of isomorphism between the two 
patterns has i n t h i s account become absorbed i n t o d i s c l o s u r e 
p . Cosmic disclosure jS could occur "on i t s own", but -
unless a r e a l f a t h e r appeared as part of the medium of j | -
Ramsey does not seem to t h i n k t h a t we would then have any 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t a l k i n g of the disclosed God i n terms of 
28<c : 
a " f a t h e r " . Tfte f a c t t h a t i t i s a f a t h e r - d i s c l o s u r e 
(disclosure o c ) which i s the necessary c a t a l y s t to evoke 
disclosure jg i s s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n Ramsey1s eyes 
f o r using f a t h e r language of the object of disclosure p. 
V/e may note t h a t Ramsey i s here o f f e r i n g a 
disclosure-based v e r s i o n of the argument £rom analogy: 
(a) The human body i s the expression of a human 
mind (personal): 
(b) The world i s analogous t o a human "body; 
(c) •*• The world i s the expression of a mind 
analogous to the human mind. 
For Ramsey (b) i s not a premise i n an argument but a f a c t 
to be discerned i n a d i s c l o s u r e , which then leads on to the "disclosed-
c o n c l u s i o n " ( c ) . For i t i s when we have a disclosure of 
the isomorphy between the world and a human body t h a t v/e 
come to know the personal (human mind - l i k e ) God, 
The f a c t t h a t Ramsey also i n t e r p r e t s (a) as a f a c t known 
i n a disclosure ensures that the whole argument from analogy 
i s transposed i n t o the key of a disclosure-epistemology. 
I t should be said, however, t h a t one could s t i l l t r e a t 
(a) - (c) as an argument from analogy, even i f (b) i s known 
i n a disc l o s u r e of isomorphism. I t would then read: 
(a) The human body i s the expression of a human 
mind (we know t h i s by a u n i v e r s a l i z i n g 
analogy from our own case, or by i n t u i t i o n 
across a number of cases); 
(b) The world i s analogous to a human body ( t h i s 
i s known i n t u i t i v e l y - the analogy i s " j u s t seen"); 
(c ) .'.The world i s the expression of a mind analogous 
to the human mind 
(known as the conclusion of an inference) ^ 
A great deal depends, of course, on how much of conclusion 
(«?) i s already i m p l i c i t i n premise (b)„ But I would argue 
that one could accept the r e c o g n i t i o n of analogy - s i m i l a r i t y , 
isomorphism - "between two sets of phenomena w h i l s t viewing 
r u r t h e r assertions as inferences from such an analogy ( i f 
the world i s l i k e a human body i n respects x, y, z t then i t 
i s l i k e l y - arguing from analogy - t h a t i t i s also the 
expression of a minS). 
However, Ramsey's main purpose i n the arguments 
o u t l i n e d i n t h i s section i s to present a view of t h e o l o g i c a l 
models which i n d i c a t e s that they are not s t r a i g h t f o r w e r d , 
l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s of that which they model. Language 
about God i s not equivalent i n status to a scale model of 
a ship. I t i s no d e s c r i p t i v e " p i c t u r e " of God. Such 
language a r i s e s , r a t h e r , i n a disclosure Itet takes us 
beyond a l l l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s . This i s the main burden 
of Ramsey's account of disclosure models,, 
(C) The Q u a l i f i e r 
Two points need to be made by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n : 
( i ) Ramsey tends sometimes to speak of a m o d e l - q u a l i f i e r 
complex as a "model" (meaning a q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l ) j 
( i i ) Ramsey's stress on the r o l e of q u a l i f i e r s i s to be 
found most c l e a r l y expressed i n h i s e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s . Later 
he intended t o focus more a t t e n t i o n on t h e o l o g i c a l models 
as "disclosure models"- i . e . n o n - l i t e r a l models - f o r God 
( c f . Schnetzer 280). However both analyses are presented 
i n Models and Mystery and are t r e a t e d i n a complementary 
fashion. Ramsey recognizes three main ways i n which models 
can give r i s e t o a cosmic disc l o s u r e : 
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(a) when disclosures " j u s t happen" around a model-situation: 
t h i s i s " r e l i g i o u s experience" 2^; 
( b) When disclosures are evoked "by our " b r i n g i n g together" 
a model-situation p i c t u r e ( o r model-language) and an isomorphic 
w o r l d - s i t u a t i o n p i c t u r e ( o r warLd-language): t h i s i s the most 
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usual context f o r Ramsey's use of the term "disclosure model" j 
( c ) when the model-word i s q u a l i f i e d i n a c e r t a i n way ( d i r e c t i o n ) 
u n t i l a disclosure i s evoked: t h i s i s the method discussed 
here. 
The 'mixing1' of models noted e a r l i e r i s one way of 
q u a l i f y i n g a model (i.e« "by adding another model to i t -
cf„ TL 1'0, RL 4 O ) , There are other r e l a t i v e l y unimportant, 
ways of q u a l i f y i n g language so as to make i t s u i t a b l y 
"odd". Ramsey suggests, f o r example, the employment of such 
typographical devices as i n v e r t e d commas, and the use of 
words i n an unexplained, t e c h n i c a l sense (RL 3 9 ) - The 
l a t t e r method i s exemplified i n the t e c h n i c a l terms of the 
A r t s and Sciences: e8g„ " f o r c e " , 'tenergy", " d i s p o s i t i o n " , 
"sovereignty 1, "climate", "appreciation" etc. Ramsey claims 
th a t such words are "witnesses to mystery", f o r we only 
come to l e a r n t h e i r meaning i n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n 
(MM 6 2 - 6 5 ) . 
These t e c h n i c a l terms "combine i n themselves the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of models and q u a l i f i e r s " (MM 6 2 ) . But Ramsey 
focuses h i s main a t t e n t i o n on the phrases which combine 
models and q u a l i f i e r s as separate words^together w i t h s i n g l e 
words th a t have the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of a (telescoped) 
q u a l i f i e r + model phrase but i n which the q u a l i f i e r i s 
reduced to a p r e f i x (e. g. "(im)mutable' 1). The " q u a l i f i e r " i n 
such a phrase or word (e.g. " i n f i n i t e " , " p e r f e c t " , " a l l " , 
"heavenly"^"im-", "only", "necessary" etc.) nas two main 
fu n c t i o n s : 
( i ) Like a mathematical o p e r a t o r 2 ^ , i t "develops the 
model i n a c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n " (TJ-FMG B 5 2 / 1 6 5 ) . Or - more 
p r e c i s e l y - i t serves as a "stimulant and a d i r e c t i v e " which 
" t e l l s us to do something" ( i b i d , ) . The "something" t h a t we 
have to do i s to meditate on the model i n a c e r t a i n way, to 
"operate &.n (the} model w i t h the q u a l i f i e r " (PR 2 0 7 ) , so as 
to produce i n our imagination "an endless series of v a r i a n t s " , 
"a f a m i l y of models" (MM 60 - 61). Eventually "God i s 
revealed i n the cosmic dis c l o s u r e which may occur at some 
stage as the j a t t e r n of models i s developed without end" 
(MM 6 1 ; c f . F I 5 8 , RL 6 8 , 1 7 5 ) . 
( i i ) Tne q u a l i f i e r also has a "formal f u n c t i o n " : 
I t reminds us by the very s t r a i n i t produces 
i n the phrase which belongs of r i g h t to the 
evoked s i t u a t i o n , t h a t any language we wish 
to use about the s i t u a t i o n which has then been 
evoked, w i l l have to be (pundane model3 language 
wi t h a d i f f e r e n c e . ( U - EMG B 5 3 / 1 6 6 ) 
Q u a l i f i e r s thus " i n d i c a t e the special l o g i c a l claims we are 
making f o r the word God" (U-TLIE 5? of. RL 6 8 , 1 7 6 ) 2 7 „ 
The presence of the q u a l i f i e r i n a qualified-model phrase 
i n d i c a t e s that the model-word i s to be taken a n a l o g i c a l l y 
and not l i t e r a l l y . 
Q u a l i f i e r s , l i k e mathematical operators, have the 
" l o g i c of imperatives" (CD 6 7 , 7 5 ; c f . TL 8 , 9 , MDA 6 3 ) . 
They are not pieces of " p l a i n , f l a t , d e s c r i p t i v e " language 
but examples of "language p o i n t i n g i n a c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n 
t e l l i n g you what t o do" (U-NRL 3 ) . Q u a l i f i e r s are "in e x p r e s s i b l e 
i n d e s c r i p t i v e language" (TL 9; RL 1 6 5 ) ; they "describe 
no 
nothing" (TG 9 5 ; c f . CD 7 5 ) , Ramsey r e f e r s t o q u a l i f i e r s , 
or the phrases which include them,as "mnemonics" ( c f , U-TLIE 
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5, PI 47, CD 71, 80), f o r they remind us to generate the 
sequence of sub-models i n our imagination-which r e s u l t s i n 
the r e q u i s i t e d i s c l o s u r e . I n an imporfent sense, t h e r e f o r e , 
t h e i r r o l e i s broadly "psychological": they are part of 
the "technique f o r meditation" (RL 53; of. E 44) t h a t 
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r e s u l t s i n our having a disclosu r e , " But the other aspect 
of t h e i r r o l e i s l o g i c a l , f o r they q u a l i f y the model i n the 
sense of changing i t s meaning, making i t more "appropriate 
currency"ior t a l k i n g about God. 
The sequence of "models w i t h f a m i l y resemblances" 
which are "created" by the operation of a q u a l i f i e r on a 
p a r t i c u l a r model (MM 6 0 - 6 1 ) , i s i n f a c t a series of 
models of inc r e a s i n g degree of q u a l i f i c a t i o n . Ramsey 
provides us with an example of such a series: that 
produced by the q u a l i f i e r " i n f i n i t e ( l y ) " a c t i n g on the 
model "goodness)" -
hardly good, f a i r l y good, j u s t good, very good, 
very good indeed, i n t e n s e l y good ( c f . RL 66 - 67) . Ramsey 
wr i t e s of " i m p l i c i t metaphors" occurring between any p a i r 
of such v a r i a n t s (I.IM60), but i t i s not cle a r what he means 
by t h i s . Does he imply t h a t speaking of someone as " j u s t good" 
i s t o use a metaphor derived from " f a i r l y good" (or from 
"good")? But such language i s not u s u a l l y viewed aS 
metaphorical. \7e should r a t h e r t r e a t the sequence, as 
Cohen suggests, as "one of q u a l i f i e d terms which are r e l a t e d 
to each other by the degree to which they modify" the model 
term (Cohen (LRL) 153). 
There are a number of d i f f e r e n t types of q u a l i f i e r s . 
I n a note i n "Pact, Metaphysics & God" (65/l78b),Ramsey 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " q u a l i f i e r s which act best as generators" 
( i . e . whose main f u n c t i o n i s ( i ) above) and q u a l i f i e r s which 
"are best at making a verbal claim" ( i . e . f u n c t i o n ( l i ) 
above). Examples of the l a t t e r include " i n d e s c r i b a b l y " , 
" r e a l l y " , "indeed", "only". These "remind us tha t something 
f a r - f e t c h e d i s on i t s way". The former category of q u a l i f i e r 
i s sub-divided by Ramsey i n t o : 
(a) "comprehensive words" - e.g. " i n f i n i t e " , "supreme" 
" a l l " , "for.e-f, "absolute", " p e r f e c t " ; and 
(b) "exclusive words" - e.g. "un-", "ex n i h i l o " . 
Sub-category ( b ) , which Evans c a l l s "negating q u a l i f i e r s " 
'(Evans (IRTG) 221), would also include the q u a l i f i e r most 
of t e n used i n negative theology, i,e„ "im~" ( i n "impassible", 
"immutable" etc. - c f . RL 50 - 55). Such q u a l i f i e r s render 
the model they q u a l i f y t o t a l l y i n a p p l i c a b l e t o G od; f o r 
"God i s not passible" t e l l s us nothing p o s i t i v e about 
the nature of God. Sub-category ( a ) , on the other hand, 
embraces the q u a l i f i e r "omni-" of the q u a l i f i e d models 
"omnipotent", "omniscient" etc. ( c f . P0 265)* Such q u a l i f i e r s 
change the meaning of the model and thus enable us to 
speak p o s i t i v e l y , though a n a l o g i c a l l y , of God. They 
d i r e c t "the s e l e c t i o n of only c e r t a i n elements out of the 
system of ideas which the model brings to mind" (Schnetzer 
520). Thus the " e t e r n a l purpose" of God i s analogous t o 
human purpose but i s d i f f e r e n t i n a v/ay t h a t i s appropriate 
to God ("cosmic- scope", "not l i m i t e d by any contingency") 
- c f . RL 75 - 79, PR 208 - 209... This point i s taken up more 
f u l l y below. 
I n Freedom and I m m o r t a l i t y Ramsey w r i t e s of " p o s i t i v e " 
( = "comprehensive") and "negative" ( = "exclusive") q u a l i f i e r s : 
" e v e r l a s t i n g " being an example of the former and "im-" an 
example of the l a t t e r ( F I 95). The word "eternal", however, 
i s said to operate filn the model " l i f e " both p o s i t i v e l y and 
negatively. Negatively i t d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n av/ay from 
such temporal, observable behaviour as l i f e ; p o s i t i v e l y i t 
d i r e c t s us to the r e c o g n i t i o n of what i s l i f e and more 
( F I y5 - 96). S i m i l a r l y the q u a l i f i e r "necessary" i n the 
qualified-model "necessary being" has both a negative and 
a p o s i t i v e use. Necessary being i s not contingent being, 
but p o s i t i v e l y i t i s presupposed by a l l contingent being 
( o f . TL 7 - 8 ) . 
Donald Evans has drawn a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n among 
the p o s i t i v e q u a l i f i e r s , a d i s t i n c t i o n of which Ramsey has 
approved (Evans (IRTG) 217 = 219, U-ITR Evans 3). Evans 
di s t i n g u i s h e s " u n i v e r s a l i s i n g " q u a l i f i e r s (e.g. "omni-", 
" a l l " , "ever", " u n i v e r s a l l y " ) from " p e r f e c t i n g " q u a l i f i e r s 
such as " i n f i n i t e l y " . A j p e r f e c t i n g q u a l i f i e r acts on the 
model so as to produce a more which " i s not i n h e r e n t l y 
cosmic i n scope" but i s "an absolute p e r f e c t i o n towards 
which the series p o i n t s " (e.g. " i n f i n i t e l o v e " ) . A 
u n i v e r s a l i s i n g q u a l i f i e r , however, modifies the model so 
as to speak of a s i t u a t i o n which i s cosmic i n scope but 
might be of q u i t e a "low grade" q u a l i t y : as i n " a l l l o v i n g " , 
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"univ e r s a l r e l i a b i l i t y " etc. 
4. The Functions of Religious Discourse 
(A) The Evocative Function 
I t i s clear t h a t Ramsey analyses r e l i g i o u s language 
i n the manner o u t l i n e d above i n order to i n d i c a t e t h a t a 
major f u n c t i o n of such language i s the evocation of a 
disclosure. Tnus the a t t r i b u t e s of negative theology are 
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" p r i m a r i l y evocative of the odd discernment" (RL 50)* and 
Ramsey speaks f r e q u e n t l y of "tales",'"narratives" or " s t o r i e s " 
evoking disclosures (e.g. RB 191, U-FIvlG Bl / 7 6 , PI 85, CPL 249), 
the qualified-model being j u s t a p a r t i c u l a r example of t h i s 
general f e a t u r e of language, Ramsey must have been speaking 
of the evocative power of q u a l i f i e r s when he argued i n a 
t e l e v i s i o n discussion: 
Theological words are l i k e poetic words: they are 
t o o l s f o r the most d e l i c a t e of operations, 
not t r a n s m i t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n but evoking a cosmic 
disclosure where God i s discerned i n wonder and 
sil e n c e , (U-BBCV/, 1965) 
Ramsey describes t h i s f u n c t i o n of r e l i g i o u s language 
as a "performative" f u n c t i o n , and regards t h e o l o g i c a l 
statements more as performatives (having "performative f o r c e " ) 
than as statements ( c f . ITR Owen 126, TEPC 220, Enc. B r i t , 601). 
This c l e a r l y r e l a t e s t o J.L. Austin's account of performatives, 
to which Ramsey o f t e n makes passing reference ( c f . BPI 34, 
TL 31) o Austin's view was that we can do something by 
speaking, i . e . perform a "speech-act" of promising, ordering 
etc. This was i n i t i a l l y developed i n terms of a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between "consta t i v e s " (utterances which s t a t e something -
and t h e r e f o r e are e i t h e r t r u e of f a l s e ) and "performatives" 
(utterances which do something other than s t a t i n g - and 
therefore cannot be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e , only "nappy" or 
"unhappy" e t c . ) : c f , J.L, Au s t i n (PP) 98 - 103, 233 - 241. 
However t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n seemed to break down ( c f . i b i d . 
k!46 - 252) and Austin began to see a l l speech as a speech-
act. He then d i s t i n g u i s h e d three elements w i t h i n a speech-
act ( c f . Austin (HDTW) V I I I and passim):-
( i ) The l o c u t i o n a r y act ( l o c u t i o n ) : i . e . what one a c t u a l l y 
says, the act of u t t e r i n g a meaningful sentence; 
( i i ) The i l l o c u t i o n a r y act ( i l l o c u t i o n ) ; i . e . what one does 
i n saying i t , the kind of speech-act i t i s ( s t a t i n g , 
promising etc.)> aoX 
j 
( i i i ) The pe r l o c u t i o n a r y act ( p e r l o c u t i o n ) : i . e . what one 
does by_ saying i t , the actual e f f e c t of the speech-act 
( f r i g h t e n i n g , persuading e t c . ) ^ 
Perlocutions are n a t u r a l , they depend on causal processes; 
i l l o c u t i o n s , on the other hand r e l y on conventions ( c f . " I 
hereby warn you"). 
Ramsey tends to t h i n k i n the older performative/ 
consta t i v e terms and speaks of some assertions having 
performative force (CPCF 52, WG 11; c f . T i l l e y (Thesis) 
52 - 53) • However Ramsey i s aware of the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the "e a r l y " and the " l a t e r " A u s t i n on t h i s p o i n t , 
and seems to agree w i t h h i s l a t e r p o s i t i o n ( c f . TECF 220, 
PA 1 8 J , 190)o The e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e to note, however, i s 
that Ramsey recognised t h a t t h e o l o g i c a l assertions may 
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have "performative" or " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " f o r c e , 
I believe t h a t Ramsey has touched on something 
very important i n h i s account of the evocative f u n c t i o n 
of r e l i g i o u s language. However I also believe t h a t he has 
developed h i s account i n a most misleading way. I would 
agree that r e l i g i o u s language can f u n c t i o n i n an evocative 
way - evoking not j u s t anotions ( c f . BPII 192), which no one 
would wish to deny, but also c o g n i t i v e i n s i g h t . Language 
i s used as a "technique f o r meditation" i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
mystical contemplation ( c f . Evans (IRTG) 221), and there 
i s no reason to deny that r e l i g i o u s language - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
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hymns, prayers and r e l i g i o u s poetry - can serve t h i s 
"engineering" iunction^as Smart, r a t h e r disparagingly, 
c a l l s i t ; cf\ Smart (EBC) 33, (PR) 224). Prayers, hymns, 
poetry, even some forms of r e l i g i o u s prose, can a l l "put us 
i n t o the p o s i t i o n " to receive God's r e v e l a t i o n of himself. 
This may happen, as I nave suggested above, p a r t l y because 
such language can increase our "desire f o r God". 
But having admitted t h a t , I must confess t o f i n d i n g 
l i t t l e of value i n Ramsey's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the way i n which 
the qualified-model acts as a piece of evocative language. 
His contention that s p o t t i n g the word " i n f i n i t e l y " i n f r o n t 
of the word "good" makes us meditate on a range of people 
of increasing degrees of goodness u n t i l a disclosure occurs, 
seems very s t r a i n e d . The q u a l i f i e r changes the meaning of 
love; i t s presence may "dis c l o s e " t o us - we may grasp" i n 
a moment" - the concept of i n f i n i t e love, or at least 
something about the concept. But t h i s does not occur by the 
pecu l i a r sort of technique t h a t Ramsey suggests. I t may be 
that Ramsey wishes to claim no more than t h a t , regarded as a 
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psychological account , t h i 3 i s what "could happen, and, 
more i m p o r t a n t l y , ^what") must happen i f we want to show 
e i t h e r the d i s b e l i e v e r , or the puzzledbeliever, what i s the 
l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of r e l i g i o u s p h r a s e s " ^ (RL 74) . But even 
to claim t h i s i s to claim too much. For surely disclosures 
never happen around a qualified-model complex i n the way t h a t 
Ramsey o u t l i n e s . Ramsey can only f i n d convincing p a r a l l e l s 
to h i s account i n the f i e l d of mathematics^where of course 
we could already have l a i d out before us a set of numbers 
or c i r c l e s or whatever. This may indeed be a most e f f e c t i v e 
technique f o r evoking the mathematical i n s i g h t necessary f o r 
understanding " I n f i n i t e Sum" or . But i n these cases 
the imagination i s not required to construct the ser i e s , i t 
can he drawn on the blackboard and then l i t e r a l l y "surveyed" 
u n t i l the disc l o s u r e comes. To suggest, however, e i t h e r 
here or elsewhere, t h a t reading a qualified-model phrase 
makes us construct the series i n our minds and survey i t 
" w i t h the mind's eye" i s unplausible. The ser i e s - d i s c l o s u r e 
analysis i s a technique of a r t i f i c a l explanation; no one 
o r d i n a r i l y comes to understand such terms by q u a l i f y i n g a 
nxodel i n the way tha t Ramsey suggests. And i n any case> as 
I have already argued, the most th a t language can evoke 
i s a disclosure of meaning - not the disclosure of an 
actual e x i s t e n t e n t i t y . When we come to know the meaning 
of i n f i n i t e goodness, we may then come to know God, But 
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the two r e v e l a t i o n s are not one and the same c 
Ramsey i s concerned to keep together the evocative 
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and the representative f u n c t i o n s of r e l i g i o u s discourse; 
f o r he wishes to i n d i c a t e that God may be spoken of i n 
a c e r t a i n way, using c e r t a i n models ( a p p r o p r i a t e l y q u a l i f i e d ) , 
because God has been disclosed i n a s i t u a t i o n evoked by t h i s 
language. I have argued already, however, that the attempt 
to r e l a t e r e l i g i o u s language too cl o s e l y t o the empirical 
medium of mediated r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n may be a mistake. I 
would now argue f u r t h e r that the f a c t t h a t we can have an 
i n t u i t i o n with the help of a c e r t a i n piece of language (a 
l i n g u i s t i c "medium") need not necessarily t e l l us anything 
about the language we ought t o use to represent what i s thus 
disclosed. C e r t a i n l y Ramsey's theory does not present us with 
a very sound argument i n the other d i r e c t i o n . For i f the 
evocative r e l i g i o u s language which serves as our "technique 
f o r m e ditation" can always be used i n our attempts to describe 
the God so disclosed, then the mystic who repeats h i s own name, 
or some nonsense phrase, over and over again i s being given 
permission to describe h i s God i n very p e c u l i a r terms! Not 
a l l evocative language can serve as a representation of what 
i t evokes. I f we discount Ramsey's analysis of the f u n c t i o n 
of the medium of a d i s c l o s u r e , he i s then i n need of a reason 
f o r h i s claim t h a t a piece of language can be both evocative 
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of, and r e p r e s e ntative ofjGod , Perhaps we might f i n d such 
a reason i n my own suggestion t h a t "having the concept of 
God" ( i . e . the c o r r e c t representative language) can a i d 
the evocation of an i n t u i t i o n of God. But on t h i s analysis 
the r epresentative status of r e l i g i o u s language determines 
i t s evocative r o l e , and not vice-versa. I t i s not t h a t 
because 
you believe that r e l i g i o u s phrase A describes God/ A gives 
a disclosure of God. I t i s r a t h e r t h a t your b e l i e f that 
r e l i g i o u s phrase A describes God puts you i n the appropriate 
frame of mind to receive the d i s c l o s u r e of God. However 
such a s i t u a t i o n may only obtain f o r c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s and 
i n the case of c e r t a i n pieces of r e l i g i o u s language. 
( B ) The Representative Function 
I f e e l considerably happier w i t h Ramsey's discussion 
of the representative f u n c t i o n of r e l i g i o u s language than w i t h 
his account of i t s r o l e i n evoking disclosures. However. I 
must f i r s t j u s t i f y the claim that such a discussion can be 
found i n Ramsey's work. For many of h i s c r i t i c s e i t h e r deny 
th a t he recognizes t h i s representative f u n c t i o n ^ o r contend 
that h i s account of i t i s t o t a l l y inadequate ( c f , Donovan 
34, Smart (ICBC) 33, Cohen (LRL) 154 - 155, ae Maulde 190 
n .72 , Helm (CE) 505). 
And yet i t should "be cle a r t o the mg>st unsympathetic 
of readers that Ramsey does argue f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e -
descriptive., as w e l l as f o r an evocative-performative, r f t l e 
f o r r e l i g i o u s language. Tnus he w r i t e s : 
I see t h e o l o g i c a l assertions having a d e s c r i p t i v e 
f o r c e , and i n so f a r as they are grounded i n a 
v i s i o n t o which i n one way or another they p o i n t , 
then, they have, i n being evocative, a performative 
f o r c e . (TECP 220; c f . Enc. B r i t . 601, CE 183^9, CPL 249) 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Ramsey i s w i l l i n g on occasions to 
speak i n t h i s way of the d e s c r i p t i v e f o r c e of r e l i g i o u s language. 
Elsewhere, as we have seen, he r e s t r i c t s the ad j e c t i v e " d e s c r i p t i v e " 
to p l a i n , l i t e r a l , language about dsservables, Ramsey may be 
saved from inconsistency here by arguing t h a t he sees i n the 
qualified-model a combination of: 
( i ) a (more or less purely) d e s c r i p t i v e element 
("force") which i s a f u n c t i o n of the model alone; 
and ( i i ) a (more or less purely) evocative element 
("force")-a f u n c t i o n of the q u a l i f i e r alone. 
Ramsey claims t h a t he does not wish "to separate the d e s c r i p t i v e 
and evocative f u n c t i o n s " of r e l i g i o u s language (iTRww): 
I do not intend to disavow d e s c r i p t i o n a l t o g e t h e r t 
and on my view most t h e o l o g i c a l assertions -
unless they are alto g e t h e r formal - w i l l have 
some d e s c r i p t i v e force i n so f a r as they include 
or develop models.(lTR Owen 126) 
But t h i s does not seem altogether to be the explanation of 
Ramsey'a use of the term " d e s c r i p t i v e " . I t would seem tha t 
he i s w i l l i n g to r e t a i n the term and apply i t to the whole 
qualified-model complex, recognizing, of course, t h a t i t i s 
now used i n a way tha t i s only analogous t o i t s use of l i t e r a l , 
e mpirical language. 
I s h a l l speak here of the "rep r e s e n t a t i v e " f u n c t i o n 
of r e l i g i o u s language, meaning by the term i t s f u n c t i o n of 
( f i g u r a t i v e l y ) r e p r e s e n t i n g , p o r t r a y i n g , s y m b o l i z i n g , o r 
" s t a n d i n g f o r " God's n a t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s . Ramsey h i m s e l f 
w r i t e s of language " r e p r e s e n t i n g " what i s d i s c l o s e d (CPL 339 9 
F I 122, MM 12, 15, ITR Owen 126; c f . McClendon &Smith (iRM) 421) 
and I adopt t h e term t o i n d i c a t e t h a t God i s not " d e s c r i b e d " 
i n such language i n some l i t e r a l , m a t t e r - o f - f a c t , p i c t u r i n g 
manner, hut " r e p r e s e n t e d " by t h e language o f qualified-models^®, 
us 
Ramsey p r o v i d e s / w i t h y e t an o t h e r m athematical analogy 
f o r our d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s t o p i c : 
w h i l e no poly g o n no m a t t e r how many i t s number o f 
side s would e x a c t l y " d e s c r i b e " a c i r c l e , never-
t h e l e s s i n a s o r t o f way and as f a r as i t went, 
what i t r e p r e s e n t e d would be a not e n t i r e l y 
m i s l e a d i n g account o f what a c i r c l e " r e a l l y i s " . 
(ITR Owen 126) 
I n c a r e f u l l y guarded terms such as these Ramsey i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
a p o l y g o n w i t h 1,008 s i d e s , a l t h o u g h n ot e x a c t l y a c i r c l e , 
i s as good a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a c i r c l e as one can expect 
i n t h e "language" of polygons ( c f . TG 91? ?-L 70 ) . S i m i l a r l y , 
one i s tempted t o add, an " e x t r e m e l y good" being i s a reaso n a b l e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an " i n f i n i t e l y good" God ( a t any r a t e i n so 
f a r as i t s goodness i s concerned). The term "good" w i l l 
have a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t meaning i n t h e l a t t e r i n s t a n c e , but 
i t w i l l a t l e a s t be analogous t o th e goodness o f an ex t r e m e l y 
good man, " I n f i n i t e l y good" i s " a p p r o p r i a t e c u r r e n c y " ( c f . 
RL 92, OBSR 64 - 65) - a p p r o p r i a t e enough t o enable us t o be 
a r t i c u l a t e about t h e r e a l i t y t h a t i s d i s c l o s e d i n a r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c l o s u r e . T h e o l o g i c a l models and q u a l i f i e r s t h e r e f o r e do 
not serve o n l y t o evoke a d i s c l o s u r e o f God, th e y a l s o f u n c t i o n 
as t h e o l o g i c a l " a p p r o x i m a t i o n s " i n our at t e m p t s t o r e p r e s e n t 
t h a t God i n human language ( c f , MM 25, CD 70 - 7 1 , CPCF 5 7 ) . 
" I n f i n i t e goodness" i s not o f the same l o g i c a l o r d e r as " g r e a t 
goodness" o r even "very g r e a t goodness" (RL 70) . But human 
goodness language may s t i l l serve us as a reasonable 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t goodness o f God. 
Or so, inde e d , one would t h i n k . But Ramsey, when 
l e f t t o h i s own d e v i c e s , o f t e n appears t o s l i p o f f t h e narrow 
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v i a media t i g h t r o p e i n t o t h e abyss of e q u i v o c i t y , 
T h i s i s - m o s t c l e a r l y seen i n h i s t r e a t m e n t of t h e change 
wrought i n t h e models used o f God's moral a t t r i b u t e s by 
c e r t a i n t h e o l o g i c a l q u a l i f i e r s ; 
" I n f i n i t e l y good" does not work a t a l l l i k e 
" i n t e n s e l y good", l e t alone " h a r d l y good".(RL7O) 
the q u a l i f i e r s i n f i n i t e , e x n i h i l o , beyond 
e s t a b l i s h t h e l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e . G r a m m a t i c a l l y , 
they may resemble e x c e e d i n g l y , from s c r a t c h and 
behind; but l o g i c a - l l y t h e y are q u i t e d i s s i m i l a r . . . 
. . t h e r e i s no easy, s t r a i g h t p r e d i c a t i o n o f 
e i t h e r good or e v i l o f God„(U-PE 25) 
"God i s i n f i n i t e l y good" does not e n t a i l "God i s 
good", though "Tom i s e x c e e d i n g l y good" aoes 
e n t a i l "Tom i s good". (U-HA: "The Problem of E v i l 
T65", 1965, p. 2;- cf. U-PE 25) 
Ramsey e x p l i c i t l y compares t h i s w i t h t h e mathematical example 
of an i n f i n i t e sequence: 
1 2 1 4 i 6 2 ... ... 
2' 3 ' 4 ' 5' 6' 7 ' 8 1000 
Here "we may be s a i d a t any stage t o be 'as f a r o f f u n i t y 
'as ever' " (0B3R 1 7 n.l). "Such a sequence suggests t h e 
i n t e g e r 1, and ' p o i n t s t o ' such an i n t e g e r . But an i n t e g e r 
i s no f r a c t i o n . . . " (U-PE 18). True enough-, i t has a v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t m a t h e m a t i c a l " l o g i c " . But s u r e l y " i n a s o r t o f 
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way and as f a r as i t went"^-~~~ would be "a not e n t i r e l y 
miS.leading" r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i n t e g e r 1? I f we are t o 
use the analogy o f a s e r i e s a t a l l , God may be a member of 
no s e r i e s of i n c r e a s i n g l y good, p o w e r f u l or vase men. But 
th e s e r i e s p o i n t s towards t h e n a t u r e of t h e God who i s 
o u t s i d e t h e s e r i e s ; h i s " p o s i t i o n " dears some r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
d i r e c t i o n i n which the s e r i e s i s developed. Thus, ( a ) i s 
an a p p r o p r i a t e diagram, but (b) and ( c ) are n o t : -
( a ) | s e r i e s o f i n c r e a s i n g X ness ' > \ J 




s e r i e s o f i n c r e a s i n g X ness 
c t s " i n f i n i t e l y 
X" 
( o ) s e r i e s o f i n c r e a s i n g X ness 
Q G o d as " i n f i n i t e l y X" 
Ramsey, however, would seemingly r e j e c t a l l t h r e e ; p r e f e r r i n g 
i n s t e a d a model which r e p r e s e n t e d t h e X ness s e r i e s by a l i n e 
or s u r f a c e , w i t h God p l a c e d on a n o t h e r dimension a l t o g e t h e r . 
I would argue t h a t j u s t a s " ^ - ^ ^ " i s a good approximation' t o 
1, and "3.. 14159" i s & good a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o l \ , and "a poly g o n 
w i t h 1,008 s i d e s " i s a good a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o a c i r c l e , so 
a l s o "an e x c e e d i n g l y good man" g i v e s us a good t h e o l o g i c a l 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o ( o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f ) t h e moral n a t u r e of God^. 
The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e one t h a t Ramsey seems t o 
espouse i n t h e q u o t a t i o n s g i v e n above, i s t h a t some q u a l i f i e r s 
rob t h e o r i g i n a l model of a l l meaning ( c f . H a r r i s (MQ) 91)• 
I n t h a t ; case " i n f i n i t e l y good" i s not analogous t o "good", 
but i s used q u i t e e q u i v o c a l l y o f C-od and of men. T h i s would 
be one, r a t h e r r a d i c a l , way of i n t e r p r e t i n g Ramsey's a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t " ' p e r f e c t ' , ' i n f i n i t e l y ' , ' a l l ' a r e q u a l i f i e r s d i r e c t i n g 
us t o c o n t i n u e such a s e r i e s a l o n g t h e r i g h t l i n e s : t o t h i n k 
away any i m p e r f e c t , f i n i t e , l i m i t e d f e a t u r e s of any and a l l 
terms i n t h e s e r i e s " (PR 208). For i f one co n s t r u e s t h e 
meaning o f "good" as i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up w i t h t h e l i m i t a t i o n s 
of t e m p t a t i o n , weakness of w i l l , t h e s t r u g g l e w i t h e v i l s 
t h a t we cannot overcome e t c . , t h e n o n l y t h e f i n i t e and 
i m p e r f e c t can be d e s c r i b e d as "good". Such a move i n t h e o d i c y 
enables i t s proposer t o deny t h e p r e d i c a t i o n of "goodness" 
of God e i t h e r as a s t e p towards atheism or (as v / i t h Ramsey) 
as an a t t e m p t t o safeguard r e l i g i o n a g a i n s t the q u e s t i o n s 
posed i n t h e problem of e v i l . The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n , "How can 
a good God he m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n p e r m i t t i n g e v i l ? " i s i n 
Ramsey's eyes a c o n f u s i o n : 
A c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey t h i s q u e s t i o n confuses a 
l o g i c a l o d d i t y , namely goodness i n God, w i t h 
a l o g i c a l commonplace, namely goodness i n man. 
He e v i d e n t l y t h i n k s i t no c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o say 
t h a t God i s i n f i n i t e l y good and p e r m i t s e v i l 
t o o c c u r , though i t would he s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
t o say t h a t God i s v e r y good and p e r m i t s t h e 
occu r r e n c e o f e v i l s , ( H u d s o n (PAR) 163) 
But t h i s move hy Ramsey i n t o the realms o f e q u i v o c i t y i s 
th e death o f t h e o l o g y . A l l d i s c u s s i o n and a l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
- i n d e e d a l l b e l i e f - must cease when we no l o n g e r have any 
i d e a a t a l l o f t h e meaning o f t h e terms we are p r e d i c a t i n g 
o f God. 
I b e l i e v e , however, t h a t t h i s aspect of Ramsey's 
thought i s something o f an a b e r r a t i o n . Thenain t h r u s t o f h i s 
p o s i t i o n a l l o w s f o r a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e - d e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n 
f o r q u a l i f i e d models, and t h i s f u n c t i o n i s v e r y c l o s e t o 
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l account of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n , Ramsey 
s t r a y s away from an a n a l o g i c a l account o f r e l i g i o u s language 
l a r g e l y because o f h i s s t r o n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n not t o m i s t a k e 
language about God f o r language about Tom, D i c k and (even) 
S t . F r a n c i s . H e expresses t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n on occasions 
i n r a t h e r i l l c o n s i d e r e d and extreme language which l e a d s 
him o f f i n t o t h e realms of a g n o s t i c i s m ( c f . Schnetzer 271) . 
But we s h o u l d not judge Ramsey too h a r s h l y , by ' t r e a t i n g t h e se 
exaggerated accounts o f t h e d i s t i n c t i v e meaning o f r e l i g i o u s 
language i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m t h e o t h e r p a r t s of h i s d i s c u s s i o n . 
The need f o r Ramsey t o u n d e r s t a n d h i s q u a l i f i e d -
models i n terms of t h e d o c t r i n e of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n 
?o3 
has been n o t e d by Cohen (Cohen (LRL) 154 - 155). Others 
have seen, however, t h a t Ramsey's work a l r e a d y goes some 
way towards m e e t i n g t h i s need and p r o v i d e s us w i t h an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t e r m i n o l o g y t o t h a t o f Thom.l-s™ f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g 
r e l i g i o u s a n a l o g i e s ( c f . Owen (CKG) 254 - 255, G i l l ( i R ) 5"1 , 
He I n t y r e (SC) 6$, Swinburne (CD)^5 - 26, Evans (IRTG) 221). 
I s h a l l c o n s i d e r i n more d e t a i l l a t e r t h e ways i n which 
Ramsey's approach d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t of Thomu.s.'n: ci " . Emirsus I I 
celow. 
(C) The Formal F u n c t i o n 
Ramsey d i s t i n g u i s h e s between : " f i r s t stage 
d i s c o u r s e " and "wider i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " i n the language we 
use about d i s c l o s u r e s (FRFI 355); r e l i g i o u s language i s not 
t h e r e f o r e a l l a t one l e v e l . The language of p r a y e r s , hymns 
and c o n f e s s i o n s a l r e a d y c o n t a i n s a l a r g e number of q u e l i f i e d -
inodels ( c f , UP 14 - 15, CD 73, TTST 84, RL 154). Tne 
problem o f C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e , Ramsey c l a i m s , i s "one o f 
s y s t e m a t i z i n g . . . . t h e uriotous m i x t u r e o f phrases which had 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e Kerygma" (as w e l l , we might add, as t h e 
Church's didache and w o r s h i p ) : RL 156, T h i s i s a second-order 
a c t i v i t y , i n v o l v i n g our r e f l e c t i n g on what has been c a l l e d -the. 
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"Primary r e l i g i o u s language" t h a t a r i s e s out of and evokes 
the cosmic d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n . The i n t e r p l a y o f models 
and q u a l i f i e r s i s here t r a n s c e n d e d as we move t o t h e more 
r a r i f i e d l e v e l s o f t h e o l o g i c a l language - i . e . t o d o c t r i n e s 
and creeds. 
As Evans has observed, "A g r e a t deal of t h e o l o g y 
i s f o r Ramsej' formal-mode d i s c o u r s e : i t i s not t a l k about 
God, but t a l k about t a l k about God" (Evans (IRTG) 222), 
Ramsey takes over R u d o l f Camruap's d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e 
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m a t e r i a l and f o r m a l modes of speech ('£ 2 ) . A s s e r t i o n s i n t h e 
m a t e r i a l mode, e.g. "two i s a number'^ are e a s i l y confused 
w i t h s i m i l a r grammatical forms, e, g. ''St. P a u l 1 s i s a 
c a t h e d r a l " . Tne r e s u l t o f such c o n f u s i o n can be t h a t numbers 
are t h o u g h t of as types of t h i n g s . To c l a r i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n 
t h e o r i g i n a l sentence may be r e c a s t i n t h e f o r m a l mode t o 
read "two 1 i s a number word". S i m i l a r l y "The grass i s green" 
i s a r e a l o b j e c t - s e n t e n c e i n t h e m a t e r i a l mode of speech. 
Whereas t h e sentences "Tne word 'grass' i s a t h i n g word", 
and "Tne word 'green' i s a c o l o u r word" are b o t h s y n t a c t i c a l 
sentences i n t h e f o r m a l mode of speech. Thus sentences about 
words are s a i d t o be i n t h e f o r m a l mode and sentences 
about e n t i t i e s , events e t c . a r e i n t h e m a t e r i a l mode. 
Ramsey w r i t e s o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
t o r e l i g i o u s language: 
Too o f t e n have men t a l k e d as i f the way t o s o l v e 
t h e o l o g i c a l problems was by g r e a t f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h 
God, when what vies needed was a p a t i e n t and tlorough 
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e language b e i n g used about him. 
(H214) 
Before j u d g i n g whether some q u e s t i o n s are 
answerable or not we might be w e l l a d v i s e d f i r s t 
t o t r a n s l a t e them i n t o t h e f o r m a l mode when they 
would r e v e a l t h e i r t r u e c h a r a c t e r , and some 
might become no more, though no l e s s , t h a n 
l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s o f c o n s i s t e n c y and coherence, 
( i b i d , ^15) . 
L e t us r e a l i s e t h a t we s h a l l never be i n a p o s i t i o n 
t o t a l k about God's i n t e n t i o n s , and t h a t i n any 
case i t i s not what God can o r cannot do, but 
r a t h e r what we can o r cannot say about him. ( i b i d . ) 
Tnese a s s e r t i o n s appear a t f i r s t s i g h t t o be r a t h e r sv/eeping, 
and Ramsey h i m s e l f does not f o l l o w h i s own a d v i c e c o n s i s t e n t l y . 
But he has made an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t : t h a t much r e l i g i o u s 
language p r o v i d e s us w i t h " r u l e s f o r c o n s i s t e n t t a l k i n g " 
about God, r a t h e r t h a n s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d d e s c r i p t i o n s of him 
(RL 6 4 ) . T h i s may be p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l , f o r example, i n 
a n a l y s i n g God's n e g a t i v e a t t r i b u t e s l i k e i m m u t a b i l i t y and 
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i m p a s s i b i l i t y ( c f . RL 50 - 53)- A c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey these 
complexes o f models w i t h n e g a t i n g q u a l i f i e r s do not d i r e c t l y 
a p p l y t o God a t a l l . They have an e v o c a t i v e f u n c t i o n but no 
( p o s i t i v e ) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n - i n s t e a d t h e y p r o v i d e 
us w i t h r u l e s f o r our c o n s i s t e n t God-talk, For example, 
" t h e y t e l l us t h a t i f a n y t h i n g i s 'mutable' i t w i l l n o t be 
exact c u r r e n c y f o r God.," (RL 53) . 
H.P. Owen has q u e s t i o n e d Ramsey's r e j e c t i o n of 
t h e use of the m a t e r i a l mode i n t h e o l o g y . As u s u a l Ramsey's 
r e p l i e s t o d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m are i l l u m i n a t i n g : 
Owen: Eave our p e r s o n a l models a c t u a l l y a c o u n t e r p a r t 
i n God's n a t u r e ? . . . . Dr. Ramsey says t h a t he 
would p r e f e r not t o speak i n t h e m a t e r i a l 
mode of God's " p e r s o n a l i t y " , Yet s u r e l y 
C h r i s t i a n s i n t e n d t h e i r p e r s o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s 
of God t o have an o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e . . . . ? 
(Owen (PTR) 735 of , PG 70) 
Ramsey: Personal d e s c r i p t i o n s o f God have an o b j e c t i v e 
r e f e r e n c e ; , , . b u t God i s not merely a person 
nor y e t one of o u r s e l v e s . We must speak of 
him as i n f i n i t e l y p e r s o n a l o r , as i t i s more 
c u s t o m a r i l y phrased, a " p e r f e c t person". 
But t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t we can speak o f 
t h a t a c t i v i t y which c o n f r o n t s us i n a cosmic 
d i s c l o s u r e , i . e . God's a c t i v i t y , i n terms o f 
words l i k e p e r s o n a l i t y and l o v e , and these 
as f a r as they go. w i l l be r e l i a b l e , (ITR Owen 126) 
We may now embrace t h e p r e l i m i n a r y c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Ramsey's 
p o s i t i o n i s s i m p l y t h a t : 
( i ) R e l i g i o u s language does not d e s c r i b e God i n a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
( l i t e r a l , p i c t o r i a l ) manner, I t s " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " f u n c t i o n , 
however, i s safeguarded because i t i n c l u d e s metaphors and 
models which, when s u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d , r e p r e s e n t God as 
adequa t e l y as any words can. M a t e r i a l mode t a l k about God 
w i l l be m i s l e a d i n g , however, i f we f o r g e t i t s m e t a p h o r i c a l 
f u n c t i o n and assume t h a t i t i s used as a l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n . 
We must always remember t h e " l o g i c a l oddness" o f r e l i g i o u s 
language: and t h i s may be made more c l e a r by t r a n s l a t i o n 
i n t o t h e f o r m a l mode. 
( i i ) Some r e l i g i o u s language, however, has as i t s main f u n c t i o n 
the formulation of r u l e s f o r the r e l i g i o u s language user, 
" l o g i c a l r u l e s " f o r our c o n s i s t e n t t h e o l o g i c a l talking,- and 
such d o c t r i n e s do not use r e p r e s e n t a t i v e models at a l l (cf„ 
MM 46 4- 47) . 
I t may he h e l p f u l at t h i s point to note some 
p a r t i c u l a r examples of Ramsey's a n a l y s i s of r e l i g i o u s 
language as formal language r u l e s : 
( a ) Christology: Ramsey comments i n h i s paper " L o g i c a l 
Empiricism and P a t r i s t i c s " , that "doctrines are not 
r i g h t l y understood as d e s c r i p t i o n s of God; they provide 
r u l e s f o r , guides to, the best ways of t h e o l o g i c a l t a l k i n g 
that we can devise" (LEP 542). He goes on to i l l u s t r a t e 
t h i s remark by reference to the doctrine of communicatio 
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Idiomatum which,Ramsey claims, does not describe the 
r e l a t i o n between the two natures of C h r i s t , but t e l l s 
us how "two l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t languages can...be united.. 
by language of a d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l order a l t o g e t h e r " (e.g. 
"Person" language ; i b i d . 545; c f . RL 168, WG $ - 9, PR 200 - 201 
(b) The T r i n i t y : I n a s i m i l a r way Ramsey views the d o c t r i n e 
of the T r i n i t y as a "means of s p e c i f y i n g i n terms of models 
f o r u n i t y the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s between those three strands 
of d i s c o u r s e {^'Father"-language, "Son"-language and " S p i r i t " 
language^ to ensure that together they do a l l that the word 
'God' aoes f o r the t h e i s t or Jew, and much more besides" (TL 38 ; 
c i . RL 174 - 179, T r i n i t y ) 4 5 . Other r e l a t e d , "highly 
s t y l i z e d " d o c t r i n e s , e.g. the concepts of hyparxiS. and 
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p e r i c h o r e s i s , serve s o l e l y "as mnemonics - slogan reminders -
to suggest v a r i o u s l o g i c a l r u l e s . . . t h e i r purpose i s to guide 
our paths i n C h r i s t i a n discourse which proceeds from a 
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multitude of models" (l.IDA 46; c f . a l s o RL 157 - 158). 
( c ) God's a t t r i b u t e s : Ramsey a l s o invokes h i s formal mode 
a n a l y s i s , as we have seen, with regard to God's personal 
(and impersonal) a t t r i b u t e s . He argues that such predications 
are best understood as claims that personal (and impersonal) 
language may be used about God (PG 70)» He makes a s i m i l a r 
a n a l y s i s of God's "negative a t t r i b u t e s " (RL 53) and of such 
a t t r i b u t e s as h i s "condescension" or " s e l f l i m i t a t i o n " 
(RL 84)0 F u r t h e r , "To t a l k of God i n terms 01 'unity' means... 
that the word 'God' u n i t e s a l l the d i v e r s i t y of language which 
i s used to t a l k about the world around us" (RL 59 ) ; " s i m p l i c i t y " 
and " p e r f e c t i o n " have a s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n . A c t i v i t i e s of God 
which are re l e v a n t to theodicy ('creation", "choice" e t c . ) 
are t r e a t e d i n comparable ways i n Ramsey's a r t i c l e on H e l l 
(pp. 213 - 214). 
(a) Duty and God's W i l l ; When theologians argue that God 
i s the source of a l l duty they are expressing i n the m a t e r i a l 
mode the formal t r u t h that "Duty" and "God's w i l l " are 
a l t e r n a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s , but that the l a t t e r i s c o n t e x t u a l l y 
more comprehensive than the former ( F I 5 5 ) . 
(e) Greeds: Ramsey extends h i s claims about p a r t i c u l a r 
d o c t r i n e s to the Creeds themselves: "the Creeds are the 
f i r s t and c l a s s i c essay i n consistency and give us r u l e s to 
guide a l l subsequent discourse..,they may be roughly 
compared to the r u l e s of the game..." (OBRS 87; c f . CPCF 5 7 ) , 
The Athanasian Creed, t h e r e f o r e , i s "fo r the most p a r t , . . . 
purely formal", " I t provides r u l e s . . . i t gives the symbol God'£J 
an appropriate l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e " (RL 179). Baptismal Creeds 
"were designed to incorporate.,.a number of t h e o l o g i c a l 
strands as i d e n t i f i e d the f i g u r e of Jesus"; C o n c i l i a r 
Creeds "met problems which arose from the uneasy conjunction 
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of various strands, and,„„provide us with l o g i c a l r u l e s f o r 
the b e t t e r ordering of C h r i s t i a n d i s c o u r s e " (U-Credo 5; of. 
OBSR 52 - 54) . But Ramsey a l s o acknowledges that words i n 
the Creeds (e.g. "uncreate") have, i n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r 
formal f u n c t i o n as r u l e s f o r our God-talk, the evocative 
f u n c t i o n of q u a l i f i e r s which develop a model u n t i l the 
d i s c l o s u r e occurs (e.g. RL 176). I would add that they a l s o 
have the more " m a t e r i a l " , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n of s t a n d i n g 
f o r what i s d i s c l o s e d ( c f . below). 
We may now concentrate our a t t e n t i o n on the examples 
of t h e o l o g i c a l language (e.g. the d o c t r i n e of p e r i c h o r e s i s ) 
that Ramsey claims have no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n 
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whatsoever. Ramsey de s c r i b e s them as "mnemonics" or 
"slogan-reminders" which "suggest Various l o g i c a l r u l e s " 
(MDA 4D)» He goes on i n s t r i d e n t tones: 
They are not, not models...They are of a 
d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l order a l t o g e t h e r , f o r t h e i r 
purpose i s to guide our paths i n C h r i s t i a n 
discourse which proceeds from a multitude of 
mo dels, (ibid.) 
Unlike model-based r e l i g i o u s language, these d o c t r i n e s or 
"highly s t y l i z e d l o g i c a l s t o r i e s " (MM 54) are j u s t i f ied"not ... 
p r i m a r i l y i n terms of the e m p i r i c a l f i t of the discourse 
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to which they l e a d , but r a t h e r i n terms of/coherence and 
consistency and comprehensiveness and s i m p l i c i t y of the t o t a l 
C h r i s t i a n scheme..." (MDA 47 ) . They are,in short, " r u l e s f o r 
our c o n s i s t e n t t a l k i n g " (RL 84; emphasis added). 
Ramsey c l e a r l y b e l i e v e s that even with regard to these 
examples, he i s s t i l l only d e s c r i b i n g the f u n c t i o n that these 
doctrines o r i g i n a l l y nad f o r t h e i r authors ( i . e . a D e s c r i p t i v e t 
A n a l y s i s i n J e f f n e r ' s terminology), although he would prdably 
be w i l l i n g to c l a i m that h i s a n a l y s i s does not f i t the way 
they thought that they were usi n g such language ( c f , J e f f n e r ' s 
D e s c r i p t i v e 2 a n a l y s i s ) . But s u r e l y Ramsey i s a c t u a l l y 
p resenting here a " c o n s t r u c t i v e " theory (again u s i n g J e f f n e r ' s 
terms) of how theologians should view (use) such language. 
For Ramsey b e l i e v e s that d o c t r i n a l language i s widely 
misunderstood today by being t r e a t e d as i n some way d e s c r i p t i v 
Some of us commit, he claims, "Tne grave e r r o r " of t a k i n g 
"these h i g h l y s t y l i z e d l o g i c a l s t o r i e s , as p i c t u r e s of C-od" 
(IVIDA 46 - 4 7 ) . 
V.'hat can we make of Ramsey's p o s i t i o n here? '.7e must 
f i r s t of a l l give Ramsey's "formal a n a l y s i s " of r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c o u r s e at l e a s t a q u a l i f i e d welcome, For i t does provide 
a 
us with a technique f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i n g / l a r g e number of 
d o c t r i n e s from the pens of p a t r i s t i c , mediaeval, Reformation 
and post-Reformation theologians; as w e l l , indeed,as c e r t a i n 
" doctrines"of B i b l i c a l theology. We can continue to gain 
some value from these d o c t r i n e s by i n t e r p r e t i n g them i n the 
formal mode, as " t a l k about t a l k about God". I n t e r p r e t e d 
l i t e r a l l y , on the other hand, many of them do r a t h e r sound 
l i k e crude attempts at " s u p e r - s c i e n t i f i c " d e s c r i p t i o n s of 
God's a c t i o n s or working p a r t s . Thi3 may be best i l l u s t r a t e d 
by what we might c a l l "mythological" r e l i g i o u s language, of 
which language about "The F a l l " a f f o r d s a good example. 
Many would c l a i m that such language r e p r e s e n t s n o 1 a c t u a l 
event i n the past - whether e m p i r i c a l or meta-empirical -
whatever. I n such a case we can only continue to use the 
language by r e i n t e r p r e t i n g i t , and one way of doing so would 
be " D y i n t e r p r e t i n g the claim i n terms of language" (RL 82), 
Ramsey argues that "the doctrine of the f a l l i s f i r s t and 
foremost consistency-language" ( i b i d , ) the use of which, 
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e s p e c i a l l y i f we are t h i n k i n g o f a "pre-mundane" f a l l , 
enables us t o overcome " i n c i p i e n t d u a l i s m " i n our t h e o l o g y 
(U-HA: "Tne Problem o f E v i l T 65",1965, p.2 ; o f . U-PE 27 -28) 
A s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s c o u l d presumably be a p p l i e d t o the d o c t r i n e 
o f the V i r g i n B i r t h , a l t h o u g h Ramsey does not i n v o k e i t i n 
t h i s case ( c f . RL 131 - 133)-
However two p o i n t s must now be made: 
( i ) I t i s too much t o c l a i m t h a t t h e t h e o l o g i a n s who 
o r i g i n a l l y propounded such d o c t r i n e s * fcf&ofct*^ them as 
r u l e s f o r d o i n g t h e o l o g y , and not ( i n some sense) as " d e s c r i p t i v e " 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f God's n a t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s , o r o f o t h e r 
"heavenly" ( o r even " e a r t h l y " ) t h i n g s and events, 
( l i ) Even r u l e s need some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , u n l e s s t h e y are 
adopted e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r i l y . S u r e l y t h e u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o f d o c t r i n a l r u l e s i s t h a t they guide us i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n 
o f a c o n s i s t e n t s y s t e m a t i c t h e o l o g y which does i n f a c t 
a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t t h e n a t u r e and a c t i v i t y of God. Ramsey 
presumably would accept t h i s p o i n t ; but i t can be t a k e n 
f u r t h e r . For Ramsey does not provid.e us w i t h any c o n v i n c i n g 
examples o f " r u l e s " which cannot be t r e a t e d - i f p r o p e r l y 
u n d e r s t o o d as q u a l i f i e d , a n a l o g i c a l language - as " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
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i n some sense o r a n o t h e r ' . T n u s , f o r example, we have a r u l e 
i n s t r u c t i n g us t o u n i t e t h e " l o g i c a l s t r a n d s " of F a t h e r -,, Son -
and S p i r i t = language when c o n s t r u c t i n g our d o c t r i n e o f God. 
But t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s r u l e i s t h a t a T r i n i t a r i a n 
d o c t r i n e o f God more a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t s h i s n a t u r e t h a n 
any o t h e r account which might be proposed. And as t h e " r u l e " 
comes t o us couched i n t h e m a t e r i a l mode as a set o f st a t e m e n t s 
about God^rather t h a n i n i m p e r a t i v e or formal-mode language, 
t o t r e a t ' i t as a ' r u l e " i s t o move the d o c t r i n e o f t h e T r i n i t y 
one p l a c e f u r t h e r back. I t i s t o c o n v e r t i t from a d o c t r i n e 
31? 
about God in t o a set of r u l e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g the 
doctrine of God. But our doctr i n e of God must i t s e l f he 
asse s s e d i n the m a t e r i a l mode i n terms of i t s adequacy as a 
re p r e s e n t a t i o n of God. So t h i s manoeuvre gains nothing 
i n the long run, except i n so f a r as i t reminds us once 
again of the f i g u r a t i v e nature of r e l i g i o u s language. 
Tnere are, of course, very great dangers i n ta k i n g 
a formal mode a n a l y s i s of r e l i g i o u s language too f a r . And 
Ramsey does seem on occasions to do j u s t that. He berates 
John Hick and others f o r speaking i n the m a t e r i a l mode of 
God, c l a i m i n g that " I t i s not what God can or cannot do, but 
rat h e r what we can or cannot say about him" (H 215) . But 
i f we convert as much theology i n t o the formal mode as 
Ramsey seems to wish we s h a l l end up with plenty of language 
about r e l i g i o u s language, but none that we are allowed to 
apply to God himself, Would t h i s not be the "verbal 
i d o l a t r y " which Ramsey himself claims to abhor? 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y enough i n a d i s c u s s i o n i n "Fa c t , 
uetaphysics & God" Ramsey s t r e s s e s the n e c e s s i t y of " t r a n s l a t i n g " 
language back i n t o the m a t e r i a l mode a f t e r a n a l y s i n g i t s use 
i n the formal mode. He contends there ths,t "even with the 
formal mode we have s t i l l some s o r t of e x i s t e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e 
to be el u c i d a t e d " (U-FIJG 1/30/32), and goes on: 
a f t e r t r a n s l a t i o n we have without doubt sentences 
about symbols, n e v e r t h e l e s s these s t i l l imply 
some sort of t a l k about " t h i n g s " a l b e i t at a 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l of abstraction . . . . I t i s not the 
case that there i s no refere n c e to f a c t once 
the t r a n s l a t i o n has been made, but that the 
sort of f a c t which i s then involved is^vcuriously 
e l u s i v e one which somehow or other i n v o l v e s the 
subject as w e l l . (U-FL1G 1/32/34) 
Tnese remarks r e l a t e to Ramsey's views about metaphysical 
language, but they a l s o i n d i c a t e that even a formal mode 
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a n a l y s i s of a p i e c e o f language does not r u l e o ut t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s h a v i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n . I t i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t much o f the m a t e r i a l i n U-FMG on t h i s 
t o p i c d e r i v e s from Ramsey's Cambridge m a n u s c r i p t on "Experience 
and P e r s o n a l i t y " . And i n t h a t paper he adds: 
We might v e r y p r o p e r l y t h i n k and t a l k about 
numbers w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g o f cows or sheep.., 
But t o t a l k about t h e word "God" i s i n some 
v e r y p r o p e r sense t o t a l k about God himself,, 
(U-EP 21) 
I t i s a g r e a t p i t y t h a t Ramsey does not seem t o have r e c o g n i z e d 
t h i s i n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s as c l e a r l y o r as e x p l i c i t l y as 
was necessary. 
5. Complementary Language, Paradoxes and R e l i g i o n 
I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e problem of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f 
b o t h p e r s o n a l and im p e r s o n a l language t o God, Ramsey w r i t e s : 
I t i s r a t h e r as i f a s c i e n t i s t o f an o l d e r day 
asked: "How can something - l i g h t - be b o t h a wave 
and a p a r t i c l e : ?" I n s t e a d of a s k i n g t h e much more 
t r a c t a b l e q u e s t i o n : "What i s t h e l o g i c o f d i s c o u r s e 
about l i g h t when wave mechanics models p a r t o f t h e 
d i s c o u r s e , and p a r t i c l e mechanics t h e r e s t ? " . What 
t h e o l o g i a n s have t o d o . . . i s something l i k e what 
Bohm has don e . . i n t h e w a v e - p a r t i c l e case by g i v i n g 
a harmonious m a t h e m a t i c a l t r e a t m e n t t o what seems 
t o be two d i s p a r a t e approaches, Wnat t h e o l o g i a n s 
must do i s t o g i v e such an account of t h e word "God" 
as makes i t p o s s i b l e t o model i t i n b o t h p e r s o n a l 
and i m p e r s o n a l terms, a t a s k which a t l e a s t i n 
p r i n c i p l e i s o n l y l i k e d i s c o v e r i n g ( s a y ) t h a t 
d i s c o u r s e b o t h about s t r a i g h t l i n e s and e l l i p s e s 
can be harmonised w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e about a cone, 
(Review liac'lagan 297 - 298) 
Ramsey t r e a t s t h e o l o g i c a l paradoxes i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n , as 
p r o p o s i t i o n s "about t h e use o f words" (PR 209): 
Tne b a s i c problem i n a s s e s s i n g and d e f e n d i n g 
r e l i g i o u s paradox i s how words can be b o t h 
u n i t e d w i t h y e t d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m v e r i f i a b l y 
d e s c r i p t i v e words - however many s o r t s o f 
" d e s c r i p t i o n " t h e r e be; what l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r 
can we g i v e t o words which are t o be u n i t e d 
w i t h v e r i f i a b l y d e s c r i p t i v e words, w i t h o u t 
themselves b e i n g v e r i f i a b l y d e s c r i p t i v e ? ( i b i d . ) 
How, f o r example, can the word God both be united with words 
l i k e " t a b l e " , 'human being" e t c , ( i . e . how can God be "immanent" 
and a l s o be " a word of unique l o g i c a l s t a t u s d i f f e r e n t i n 
i t s l o g i c a l behaviour from a l l other nouns" ( i . e . how can God 
- a l s o - be "tra n s c e n d e n t " ) . 
Ramsey c i t e s the p a r a l l e l of the wa v e - p a r t i c l e (or 
"wavicle") paradox more than once i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of 
t h e o l o g i c a l language (cf„ a l s o PG ? 0 ) , I t provided him with 
an a t t r a c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the realm of s c i e n c e f o r the 
use of two d i f f e r e n t , though complementary, languages about 
one e n t i t y or s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s a problem, as we have seen, 
not only with rega.rd to our use of personal and impersonal, 
or immanent and transcendent, language about God; but a l s o 
f o r our use of human language and d i v i n e language about 
Jesus ( c f . LEP 545, RL 168 - 169), and our use of "Duty" and 
"God's w i l l " as "two a l t e r n a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s " ( P I 55) of a 
moral claim. I n d i s c u s s i n g such t o p i c s theologiae, l i k e 
s c i e n t i s t s , "must be content to use at one and the same 
time, languages of d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e about s i m i l a r 
s i t u a t i o n s " (RSP 80). 
As W.H. A u s t i n has noted, Ramsey does not press 
any f u r t h e r the analogy between theology and s c i e n c e i n 
t h e i r complementary use of d i f f e r e n t models. Austin's own 
proposal i s that i n science and r e l i g i o n s 
models are c a l l e d complementary i f both must be 
used i n an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , but the use of each 
imposes l i m i t a t i o n s on the freedom and p r e c i s i o n 
with which the other can be developed. Thus a 
"complementarist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " of the paradox 
of love and j u s t i c e i n God would a s s e r t (1) that 
behind the paradox l i e the models M e r c i f u l F a t h e r 
and Stern Judge, ( z ) that theologians need both 
models i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of experience, 
but (3) that the need to preserve both r e s t r i c t s 
the way that each can be developed. (V/.H. A u s t i n 
(i.'J.'iP) 42; c f . i b i d . 54) 
However, i n d i s c u s s i n g r e l i g i o u s paradoxes Ramsey concentrates 
on the evocative f u n c t i o n and the formal f u n c t i o n of r e l i g i o u s 
language and l a r g e l y ignores i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a n a l o g i c a l 
use ( c f . Barbour (ivMP) 63; Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 177). Ramsey seems 
to b e l i e v e that r e l i g i o u s paradox ( i . e . "apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' 
only a r i s e s when people i n t e r p r e t the d i f f e r e n t models i n 
multi-model t h e o l o g i c a l discourse as p i c t u r i n g models which 
a l l serve as l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s of the same e n t i t y ( c f . 
PO passim). Q.uestion; How can God be both a "Father" and a 
"Rock"? C l e a r l y he cannot i f both words are applied 
l i t e r a l l y to God. Ramsey's answer to the question (Answer 1) 
i s that God i s both "Father" and "Rock" i n the sense that 
the d i s c l o s u r e of God may be evoked by father-language and 
by Rock-language. Such a t h e o l o g i c a l paradox d i s s o l v e s , 
Ramsey claims, when both kinds of language are "narmonised 
by being tracked back to the same kind of s i t u a t i o n " (PR 208; 
c f . RFT 35), wh en we read theology 1 backwards, back i n t o the 
d i s c l o s u r e of God" (H 221; c f a l s o F I 148, OBSR 16, PR 208, 
CD 55)» The paradox of God's omnipotence and our f r e e - w i l l 
i s therefore r e s o l v e d i n so f a r as we come to know the 
omnipotent God i n a d i s c l o s u r e (reached by the q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
of "powerfulness" by " a l l " ) which i s at the same time a s e l f = 
d i s c l o s u r e i n which v/e r e a l i s e our freedom ( c f . F I 59 - 6o)„ 
S i m i l a r l y , God can be both " l o v i n g " and"impassible" l o r 
" 'God i s i m p a s s i b l e 1 , i s to be understood by i t s a b i l i t y to 
evoke i n terms of ' p a s s i b i l i t y 1 s t o r i e s . . . t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
t h e o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n " and "God i s l o v i n g " (or r a t h e r , "God 
i s i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g " ) nas a s i m i l a r evocative f u n c t i o n . 
Tnus "Each a s s e r t i o n evokes the s u i t a b l y odd s i t u a t i o n " and 
"each c l a i m s an odd p o s i t i o n i n g f o r the word 'God' " (RL b9; 
c f . PR 207 = 209). 
The f o r m a l f u n c t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s language a l s o 
may he invoked t o s o l v e a r e l i g i o u s paradox. Tnus t h e 
C n r i s t o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e t h a t C n r i s t ' s person u n i t e d h i s 
human and d i v i n e n a t u r e s , which were n e v e r t h e l e s s separate 
and d i s t i n c t , i s e x t r e m e l y p a r a d o x i c a l . I t may be r e s o l v e d , 
Ramsey c l a i m s , by b e i n g t r e a t e d i n t h e f o r m a l mode: " w h i l e 
words about 1numan n a t u r e ' and 'God' are l o g i c a l l y d i v e r s e , 
y e t they have t o be mixed t o t a l k about Jesus C n r i s t " ( P R 200), 
But t h i s i s a r e l a t i v e l y minor f e a t u r e i n Ramsey's a n a l y s i s 
o f r e l i g i o u s paradox,and he h i n t s h i m s e l f ( c f . PR 201, 209, 
216) t h a t the p a r a d o x i c a l language i n v o l v e d must be t r a c e d 
back t o a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n f o r a c o m p l e t e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r e s o l u t i o n . For Ramsey t h i s means t h a t an a n a l y s i s i n terms 
o f t h e e v o c a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s language must be 
i n v o k e d a t some stage o r o t h e r . 
But Answer 1, of course, i s o n l y h a l f t h e s t o r y . 
We must a l s o o f f e r Answer 2; t h a t b o t h "Father" and "Rock" 
may be used t o r e p r e s e n t God i f t h e y a r e used a n a l o g i c a l l y , 
and i f t h e a n a l o g i c a l development o f each model i s such 
t h a t i t becomes c o m p a t i h l e w i t h t h e analogy d e r i v e d f r o m 
t h e o t h e r . Thus God i s " f a t h e r - l i k e " i n t h e sense t h a t he 
l o v e s , cares and p r o v i d e s ; he i s also" r o c k - l i k e " i n t h e sense 
t h a t he i s dependable, permanent and a source o f "shade" and 
' r e s t " . God i s not i n every r e s p e c t l i k e a human f a t h e r , even 
l e s s i s he i n every r e s p e c t l i k e a r o c k . T h i s answer i s 
e n t i r e l y i n l i n e w i t h Ramsey's v i e w o f the K p r e s e n t a t i v e 
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f u n c t i o n of models ; he n e g l e c t s t o p r o v i d e i t h i m s e l f 
o n l y because he has become "bemused by t h e e v o c a t i v e f u n c t i o n 
o f r e l i g i o u s models (cf.WW A u s t i n (MMP) 43, Smart (PR) 222 - 226; 
a l s o CD 35 - 44). 
I n h i s paper "Paradox i n R e l i g i o n " , Ramsey c l a s s i f i e s 
paradoxes i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: 
( a ) a v o i d a b l e paradox "which s p o t l i g h t s some c o n f u s i o n or 
o t h e r " (PR 196). T h i s i s ( o b v i o u s l y ! ) a v o i d a b l e , and can be 
removed from our d i s c o u r s e . There are two t y p e s : -
( i ) r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y n e g a t i v e paradoxes are c l e a r e d 
up by r e t r a c i n g our argument. They u s u a l l y i n v o l v e c a t e g o r y 
m i s t a k e s ; f a i l u r e s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t 
types o f d i s c o u r s e ( e . g . c o n f u s i n g t h e meanings o f " p r e - e x i s t e n c 
i n Wisdom-language, Messiah-language, and Logos-language: 
PR 198 - 199). Here we have " u t t e r l y u n r e v e a l i n g paradox 
g e n e r a t i n g bogus q u e s t i o n s " ; t h e s o r t of paradox, Ramsey 
no t e s , which u n f o r t u n a t e l y " c h a r a c t e r i s e s not a l i t t l e 
d o c t r i n a l s p e c u l a t i o n " ( i b i d . 199)» 
( i i ) s u bsequently s i g n i f i c a n t paradoxes are o n l y 
avoided when we are l e d t h r o u g h t h e t?/o a s s e r t i o n s which g i v e 
r i s e t o t h e paradox t o a new a s s e r t i o n , a s o r t of H e g e l i a n 
s y n t h e s i s . The w a v e - p a r t i c l e paradox o f f e r s a s e c u l a r 
example, f o r t h e t h e o r i e s o f Bohm and o t h e r s seek t o overcome 
the paradox i n a more comprehensive hypotheses. I n 
t h e o l o g y t h e r e i s t h e paradox o f t h e divine-human n a t u r e o f 
C h r i s t \yhich t h e o l o g i a n s seek t o r e s o l v e i n terms of 
" h y p o s t a t i c u n i t y " , "Person" e t c . (200) 0 
( b ) U navoidable paradox, however, i s permanent and i r r e d u c i b l e . 
I t a r i s e s i n our a t t e m p t s " t o d e s c r i b e what i s b o t h 'seen and 
unseen' i n language p r i m a r i l y s u i t e d t o o b s e r v a b l e s " (203). 
3.17 
T h i s may he c o n s t r u e d i n one o f two ways: 
( i ) l o g i c a l l y i n a c c e s s i h l e paradoxes T h i s jte-ase 
serves t o denote an empty c l a s s a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey. Others, 
however (Ramsey mentions T e r t u l l i a n , K i e r k e g a a r d , B a r t h , 
IJcPnerson and I l a c l n t y r e ) , would p l a c e a l l u n a v o i d a b l e 
paradoxes, perhaps a l l paradoxes, i n t h i s c a t e g o r y . Such 
paradoxes, as t h e name i m p l i e s , a l l o w o f no l o g i c a l 
e x a m i n a t i o n or assessment whatever. 
( i i ) l o g i c a l l y e x p l o r a h l e paradoxes, on t h e o t h e r 
hand, have"a d i s c e r n a b l e , i f c u r i o u s s t r u c t u r e i n v i r t u e 
of which { t h e y become] r e v e a l i n g " (196). Ramsey argues: 
Any u n a v o i d a b l e r e l i g i o u s paradox w i l l be d e f e n s i b l e 
o n l y i n so f a r as i t can be so s t r u c t u r e d as t o be 
e v o c a t i v e of a d i s c l o s u r e s i t u a t i o n c o m p r i s i n g 
"what i s seen and more" (216) 
Ramsey thus a l l o w s f o r "genuine mystery i n t h e sense t h a t 
'what t h e r e i s ' i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o o b s e r v a b l e s " and 
suggests " t h a t i t i s as apt c u r r e n c y f o r such mystery t h a t 
t h e r e a r i s e s 'mysterious paradox', which i s t h e n n e i t h e r 
a v i c i o u s muddle nor an i n a c c e s s i b l e i n c a n t a t i o n , b ut paradox 
whose s t r u c t u r e can be i n v e s t i g a t e d and e x p l o r e d " ( 2 1 8 ) . And 
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here we r e t u r n t o Ramsey's t r e a t m e n t o f models and q u a l i f i e r s 
and ( p a r t i c u l a r l y ) t h e i r e v o c a t i v e r o l e , as w e l l as t o h i s 
account o f t h e l o g i c of " I " , For Ramsey a l s o goes on t o 
note t h a t " ' I ' i s t h e bes t . . . c l u e t o a l l genuine m y s t e r y , 
a l l sublime paradox, and a l l r e v e a l i n g i m p r o p r i e t y " ( i b i d . ; 
c f , BPELI 16). I , l i k e God, " g i v e s r i s e t o u n a v o i d a b l e 
paradox i n v i r t u e of h a v i n g t o be b o t h a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
v e r i f i a b l e d e s c r i p t i o n s , y e t d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m any o r a l l 
of them" (215). And t h i s i s t r u e of I as i t i s t r u e of God, 
because b o t h a r e known i n a s i t u a t i o n o f d i s c l o s u r e . R e l i g i o u s 
paradoxes are s i m i l a r t o t h e r e s t of r e l i g i o u s language i n 
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t h a t they a r e r e n d e r e d i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y "by t h e u n v e i l i n g 
of t h e r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e s behind them. But f o r Ramsey 
t h i s i n v o l v e s f o c u s s i n g on t h e e v o c a t i v e and f o r m a l 
f u n c t i o n s of d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d language, whereas an a n a l y s i s 
i n terms of i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n i s s u r e l y more s i g n i f i c a n t . 
3 I f 
(6, Ramsey1 s General Approach t o I l e t a p h y s i c s 
Ramsey r e c o g n i z e s t h a t much of C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y 
has t h e l o g i c o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme; f o r t u n a t e l y he 
b e l i e v e s t h a t d o i n g metaphysics i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , even 
i o r a contemporary e m p i r i c i s t ( c f . CP Cf- 539 PPiJT 173). 
He concludes h i s paper on "Pacts and D i s c l o s u r e s " 
w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t ; 
we can t a l K o f " f a c t s " i n r e l a t i o n t o r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c o u r s e when such t a l k r e g i s t e r s a c l a i m f o r 
o b j e c t i v i t y , and what i s o b j e c t i v e l y d i s c l o s e d , 
b e i n g more t h a n t h e appearances i n and t h r o u g h 
which i t i s d i s c l o s e d , has t h e chance o f b e i n g 
r i g h t l y c a l l e d " m e t a p h y s i c a l " . (FD 133) 
Ramsey reg a r d s t h e bas i c c l a i m o f b o t h metaphysics and 
r e l i g i o n as t h e c l a i m t h a t s i t u a t i o n s e x i s t t h a t a r e 
e m p i r i c a l and more ( c f , CE 181, CPL 246, Emj> R 162, 
MRIC 308, P I 152, PPMT 174, RSCS 64 e t c . ) . 
Ww nave a l r e a d y had o c c a s i o n to note some 
aspects of t h e development of Ramsey's views on metaphysics 
f r o m t h e t i m e of h i s e a r l i e s t w r i t i n g on t h e s u b j e c t . 
I t would appear t h a t t h i s development c o n t i n u e d a l o n g t h e same 
l i n e s d u r i n g Ramsey's t i m e a t Oxford and Durham, T.W. T i l l e y } 
who has c a r e f u l l y mapped t h e stages i n Ramsey's i n t e l l e c t u a l 
j o u r n e y , notes t h a t he soon "stopped w o r k i n g as a meta-
p h y s i c i a n and began f o c u s s i n g on t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems 
of r e l i g i o u s language and d i s c o v e r i n g t h e necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i a b l e r e l i g i o u s language" 
( T i l l e y ( T h e s i s ) 268). Tne reason f o r t h i s , T i l i e y c l a i m s , 
i s t h a t Ramsey "saw t h a t t h e t a s k of s t a k i n g a c l a i m f o r 
f a i t h d i d not e n t a i l a r t i c u l a t i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l system, 
but o n l y showing t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r making 
such a c l a i m " ( i b i d , 269). 
V,re may r e a d i l y agree with, t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
A survey of Ramsey's work from t h e t i m e he t o o k up h i s 
c h a i r a t Oxford (19SI) t o t h e date o f h i s death ( 1972) 
r e v e a l s c l e a r l y a s h i f t o f emphasis. The at t e m p t t o 
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c o n s t r u c t a f u l l - b l o w n metaphysic , t h a t dominated h i s 
thought a t Cambridge, i s s t i l l p r e s e n t i n h i s i n a u g u r a l 
l e c t u r e on " M i r a c l e s " i n 1951. I t i s expressed a l s o i n 
n i s 1952 paper on "The Challenge o f Contemporary Prulosophy 
t o C h r i s t i a n i t y " . The t y p e s c r i p t f o r " F a c t , I'letaphysics 
and God" (pre-1960 ) nas a much more d e t a i l e d - b u t , 
as we s h a l l see, i n t h e end r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t - u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f metaphysics. But t h i s t r e a t i s e was never p u b l i s h e d 
and Ramsey's o n l y o t h e r work on metaphysics, i . e . n i s essay 
"On the P o s s i b i l i t y & Purpose o f a M e t a p h y s i c a l Theology" 
( l e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d 1959) a n ( i c h a p t e r 3 o f RSCS ( l e c t u r e s 
o f 196O), are even more t e n t a t i v e and f a r l e s s a m b i t i o u s . 
T h e r e a f t e r Ramsey's a t t e n t i o n seems t o have been d i v e r t e d 
i n t o more a n a l y t i c a l c h a n n e l s , i n p a r t i c u l a r towards t h e 
e x p o s i t i o n and defence o f h i s t h e o r i e s of t h e q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l 
and the d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n . Perhps he sensed the,t h i s own 
m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s were o v e r - a m b i t i o u s ; o r , a t l e a s t , 
t h a t t h e time was not r i p e t o pursue them. 
I t has been my i n t e n t i o n i n t h e body of t h i s t h e s i s 
t o p r e s e n t , as f a r as i s p o s s i b l e , an account o f Ramsey's 
l a t e s t t h o u g h t s . I nave tended, t h e r e f o r e , i n my own st u d y 
of Ramsey, t o devote most a t t e n t i o n t o h i s l a s t p i e c e s of 
w r i t i n g . A l t h o u g h I nave drawn h e a v i l y on e a r l i e r works, I 
have always t r i e d t o ensure t h a t t h e passages c i t e d f r o m 
these v/orks were consonant w i t h Ramsey's more mature 
p o s i t i o n . I n t h e case of Ramsey's work on metaphysics, 
however, t h i s task; i s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t "because o f t h e 
almost t o t a l l a c k o f evidence about h i s views on such 
m a t t e r s d u r i n g t h e l a s t t e n years of h i s l i f e . A l l I 
can attempt here i s an e x p o s i t i o n and c r i t i q u e o f t h e 
v a r i o u s themes i n Ramsey's m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g as t h e y 
appeared a t d i f f e r e n t stages (and o c c a s i o n a l l y t h r o u g h o u t ) 
h i s " l a t e r p e r i o d " . But I am persuaded t h a t much o f .the 
pre-1960 m a t e r i a l i s o n l y o f l i m i t e d v a l u e f o r t h e 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e f i n a l stages of Ramsey's t h o u g h t . By 
then h i s major i n t e r e s t was i n r e l i g i o u s language and i t s 
d i s c l o s u r e - b a s i s , I.Ietaphysics was, o f course, s t i l l " p o s s i b l 
indeed i t was s t i l l necessary - but o n l y as an " e m p i r i c a l 
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metaphysics" . Indeed h i s i n t e r e s t i n metaphysics seems 
t o have shrunk t o a concern t o argue f o r ( a ) i t s d i s c l o s u r e -
b a s i s , and ( b ) i t s d i s t i n c t i v e l o g i c ( w h i c h s h o u l d never be 
confused w i t h t h a t o f s c i e n t i f i c l a n g u a g e ) . I n Models f o r 
D i v i n e A c t i v i t y ( t h e Zenos l e c t u r e s of 1966^subsequently 
r e v i s e d and p u b l i s h e d posthumously), Ramsey wrot e : 
I see models and d i s c l o s u r e s as making p o s s i b l e 
the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of a metaphysics. But t h i s 
w i l l never be a metaphysics o f a s u p e r - s c i e n t i f i c 
brand. I t w i l l be a metaphj'sics whose m o t i f s 
are i n s i g h t and t e n t a t i v e n e s s , (I.IDA 53; c f , F I 152) 
I t i s convenient a t t h i s p o i n t t o take up t h e more 
n e g a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f metaphysics a l l u d e d t o above. 
Ramsey always i n s i s t e d t h a t whatever metaphysics was, i t 
was not a " s u p e r - s c i e n c e " : 
The m e t a p h y s i c i a n i s not a r e c l u s e shut o f f f r o m 
human a f f a i r s whose i n t e n s i v e p e e r i n g d i s c e r n s 
a c o u n t e r - p a r t w o r l d . He i s not engaged i n a 
remarkable k i n d o f s c i e n t i f i c e n q u i r y , remarkable 
not l e a s t i n c o s t i n g v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g . (DCCD 10; 
c f . RL 171, TTST 76) 
Ramsey h i m s e l f espouses a "new approach t o t h e o l o g y " which 
employs t h e methods and t o o l s of l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s m " r a t h e r 
t h a n c l a s s i c a l meta-physics w i t h i t s t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s 
and a l l t o o d e t a i l e d o n t o l o g i e s " (Emp R 162 - 163). The 
danger of the l a t t e r t y p e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach was t h a t 
i t was couched i n a language whose l o g i c a l c o m p l e x i t y was 
e a s i l y o v e r l o o k e d r e s u l t i n g i n " o n t o l o g i c a l lumber 1 1 , f i t 
o n l y as " f u e l t o warm up c o n t r o v e r s y " : 
I'To t e a r s need he shed f o r those p r o f o u n d " o b j e c t s " 
which have h i t h e r t o been thoug h t t o be open t o 
i n s p e c t i o n i n t h e s u p e r - s c i e n t i f i c l a b o r a t o r i e s 
of t h e metaphysicians-Substances, A c c i d e n t s , 
Essences, Eeing, Potency.„.. N o t h i n g . 
I ao not say t h a t such words as I nave quoted 
are t h e o l o g i c a l l y w o r t h l e s s , but I do say t h a t 
t h ey must be g i v e n a l o g i c a l p l a c i n g v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t which i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e a d 
i n t o them, when t h e y become f e a t u r e s o f a c o u n t r y -
s i d e known o n l y t o ghosts v/ho chance f o r t h e 
moment t o i n h a b i t machines, ( i b i d . 1635 c f . RL 185, CSC 
The g r e a t e s t danger i n d o i n g metaphysics i s t h e danger o f 
s u b m i t t i n g t o t h e same t e m p t a t i o n t h a t l u r e s t h e us e r o f 
r e l i g i o u s language t o d i s a s t e r - i . e . t r e a t i n g what i s 
l o g i c a l l y odd and d i s c l o s u r e - b a s e d as i f i t were l o g i c a l l y 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and d e r i v e d o n l y from sense e x p e r i e n c e . 
A p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r f l a t , d e s c r i p t i v e , " o b j e c t " language i s 
as d i s a s t r o u s i n metaphysics as i t i s i n t h e o l o g y . 
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7• " D e s c r i p t i v e " Metaphysics 
A l t h o u g h Ramsey i s p r i m a r i l y concerned t o disabuse 
h i s f e l l o w t h e o l o g i a n s of t h e m i s t a k e n i d e a t h a t metaphysics 
i s a h i g h l y e s o t e r i c and s o p h i s t i c a t e d s k i l l by means o f 
which we can "observe" and " d e s c r i b e " t h e n a t u r e and f u n c t i o n s 
o f God o r t h e A b s o l u t e , i n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t h i s t r e a t m e n t o f 
metaphysics may a p p r o p r i a t e l y be d e s i g n a t e d as " d e s c r i p t i v e " . 
P.F. Strawson has d i s t i n g u i s h e d between " d e s c r i p t i v e " a n d 
" r e v i s i o n a r y " metaphysics a l o n g these l i n e s : 
D e s c r i p t i v e metaphysics i s c o n t e n t t o d e s c r i b e 
t h e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e s o f our t h o u g h t about t h e 
w o r l d , r e v i s i o n a r y metaphysics i s concerned t o 
•produce a b e t t e r s t r u c t u r e . (Strawson ( l ) 9) 
Ramsey remarks t h a t Strawson does "tak e 'the w o r l d ' (wnatever 
t h a t i s ) and p a r t i c u l a r s (whatever t h e y a r e ) r a t h e r t o o much 
f o r g r a n t e d " ; and he would wish t o plead, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
( i n a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t h e s i s o f Strawsons I n d i v i d u a l s ) , 
t h a t " t h e r e i s more t o persons and t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a n 
t h a t t h e concept of a person i s l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e " (CPCP 51; 
c f . DPI 44 , I.'H-.-T 4 1 ) , However, Ramsey remains s y m p a t h e t i c t o 
Strawson's g e n e r a l approach t o metaphysics and i n c r e a s i n g l y 
a v oids t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o over i n d u l g e i n " r e v i s i o n a r y " 
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metaphysics , He applauds t h e approach o f a metaphysics 
which has "more concern f o r t h e c o n c r e t e t h a n f o r t h e a.bstract" 
(CPCF 50, c f . i b i d . 53)» a metaphysics t h a t has i t s f e e t 
on t h e ground o f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s and a c t u a l uses of 
54 
ianguage , However ;such s i t u a t i o n s and uses of language 
are themselves o f t e n r a t h e r p e c u l i a r . "The metaphysician," 
Ramsey c l a i m s , "must b o t h appeal t o an odd e x p e r i e n c e and 
use odd language" (Review Wisdom 54). 
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8, I.Ietaphysics as "?.Iap-3',laking" 
Ramsey was v e r y f o n d o f t h e metaphor o f map-making 
and a p p l i e d i t t o h o t h t h e o l o g y and metaphysics, v i e w i n g 
t h e l a t t e r as "a f o r m o f c a r t o g r a p h y i n which man a t t e m p t s 
t o p l o t h i s cosmic p o s i t i o n " (Richmond 124). He t o o k over 
from contemporary p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s t h e phrase " l o g i c a l 
mapping", u s i n g i t w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t a s k of a n a l y s i n g 
t h e i n f o r m a l l o g i c o f d i s c o u r s e ( c f . 1.1 3 - 4, CE 183, Review 
Eeineniann 200, I f i ?1). He saw t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n s t a s k as t h a t 
of coming t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d i s t i n c t i v e l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s 
of d i f f e r e n t t y pes o f d i s c o u r s e , by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a 
m e t a p h y s i c a l language t h a t would serve t o i l l u m i n a t e and 
u n i f y a l l o t h e r languages. Thus t h e j o b o f metaphysics i s t o 
" f o r m u l a t e some language scheme by which we can t h e b e t t e r 
u n d erstand and f i n d our way about i n t h e language o f commonsense" 
(U-ITR V/PZ 2); "Metaphysics now becomes p o s s i b l e as language 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h some a t t i t u d e t o t h e U n i v e r s e , w i t h some 
no v e l v i e w p o i n t which s p o t l i g h t s f e a t u r e s of t h e U n i v e r s e 
which would be o t h e r w i s e i g n o r e d" (U-CSCPT 1 ) . 
Ramsey views r e a l i t y as "one t e r r i t o r y " i n r e l a t i o n 
t o which we are f a c e d w i t h t h e problem " o f s o r t i n g t h e 
d i f f e r e n t languages which endeavour t o map i t i n t h e whole 
or p a r t " (Review Uaclagan 298). Such d i f f e r e n t languages -
o r d i f f e r e n t maps - " d i s p l a y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e s o f t h e 
c o u n t r y s i d e , each language, s c i e n t i f i c or h i s t o r i c a l , 
f o r example, d i s p l a y s i t s own brand of ' f a c t s ' " (M 4 ) . 
Tne main i t e m on t h e metaphysician's agenda i s t o c o n s t r u c t 
"one comprehensive language map which would l i n k t o g e t h e r , 
f o r example, t h e words o f science and h i s t o r y " ( i b i d . . ) . 
Such a u n i f y i n g r o l e cannot be p l a y e d by any o f t h e languages 
o f t h e d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s o f knowledge, "because o f t h e i r 
r e s t r i c t e d , s p e c i a l i z e d , v i e w p o i n t s . Even t h e sciences 
cannot f u l f i l t h i s f u n c t i o n : " f o r what exceeds t h e language 
of science a r e t h e v e r y d i s c l o s u r e s which s c i e n t i f i c method 
i t s e l f demands" (RSP 6 8 ) . 
Here Ramsey r e v e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t metaphysics 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y a quest f o r u n i t y : 
b e l i e f i n God - and, I would say, t h e h o l d i n g o f 
any m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme - i s . . . a p o s i t i n g o f u n i t y 
i n a w o r l d view v/hioh i s t h e n s u b j e c t e d t o an 
e m p i r i c a l and l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a , ( s i c - U-ITR Evans 4; 
F I 109, E 43) 
As t h i s passage i n d i c a t e s , Ramsey r e c o g n i z e d t h e i s m as "a 
t y p i c a l m e taphysics" i n t h a t i t p r o v i d e d a l a r g e - s c a l e map 
"by which t o i l l u m i n a t e and o r g a n i z e t h e d i v e r s e a s s e r t i o n s 
of o r d i n a r y language" (PPMT 158), B e l i e f i n God i s a map 
"which we b r i n g t o bear on t h e u n i v e r s e " a map " w i t h which 
we e x p l o r e t h e u n i v e r s e " (RFT 32). But Ramsey r e c o g n i z e s 
t h a t t h e r e a r e a v a r i e t y o f " r i v a l maps" t o choose from 
w i t h i n t h e g e n e r a l c a t e g o r y of t h e o l o g y and t h e i s t i c 
metaphysics. Such maps, f o r example, d i f f e r i n t h e i r 
p l a c i n g of t h e presence of e v i l i n a c r e a t e d w o r l d ( c f . U-HA; 
"The Problem of E v i l T 65",1965, p i . ; U-P3 9), 
J u s t as t h e maps p r o v i d e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r d i s c i p l i n 
are never t o be reg a r d e d as f i n a l , f o r t h e y are t h e r e s u l t 
of an e x p l o r a t i o n o f a mystery (MM 46), so t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n ' s 
map-making must a l s o be viewed as "ever t e n t a t i v e " (Review 
Matson 132), But a l t h o u g h even a t o t a l language map cannot 
be an "exact f i t " (CPL 337) t h i s "does not mean t h a t any map 
i s as good as any o t h e r , s t i l l l e s s t h a t maps do not m a t t e r 
a t a l l " (CD 26), On t h e c o n t r a r y our r a t i o n a l i t y demands t h a t 
we seek t h e most comprehensive and u n i f i e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
r e a l i t y - t h e most complete and l a r g e - s c a l e map - t h a t i t i s 
p o s s i b l e f o r us t o f i n d . But Ramsey warns us a g a i n s t a p r i o r i 
s p e c u l a t i o n as a source of such a map. I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t 
our map i s c o n s t r u c t e d On t h e b a s i s o f the a c t u a l n a t u r e o f 
the c o u n t r y s i d e , and n o t i n any armcha i r f a s h i o n . I t i s t h e 
c a r d i n a l s i n o f t h e a p r i o r i t h e o l o g i a n or m e t a p h y s i c i a n t h a t 
he i n s i s t s t h a t h i s map " f i t s " t h e t e r r a i n "no m a t t e r what 
t h e c o u n t r y i s l i k e " (U-TLI 14). Ramsey, as t h e d e s c r i p t i v e 
m e t a p h y s i c i a n , i s anxious t o a v o i d such pitfalls„ 
I n h i s essay "On t h e P o s s i b i l i t y and Purpose o f a 
M e t a p h y s i c a l Theology", Ramsey e x p l a i n s h i s concept of "maps" 
by means o f t h r e e examples o f non-metaphysical maps;. 
( i ) t h e mat h e m a t i c a l map, "which brought a l o n g s i d e 
common-sense language, can h e l p t o u n i t e what i s a p p a r e n t l y 
d i v e r s e , can h e l p us t o a t t a i n vri.de sweeps o f g e n e r a l i z a t i o n " 
(PPMT 155). Thus, f o r example, we observe waves on t h e sea, 
the v i b r a t i o n o f b r i d g e s and t h e phenomena o f e l e c t i s n a g n e t i c 
r a d i a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t them a l l w i t h t h e h e l p o f some 
g e o m e t r i c a l "map". 
( i i ) t h e l o g i c a l map, " i s ^/scheme, more or l e s s 
complex, l e s s o r more u n i f i e d , whose purpose i s t o i l l u m i n a t e , 
as and where i t can, t h e connexions between a s s e r t i o n s which 
occur i n o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e " ( i b i d . ) . The l o g i c i a n d e v i s e s 
a f o r m a l set of s y s t e m a t i c r u l e s which can be a p p l i e d t o 
o r d i n a r y language, a l t h o u g h t h e y never e x a c t l y " f i t " auch 
language - f o r o r d i n a r y language has no s y s t e m a t i c l o g i c o f 
i t s own. 
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( i i i ) t h e s c i e n t i f i c map i s a t h e o r y which, when 
"brought a l o n g s i d e " o r d i n a r y language, i l l u m i n a t e s and e x p l a i n s 
what was h i t h e r t o u n e x p l a i n e d (157)» Thus, f o r example, 
t h e t h e o r y of r e f r a c t i o n r e s o l v e s our puzz l e s about t h e 
"bent" s t i c k h a l f immersed i n water, 
i i e t a p h y s i c s , c l a i m s Ramsey, resembles such examples 
i n t h a t i t i s an " a n c i l l a r y scheme" (157). But i t i s an 
a n c i l l a r y scheme which has a l a r g e r s c a l e - f o r "metaphysics 
i s concerned w i t h ' R e a l i t y ' " (T58). The m e t a p h y s i c a l 
scheme a l s o possesses a l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r which i s d i f f e r e n t both 
fro m t h e l o g i c o f o r d i n a r y language and fr o m t h e l o g i c s o f 
o t h e r a n c i l l a r y schemes. Metaphysics may use terms suggested, 
f o r example, by t h e s c i e n c e s as " m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e g r a t o r s " 
(162) i n i t s " v e n t u r e a f t e r u n i t y " - i t s "endeavour t o 
p r o v i d e a scheme o f maximum i n t e r p r e t a t i v e power" ( 1 6 0 ) . 
Such concepts - e.g. substance, process, a c t i v i t y - are n o t , 
however, merely s c i e n t i f i c concepts. Tney are "not n a t i v e 
t o any o f t h e languages of sc i e n c e " but are d i s c l o s u r e - g i v e n 
(162 - 163). For metaphysics i s not j u s t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
( y e t a n o t h e r ) map; i t i s " t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a map i n accordance 
w i t h a v i s i o n o f the unseen" (163) - i . e . w i t h a d i s c l o s u r e -
s i t u a t i o n (174)• 
Ramsey i s emphatic t h a t such a t o t a l , o v e r - a l l map 
can never be produced w i t h i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c languages themselves, 
Tne reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e s c i e n c e s 
can o n l y t a k e p l a c e by our r e p l a c i n g t a l k about l o g i c a l l y 
d i v e r s e areas ( l i g h t , h e a t , magnetism, e l e c t r i c i t y e t c . ) by 
t a l k a t a more g e n e r a l i z e d l e v e l ( e . g , mass, v e l o c i t y , energy),, 
Thus, i n s c i e n c e , "any g a i n i n comprehensiveness seems t o be 
a t t h e expense of p a r t i c u l a r i t y " ; i t i s achieved by " r e p l a c i n g 
d i v e r s i t y by more g e n e r a l i z e d and l e s s d i v e r s e schemes" ( 1 6 1 ) , 
But "liach g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , each t h e o r y , has i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e 
which i s never w h o l l y t a k e n over by a n o t h e r " (RSP tsa). 
S c i e n t i f i c language i s thus permanently i n c o m p l e t e : 
The g a i n i n s c i e n t i f i c coverage, which comes f r o m 
e x p a n s i b i l i t y and c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , seems always 
t o be a t t h e expense o f i n c r e a s e d a b s t r a c t i o n -
s a y i n g l e s s and l e s s about t h a t p a r t of t h e 
c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n w i t h and f r o m which a 
b e g i n n i n g was made, i n o r d e r t o say more and more 
about t h e c o n c r e t e t o t a l i t y of f a c t s over which 
s c i e n t i f i c language i s f a r t h e r and f a r t h e r extended. 
(I.I7) 
Ramsey argues t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y one way i n which science can 
p r e s e r v e i t s i d e a l of p r o v i d i n g us w i t h one language map 
of t h e u n i v e r s e : 
I t needs a s s e r t i o n s which can i n t e r l o c k w i t h 
s c i e n t i f i c a s s e r t i o n s and y e t not be themselves 
s c i e n t i f i c . (RSCS 7y; c f . 1.1 7, RSP 8 8 ) . 
He h o l d s t h a t " I e x i s t " and "God e x i s t s " can p r o v i d e such 
"an i n t e g r a t i n g c e n t r e f o r s c i e n t i f i c a s s e r t i o n s " (RSCS 79 
n. 2 ) . For these a s s e r t i o n s , as we have saen, a r e e n t a i l e d 
by a l l s o r t s o f s c i e n t i f i c a s s e r t i o n s but themselves e n t a i l 
none o f them (RSP «y). " I " and "God" a r e m e t a p h y s i c a l words 
w i t h an odd—because m o r e - t h a n - s c i e n t i f i C ' — l o g i c ; words which 
i n t e g r a t e , r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e d i v e r s e languages about t h e 
body and i t s b e h a v i o u r and t h e d i v e r s e languages about t h e 
w o r l d . Armed w i t h such words we now have t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
r e a l i z i n g our " u n i f i e d map" (RSCS 8 1 ) . 
How v a l u a b l e i s Ramsey's map-making analogy? There 
i s some p o i n t i n u s i n g the r..«,p : w o r l d r e l a t i o n s h i p as an 
analogy f o r t h e language : world r e l a t i o n s h i p when we are 
a n a l y s i n g d e s c r i p t i v e languages. For such language i s 
an a t t e m p t t o " p o r t r a y " i n a d i f f e r e n t medium e n t i t i e s i n 
t h e w o r l d and t h e r e l a t i o n s between them. There i s t h a t 
much t r u t h a t l e a s t i n t h e L o g i c a l Atomism o f Rts s e l l and t h e 
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e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n . D e s c r i p t i v e language, l i k e a map, 
can h e l p us t o f i n d our way about t h e w o r l d because t h e r e 
i s t h i s " p i c t u r i n g " r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and t h e 
w o r l d . The metaphor may be a p p r o p r i a t e l y extended so t h a t 
we speak of d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i v e languages - t h e languages 
of t h e sciences and o f some o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s - as d i f f e r e n t 
maps mapping t h e same w o r l d . Tnus a c e r t a i n area of 
c o u n t r y s i d e might be mapped by a g e o l o g i c a l map, a map 
o f p o l i t i c a l / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o u n d a r i e s , a p o p u l a t i o n 
d i s t r i b u t i o n map, a map o f c l i m a t e , a map showing h i s t o r i c a l 
s i t e s e t c . They a l l p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t i v e and complementary 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e same r e a l i t y . 
However, Ramsey develops t h e metaphor by a s k i n g , 
"How can these d i f f e r e n t maps be u n i f i e d ? " . And h i s answer 
t u r n s out t o be "By a ' l a r g e r - s c a l e 1 map", But here t h e 
c a r t o g r a p h i c a l metaphor begins t o break down. For t h e o n l y 
way i n which we can " i n t e g r a t e " d i f f e r e n t maps i s by p r o d u c i n g 
one super-map ( t h e a c t u a l " s c a l e " i s i r r e l e v a n t ) which 
i n c l u d e s a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n on those o t h e r maps. Such a 
map ; l i k e t h e sub-maps, ope r a t e s as a s t r a i g h t f o r v / a r d "map 
d e s c r i p t i o n " of t h e t e r r i t o r y under survey. No one map can 
by i t s e l f " i n t e g r a t e " a l l t h e o t h e r maps i n any o t h e r f a s h i o n — 
we can expect no more from m a p - i n t e g r a t i o n . But Ramsey does 
appear t o expect more, f o r t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l "map" c l e a r l y has 
a d i f f e r e n t " l o g i c " f r o m a l l t h e o t h e r "maps" (whether viewed 
s e p a r a t e l y or i n combination)„ Such a m e t a p h y s i c a l "map", 
however, i s o u t s i d e t h e range of t h e map metaphor. For maps, 
l i k e s c i e n t i f i c languages, are e s s e n t i a l l y d e s c r i p t i v e " , 
whereas metaphysics i n Ramsey's view i n c l u d e s r e f e r e n c e t o 
what i s non-observable and cannot be d e s c r i b e d ( F I 152 e t c . ) . 
For t h i s reason metaphysics cannot h e l p us t o " f i n d our way 
about t h e w o r l d " , except i n a v e r y a t t e n u a t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f t h a t phrase. For t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l "map" does not r e l a t e 
i n any d i r e c t manner t o t h e w o r l d . I t serves r a t h e r t o 
answer our own u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n s about t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l 
s t a t u s and "coherence" o f the w o r l d , w i t h o u t e n a b l i n g us 
t o deduce a n y t h i n g f r o m i t about t h e e m p i r i c a l u n i v e r s e . 
T h a t , a f t e r a l l , i s t h e n a t u r e of metaphysics. Every 
m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme must be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a l l a c t u a l 
s t a t e s of a f f a i r s i n t h e w o r l d - f o r t h e y must a l l have 
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Deen t a k e n i n t o account i n d e v i s i n g t h e scheme. I d e a l i s m 
and r e a l i s / i j t h e i s m and a t h e i s m , mfflnism and d u a l i s m are a l l 
c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d of t h e d e s c r i p t i v e 
s c i e n c e s . The e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h each o f 
them, and cannot be used t o decide between them. 
I f e e l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Ramsey i s r a t h e r s t r a i n i n g 
the metaphor i n s p e a k i n g o f a " m e t a p h y s i c a l map". Super-maps 
do not i n t e g r a t e o t h e r maps i n th e v/ay t h a t a m e t a p h y s i c a l 
scheme i n t e g r a t e s o t h e r ( d e s c r i p t i v e ) schemes. M e t a p h y s i c a l 
schemes cannot be t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e w o r l d i n the way t h a t 
a super-map can be. I t would appear t h a t t h e i n t e g r a t i v e 
scheme of metaphysics i s more analogous t o t h e map-reader 
t h a n t o any map b e f o r e him. For i t i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ( o r 
community) who i s a b l e most c o m p l e t e l y t o i n t e g r a t e - i . e . 
u n i t e and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e - t h e d a t e t h a t t h e d i v e r s e 
maps p o r t r a y . And he does t h i s by h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and w i t h o u t a t t e m p t i n g t o draw anoth e r map. 
Only t h e map-reader, and not anothe r map, can s u f f i c i e n t l y 
t r a n s c e n d t h e d e s c r i p t i v e t o do metaphysics: i . e . both t o 
speak of t h e "m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t u s " o f t h e maps and t o 
b u i l d on experi e n c e s of r e a l i t i e s t h a t are m e t a - e r n p i r i c a l 
and t h e r e f o r e i n p r i n c i p l e unmappable, 
9. The " H i e r a r c h y o f Language" 
The map metaphor i s e s s e n t i a l l y a metaphor o f "areas" 
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I n h i s e a r l y e x p l o r a t i o n s , however, Ramsey seemed t o 
p r e f e r t o speak o f " s t r a t a " o r 'levels""'® of language, 
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a h i e r a r c h y o f language 
which has p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i s t i c metaphysics. 
Ramsey observes: 
A language map which aims a t adequacy and 
comprehensiveness must c o n t a i n words used 
at many d i f f e r e n t ' l e v e l s " . (CCP 259) 
A s u f f i c i e n t , a l t h o u g h not a necessary, c o n d i t i o n f o r words 
wl and w2 t o be used a t two d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s i s t h a t "a 
sentence which c o n t a i n s w1 and w2 s h o u l d be nonsense o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r k i n d " ( i b i d . ) : f o r example: " t h e e x p o n e n t i a l 
base of l o g a r i t h m s i s green". Group words and member words 
are a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of t h e h i e r a r c h y of language, as 
are o t h e r u n i t s of language whose d i f f e r e n t ' ' l o g i c s " 
r e s u l t , on m i x i n g , i n a " c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e " ( i b i d . 2 5 6 ) . 
S i m i l a r l y t h e languages o f b i o l o g y , mathematics, p n y s i c s , 
e t h i c s and p o e t r y are a l l a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , f o r "each 
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language g i v e s i t s own i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , and t h i s i s 
r o u g h l y what i s meant by s a y i n g t h a t each language r e p r e s e n t s 
a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l " (U-TLIE 2 ) . 
I n a d r a f t f o r " F a c t , Metaphysics, and God", Ramsey 
w r i t e s o f t h e a b s t r a c t i v e l e v e l s o f l a n g u a g e , " T r a v e l l i n g i n 
a t r a i n " i s a c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n which i s a " f u n c t i o n " o f 
t h e c o n s t i t u e n t experiences o f : 
B i t t i n g i n a compartment, 
w a l k i n g i n a c o r r i d o r e t c , 
Each o f these s i t u a t i o n s may he a n a l y s e d f u r t h e r , f o r 
example, i n t o : 
r e a d i n g a newspaper, or 
k i c k i n g a s u i t c a s e , 
t h u s c o n s t r u c t i n g a sequence o f l e v e l s of i n c r e a s i n g a b s t r a c t i o n 
(U-FI.1G D r a f t 6/5 - 6/4.). Such f a c t s a r e not a l l " a t t h e same 
l e v e l o f c o n c r e t i o n " ( 6 / 5 ) - Rather t h e y are o f d i f f e r e n t 
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l o g i c a l t y p e s f o r t h e y cannot he s u b s t i t u t e d f o r one 
a n o t h e r w i t h o u t t h e " l e v e l m i x i n g " ( 6 / 8 ) of t h e c a t e g o r y 
m i s t a k e ( c f . U-PMG 3/9/47 - 3 / H / 5 2 ) . 
Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n begins t o sound a l i t t l e 
a r t i f i c i a l a t t h i s p o i n t , f o r i t i s by no means c l e a r t h a t 
a l l such " l e v e l m i x i n g " would be as d i s a s t r o u s as t h e " t y p e -
t r e s p a s s " t h a t r e s u l t s i n such nonsense as "Muscle = ^Tendon" 
( c f . LEP 545) . What Ramsey i s a t t e m p t i n g here i s t h e 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f h i s e a r l i e r views on t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f 
a b s t r a c t i v e s i n t o a new e x p l i c a t i o n of t h e n a t u r e o f language 
and metaphysics. He c l a i m s t h a t a t o t a l language map would 
c o n s i s t of " s u b o r d i n a t e languages" ma&<e up o f words used a t 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s (CCP 260$ cf. M14 ,15 ) . Such languages -
mathematics, h i s t o r y , e t h i c s , t h e sciences e t c . - a l l have 
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t h e i r own d i s t i n c t i v e l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . But Ramsey, qua 
m e t a p h y s i c i a n , seeks t o u n i t e them and thus produce one map 
which would have a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d s t r u c t u r e and 
which would r e f l e c t a " c o r r e s p o n d i n g h i e r a r c h y o f f a c t s i n 
th e w o r l d " , t h e r e b e i n g an a p p r o p r i a t e "brand o f f a c t f o r 
each language l e v e l (CCP 260 - 2 6 l ) . Ramsey contends t h a t 
a l t h o u g h t h e s u b o r d i n a t e languages o f t h e h i e r a r c h y are i n f i n i t e 
("they can go on and on and "be developed f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r " ) , 
t h e o v e r a l l t o t a l language must be f i n i t e , s i n c e " f a c t i s g i v e n " 
and "we cannot t a l k about a n y t h i n g we j o l l y w e l l l i k e " (CCP 
261)„ Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s t h i s l i m i t a t i o n as i m p l y i n g t h a t 
"our language h i e r a r c h y s h a l l have something l i k e what 
Whitehead would c a l l an apex" ( i b i d . ) . "God" i s such an apex 
word "which e f f e c t s t h e f i n a l c l o s i n g o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c " 
h i e r a r c h y , t h a t word which i s t h e u l t i m a t e c o - o r d i n a t i n g 
word t o make our t o t a l language f i n i t e " ( i b i d . 2 6 4 ) . 
I have drawn t h e above argument m a i n l y from Ramsey's 
paper, "The Challenge of Contemporary P h i l o s o p h y t o C h r i s t i a n i t y " . 
Tnere he t r a c e s h i s view of a language h i e r a r c h y back t o 
R u s s e l l ; i n d i c a t i n g , however, t h a t whereas R u s s e l l accepted 
a h i e r a r c h y o f language he acknowledged o n l y "one brand o f 
f a c t " - i . e . sense-data (CCP 258; c f . i b i d . 2 6 0 ) . I n 
"Fact, Metaphysics & God" Ramsey develops t h i s argument i n 
more d e t a i l , d e a l i n g f i r s t o f a l l w i t h R u s s e l l ' s n o t i o n o f 
an " i n c o m p l e t e symbol": a concept d e r i v i n g from R u s s e l l ' s 
Theory o f D e s c r i p t i o n s , R u s s e l l argued t h a t e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t 
are d e f i n i t e o r i n d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s do not need t o denote 
a n y t h i n g i n o r d e r t o have a meaning. To d e s c r i b e such an 
e x p r e s s i o n as an "i n c o m p l e t e symbol" i m p l i e s " t h a t t h e meaning 
of any sentence i n which i t occurs can be s p e l l e d out i n such 
a way t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g sentence no l o n g e r c o n t a i n s t h e 
e x p r e s s i o n o r any synonym f o r i t " (Ayer ( s ) 54 - 55; o f . 
R u s s e l l (LA) y9 - 112, 120 - 121). L o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s -
e.g. " t h e average man" - a r e i n c o m p l e t e symbols. 
For R u s s e l l a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t word, e.g. " t a b l e " , 
was a l s o an i n c o m p l e t e symbol - a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n out 
o f sense-data: a " l o g i c a l f i c t i o n " ( R u s s e l l (LA) 111), 
Ramsey, however, denies b o t h t h a t any symbol i s p e r f e c t l y 
complete ( o r i n c o m p l e t e ) , a n d t h a t t h e r e i s any sac r o s a n c t 
l e v e l o f f a c t ; 
The c o n c l u s i o n of a l l t h i s i s t h e n t h a t we have 
two h i e r a r c h i e s - o f language and o f f a c t . 
The h i e r a r c h y of language d i s p l a y s degrees o f 
completeness i n t h e symbols t h a t are used a t 
i t s v a r i o u s l e v e l s , and t h e r e comes t h e i d e a 
of a s e r i e s of complementary languages. But 
a l o n g si d e a l l t h i s goes a l s o (we would c l a i m ) 
a h i e r a r c h y of f a c t s of which sense-data 
r e p r e s e n t o n l y one p a r t i c u l a r a b s t r a c t i v e s e t , 
(U-FHG 1/14/16) 
Ramsey e x p l i c i t l y p a r a l l e l s R u s s e l l ' s t h e o r y o f incompleteness 
i n r e l a t i o n t o s y m b o l s ^ w i t h B r a d l e y ' s degrees o f t r u t h , 
and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h i e r a r c h y o f f a c t s w i t h B r a d l e y ' s 
"degrees of r e a l i t y " ( i b i d . ) . The phrase " a b s t r a c t i v e s e t " 
a l s o has a t a s t e of "whitehead about i t ; and Ramsey does 
i n f a c t develop h i s metaphysics i n an ongoing debate w i t h 
a l l t h r e e p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
B r a d l e y , Ramsey c l a i m s , i s "very s u g g e s t i v e " about 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h i e s p r o c e e d i n g from a 
" g i v e n " and "most c o n c r e t e " f a c t - h i s " f e l t t o t a l i t y " . 
A i l t h e f a c t s of o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e are a b s t r e c t i v e s f r o m 
t h i s c o n c r e t e datum (U-FI.IG B l / b l ) ; t h e r e i s t h e n i n B r a d l e y 
an " a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y o f ' f a c t s ' " ( i b i d . B l / 9 2 ) . 
Ramsey goes on t o c l a i m t h a t : 
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B r a d l e y ' s v i e w o f an a b s t r a c t i v e n i e r a r c h y o f 
f a c t , though he never says t h i s , demands an 
h i e r a r c h i c a l view about language. At t h e t o p 
or t h i s h i e r a r c h y o f language would come f o r 
B r a d l e y one word o n l y , v i z . " A b s o l u t e " , and 
h i s g e n e r a l p i c t u r e would be of a language 
n i e r a r c h y spread out from t h i s word as v e r t e x . 
(TJ-FMG B1/&4) 
T h i s word "covers e v e r y t h i n g . . , I t s r e f e r e n c e ms most c o n c r e t e ; 
i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y r i c h ? i t i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y h e l p l e s s ; what 
might be c a l l e d f r o m a n o t h e r p o i n t o f view, a p a r a s i t e . 
Here i s a term p o s s e s s i n g zero g e n e r a l i t y and r e l a t i n g t o 
f a c t a t i t s most c o n c r e t e " ( i b i d . B1/&4 - B l / 8 5 ) . On t h e 
o t h e r hand, a t " t h e bottom o f t h e h i e r a r c h y w i l l come words 
which cover v e r y l i t t l e i n d e e d , whose r e f e r e n c e i s most 
a b s t r a c t ; which a r e e m p i r i c a l l y poor, l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m o b i l e ; 
„o..These terms o f g r e a t g e n e r a l i t y r e l a t e to f a c t s of 
h i g h a b s t r a c t i o n , . " ( i b i d . B l / 8 5 ) . The c l a i m i s th.at0faU.ley 1 s 
"degrees o f t r u t h " and "degrees o f r e a l i t y " can best be 
understood i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e concept o f a double h i e r a r c h y 
of language and f a c t : 
The h i e r a r c h y of language or of t r u t h has, as 
a s o r t o f apex v/ord, " a b s o l u t e " which p r e s i d e s 
over, and l i n k s t o g e t h e r each and every a s s e r t i o n 
about t h e u n i v e r s e t h a t i s made i n terms of t h e 
v a r i o u s languages c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e h i e r a r c h y . . . . 
A l o n g s i d e t h i s we have our h i e r a r c h y of f a c t s or 
" r e a l i t y " , Here, a t t h e t o p , i s t h e " a b s o l u t e 
u n i t y " , t h e e m p i r i c a l f a c t f o r whose occurrence 
B r a d l e y would make h i s e x p e r i m e n t a l a ppeal, ( i b i d . ) 
B r a d l e y ' s "Absolute"; which occupies the v e r t e x o f n i s l i n g u i s t i c 
n i e r a r c h y , i s d e s c r i b e d by Ramsey as " t h e keystone of a t o t a l 
language" ( B l / 8 7 ) and as h i s " f i n a l ' o p t i o n ' " ( B l / 8 8 ) . 
V/hitehead 1 s d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m B r a d l e y have already-
been n o t e d , i n so f a r as t h e y are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r Ramsey'a 
e a r l y t h o u g h t . V/iiitehead a l s o d i f f e r s f r o m B r a d l e y i n b e i n g 
f a r more e x p l i c i t i n h i s account of a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h i e s 
( c f . Whitehead (SL.'.T) ch.X, (PR) passim ) „ Whitehead begins 
f r o m " a c t u a l o c c a s i o n s " . . . . . . 
By means of " a b s t r a c t i o n " from any one such 
a c t u a l o c c a s i o n , we reach some " e t e r n a l o b j e c t s " . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , OAy one c o n c r e t e o c c a s i o n - any 
s p e c i f i c happening - i s a s o r t o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
of t hese e t e r n a l o b j e c t s and a p o s i t i v e e x c l u s i o n 
o f o t h e r s . For example, i f we happen t o s t a r t 
w i t h a r e d rubb e r b a l l i n a n u r s e r y , t h e n t h e 
" e t e r n a l o b j e c t s " - r e d , e l a s t i c , s p h e r i c a l -
are " t o g e t h e r " , but t h e i r t o g e t h e r n e s s i s a t 
th e c o s t o f an e x c l u s i o n . For e t e r n a l o b j e c t s 
such as green, h a r d , b l u e , square are p l a i n l y 
e xcluded and i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e " t o g e t h e r n e s s " 
o f r e d , e l a s t i c and s p h e r i c a l are " i s o l a t e d " . 
Ramsey c o n t i n u e s : 
For Whitehead, a n y t h i n g i s " a b s t r a c t " i f i n t h i s 
k i n d of way i t transcends " p a r t i c u l a r c o n c r e t e 
occasions of a c t u a l happening". (B2/98) 
Thus from every " a c t u a l happening" an a b s t r a c t i v e set may be 
c o n s t r u c t e d . At t h e "base" of t h i s h i e r a r c h y w i l l be a group 
o f " s i m p l e e t e r n a l o b j e c t s " , such as a d e f i n i t e shade of 
c o l o u r ( o f . B2/97). 
A p e n n y - s i t u a t i o n , e.g., would g i v e r i s e t o c e r t a i n 
" s i m p l e " c a t e g o r i e s such as " n i g g e r brown" but 
would a l s o n e c e s s i t a t e v a r i o u s "complex" economic 
c a t e g o r i e s l i k e " t r a d e " and i t may even be " S t a t e " , 
To t e l l a f u l l t a l e about any penny s i t u a t i o n , 
words l i k e t h i s would, be wanted. Whitehead's i d e a 
i s t h a t no m a t t e r how e x t e n s i v e l y these c a t e g o r i e s 
spread, they w i l l a l l be anchored t o " s i m p l e " 
c a t e g o r i e s as a "base": and f r o m t h i s base t h e y w i l l 
g i v e an " a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y " . . , . . 
......We might have supposed t h a t t h e r e was no l i m i t 
t o t h e c o m p l e x i t y which any a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y 
c o u l d m a n i f e s t . But Whitehead v i s u a l i z e s t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a f i n i t e a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y which 
should have a v e r t e x . The a b s t r a c t i v e f i e l d as i t 
i n c r e a s e d i n c o m p l e x i t y , i n a b s t r a c t i v e d i s t a n c e 
from t h e " s i m p l e " base, might narrow u n t i l presumably 
i t reached one concept. Such (V) concept w h i l e 
h a v i n g an e x c e e d i n g l y complex l o g i c a l s t a t u s would 
p r e s i d e over t h e r e s t and have a f i n a l i t y about 
i t s e l f , b e i n g the p o i n t beyond which i n t h a t p a t t e r n 
of t a l k i n g , our t a l k c o u l d never go. I t would be 
f o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r h i e r a r c h y , an " e n d - p o i n t " i o r 
" e x p l a n a t i o n s " . I t would be a "key-word" f o r t h e 
h i e r a r c h y over which i t p r e s i d e d , and Whitehead 
c a l l s i t a " v e r t e x " , no doubt t o p o r t r a y something 
of i t s r e l a t i o n t o what he has c a l l e d t h e "base". 
Here would be a " f i n i t e " h i e r a r c h y . (B2/99; °f< 
Whitehead ( S E W ) - 205) 
537 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , however, a h i e r a r c h y might he " i n f i n i t e " - f o r 
i t may he i m p o s s i b l e t o complete t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of an a c t u a l 
o c c a s i o n i n terms o f concepts (B2/IOO5 c f . Whitehead (SMW) 204) -
Thus: 
An a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y i s c a l l e d " f i n i t e " i f i t 
stops a t a f i n i t e grade o f c o m p l e x i t y . I t i s 
c a l l e d " i n f i n i t e " i f i t i n c l u d e s members b e l o n g i n g 
r e s p e c t i v e l y t o a l l degrees o f c o m p l e x i t y . 
(Whitehead (SiM7) 202) 
For Ramsey, t h e v a l u e of a b s t r a c t i o n s i s t h a t : 
i f we set out t o d e s c r i b e some a c t u a l happening 
we s h a l l do b e t t e r j u s t i c e t o a l l i t s f u l n e s s 
when we a r e u s i n g language o f a h i g h grade o f 
a b s t r a c t c o m p l e x i t y . I n t h i s way by h i g h l y 
complex a b s t r a c t language v/e s h a l l "approach 
t o t h e f u l l c o n c r eteness" o f t h e a c t u a l o c c a s i o n , 
as j u s t what i t i s i n i t s c o n c r e t e s e t t i n g . On 
th e c o n t r a r y we s h a l l say l e a s t about i t , and i n 
t h i s sense be l e a s t s p e c i f i c , when we use "a low 
grade" o f c o m p l e x i t y , when i n f a c t we use o n l y 
" s i m p l e e t e r n a l objects". So i t i s t h a t i n one 
sense we seem t o be more s p e c i f i c and n e a r e s t t o 
f a c t when v/e use a s i m p l e word l i k e "green" 
p o i n t i n g t o a green o b j e c t ; b u t i n a n o t h e r sense 
we are n e a r e s t t o 1'act when we say as much as 
we can about t h e whole s i t u a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
as p a r t of i t s givenness by t h e green o b j e c t . 
(B2/100) 
Ramsey goes on t o speak o f t h e "shear" - t h e " d i r e c t i o n a l l y 
opposed movement" - between h i e r a r c h i e s o f language and 
f a c t : 
Only t h e most complex a b s t r a c t language becomes 
c u r r e n c y s u i t e d t o t h e most c o n c r e t e f a c t ; w i t h 
the most s i m p l e , unambiguous concretelanguage 
i s a s s o c i a t e d t h e most a b s t r a c t f a c t . The more 
p r e c i s e and c l e a r our language, t h e f u r t h e r i s 
i t f rom d e a l i n g f u l l y and a d e q u a t e l y w i t h any 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . The more d e f i n i t i v e our 
language t h e l e s s d e f i n i t i v e our s i t u a t i o n ; t h e 
more d e f i n i t i v e t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e more complex 
and p r o b l e m a t i c a l becomes i t s d e s c r i p t i o n . 
(B2/101; c f . Bl/04) 
I t i s not ^necessary here t o a t t e m p t a d e t a i l e d 
exegesis o f what Whitehead i n t e n d e d by h i s account o f " a b s t r a c t i v e 
h i e r a r c h i e s " and t h e p l a c e w i t h i n them o f b o t h " s i m p l e " and 
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"complex" " e t e r n a l o b j e c t s " . For i t i s Ramsey'a use of 
Y/hitehead ?/hich i s o f i n t e r e s t t o us. And t h e r e i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t Ramsey b e l i e v e s t h a t "any 'appeal t o t h e c o n c r e t e ' -
whether sense-data o r A b s o l u t e - i s . . . t o commend a t o t a l 
language scheme i n r e l a t i o n t o a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n " ( B 2/l02), 
The c o n c r e t e g i v e n f a c t i s not t o be l a b e l l e d by a s i n g l e 
" g i v e n " word, but can o n l y be r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e t o t a l 
complex language scheme. However, t h e r e can be no " g i v e n 
i t 
f a c t " u n l e s s t h e " t o t a l language scheme w h i c h / i n v o l v e s i s 
f i n i t e : l i m i t e d by some v e r t e x or apex word" (Bi;/104). 
Ramsey views as of major importance ''..'hitehead's s u g g e s t i o n s 
about t h e f i n i t e h i e r a r c h y ("closed by one word which i n 
some way c l o s e s a l l a b s t r a c t i v e r o u t e s " ( B 2 / l 0 2 ) ) a n d h i s 
notion t h a t "God" may f u n c t i o n as such a v e r t e x word (B2/103), 
He concludes: 
the appeal t o f a c t as " c o n c r e t e " i s an appeal t o 
a f i n i t e a b s t r a c t i v e h i e r a r c h y e l a b o r a t e d i n 
r e l a t i o n t o i t ; and any such e l a b o r a t i o n of a 
f i n i t e h i e r a r c h i c a l p a t t e r n of language, 
commended i n r e l a t i o n t o some f a c t or o t h e r , 
becomes metaphysics... ( B 2 / 1 0 5 ) . 
Ramsey now moves on t o a f u r t h e r s t u d y o f R u s s e l l 1 s 
t h e o r y o f l o g i c a l t y p e s and i n c o m p l e t e symbols. He e x p l i c i t l y 
broadens t h i s n o t i o n ( o f a symbol t h a t has no meaning i n 
i s o l a t i o n but i s o n l y d e f i n e d i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s - i . e . 
" i n u s e " ) , t o suggest a sequence " o f i n c r e a s i n g 'incompleteness' 
e.g. brown p a t c h - penny - , . . ,„ „ - money ; 
or p u n c t i f o r m sense-data - p o i n t - l i n e - area 
volume - space. 
Ramsey no t e s ; 
the f u r t h e r t h e .Sequence develops, t h e more 
" i n c o m p l e t e " are t h e symbols, t h e vaguer, 
the more e l u s i v e t h e i r r e f e r e n c e , t h e more 
complex t h e t r a n s l a t i o n n e e d f u l t o reach 
i n d u b i t a b l y c l e a r assertions. ( B 5/1O8) 
He has thus produced a l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y o ut of h i s r e a d i n g 
o f R u s s e l l ' s p o s i t i o n , and he defends t h e reasonableness o f 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a t some l e n g t h (B5/IO8 - B5/1I8; c f . B7 /120) 
The a n a l y s i s has so f a r c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e language h i e r a r c h y , 
Ramsey now a t t e m p t s t o show "t h e e x t e n t t o which R u s s e l l ' a 
f o r m u l a t i o n presupposes - we may even say begs - a c e r t a i n 
f a c t background" ( B 5/H8). For: 
R u s s e l l wishes t o develop....»a pure h i e r a r c h y 
of language which a t t h e end i s based on some 
p r i m i t i v e p r o t o c o l language r e l a t i n g d i r e c t l y 
t o one b a s i c brand of f a c t . Tnat i s t h e 
p i c t u r e t h a t c o l o u r s a l l h i s e x p o s i t i o n , ( i b i d . ) 
Ramsey, however, pleads f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e o n t o l o g y and seeks 
t o d i s c o v e r i n Russe l l h i m s e l f evidence f o r a l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e 
v iew o f f a c t s ( By / l 2 2 - B11 / 1 2 4 ) . He t h i n k s t h a t he 
f i n d s i t , f o r example, i n R u s s e l l ' s c l a i m f o r u n i v e r s a l s -
"a c l a i m t h a t we must have 'wholes' as 'given' as.,., 
'atomic' data. Atomic f a c t s alone a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r i t s 
e p i s t e m o l o g y " ( B l l / 1 2 4 ) . 
Ramsey notes t h a t b o t h R u s s e l l and B r a d l e y have 
"bounded" t h e i r language h i e r a r c h i e s - R u s s e l l at i t s l o w e s t 
o r d e r ( w i t h p r o t o c o l p r o p o s i t i o n s ) and B r a d l e y a t i t s h i g h e s t 
o r d e r ( w i t h t h e A b s o l u t e ) . He concludes t h a t : 
Each b e l i e v e s t h a t a l l language j o u r n e y s , however 
l o n g , w i l l i n t h e end f i n i s h a t some i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e 
f a c t , 3ach b e l i e v e s t h a t we s h a l l understand a l l 
a s s e r t i o n s c l e a r l y when, and o n l y when, we 
r e c o g n i z e t h e i r b a s i s i n what i s thus " g i v e n " . 
R u s s e l l would say perhaps t h a t e x p e r i e n t i a l 
wholes as w e l l as atomic d a t a are th u s " g i v e n " ; 
B r a d l e y would make t h e same c l a i m f o r h i s 
"whole of f e e l i n g " . Only i f language i s somewhere 
and somehow bounded can i t be s e c u r e l y anchored 
l i k e t h i s i n " g i v e n f a c t " ; o n l y a t some bound 
w i l l language p o i n t beyond i t s e l f t o what i t i s 
t a l k i n g about. 
From t h e o t h e r p o i n t of view, s t i l l t a k i n g 
R u s s e l l and B r a d l e y as examples, we might say 
t h a t each sponsors a bounded h i e r a r c h y i n o r d e r 
t o a l l o w f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f " e x p l a n a t i o n " ; 
i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y t h e e x p l a n a t i o n game. 
There must somewhere he a " s t o p c a r d " ; t h e 
language h i e r a r c h y must i n some d i r e c t i o n or 
ano t h e r he f i n i t e , i f " e x p l a n a t i o n " i s t o he 
o t h e r t h a n a wild-goose chase. (B12 /125) 
But a t t h i s p o i n t , h a v i n g squeezed out of b o t h 
B r a d l e y and R u s s e l l as much as he can t h a t seems t o support 
th e g e n e r a l n o t i o n c f a language h i e r a r c h y , Ramsey makes 
something o f a v o l t e - f a c e . He r e j e c t s t h e v i e v / p o i n t s o f 
b o t h p h i l o s o p h e r s : 
We cannot be happy about R u s s e l l c l o s i n g h i s 
h i e r a r c h y by a low e s t o r d e r ; n e i t h e r has 
B r a d l e y made h i s c l a i m f o r c l o s i n g the h i e r a r c h y 
w i t h some s p e c i a l word l i k e " a b s o l u t e " v e r y 
p l a u s i b l e . (B14/127) 
Ramsey c o n t i n u e s : 
Hence, i n my own e x p o s i t i o n I s h a l l urge t h a t 
th e appeal t o " g i v e n f a c t " and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f " e x p l a n a t i o n " demands" a d i f f e r e n t s o r t o f 
p r o t o c o l language a l t o g e t h e r - a language which 
has not i t s e l f e i t h e r a " l o w e s t " o r a " h i g h e s t " 
l e v e l . Whether i t be a more o s t e n s i b l y 
e m p i r i c a l appeal t o g i v e n f a c t or a more 
o s t e n s i b l y r a t i o n a l i s t i c appeal t o e x p l a n a t i o n ; 
b o t h appeals, I s h a l l suggest, demand words o f 
a l o g i c a l s t a t u s d i f f e r e n t a l t o g e t h e r f r o m 
language o f t h e o r d e r s i n t o which language as 
a h i e r a r c h y f a l l s . F i r s t l y , and as might be 
expected, such words w i l l r e l a t e t o a " f a c t " 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y d i f f e r e n t and d i f f e r e n t l y 
commended from t h e k i n d o f " f a c t " t o which 
any o f t h e l e v e l s o f t h e language h i e r a r c h y 
r e l a t e . ( i b i d . ) 
Ramsey's m e t a p h y s i c a l language, t h e r e f o r e , i s not a f t e r a l l 
a h i e r a r c h y o f d e s c r i p t i v e languages about t h e v/orld. 
R ather i t i s a s e p a r a t e scheme which has an a l t o g e t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t l o g i c . T h i s c r u c i a l p o i n t was not made c l e a r i n 
n i s e a r l i e r essay "The Challenge o f Contemporary P h i l o s o p h y 
t o C n r i s t i a n i t y " , nor even i n " I . I i r a c l e s " , But " F a c t , 
Metaphysics & God" now proceeds v / i t h an account o f 
metaphysics as an " a n c i l l a r y scheme" (B15 /128 - El 9/"' 3 2 ) , 
an account which i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e one g i v e n i n 
"On t h e P o s s i b i l i t y and Purpose o f a M e t a p h y s i c a l Theology" 
a,nd o u t l i n e d above. T h i s i s f o l l o w e d by an account o f t h e 
s o r t s of s i t u a t i o n s t h a t demand metaphysics: i . e . an 
account of d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n s (B;>5/148 - B44 / 1 5 7 ) . 
I n t h e l a t e r p a r t s of t h e essay Ramsey w r i t e s o f 
a h i e r a r c h i c a l language as "some k i n d o f p r e c i s i o n language 
which a p h i l o s o p h e r might b r i n g a l o n g s i d e commonsense language 
t o deal w i t h t h e problems and puz z l e s which t h a t commonsense 
language d i s c l o s e s " ( B ^ 7 / l 8 0 ) - Such an e x p l a n a t o r y scheme 
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i n c o r p o r a t e s an " i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t " o r " f i n a l o p t i o n " 
(B70/183) and a t t e m p t s t o ' U n i f y t h e v a r i o u s r e g i o n s o f 
language" Dy means o f t h i s f e a t u r e (B72/185). We may judge 
between such m e t a p h y s i c a l schemes by employing t h e c r i t e r i a 
o f s i m p l i c i t y , comprehensiveness and c o n s i s t e n c y : 
one m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme i s b e t t e r t h a n a n o t h e r , 
( l ) The fev/er m e t a p h y s i c a l words i t demands t o 
complete t h e o b j e c t languages and t o u n i t e 
them. 
(z) The more comprehensive t h e -whole map i s i n 
i t s survey of t h e u n i v e r s e , and 
(5 ) The more coherent t h e map i n r e l a t i n g t h e 
d i v e r s e f e a t u r e s o f t h e u n i v e r s e most 
c o n c i s e l y t o g e t h e r . (B78 /191) 
To Ramsey, o f course, t h e i s m appears as a metaphysics which 
possesses " r e l a t i v e s i m p l i c i t y and immense coherence and 
comprehensiveness" (Bb5/l98 - B86/199) . 
I must s t r e s s a g a i n t h a t Ramsey i s a r g u i n g here f o r 
a view of metaphysics as an a n c i l l a r y o r supplementary 
language, a language which i s a b l e t o g i v e u n i t y and 
coherence t o a l l o t h e r languages o n l y because i t c o n t a i n s 
words o f an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t l o g i c . On t h i s a n a l y s i s t h e 
" h i e r a r c h y " i s not t o be f o u n d i n t h e languages t h a t d e s c r i b e 
the w o r l d : these languages cannot be r e l a t e d t o g e t h e r by 
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b e i n g p l a c e d on d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . Of course t h e a n c i l l a r y 
language of metaphysics may be h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d 
and t h i s may h e l p i t t o serve as an e x p l a n a t o r y scheme, 
t o which t h e d i v e r s e languages o f o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e can 
be r e l a t e d . But Ramsey's o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , t o t h e e f f e c t 
t h a t o r d i n a r y language i t s e l f c o n t a i n s d i f f e r e n t " l e v e l s " , 
nas been abandoned. I n 1956 Ramsey wrote t o Y/.F. Zuurdeeg: 
I would not v/ish t o say t h a t we can somehow 
" d i s c e r n " l e v e l s i n t h e commonsense language 
we a l l use about e v e r y t h i n g , though I am 
aware t h a t I t a l k as though t h i s were t h e 
case, and indeed a t one t i m e i n t h e past I 
b e l i e v e d i t t o be so.(U-ITR \VFZ p . l ) 
Ramsey's vi e w now i s t h a t " t h e c o n c e p t i o n of h i e r a r c h i c a l 
language belongs o n l y t o some k i n d o f p r e c i s i o n language 
which a p h i l o s o p h e r might b r i n g a l o n g s i d e commonsense 
language t o de a l w i t h the problems and puz z l e s which t h a t 
commonsense language d i s c l o s e s " (U-FIvIG B67/I8O). The 
m e t a p h y s i c a l "map" can serve as a t o t a l map, u n i f y i n g a l l 
o t h e r s , o n l y by b e i n g a v e r y d i f f e r e n t s o r t of "map" from 
any o f them. The s t r u c t u r e of r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n t h e 
m e t a p h y s i c a l map cannot be d i s c e r n e d i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t 
e x i s t between t h e s u b o r d i n a t e maps, Perhaps t h i s i s t h e p o i n t 
t o s t o p t a l k i n g of "maps" a l t o g e t h e r ? 
A i o n g w i t h t h e abandonment o f t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l v i e w 
of s u b o r d i n a t e languages, t h e r e goes a r e j e c t i o n of Ramsey's 
o r i g i n a l "Department s t o r e " analogy. I n "Theology & Language; 
some i l l u s t r a t i v e examples" and "Science, I.Ietaphysics & R e l i g i o n " , 
Ramsey had w r i t t e n of knowledge as "a department s t o r e w i t h o u t 
s t a i r s o r l i f t " - a s e r i e s o f l o g i c a l l y i s o l a t e d l e v e l s o f 
language. These " f l o o r s " c o u l d o n l y be connected by something 
o f t h e 
"which can "be p a r t / f l o o r a t any l e v e l , y e t i s not i t s e l f any 
f l o o r " - i . e . a l i f t . Hence Ramsey spoke of " l i f f c " - w o r d s ( e .g. 
" I " , "person", "God") v/hich performed t h e u n i f i c a t i o n : "The 
l i f t keeps t h e whole s t o r e a c t i v e l y u n i t e d " (U-3ITR 16 ) . But 
i f o r d i n a r y , n o n-metaphysical, language i s not i t s e l f 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d , t h e n t h i s analogy has t o he r e j e c t e d . 
And Ramsey must develop o t h e r a n a l o g i e s o f i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t 
a r e independent o f a h i e r a r c h i c a l a n a l y s i s of everyday 
languages. I t i s these t h a t we must now survey. 
10. The Kata-Language 
Ramsey argues: 
J u s t as people have spoken of a meta-language, 
i . e . t a l k about a p a r t i c u l a r language, 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s f o r i t s c o n s i s t e n t use and so 
on, and such meta-language happened t o be 
concerned w i t h t h e s t r u c t u r e of each s p e c i f i c 
r e g i o n , so we might now speak o f Kata-language, 
language a c c o r d i n g t o which and down from which 
t h e r e g i o n s o f o b j e c t - l a n g u a g e spread, and i n 
a way t h e v e r y use o f t h i s o b j e c t i v e language, 
i n so f a r as i t bespeaks a c e r t a i n o p t i o n made, 
w i l l d i s p l a y these p r e s i d i n g words t h r o u g h o u t 
t h e whole of e x p e r i e n c e . Y7e can see perhaps 
how m e t a p h y s i c a l words and those of t h e many 
meta-languages are b o t h s i m i l a r and d i s t i n c t . 
They a r e s i m i l a r i n b e i n g o u t c r o p s , so t o say, 
of p r e c i s i o n language. They are s i m i l a r i n 
b e i n g a use of words which extend beyond t h a t 
o f t h e p r a i s i o n languages themselves. They 
a r e , however, d i s t i n c t s i n c e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s 
t o t h i s o b j e c t language are u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t . 
One i s concerned w i t h , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s of c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h i n each language 
r e g i o n . The o t h e r - metaphysics - i s concerned 
w i t h t h e c o m p l e t i n g o f t h e r e g i o n s and t h e i r 
u n i t i n g w i t h i n one system w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f t h e i r b e i n g one key-word f o r t h e whole o f 
language. (U-FIiG B76/189) 
The i m p o r t a n t sense i n v/hich words are m e t a p h y s i c a l i s , f o r 
Ramsey, t h a t of b e i n g capable o f b e i n g used " i n a l l t h e 
s u b o r d i n a t e languages, though t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e l o g i c o f 
none" (i.I 1 4 ) . i t i s such words t h a t make up a "Kata-language"; 
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and a p a r t i c u l a r Kata-language i s a p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h y s i c a l 
system (Uz2). 
The v/ords making up t h e Kata-language have been 
g i v e n v a r i o u s t i t l e s a t v a r i o u s t i m e s i n Ramsey's w r i t i n g s : -
(a ) " M a r g i n a l words": I n " M i r a c l e s " , Ramsey suggests 
t h a t m e t a p h y s i c a l v/ords may he viewed as*''marginal words' t o 
any language map": 
i n some cases (and t h i s resembles s c i e n t i f i c 
language) these words are w h o l l y w r i t t e n i n t h e 
margins, e.g. "To Reading", "To Banbury","To E l y " , 
"To Norwich". I n o t h e r cases (and t h i s i s more 
l i k e t h e case of h i s t o r i c a l language which uses 
o n l y p a r t of a complete m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t r i x ) p a r t 
of a word, e.g. "BERK" may be w r i t t e n i n t h e 
margin whi le t h a r e s t , e.g. "SHIRE", may be used 
i n and occur on t h e map i t s e l f . (M13), 
T h u s W t a,physical words " a r i s e " from t h e map and are i m p l i e d by i t , 
( b ) "Boundary words" : T h i s i s t h e name g i v e n t o 
t h e words of t h e Kata-language when t h e y serve t o "round o f f 
some p a r t i c u l a r s u b o r d i n a t e language ( l i K e a 'boundary')" 
(M14; c l " . GCP 261). Ramsey speaks i n a s i m i l a r v e i n o f 
th e number 2 c o m p l e t i n g o r " p r e s i d i n g over", t h e sequence, 
1 + \ + ±2 + ± 3 (U-FLIC- B£>/178) 
Ee develops t h i s n o t i o n - as we have seen - w i t h r e g a r d t o 
th e m e t a p h y s i c a l words of an odd l o g i c t h a t p r e s i d e over 
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( i n f i n i t e ) s e r i e s . A g a i n metaphysics on t h i s a n a l y s i s 
a r i s e s f r o m , but i s o n l y " o d d l y " r e l a t e d to, o r d i n a r y language, 
( c ) "Index words" : Ramsey sometimes w r i t e s o f 
m e t a p h y s i c a l words under t h i s h eading because t h e y " a s s i s t 
i n t h e m a t t e r of f a c t u a l r e f e r e n c e ( l i k e an ' i n d e x ' ) " (I . H 4 ) . 
They a r e , he e x p l a i n s . . . . 
... words which are good c l u e s t o , and d e f i n i t i v e 
of, the t o t a l language scheme, as i s t h e i n d e x 
of a book to t h e words c o n t a i n e d i n i t s c h a p t e r s 
...They are words which b r i n g to a f u l l l e v e l o f 
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c o n c r e t i o n what i s "being talKed about - which 
i n d i c a t e s t h e a b s t r a c t i n i t s c o n c r e t e s e t t i n g . 
They p o i n t a t f u l l c o n c r e t i o n * ^ ( c p . " i n d e x " 
f i n g e r ) . (CGP 261 - 262) 
Ramsey p r o v i d e s no examples o f " m a r g i n a l " words, 
but i m p l i e s t h a t a l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s ( ( a ) , ( b ) and ( c ) ) 
are but d i f f e r e n t ways of d e s i g n a t i n g t h e same t h i n g . Thus 
"boundary" words are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h " i n d e x " words; and 
Ramsey does p r o v i d e examples o f t h e l a t t e r : 
"God", " I " , "persons" (may} De a l l c a l l e d 
i n d e x words^5 as h a v i n g a s p e c i a l and separated 
s t a t u s i n r e g a r d o f a l l l e v e l s o f language, and 
y e t somehow used a t them a l l , . . , t h e use of t h i s 
t e r m " i n d e x " i s s u f f i c i e n t to i n d i c a t e a f a m i l y 
resemblance between a l l t h r e e . (U-PI.iG (2) 
10/70/177; o f . CCP 265 - 264) 
A i l such words have a c o o r d i n a t i n g o r l i n k i n g f u n c t i o n , 
t h ey "supplement i n v a r i o u s ways t h e i n f i n i t e s u b o r d i n a t e 
languages", t h e y " l i n k them t o g e t h e r , and so,,., complete 
our language map as a f i n i t e s t r u c t u r e " (CCP 2 6 2 ) ^ . 
( a ) " I n t e g r a t o r words" : As i n d e x words u n i t e , 
c o o r d i n a t e o r " i n t e g r a t e 1 " t h e v a r i o u s s u b o r d i n a t e languages 
( c f . 1.114f U-HA: "Omnipotence", e t c , ) , Ramsey o f t e n r e f e r s 
t o them as " i n t e g r a t o r words" o r " i n t e g r a t i n g c a t e g o r i e s " . 
These phrases cro p up p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s -
e.g. PPL1T 161, R3CS 72 , 79 n . 2 , OBSR 45 , TMVH 16 e t c . 
I n t e g r a t o r words e n t e r i n t o o r are presupposed by every 
s o r t of d i s c o u r s e ( c f . U-ITR WW), and t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what 
i s c l a i m e d f o r t h e i n d e x words " I " and "God" ( c f . RSC3 7 5 , 
PPUT 164 - 174, Svans (iRTG) 158 - 139) . 
(e) "Apex words" ( o r "Ve r t e x " words; c f . U-FUG B2 /104 
e t c . ) : "God" and " I " both have i n d e x s t a t u s , but "God" nas -
f o r t h e t h e i s t - the a d S i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f b e i n g an "apex" 
word ( c f . U-FiiG (3) 1I/14/2O6; c f . U-HA: "Problem of Freedom", 
34k 
c. 1953» P.2). D u r i n g the e a r l ; / f i f t i e s Ramsey t r e a t e d t h i s 
concept v e r y s e r i o u s l y indeed. He c l a i m e d , f o r example, 
t h a t " b e l i e f i n God disappears as soon as God ceases t o be 
t h e apex. He t h e n becomes one o f o u r s e l v e s " (U-HA: "God's 
C o n t r o l of t h e U n i v e r s e " , c. 1952, p.2). O r i g i n a l l y Ramsey 
appeared t o i m p l y t h a t t h i s apex i s t h e apex o f t h e h i e r a r c h y 
of a l l language ( c f . U-HA: "The Problem o f E v i l " A, c . 1 9 5 2 , 
p1; D i t t o B, c 0 1954, p.2; U-HA "God & Purpose" A1 , c. 1952; 
CCP zb"] e t c ) . I n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , however, i t i s best 
u n d e r s t o o d as t h e apex o f t h e a r t i f i c i a l Kata-language o f 
metaphysics. An apex word i s an " u l t i m a t e word", a " d o m i n a t i n g 
c a t e g o r y " (U-HA: "God & Purpose" A ,c. 1952, p l ) , a n " u l t i m a t e 
of e x p l a n a t i o n " (U-HA: "God & Creation 1; B, c . 1 9 5 2 , p.1), a 
" p r i m a r y word" (U-FLTG y / 3 6 / l 4 3 ) j a " p r e s i d i n g word" (i'HA), and 
an " u l t i m a t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n " (U-CIi b ) . Ramsey w r i t e s : 
"God" as an apex word names, d e f i n e s , p r e s i d e d 
over, characterizes..„a t o t a l language map, 
and b e i n g a word w i t h t h i s s t a t u s i t r e l a t e s 
. . . t o t h e most c o n c r e t e l e v e l o f fact....(CCP 267) 
T h i s q u o t a t i o n has as i t s c o n t e x t an e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e o n t o l o g i c a l 
argument, which Ramsey i n t e r p r e t s as c l a i m i n g " t h a t a t any r a t e 
one e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l be n e c e s s a r y , i n t h e sense 
t h a t , t o t h e apex word which completes our t o t a l language 
map, on which a l l o t h e r e x i s t e n t i a l sentences are g i v e n a 
p l a c e , something must correspond..." ( i b i d . ) . T n i s i l l u s t r a t e s 
w i l l t he r a t h e r a p r i o r i n a t u r e of Ramsey's e a r l i e s t a t t e m p t s 
a t metaphysics d u r i n g h i s t i m e a t Ox f o r d - d e s p i t e h i s defence 
of i t s " e m p i r i c a l " f o u n d a t i o n s . For Ramsey, a t t h i s s t a ge, 
d o i n g metaphysics i s v e r y much a m a t t e r of c o n s t r u c t i n g an 
a p p r o p r i a t e language h i e r a r c h y as a m e t a p h y s i c a l schema. He 
leaves us w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e e m p i r i c a l ( d i s c l o s u r e ) 
b a s i s f o r b e l i e f i n God can be i g n o r e d i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
argument f o r an apex word ("God") which w i l l close the 
l i n g u i s t i c hierarchy ( c f . CCP 2 6 1 , H 1 9 ) . Ramsey claims t h a t 
"The metaphysically minded" w i l l always search Tor some 
dominant category; and the use of Occam's razor, together w i t h 
the t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysical quest f o r u n i t y , suggests th a t 
"the word 'God* ([should] predominate" ( F I 4 B ; c f . GCP k ! 6 l ) . 
I n summary: 
a metaphysical controversy would he the claim 
t h a t one apex rather than another, so placed 
the language map as to give i t the most 
coherent and comprehensive character possible 
i n terms of the minimum number of index words, 
•basic concepts, or words of a curious l o g i c . 
The f i n a l defence of theism would he t h a t 
"God" and the index words associated w i t h i t , 
give us at once the simplest yet most coherent 
and comprehensive language map we can have 
f o r understanding the universe. (U-F1.IG H / 1 5 / 2 0 7 ) 
( f ) "Key words" : On occasions Ramsey uses t h i s 
phrase synonymously w i t h "apex words" ( c r . U-HA: "Foreknowledge" 
A 1 , C .1955, p.1 ; U-FMG B l / 8 6 ) . I n "Theology and Language 
some I l l u s t r a t i v e Examples", Ramsey describes the apex 
words as "the keystone of the whole s t r u c t u r e " ( p , 4 ; of. U-FI'.IG 
B l / 6 7 ) ; elsewhere he w r i t e s of "omnipotence" as claiming'la 
Key placing f o r the wo r d 'God' " (U-HA "Omnipotence", c. 1953 ; 
c f , also U-FIiG B ^ / 9 9 ) - ^ n Religious Language we read of: 
ney words whose l o g i c no douht resembles t h a t 
of the words which characterize personal 
l o y a l t y as wel l as t h a t of the axioms of 
mathematics, and somehow combines features 
of both, being what might be c a l l e d " s p e c i a l l y 
r e s i s t a n t " p o s i t s , " f i n a l " endpoints of 
explanation, key-words suited t o the whole 
job of l i v i n g - "apex" words.(RL 5 7 ; c f . F I 4 9 ) 
I n Religious Language Ramsey r e t a i n s the idea of the word 
"God" i n some way " p r e s i d i n g over and u n i t i n g ^'S-U a H 
causal explanations" (RL 6 4 ) , and having indeed "a p r e s i d e n t i a l 
p o s i t i o n over the whole language route" ( 6 6 ; c f , 59» 1 7 6 ) . 
However the designation, "apex word" l a r g e l y 
disappears a f t e r the mid 1950 s. I t s pla,ce i s taken by the 
phrase "Key word" (as i n U-HAs " T r a d i t i o n a l Arguments" yi 9b5} 
p5; F I 4-9); although "Key word" may also he used more 
generally of any in d e x / i n t e g r a t o r word. - e.g. "uuty", 
"conscience", "love", " a c t i v i t y " , "Process" ( c f . PI 53? 
if a 
PPL1T 1 6 2 , RSP 81, OBSE 3 0 ) . Later s t i l l we f i n d Ramsey 
ta k i n g up t h i s l a t t e r usage even more generally, speaking 
of "key phrases" (CD 8, I.IDA 1 4 ) , "key metaphors" (lU.166), "key 
ideas" (NL 5 9 1 9 JR j), "key categories" (U-Intercommunion 
7 , U-UBI/ID2, U-TM 5 , CSC 5 0 ) etc. Now models and symbols are 
thought of as "key ideas" (cf„ U-Credo A, v/T 2 , U-Intercommunion 
1 7 , U-CF 15 ^ p r i v a t e s c r i p t ] e t c , ) . And t a l k about a 
metaphysical index which has "God" at the apex has become 
transformed i n t o discussions about the problem of preference 
between d i f f e r e n t models of God, Despite the complexity and 
apparent s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of Ramsey1s metaphysical scheme of 
key and apex words, i t did not r e a l l y help to eluc i d a t e 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between metaphysical words such as "God" and 
" I " ( c f . Evans (iRTG) 139 - HO, 2 1 3 ) , I t would appear t h a t 
Ramsey the r e f o r e abandoned the attempt to r e l a t e such notions 
together along these l i n e s ( c f . T i l l e y (Tnesis) 1 6 6 ) , l e a v i n g 
himself only w i t h h i s quasi-monistic scheme which viewed a l l 
disclosed "mores" as somehow being a "part" of God , The 
Kata-language proved to be somewhat opaque to Ramsey's 
a n a l y t i c a l gaae, and he was unable t o say very much about i t 
that c l a r i f i e d , rather than obscured, the metaphysical task. 
However one f i n a l phrase i n Ramsey's terminology may be 
mentioned as being more than u s u a l l y i l l u m i n a t i n g : 
( g ) " I r r e d u c i b l e P o s i t " ("Pinal Option") : Ramsey 
describes the word "God" not only as "a unique and u l t i m a t e 
key-word dominating the whole of a t h e i s t i c language scheme" 
hut also as an " i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t " (PR 208; c f . RL 3 7 , 4 7 ) . 
This phrase i s used throughout Ramsey's l a t e r period (e.g. 
U-TLIE 3 , RL passim. U-FLiG B 6 5 / l 7 8 c , TL 8, H 2 1 7 ) , I t i s 
synonymous wi t h " f i n a l option" (U-FMG B70 / 1 8 3 , U-TLIE 1 6 , 
RL 4'I - 4 2 , 110) and "stop card" ("something emphatic 
and i i n a l , . . a d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l move":RL 6 3 ) , and may "be 
expressed i n a tautology (RL q.0, 110). 
Tne i m p l i c a t i o n of these passages i s t h a t a word or 
phrase th a t i s "posited" - i . e . proposed f o r use - might 
serve as an expression of a person's t o t a l commitment to 
s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n ( i ) or Duty or God (ci-„ RL 7 4 , RE 4 O 4 ) . 
"I'm I " , "men are men","Duty f o r Duty's sake", " I am t h a t 
I am", each serves as an example of a " s i g n i f i c a n t tautology 
l a b e l l i n g a commitment" (RL 4 6 ) . Such t a u t o l o g i e s o f t e n 
serve to "recommend" a metaphysical word (U-FMG 3 / l 4 / 5 2 c ) , 
and "express" an option ( i b i d . B 45/158)» Ramsey notes 
t h a t : 
the request to someone f o r "an explanation" 
may express the desire to have disclosed what 
they are t a k i n g as a f i n a l o p t ion. The purpose 
of the question-arsver game i n explanation may 
be to make cle a r what i s being taken as an 
i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t i n Quine'a phrase, as an 
i r r e d u c i b l e p o s it i n r e l a t i o n to the language 
of the game. I n t h i s way i f we query f a r 
enough we may a r r i v e at axioms which he 
uight have t o l d us at the one time are " s e l f -
evident". (U-P:,:G B 7 0 / 1 8 3 ) 
Metaphysical words which are " i n t r i n s i c t o no p a r t i c u l a r 
[language]) region, represent ' i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t s of them a l l 
Tuey serve to " u n i t e the regions" and provide us w i t h our 
u n i f i e d metaphysical scheme (U-P1.1G B 7 2 / 1 8 5 ) . Ramsey notes, 
i n a discussion of theodicy: 
we only " e x p l a i n " e v i l i f and when we have 
incorporated i t c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t o our discourse 
. . . . . i f v/e do t h a t we have incorporated the 
e v i l of the universe w i t h i n a t o t a l l o y a l t y 
to God, w i t h i n our r e l i g i o u s commitment.(U-PE 5 4 ) 
The t h e i s t i c "stop-card" i s what puts a stop t o the search 
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f o r explanations (U-FLiG B 1 2 / 1 2 5 ) , i t i s t h i s i r r e d u c i b l e 
p o s i t that makes explanation possible. 
As we have noted, Ramsey e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r s to the 
use 01 the phrase " i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t " oy V/.V.O. Quine ( c f . 
also PR 208 n.22). For Quine an i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t i s an 
e n t i t y that has a r e a l i t y of i t s own, and i s not simply 
reducible t o sense experience, but whose existence can 
7 
only he "posited" by our l i n g u i s t i c and conceptual schemes 
Thus a physical object i s an i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t f o r Quine, a 
are the more abstract e n t i t i e s of science and the e n t i t i e s 
of mathematics. Quine w r i t e s : 
we adopt, at l e a s t i n so f a r as i t i s reasonable, 
the simplest conceptual scheme i n t o which the 
d i s o r d e r e d fragments of raw experience can be 
f i t t e d and arranged. Our ontology i s determined 
once we have f i x e d upon the o v e r - a l l conceptual 
scheme....Pnysical objects are postulated 
e n t i t i e s which round out and s i m p l i f y our account 
of the f l u x of experience....(Quine (FLPV) 17 - 18) 
As an e m p i r i c i s t I continue to t h i n k of the 
conceptual scheme of science as a t o o l , u l t i m a t e l y , 
f o r p r e d i c t i n g f u t u r e experience i n the l i g h t of 
past experience. Physical objects are conceptually 
imported i n t o the s i t u a t i o n as convenient 
inte r m e d i a r i e s - not by d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of 
experience, but simply as i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t s 
comparable, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , to the gods of 
Homer.... Both sorts of e n t i t i e s enter our conception 
only as c u l t u r a l p o s i t s . . . . . P o s i t i n g does not stop 
wi t h macroscopic physical objects. Objects at 
the atomic l e v e l are posited to make the laws of 
macroscopic objects, and u l t i m a t e l y the laws of 
experience, simpler and more manageable...,. 
Forces are another example.... .Lioreover, the 
abstract e n t i t i e s which are the substance of 
mathematics - u l t i m a t e l y classes and classes of 
classes and so on up - are another p o s i t i n the 
same s p i r i t . Epistemologically these are myths 
on the same f o o t i n g w i t h physical objects and gods, 
n e i t h e r "better nor worse except f o r di f f e r e n c e s 
i n the degree to which they expedite our 
dealings with sense experiences. ( i b i d . 44 - 4 5 ) 
Donald Evans 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what i t i s i n 
Quine's t h i n k i n g t h a t a t t r a c t s Ramsey nas been accepted by 
Ramsey himself (U-ITR Evans 3 ) . I t i s appropriate, t h e r e f o r e 
to quote i t at some length; 
For Quine, a t h e o r e t i c a l word can nave a r e a l 
reference which i s not a reference to some 
p a r t i c u l a r sense-experiences or p a r t i c u l a r 
physical objects, while nevertheless we 
can t a l k about a sense-experience or a 
physical object i n r e l a t i o n t o the t h e o r e t i c a l 
word i f we widen the context and s h i f t i n t o 
the appropriate t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l of language. 
Thus f o r Ramsey "God" can have a r e a l 
reference which i s not any p a r t i c u l a r , yet 
we can t a l k about a p a r t i c u l a r i n terms of 
God i f we widen the context cosmically, and 
s h i f t i n t o r e l i g i o u s language,.'i.'here a 
Quinean t h e o r e t i c a l term i s remotely l i n k e d 
to sense-experiences, Ramsey's "God" i s 
remotely l i n k e d t o discernments of the "mores" 
of p a r t i c u l a r ' persons and t h i n g s , .. .The word 
"God" does not r e f e r to any p a r t i c u l a r "more" 
or t o any group of "mores" as an aggregate. 
Rather, i n t h i s strand of h i s thought, Ramsey 
seems t o be suggesting the f o l l o w i n g analogy: 
The word "God" i s r e l a t e d to the p a r t i c u l a r 
"mores" i n a way t h a t i s somewhat analogous 
to the way i n which a Quinean t h e o r e t i c a l 
term i s r e l a t e d to tha t which i s experienced 
i n sense-experience. (Evans (IRTG) 2 1 4 ) 
Evans i s here attempting to f i n d an answer i n Ramsey 
to the problem of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the disclosed 
"mores" - a question th a t Ramsey confesses th a t he has "not 
....been too bothered about" (U-ITR Evans 3 ) . I have 
i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n Ramsey as a hangover from • 
h i 3 B r a d l e y - l i k e monistic tendency i n metaphysics. As Evans 
notes Quine 1 ts " i r r e d u c i b l e p o s i t " may provide another 
s o l u t i o n to the problem. But Evans goes on to point out 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n t e r p r e t i n g God along these l i n e s as 
a Quinean t h e o r e t i c a l term. For then: 
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(a) there would he no disclosure experience of 
God, hut only of p a r t i c u l a r "mores" (Evans (IRTG) ' ^ 1 4 ) ; 
and (b) God would he downgraded and depersonalized ( i b i d . 2 1 5 ) » 
Tnis p a r t i c u l a r f l i r t a t i o n w i t h an apparently sympathetic 
category of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n from Quine ends up, l i k e many 
of Ramsey's explorations i n metaphysics tin a t h e o l o g i c a l 
cul-de-sac. As Evans puts i t : 
To t h i n k of God as i f he were an e l e c t r o n i s 
v i r t u a l l y to r e j e c t any thought concerning 
him as being l i k e an I - which i s the thought 
from which we s t a r t i n Ramsey ., ( i b i d . ) 
1 1 . I a n Ramsey as a metaphysician 
Ramsey, l i k e a l l metaphysicians, i s concerned both 
to a r r i v e at a general p i c t u r e of the world ( c f . Quinton 
(ITT) 2 3 5 ; Hampshire (MS) 3 3 ) and to ta c k l e some of the 
c e n t r a l questions of ontology (cf, E.A.O. Williams 5 5 , Ryle 
(IT Li) 1 4 4 ) . I n p a r t i c u l a r Ramsey the metaphysician believes 
i n the existence of meta-empirical e n t i t i e s such as I 
and God ( c f . Kearney 188). C h r i s t i a n theism claims both 
that God e x i s t s and t h a t h i s existence serves as a general 
explanation of the existence of everything else. I n these 
ways theism - as Ramsey i n s i s t s - i s a paradigmatic 
metaphysical scheme ( o f , also D i l l e y ch. I I I ) . The problems 
rai s e d i n j u s t i f y i n g such a scheme w i l l be our concern i n the 
f o l l o w i n g chapter. \7e may conclude here, however, th a t 
Ramsey's attempts to analyse the nature of metaphysics i n 
general tand t h e i s t i c metaphysics i n p a r t i c u l a r ^ a r e hardly 
very i l l u m i n a t i n g . The notions of metaphysical mapping, 
language h i e r a r c h i e s , apex words and so on, are, i n the 
opinion of t h i s v r r i t e r , n e i t h e r c l e a r i n themselves nor 
i n any way es s e n t i a l f o r our understanding of the essence 
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of Ramsey's p o s i t i o n . I t may be t h a t "Fact, Iietaphysics and 
God" could have developed i n t o a usefu l supplement to Ramsey's 
other works. But the f a c t remains th a t i t d i d not-, and t h a t 
p r a c t i c a l l y every one of Ramsey's attempts to deal i n d e t a i l 
w i t h the nature of metaphysics was qu:etly dropped by Ramsey 
himself. We may therefore be j u s t i f i e d i n moving on 
without f u r t h e r comment to more f r u i t f u l areas. 
CHAPTER IV: 
T H E J U S T I F I C A T I O N OF R E L I G I O U S 
B E L I E F 
I i n t e n d i n t h i s chapter to review Ramsey's account 
of the ways i n which the use of r e l i g i o u s language can he 
" j u s t i f i e d " or vi n d i c a t e d ( c f , i.IDA 2 1 , 54, AC 6 3 , HG 2 1 3 ) * 
Before focussing a t t e n t i o n on t h i s question, however, I 
s h a l l b r i e f l y toucn on the r e l a t e d issue of the meaning 
of r e l i g i o u s discourse, 
1 , The Leaning of Religious Language 
Ramsey's work i s o f t e n presented i n the context of 
the t w e n t i e t h century debate about the meaningfulness of 
r e l i g i o u s language ( c f . G i l l (lR) chs. 1 & 2 , Schnetzer 
chs. 1 & 2 ) . Such a presentation may lead the reader of 
Ramsey to expect many references to t h i s debate, a debate 
which has u s u a l l y centred on the Wisdom - Flew "Parable of 
the Gardener". But t h i s expectation w i l l >not be f u l f i l l e d . 
For. although Ramsey i s fundamentally concerned w i t h the 
meaning of r e l i g i o u s language ,his discussion of the t o p i c 
i s only r a r e l y couched i n terms of a d i r e c t arayer t o the 
c r i t i c i s m s of those who espouse the v e r i f i a b i l i t y or 
f a l s i f i a b i i i t y c r i t e r i o n of meaning. However, h i s w r i t i n g s 
should c e r t a i n l y be r e l a t e d to such c r i t i c i s m s ( c r . ITR 
Smart 1 0 9 ) . 
The essence of the challenge of v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s 
and f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s t s i s t h a t r e l i g i o u s language i s 
"without ( f a c t u a l ) meaning". Ramsey strenuously denied t h i s 
c r i t i c i s m : 
I would point out that t h e i s t i c statements i n 
the end being developed from models and also 
containing q u a l i f i e r s have both d e s c r i p t i v e 
and performative f o r c e , and they gain t h e i r 
"meaning" i n two ways: 
( i ) I n the matter of "sense", because and i n 
so f a r as they can form part of a consistent 
comprehensive, simple and coherent discourse 
which can be tested f o r empirical f i t ; and 
( i i ) I n the matter of "reference", they are to 
be grounded i n the end i n the o b j e c t i v e 
constituent of every cosmic disclosure,,.,.. 
(ITR Owen 1 2 6 ) 
Tne reference of r e l i g i o u s language i s disclosure-given, 
i t i s a "more" disclosed through obbervables, V/e can, 
th e r e f o r e , point to observables which serve as c r i t e r i a 
(evidence) f o r the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of an a s s e r t i o n about God, 
but these c r i t e r i a on t h e i r own do not exhaust the reference 
or r e l i g i o u s language: 
\.'e would agree t h a t t e s t a b l e propositions must 
always r e f e r to c e r t a i n spatio temporal 
p a r t i c u l a r s c a l l e d once "sense-data" or now 
"what i s seen",.. But i t i s an o l d story t h a t 
what confirms a p r o p o s i t i o n need not be a l l 
tha t the p r o p o s i t i o n r e f e r s t o , so that a 
pr o p o s i t i o n may w e l l be te s t a b l e without 
having to r e f e r to nothing whatever beyond 
the t e s t a b l e p a r t i c u l a r s . I t may be said at 
once that we are then doing no more than to 
d i f f e r on the o l d d i s t i n c t i o n between c r i t e r i a 
and meaning. But not q u i t e . I am not 
ass e r t i n g that the meaning i s "something 
altogether over and above" the " c r i t e r i a " . 
I am rather suggesting t h a t meaning i s 
something which includes the c r i t e r i a . , i s 
that of which the c r i t e r i a themselves are 
both evidence and p a r t , i s th a t which the 
c r i t e r i a themselves demand. But the c r i t e r i a 
are not c r i t e r i a merely of themselves. I 
suppose I am s i l l y making the old d i s t i n c t i o n 
between "what makes you c e r t a i n " , and "what 
you are c e r t a i n of". (U-FI.1G 3 / l 8 / 5 b - 3 / 1 9 / 5 7 ) 
I n another discussion of meaning Ramsey argues: 
Suppose we ask someone: "'./hat i s the meaning of 
x?" The f i r s t p o int to notice i s the possible 
d i v e r s i t y of the answers, which (as we s h a l l 
see) enshrines a c e r t a i n basic ambiguity. 
Let us take three examples. F i r s t , suppose 
x i s a t e r r i f i c commotion i n an undergraduate's 
room - heat, noise, smoke, j o s t l i n g , "What's 
the meaning of t h i s ? " we ask, and the r e p l y 
comes: " I t s Jim's t w e n t y - f i r s t b i r t h d a y p a r t y . " 
The question i n t h i s f i r s t example i s thus a 
request f o r a context, and given the context 
we are s a t i s f i e d . Take now a second example. 
Presented w i t h an i n t e g r a t i o n sign,.^, or 
wit h ^ ydx, we maj^ ask: "'.That's the meaning 
of t h i s ? " and we may then be t o l d how to use 
or operate the sign ^  j or how to work out the 
expression. A l t e r n a t i v e l y we might be t o l d : 
" I t s the area under the curve y = f ( x ) " l 
T h i r d l y we may ask: "'.."hat's the meaning of 
ultramarine?" and t h i s i s normally a request 
to see the colour. The basic ambiguity, which 
the second example best i l l u s t r a t e s i n so f a r 
a s i t combines the kinds of answer given 
r e s p e c t i v e l y i n the f i r s t and t h i r d examples, 
i s between context and reference, and when 
we speak of the meaning of a word we normally 
have both i n mind. (OBSR 62; c f . P.SCS 4O) 
Ramsey i s g r e a t l y concerned with e l u c i d a t i n g the meaning 
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of r e l i g i o u s language i n terms of i t s reference , and t h i s 
i s given i n a d i s c l o s u r e - s i t u a t i o n — what he c a l l s the 
"e m p i r i c a l anchorage" of theology ( c f . RL 8 9 , 171» F I 44 -
4 5 , 9 7 , FRFI 3 4 8 , TL 2 5 , I£DA 1 3 ) : i t s "grounding" ( c f , 
PPI.IT 1 6 3 , CE 1 8 3 , CPL 2 4 6 , CD 7 4 ) or " j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' i n f a c t ' 
( F I 1 2 5 ) , But Ramsey i s also f u l l y aware — p a c e 
P h i l l i p s (PPE) 135 and Cohen (LRL) 148 - 1 5 0 , (Thesis) 169 — 
of the importance of showing how r e l i g i o u s language i s used: 
i t s "meaning" as use ( c f . WG 9 - 1 1 , U-FIJG 1/26/28, CE 176 -
1 7 8 ) . " I t i s s p e c i a l l y important", he w r i t e s , " i n the case 
of r e l i g i o u s words to emphasize th a t the meaning of words 
i s not p r i m a r i l y a p i c t u r e which the word describes" (OCR 1 ; 
c f , FP 1 4 , CE 1 7 8 ) . His advice i s : 
Let us be on our guard against supposing names 
to stand f o r th i n g s . Rather, i n order to see 
what i s being t a l K e d about, consider words i n 
the context of sentences, themselves i n the 
context of discourse, which i t s e l f i s given 
i t s concrete s o c i a l setting,(TECF 2 2 0 ) 
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Iluch of Ramsey's work i s devoted, t h e r e f o r e , to an analysis 
of the contextual s e t t i n g s of r e l i g i o u s words and phrases. 
This " c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n " ^ r e s u l t s , on Ramsey's view, i n a 
language about God s t r u c t u r e d i n terms of a number of d i f f e r e n t 
models, a l l of which can only be understood i n t h e i r appropriate 
contexts. And the use of such language i s only j u s t i f i a b l e 
i f i t i s both consistent and " f i t s " the world, Ramsey 
wr i t e s : 
the word "God" thus derives i t s meaning i n use 
as and when i t / c o n t e x t u a l i z e d i n multi-model 
discourse, which i s subject both to l o g i c a l 
c r i t e r i a and the c r i t e r i o n of "e m p i r i c a l f i t " . ( T G 92) 
A r a d i c a l V.'ittgensteinian would endorse the former c r i t e r i o n , 
but would be l i a b l e to b r i d l e at the l a t t e r . For such a 
person prefers t o t h i n k of t h e o l o g i c a l language games as 
being t o t a l l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and i n t e r n a l l y j u s t i f i e d without 
reference to em p i r i c a l f a c t s ( c f , P h i l l i p s (CP) 9 - 23, (RBPE) 
118 - 119; Winch (ISS) 15, 100 - 101, (UPS) 13? W i t t g e n s t e i n 
(LC) 70 e t c , ) . But Ramsey i s by no means a "Wit t g e n s t e i n i a n 
F i d e i s t " 5 . 
I t i s , of course, naive to set the r e f e r e n t i a l and 
the contextual ("use") theories of meaning one against the 
other. For one of the most important uses of language i s 
to r e f e r to e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y . This i s the c r u c i a l 
element t h a t seems to be omitted by the r a d i c a l W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n . 
Ramsey, however, recognizes how important i t i s to analyse 
the use of a pice of language - at l e a s t i n part - i n terms 
of i t s reference, Tnus: 
we might notice t h a t " I " i s only given i t s f u l l 
- more than "objects" - use i n a discl o s u r e . I f 
we ask "What does ' I ' t a l k of?" we s h a l l only 
know the answer when we come to ourselves, when 
we are aware of ourselves i n a disclosure s i t u a t i o n . 
(PR 215) 
At some point or another, an answer to the question "What 
does t h a t mean?" must include a reference t o something th a t 
e x i s t s outside language, A.nd the f a c t t h a t meta-empirical 
e n t i t i e s cannot be "pointed t o " as e a s i l y as spatio-temporal 
A 
objects does not permit us to say t h a t we can f u l l y 
understand the language t h a t i s used about them without 
reference t o any experience of the objects themselves. 
Religious experience i s surely e s s e n t i a l f o r any r e a l 
understanding of tha t of which r e l i g i o u s language speaks. 
Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t c r i t i c i s m t h a t can 
be made of the e m p i r i c i s t c r i t i q u e of r e l i g i o u s language 
i s t h a t i t confuses meaning wi t h evidence;, i . e . what a r e l i g i o u s 
a s s e r t i o n a c t u a l l y means ( i t s " t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s " ) w i t h the 
( e m p i r i c a l ) ways i n which i t can be shown to be t r u e 
or f a l s e ( i t s "checking c o n d i t i o n s " ) ; c f . Heimheck c h . I I ^ . 
As R.S, Heimbeck has put i t : 
having checking procedures ( v e r i f i c a t i o n and 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n procedures) i s a s u f f i c i e n t 
but not a necessary c o n d i t i o n of c o g n i t i v e 
s ignificance,..,having semantical entailments 
and incompatibles (which also d i s p l a y the 
meaning of c o g n i t i v e l y meaningful sentences) 
i s both a necessary a n d a s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n 
of c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e , ( i b i d , 37) 
V e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s and f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s t s ^ i n t h e i r attempts to 
develop a c r i t e r i o n o f • t^enLngailnes3"ended up w i t h a c r i t e r i o n of'checkability" 
f o r t r u t h . Furthermore, they .worked . w i t h what was an 
inadequate _paradigm . of t r u t h - f o r they i n t e r p r e t e d i t 
e n t i r e l y i n terms of em p i r i c a l t r u t h . Metaphysical, r e l i g i o u s , 
even moral " t r u t h " - they agreed - must be reduced to the 
l e v e l of t r u t h about physical objects or ( a t the most) 
the t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s of sciences otherwise i t s claim 
to be t r u t h would be rejected,, Ramsey w r i t e s : 
When a C h r i s t i a n says "Jesus was conceived by 
the Holy Ghost and born of the V i r g i n Iiary" i t 
i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e that part of what t h i s i m p l i e s , 
v i z , partheno-genesis, i s t r ue or f a l s e i n the 
Li n c o l n and ITapolean senses r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ . (BP I I 201) 
However, he continues: 
But C h r i s t i a n s do not r e j e c t them { i . e . complex 
C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s ] ] as f a l s e - nor of course 
accept them as true - on the supposition t h a t 
they conform to a class of b e l i e f s , i . e 4 
s c i e n t i f i c b e l i e f s , which they could not from 
the nature of the case do. ( i b i d . 202) 
"The Truth" i s wider than j u s t e m p i r i c a l t r u t h s , and i t i s 
only t o be known i n i t s f u l l n e s s i n a v i s i o n or disclosure 
( o f . PI 73 - 75, CBOS 18). 
We have already seen something of Ramsey's treatment 
of the V e r i f i c a t i o n P r i n c i p l e d u ring h i s time at Cambridge. 
I n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s he regards i t as no more than a 
"nonsense j i n g l e " u s e f u l f o r demarcating the t e r r i t o r y of 
s c i e n t i f i c language: 
Bo not take i t too seriously. Do not ask what 
i t means or how i t i s derived, or how i t can be 
defended. S u f f i c e t h a t i t can create a whole 
matrix of em p i r i c a l examples by which the 
language of science can be c l a r i f i e d and 
i l l u m i n a t e d . To use a popular contemporary 
metaphor, the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i n c i p l e reveals 
what i s i n the suitcase of s c i e n t i f i c language 
before i t i s unpacked. (U-FLIG 1/20/22, c f . CE 176) 
To Ramsey - as to most philosophers i n the l a t t e r h a l f of 
the t w e n t i e t h century - v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m appears as a "narrow 
circumscribed view of s i g n i f i c a n t , meaningful language" 
(CPL 244). But he - l i k e others - recognizes t h a t " i n a 
way the basic problem raised by the V e r i f i c a t i o n P r i n c i p l e 
s t i l l remains - namely, how i s sense experience relevant t o 
r e l i g i o u s a ssertions" ( i b i d . 245). Ramsey's own answer, 
of course, was twofold: 
(a) r e l i g i o u s experience - on which r e l i g i o u s assertions are 
based - i s sense experience and more ( o f . PPHT 176); and 
(b) r e l i g i o u s assertions are i n part to be j u s t i f i e d by the 
extent to which they " f i t " the f a c t s and features of the world 
( o f . LffiA 62 - 63 ) . 
But " e m p i r i c a l f i t " , as we s h a l l see s h o r t l y , i s very 
d i f f e r e n t from the v e r i f i c a t i o n by means of empirical deductions 
t h a t i s such a fe a t u r e of the s c i e n t i f i c language game ( c f . 
RSP 80, 90 etc.) 
Other philosophers of r e l i g i o n have also f e l t i t 
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necessary to reckon w i t h the "afterglow" of v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m . 
Ramsey's p o s i t i o n i s close t o the "Right Wing 
Q 
Response" to the r e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s ' o n a l l e n g e as i t i s 
presented by L i t c h e l l , Hick, Perre etc. , although- he- opts -"for 
a broader conception of what c o n s t i t u t e s e m p i r i c a l experience 
than e m p i r i c i s t s u s u a l l y assume" ( G i l l (IR) 4 3 ) . He refuses, 
t h e r e f o r e , to mount an apologetic f o r theism t h a t would be 
completely acceptable bo the v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t at h i s own 
l e v e l . The v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t must "come up higher" - to 
Ramsey's l e v e l : and allow the existence, and v e r i d i c a l 
nature, of disclos u r e s , 
Ramsey i s not to be counted among the theologians 
who regard r e l i g i o u s assertions as u n f a l s i f i a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e . 
As we s h a l l see he contends th a t b e l i e v e r s should accept the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of there being " c r i t i c a l c o n t r a - f a o t o r s " to 
t h e i r f a i t h (HG 213). But t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s to be found 
i n a discussion of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the t r u t h , r a t h e r 
than the meaning, of r e l i g i o u s language , He does also 
w r i t e of the "check" on discourse about God ( i t s " f i t w ith 
the universe") as a defence against the charge of 
meaninglessness (RFT 31 )• But h i . s more usual p o s i t i o n i s 
t h a t even those types of " v e r i f i c a t i o n " and " f a l s i f i c a t i o n " 
which are appropriate i n the area of r e l i g i o u s knowledge are 
c r i t e r i a of t r u t h , r a t h e r than c r i t e r i a of meaning. And 
t h i s perhaps explains why h i s w r i t i n g s are not as d i r e c t l y 
relevant to the debate i n i t i a t e d by Antony Fiew as are 
those of c e r t a i n other philosophers of r e l i g i o n . He 
i n d u b i t a b l y denies t h a t the sort of empirical non-
f a l s i f i a b i l i t y of which Flew i s t a l k i n g presents an 
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^insurmountable c h a l l e n g i t o r e l i g i o u s knowledge claims ; 
"a devotion which i s n o n - f a l s i f i a b l e , which can never be 
caught out, which can contain w i t h i n i t s e l f t h i s or t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstance" i s not necessarily "disingenuously 
vaaous and i r r e l e v a n t " ( F I 37). This point v / i l l be taken 
up again l a t e r . 
3 6 2 
2. S c i e n t i f i c and Theological " V e r i f i c a t i o n " 
I n h i s inaugural lecture at Oxford, Ramsey remarked: 
The importance of t h i s f a l s i f i c a t i o n puzzle i s 
surely to remind us that the word "God" does 
not work as a high-grade s c i e n t i f i c word at a l l 
I t i s indeed t h i s fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n the 
l o g i c a l geography of s c i e n t i f i c words and "God" 
which the f a l s i f i c a t i o n puzzle underlines, and 
the only lesson we have to l e a r n i s t h a t the word 
"God" when introduced must be given some other 
so r t of empirical j u s t i f i c a t i o n , (1.19; of. CCP 258) 
Ramsey stresses i n several places the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
experimental v e r i f i c a t i o n i n science and what he c a l l s 
" e m p i r i c a l f i t " i n theology. He o u t l i n e s the nature of 
s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n thus: 
Prom a theory or a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , sharp, precise 
deductions must be able t o be made i n d e t a i l and 
subsequently v e r i f i e d . I f they are not v e r i f i e d 
the theory or g e n e r a l i z a t i o n f a l l s , or (more 
accurately) i s g r e a t l y weakened. Here i s 
s c i e n t i f i c reasoning: c r i s p , c l e a r , precise, 
and appealing i n the end to observable f a c t . 
(RSCS 67) 
He then asks, "Why have r e l i g i o u s people been scandalized 
over t h i s experimental method?". He suggests, by way of an 
answer, two bad reasons, and one r a t h e r b e t t e r one (R3CS 67-
75) : 
( i ) because the experimental method "panders to 
man's s e l f i s h desire f o r human mastery", 
Ramsey r e p l i e s , however, that "Pride i s no 
p e c u l i a r l y s c i e n t i f i c v i c e " ; 
( i i ) because the experimental method i s fundamentally 
i r r e l i g i o u s i n that i t puts nature to the t e s t 
( c f . Foster 58). 
Ramsey r e p l i e s : 
The s c i e n t i s t puts h i s questions t o nature a l l 
r i g h t , but what he t e s t s i s not nature, but 
his own i n s i g h t and t h i s can be a very 
h u m i l i a t i n g experience - not f o r nature, 
but f o r the s c i e n t i s t ! (RSCS 68) 
( i i i ) because.». 
S c i e n t i f i c method, i n f o r m u l a t i n g v e r i f i a b l e 
deductions, has a procedure t o which there 
i s no t h e o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l and which i s q u i t e 
u n l i k e the theologian's a t t i t u d e to nature. 
There are nothing l i k e v e r i f i a b l e deductions 
i n t h e o l o g i c a l method, ( i b i d , 69) 
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V/e do not seek v e r i f i c a t i o n of our prayers or of our assertions 
about God i n the way t h a t a s c i e n t i s t searches f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n 
(or f a l s i f i c a t i o n ) of his hypotheses. Even i n the contest 
on l i t . Carmel, " E l i j a h i s not v e r i f y i n g d e d u c t i o n s ^ , he 
i s y i e l d i n g himself i n prayer, and t r u s t i n g God f o r some 
- no matter what = v i s i b l e answer" ( i b i d . ?1). And, i n any 
case,Ranisey argues: 
I n many ways Elijah,„.might have had h i s 
r e l i g i o n enriched, i f God had not displayed 
himself so vigorously and so v e r i f i a b l y on 
t h a t afternoon, ( i b i d . 70 
But why cannot theology provide us with v e r i f i a b l e 
deductions, i n the way that science does? Why i s i t t h a t ... 
a t h e o l o g i c a l model i s not judged f o r i t s 
success or f a i l u r e by reference to the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of v e r i f i a b l e deductions. I t i s r a t h e r judged 
by i t s s t a b i l i t y over the widest possible range 
of phenomena, by. i t s a b i l i t y to incorporate 
the most diverse phenomena not i n c o n s i s t e n t l y . 
A p a r t i c u l a r model i n theology, by contrast 
w i t h the s c i e n t i f i c case, i s not now usedto 
generate deductions which may or may not be 
experimentally v e r i f i e d . As a model i n theology 
i s developed, i t r a t h e r stands or f a l l s according 
to i t s success (or otherwise) i n harmonizing 
whatever events are to hand. There are i n 
theology, as opposed to science, no deductive 
d e r i v a t i o n s , emerging one by one, to confirm 
or f a l s i f y the theory which i s on our l i p s , 
(MH 16 - 17; cI.TRT 54, TTST 78) 
Ramsey seems to be o f f e r i n g us two reasons f o r t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between science and theology: 
REASON ( i ) The subject matter of theology, i . e . God, i s u n l i k e 
a s c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t i n t h a t God serves to i n t e g r a t e and 
e x p l a i n a f a r greater range of spatio-temporal events^and 
to do so i n a very d i f f e r e n t way. For "God" - l i k e "I" -
i s a metaphysical category. Thus (a) "God e x i s t s " , and 
(b) " I e x i s t " , are presupposed by a l l the s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s 
about (a) the universe, and (b) my body and i t s behaviour, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . But j u s t as "from such assertions as 'I'm I ' , 
' I e x i s t ' , ' I am alive'....we can make no p r e c i s e l y v e r i f i a b l e 
deductions, Whatever f a c t you describe about me now might 
have been otherwise" (RSCS 73; c f . CPL 246); so "Prom 'God 
e x i s t s 1 nothing v e r i f i a b l e can be l o g i c a l l y deduced" ( i b i d . 7 4 ) . 




p e r s o n a l i t y 
/ — N 
"mass" "force" " p a r t i c l e " etc. 
\ b. \ b. 
\ 
spatio temporal events - events 
a : words as a r i s i n g i n r e l a t i o n to a. discl o s u r e ; 
and b : words as g i v i n g r i s e to v e r i f i a b l e deductions; 
c : p e r s o n a l i t y as the i n t e g r a t i n g category which 
may provide some sor t of l o g i c a l clue to the 
behaviour of the word "God". 
I t remains t r u e , of course^that "God" i s not j u s t posited 
as a usefu l i n t e g r a t i n g category i n our metaphysical mapping 
He i s also known i n a cosmic disclosure "when the whole 
universe i s gathered together" ( i b i d . 7 3 ) . But Ramsey's 
main point here i s tha t words l i k e "God" and " I " operate 
very d i f f e r e n t l y from "mass", " p a r t i c l e " , "gene" or " e l e c t r o n " , 
f o r one of t h e i r main tasks i s t o i n t e g r a t e i n a more abstract 
way a wider range of events. 
The " s c i e n t i f i c method" involves i n essence the 
con s t r u c t i o n of a hypothesis on the basis of emp i r i c a l 
evidence, followed by the t e s t i n g of th a t hypothesis - i . e . 
making deductions from the hypothesis and seeing whether 
they are v e r i f i e d lay empirical t e s t . This i s the hypothetico-
deduotive method: 
S c i e n t i f i c knowledge. ... i s not a r r i v e d at "by 
applying some i n d u c t i v e inference proce dure 
to antecedently c o l l e c t e d data, but rather "by... 
"the method of hypothesis"; i . e . "by i n v e n t i n g 
hypotheses as t e n t a t i v e answers to a problem 
under study, and then sub j e c t i n g these t o 
empirical t e s t . I t w i l l he part of such a 
t e s t t o see whether the hypothesis i s home 
out "by whatever relevant f i n d i n g s may have 
been gathered before i t s f o r m u l a t i o n ; an 
acceptable hypothesis w i l l have to f i t the 
a v a i l a b l e relevant data. Another part of 
the t e s t w i l l consist i n d e r i v i n g some t e s t 
i m p l i c a t i o n s from the hypothesis and checking 
these by s u i t a b l e observations and experiments, 
(Hempel 17 - 18) 
Philosophers of science commotJy deny t h a t s c i e n t i f i c 
methodology i s "in d u c t i v e i n the narrow sense" (Hempel 18), 
i . e . that i t i s " a method that leads, by means of mechanically 
applicable r u l e s , from observed f a c t s to corresponding general 
p r i n c i p l e s " ( i b i d , 14, c f . Toulmin 39 n. 1 , Harre ch , 2 , Losee 
ch. 10, Popper (CH) ch.1 , Kuhn (CDPIl) 12) . On the contrary: 
The t r a n s i t i o n from data to theory requires 
c r e a t i v e imagination. S c i e n t i f i c hypotheses 
and theories are not derived from observed 
i a c t s , but invented i n order to account l o r 
them. Tney c o n s t i t u t e guesses....(Hempel 15) 
Such an account places great stress on the r o l e of the 
imagination i n s c i e n t i f i c methodic!'. Popper (RSE) 78, (LSD) 
32), Although, as Toulmin reminds us, i t i s not an "untutored 
imagination" and i t must be combined wi t h " t r a i n e d s k i l l " 
(Toulmin 39 ~ 40 ) . Peter Iledawar has spoken of the generative 
act i n s c i e n t i f i c discovery as a non-logical act of i n t u i t i o n 
( c f . I.edawar 46, 55 - 57)• These accounts have at l e a s t 
something i n common with the i n t u i t i o n of which Ramsey speaks 
and the place he gives to imagination i n s c i e n t i f i c method 
( c f . U-Si.iE 6, HI,: 57) , 
But how does "metaphysical methodology" d i f f e r from 
s c i e n t i f i c methodology? V/e should note, f i r s t of a l l , t h a t 
the hypothetico-deductive scheme must he given a l o g i c a l , 
r a t h e r than merely a temporal-genetic, s i g n i f i c a n c e . For 
i t claims t h a t a hypothesis i n t e g r a t e s a c e r t a i n range cf 
f a c t s , some of which provide the "evidence" from which 
the i n i t i a l act of i n s i g h t a r i s e s , and some of which serve 
as the "new evidence" that - confirms the hypothesis ( i . e . 
t h a t • v e r i f i e s the deductions from the hypothesis). 
As Eempel puts i t s 
from a l o g i c a l point of view, the strength of 
the support t h a t a hypothesis receives from 
e, given body of data should depend only on 
what the hypothesis asserts and what the 
data are: the question of whether the 
hypothesis or the data were presented f i r s t , 
being a purely h i s t o r i c a l matter, should not 
count as a f f e c t i n g the confirmation of the 
hypothesis. (llempel 38) 
A s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis or postulated e n t i t y serves, therefore 
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as the best " s c i e n t i f i c explanation" f o r a l i m i t e d range of 
empirical f a c t s : thus, e.g., "gene" explains the f a c t s about 
i n h e r i t a n c e , and " e l e c t r o n " explains c e r t a i n physical and 
chemical p r o p e r t i e s of matter. I n the case of metaphysics, 
however, the range of phenomena "explained" by "God" or 
" I " i s very much wider - i . e . a l l the f a c t s about the Universe 
or a l l the f a c t s about t h i s human being's behaviour, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . P a r t l y because of t h i s , metaphysical "hypothese 
are much more a b s t r a c t , much more remote from the world, than 
t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c counterparts. They serve as very general 
explanations, and not as r e s t r i c t e d , p a r t i c u l a r i z e d 
explanations. And they o f t e n "explain" by reference to 
meta-empirical e n t i t i e s whose r e l a t i o n to e m p i r i c a l f a c t s 
i s seen as c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of other e m p i r i c a l 
e n t i t i e s . I.ietaphysical e x p l a n a t i o n ^ i s , t h e r e f o r e , d i f f e r e n t 
from s c i e n t i f i c explanation; and the two d i s c i p l i n e s have 
rather d i f f e r e n t checking techniques ( c f . BP I I 203). Such 
an analysis would t i e i n wi t h accounts of metaphysical 
assertions as "world hypotheses" or generalized "co-ordinatin, 
analogies" ( c f . Pepper 369 and Emmet (N?ZL') 215) -
The t h e i s t claims t h a t the "God-hypothesis" 
i n t e g r a t e s across the e n t i r e Universe. "God" i s theref o r e 
a metaphysical category and i n c o n s t r u c t i n g t h i s 
category the metaphysician must take i n t o account a l l 
the empirical evidence there i s . Ramsey has argued that 
the whole world may somehow he t r e a t e d as the medium of a 
"cosmic dis c l o s u r e " . This may be h i s way of 
recognizing t h a t everything i s already taken i n t o account 
when the t h e i s t p o s i t s "God" as h i s explanatory concept. 
On t h i s model, nothing can serve to conclusi v e l y v e r i f y 
or f a l s i f y the God-hypothesis. For u n l i k e h i g h l y s p e c i f i c 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses, which i n t e g r a t e over a r e l a t i v e l y 
narrow range of f a c t s and which may be f a l s i f i e d by other 
relevant f a c t s which they do not i n t e g r a t e , general 
metaphysical explanations are at a very remove l e v e l and 
i n t e g r a t e and explain a l l f a c t s ( c f . D i l l e y 121 , 127 - 128 3,. 
ch. 4» Kearney 258). 
Tnus G.B. Daly argues: 
ITo statement about r e a l i t y as a whole could be 
e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e , i n the sense of i t s 
"being possible to describe i n observational 
terms two d i f f e r e n t states of the universe -
one th a t takes place when the statement i s 
tru e and another when i t i s not". A statement 
about r e a l i t y as a whole must be compatible 
with a l l states of the Universe, or "neutral 
i n respect of matters of f a c t " . , . , A l l meta-
physical statements are of t h i s k i n d . . , . 
(Daly 202) 
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S i m i l a r l y F, Ferre w r i t e s : 
a jjnetaphysical] model which i s taken to 
include, i n p r i n c i p l e , a l l r e a l or possible 
events, cannot he disproved by any r e a l or 
possible events t h a t come to pass. I t has 
already, i n germ, accounted f o r anything 
th a t might occur. (Ferre (JILI.l) 81; c f . Black (lib') ^42) 
Thus the concept of God hasalready been constructed 
so as to i n t e g r a t e across the universe. I t contains w i t h i n 
i t s e l f , e.g.;some more or less consistent explanations of 
the e v i l i n the world. Tnerefore i t i s not possible to 
point to the existence of e v i l as evidence s u f f i c i e n t to 
f a l s i f y the hypothesis of God's existence. The God-hypothesis 
does ex p l a i n a l l that i t should explain because theologians 
have constructed i t so tha t i t w i l l " . , A s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis 
may f a i l ( i . e . be f a l s i f i e d ) when s c i e n t i s t s are no longer 
able to adjust the hypothesis to cover apparently c o n f l i c t i n g 
evidence ( c f . Popper (LSD) ch.IV, (CR) chs.1 & o ) . But t h i s 
i s because the s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis i s less wide-ranging, 
less remoie from empirical f a c t s and less adaptable, than 
the t h e o l o g i c a l hypothesis. Furthermore, God cannot be 
i s o l a t e d experimentally f o r f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Nor can we compare the world t h a t he creates w i t h a " c o n t r o l " 
world t h a t he doesn't create. For these reasons "theological 
v e r i f i c a t i o n " i s l i k e l y to be very d i f f e r e n t from s c i e n t i f i c 
v e r i f i c a t i o n . Ramsey w r i t e s : 
There i s , i n t r u t h , no empirical s i t u a t i o n which 
would lead the t h e i s t t o say tha t God does not 
exist.„,„.it i s bound to be admitted t h a t b e l i e f 
i n God i s a s p e c i a l l y important brand of dominating 
b e l i e f which only has the most curious and d i s t a n t 
empirical relevance. I t i s not at a l l a " s c i e n t i f i c 
a t t i t u d e , " (CCP 257) 
A l l t h a t n o n - f a l s i f i c a t i o n suggests i s t h a t "God" 
does not work l i k e a word i n an observation 
sentence, t h a t t h e o l o g i c a l assertions are not 
s c i e n t i f i c assertions, and what we have t r i e d to 
do ....has been to show that the word "God" has a 
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d i f f e r e n t sort of empirical relevance alt o g e t h e r . 
I t i s a metaphysical apex which has, w i t h the 
associated index, an a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t 
empirical j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the words of 
subordinate languages,...... 
I f we are asked what would "be d i f f e r e n t i f God 
di d not e x i s t , t h i s i s r e a l l y to ask what would 
he d i f f e r e n t i f we ceased to have the word "God" 
as a metaphysical index..... The answer i s . . . 
e v e r y t h i n g . . T h e word "God" ( i f we have 
constructed our t h e i s t i c map c o r r e c t l y ) i s 
necessarily hound up with the whole t o t a l i t y of 
f a c t s as they are. ( i b i d . 268 - 269) 
The above analysis i s somewhat at odds with the view 
that God i s disclosed to us as having a c e r t a i n nature - i . e . 
that the concept of God i s disclosure-given and not simply 
constructed by us so as t o accord w i t h these metaphysical 
c r i t e r i a . I t i s surely necessary, however, t o view the 
concept of God, both as ( p r i m a r i l y ) discovered i n r e l i g i o u s 
experience and as ( p a r t l y ) reconstructed ("adapted", " q u a l i f i e d " 
etc.) to serve as a more e f f e c t i v e explanatory ( i n t e g r a t i v e ) 
category. Thus the man who has an experience of God may 
say, " I am aware of an i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g , omnicompetent 
God". But as he i s also aware of the existence of e v i l 
i n the world, he w i l l adapt h i s concept of God accordingly 
(e.g. "This God must be unable to prevent n a t u r a l e v i l " ^ 
or " t h i s God must have a morally s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r 
all o w i n g moral e v i l " e t c . ) . I n .this' way the "discoveries" of 
r e l i g i o u s experience and those of metaphysical c o n s t r u c t i o n 
may c o n f l i c t . The God we encounter i n worship may seem 
to be " a l l - p o w e r f u l " ( c f . Kick (i3GL) 35 - 36, Findlay 51 - 52) ; 
but our r e f l e c t i o n on the e v i l i n the world may lead us to 
regard t h i s a t t r i b u t i o n as no more than a "metaphysical 
compliment" ( c f . Whitehead (SI.M) 214). We might the n modify 
our view of God accordingly (e.g. "God i s extremely, powerful, 
but not powerful enough to a b o l i s h e v i l " ) . 
REASON ( i i ) Answer ( i ) , then, i s e s s e n t i a l l y a metaphysical 
answer, and has been i l l u s t r a t e d i n the section on metaphysic 
above. But Ramsey has another reason t o o f f e r f o r the 
d i f f e r e n c e between theology and deductively v e r i f i a b l e 
science: 
the problem of r e l i g i o n , or more accurately of 
theology, i s , s t a r t i n g from t h i s v i s i o n , to get 
empi r i c a l relevance. No v e r i f i a b l e deductions 
can be made. Not that t h i s i s s p e c i a l l y 
d i s t r e s s i n g - i t i s merely i n d i c a t i v e of what 
r e l i g i o u s l o y a l t y i s , and l e t us recognize i n 
parenthesis t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y recurs, as vie 
might well expect i t to recur, i n m o r a l i t y . 
We may recognize duty w i t h a c a p i t a l D, we may 
we l l be aware of an o b l i g a t i o n , but very o f t e n 
i t i s an o b l i g a t i o n which defies any exact 
empirical formulation.(RSCS 83) 
Here Ramsey i s h i n t i n g at something which he developed i n 
more d e t a i l l a t e r : 
Prom "a loves b" nothing can be r i g o r o u s l y 
deduced which permits of appeal to experiment 
and consequent v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n . 
For instance, someone might allege t h a t i f 
"a loves b" there w i l l be some occasion when 
a w i l l be found planning f o r b's happiness; 
but a might some day plan f o r V s happiness 
simply i n the hope of favours to come - and 
apparent experimental v e r i f i c a t i o n would be 
wholly deceptive. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , from "a 
ioves I D " someone might suppose that a. would 
never be seen f o r example i n any sor t of 
way which might cause _b even momentary 
unhajpLness. But t h i s would be a f a r too 
shallow view of human r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; love 
indeed i s "deepened", through tensions l i v e d 
through and redeemed. I n b r i e f , "a loves la" 
v / i l l only be v e r i f i e d i n terms of 
"emp i r i c a l f i t " and the t e s t w i l l be how 
stable the a s s e r t i o n i s as an o v e r a l l 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of a complex; m u l t i - v a r i e d 
p a t t e r n of behaviour which i t i s impossible i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r case to specify deductively 
beforehand, (LIlvI 38) 
Love, Ramsey argues, i s not tested by means of v e r i f i a b l e 
deductions.„,. 
we only check i t by seeing how wel l i t 
harmonizes many diverse patterns of behaviour, 
and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l only be found by 
looking "back on these patterns of "behaviour 
extending over many years, (BP I I 2O3) 
Love, then can be tested ,by the c r i t e r i o n of "e m p i r i c a l 
f i t " ( c f . Kellenherger (MFC) 243 - 245). The no t i o n of 
empirical f i t w i l l he discussed i n more d e t a i l l a t e r ; hut 
I s h a l l argue here t h a t t h i s apparently " e m p i r i c a l " 
j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i o n i s not t h a t f a r removed from the 
"metaphysical answer" given above under ( i ) . I s h a l l also 
explore i n more depth Ramsey's use of the category of "love" 
w i t h reference to the d i s t i n c t i o n between saence and 
theology. And again I s h a l l argue that the d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s best understood as a d i s t i n c t i o n between non-metaphysical 
and metaphysical categories. 
Ramsey asks about.... 
the disclosure which occurs when the C h r i s t i a n 
discerns the grace of God i n Ch r i s t and responds 
to i t w i t h the commitment of the Apostle Thomas, 
can i t be a p t l y modelled i n terms of the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y personal disclosure which can 
be c a l l e d "love", or i n terms of the t r u s t we 
are prepared to place i n some man? (EG 211 - 212) 
He develops t h i s point at some l e n g t h i n the same essay: 
Suppose we now ask„„„.but i s tha t a genuine 
" f a l l i n g i n love" or not? I s tha t man " r e a l l y " 
trustworthy? \?hat can we say about the p a t t e r n 
of r e l i a b l e discourse which meets these questions? 
I t w i l l concern i t s e l f , I suggest, w i t h at l e a s t 
f i v e p o i n t s : 
(a) There must be some pr o - f a c t o r s which we recognize 
as grounds of making the presupposition of love or 
trustworthiness at a l l , . . . . 
(b) There must be the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h i s 
presupposition of love or trustworthiness harmonises 
with a vast area of X's behaviour towards me. 
(c) On the other hand, while there may be some 
c o n t r a - f a c t o r s , the existence of these w i l l not, 
by i t s e l f i n v a l i d a t e our presumption. 
(d) Even so, there must c e r t a i n l y be the l o g i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y of r e j e c t i n g our presupposition i f too 
many con t r a - f a c t o r s come to l i g h t . Further, t h i s 
l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l remain even though the 
exact point when the presupposition w i l l be r e j e c t e d 
cannot be s p e c i f i e d beforehand. I n c i d e n t a l l y , i n 
t h i s connection i t seems to me t h a t , i n what 
contemporary philosophers c a l l the f a l s i f i c a t i o n 
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controversy, r e l i g i o u s people have been f a r too 
i n c l i n e d to grant t h e i r opponents' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of such phrases as " I w i l l t r u s t God though he 
slay me", as though r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f could never 
e n t e r t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of c r i t i c a l contra-
f a c t o r s . 
(e) Here, a curious p o i n t . I t may well be t h a t 
as our perspective i s broadened, what we supposed 
to be a p r o - f a c t o r at the s t a r t , indeed t h a t i n 
which our judgment of love or trustworthiness 
o r i g i n a t e d , may t u r n out to be mistaken or i t s e l f 
ambiguous. But t h a t , by i t s e l f , w i l l not weaken 
our judgment of love or trustworthiness i f , by 
t h a t time, our wider perspective i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
stable to incorporate i t . (KG 212 - 213) 
Eere, we may note, C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i s viewed as 
f a l s i f i a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , although - as we have seen - Ramsey 
views i t as h i g h l y r e s i s t a n t to f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e 
( c f . CCP 257)- Ramsey's whole discussion i s less useful 
than i t might be because of h i s reluctance to specify 
the sort of " c o n t r a - f a c t o r s " t h a t might u n i t e to f a l s i f y 
a r e l i g i o u s assertion. However h i s claim t h a t "we have 
no need to speel0y a point of r e j e c t i o n beforehand" (HG 213) 
seems to i n d i c a t e thet he i s not concerned over much with the 
l o g i c a l checkirgconditions of r e l i g i o u s assertions, but more 
w i t h the (psychological} conditions under which a r e l i g i o u s 
c o n v i c t i o n w i l l i n f a c t s t i l l be r e t a i n e d . This does seem 
to be the i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s ( r a t h e r i n f e l i c i t o u s ) passage: 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h might reasonably remain i f 
some one event or other proved f a l s e as a 
h i s t o r i c a l f a c t . But not a l l the events 
must be proved f a l s e without our being 
converted to i n f i d e l i t y . (HG 214) 
Thus, f o r Ramsey, r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i s falsLfiable i n p r i n c i p l e 
( l o g i c a l l y f a l s i f i a b l e ) and ps y c h o l o g i c a l l y i t w i l l be 
" f a l s i f i e d " i f a l l the empirical t e s t s t u r n out negatively. 
I t should be noted here that the passage i n CCP i s concerned 
w i t h the existence of God, whereas the quot a t i o n j u s t given 
from HG i s to be found i n the context of an analysis of 
the question, "Did the Resurrection occur?". The occurrence 
of the Res .urrection may he t r e a t e d as a small scale "hypothesi 
which i s much less r e s i s t a n t to f a l s i f i c a t i o n ( l o g i c a l l y and 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ) than what we might describe as the l a r g e r 
scale "theory" of the existence of God. However, i t i s not 
always clear i n "History and the Gospels" whether Ramsey 
i s speaking of small scale r e l i g i o u s hypotheses or of 
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l a r g e r , a l l embracing, t h e i s t i c theories . 
I t i s o f t e n argued that a key d i f f e r e n c e between 
science and r e l i g i o n i s t h a t the l a t t e r e n t e r p r i s e does not 
propose t e n t a t i v e hypotheses - or theories - at a l l ( c f . 
ZcPnerson (PR3) 110 - 111, Kellenberger (RDPK) 131, i.laclntyre 
(LSRB) 171 - 172, 184 - 187 e t c . ) . Theology cannot "get 
along without appeal to a u t h o r i t y " (HcPherson (PRB) 112, 
c f . l i a c l n t y r e (LSRB) 189 - 192), whereas i n science - at 
l e a s t on a Popperian account - c o n j e c t u r e / r e f u t a t i o n are 
f a r more important. This d i s t i n c t i o n may be presented as 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between "commitment" and " o b j e c t i v i t y " , or 
between the s e l f - i n v o l v i n g assertions of r e l i g i o n and the 
n e u t r a l assertions of science ( c f . Haclntyre (LSRB) l o c . c i t . , 
Evans (DSRA) 111 - 117, 125 - 128). But such demarcations 
are f a r too clear cut ( c f . w'.H. Au s t i n (RNS) y3 - 113; 
Coulson 66 - 69, 72; S c h i l l i n g (TPN) passim, i b i d . (SR) 
ch.IX). C e r t a i n l y i t i s not the case th a t a l l s c i e n t i f i c 
hypotheses, postulates and the o r i e s are held equally 
t e n t a t i v e l y . Rather we must d i s t i n g u i s h between the 
t e n t a t i v e commitment to " a u x i l i a r y hypotheses" and the 
scientist's much stronger commitment to the hard-core doctrines 
of a"research programme" ( c f . Lakatos passim, Kuhn (SSR) & 
(LDPR), liagee 4 1 ; also RSP «5 - 86, 118). Yet although 
such a commitment to c e n t r a l postulates i s very strong ( c f , 
Quine (i'LPV) 43 ) 7 i t need not be u n c o n d i t i o n a l . Even "research 
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programmes" and "paradigms" are from time to time overthrown 
i n " s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n s " ( c f . again Lakatos and Kuhn, also 
U.K. Austin (RI\TS) 112 - 113, Barbour (i.IIP) ch . 6 ) . 
Such concepts i n the philosophy of science have 
r e c e n t l y received a t t e n t i o n from philosophers of r e l i g i o n 
( c f . Barbour (i/HIP), M i t c h e l l (JRB)), Barbour proposes a 
spectrum of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y , viewing', s c i e n t i f i c laws as 
less r e s i s t a n t to f a l s i f i c a t i o n than t h e o r i e s , theories 
as less r e s i s t a n t than research programmes, and research 
programmes as less r e s i s t a n t than metaphysical assumptions 
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( o n . c i t . 114). On t h i s spectrum " r e l i g i o u s paradigms" 
would be seen as more r e s i s t a n t to f a l s i f i c a t i o n than 
s c i e n t i f i c paradigms - both being less r e s i s t a n t than 
metaphysical systems (132 - 133). And i f C h r i s t i a n theism 
i s "a special case of metaphysical reasoning. . , ([attempting) 
to provide an account of everything there i s i n accordance 
w i t h i n t e l l i g i b l e p r i n c i p l e s " ( M i t c h e l l (JRB) 6O) , i t w i l l 
be s t r o n g l y r e s i s t a n t to f a l s i f i c a t i o n ( c f . i b i d , c h . 7 ) . 
This i s not l e a s t because a metaphysical system i t s e l f 
decides what i s to count as " r e a l " , and t h e r e f o r e as "evidence" 
e i t h e r f o r or against i t s e l f ( c f . i b i d . 71 - 74, 85; Ferre' 
(LTLI.l) a 1 , Ayer (CP) 2 1 , 27) . Thus metaphysical systems 
cannot simply he judged, against the f a c t s because the 
system i t s e l f determines v/hat the " f a c t s " are (>,7alsh (l.i) 
178). Yet there are c r i t e r i a f o r t e s t i n g such metaphysical 
schemes. V/e might ask, f o r example, Does t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
scheme r e a l l y cover a l l the f a c t s , or i s i t less adequate 
i n important areas than other schemes'? ( c f . V.ralsh (M) 179)» 
57? 
I s i t " i l l u m i n a t i n g " and " f e r t i l e " , h e l p i n g us to see what 
we did not see before? ( c f . i b i d . 180 - 183; Wisdom (PD) ch.Xl). 
I s i t a system, of p r a c t i c a l importance ;one " i n r e l a t i o n to 
which (a mail] l i v e s h i s l i f e " ? ( c f . I . i i t c h e l l (JRB) 122). 
However we assess them, the o v e r a l l theories or 
conceptual schemes t h a t metaphysics provide are of c e n t r a l 
importance i n C n r i s t i a n b e l i e f . For, as L i t c h e l l has put 
i t : 
I t i s only i n the l i g h t of some o v e r a l l theory 
t h a t the man i n the garden could be e n t i t l e d 
to claim t h a t what he experienced r e a l l y was 
(amounted t o ) being i n the presence of and 
hearing the voice of the gardener, ( i b i d . 1 1 4 - 115) 
Metaphysical schemes do not j u s t conceptually i n t e g r a t e 
" a l l t h a t i s " , they also determine what we believe "there i s " 
- and could p o s s i b l y be - i n the f i r s t place. 
But l e t us now t u r n w i t h Rt.msey to the question, 
"Bid the Resurrection occur?',' He develops h i s answer 
along the l i n e s t h a t he has already traced (EG 213 - 214). 
Here again there i s the f i v e - f o l d p a t t e r n : 
(a) p r o - f a c t o r s : which include the empty tomb 
and the "appearances" to the d i s c i p l e s ; 
(b) narmonisation: does the r e s u r r e c t i o n -
presupposition harmonise w i t h the existence 
of the C n r i s t i a n Cnurch and the observance 
of Sunday?; 
(c) contra - f a c t o r s : e.g. the rumour of the body 
being s t o l e n , the problem of miracles i n 
general; 
(d) f a l s i f i c a t i o n : "We must be prepared to 
r e j e c t the Resurrection i f too many contra-
f a c t o r s appear. But we have no need to 
s p e c i f y a point of r e j e c t i o n beforehand" 
( i b i d . 213) 
(e) the s h i f t i n g of the grounds f o r the a s s e r t i o n 
Ramsey argues t h a t , in- the case of f a l l i n g i n 
love: " I t may be that the look of the eyes 
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which f i r s t evoked the love only occurred 
because of the s k i l f u l use of eye-shadow.„.. 
Even so, the l o y a l t y . . . may remain, and 
reasonably remain, even though...the o r i g i n a l 
event from which i t took i t s r i s e proves bogus", 
( i b i d . 214) 
And the s i t u a t i o n i s the same w i t h regard t o 
the fiesurrection. (This, presumably, i s only 
an u n d e r l i n i n g of the general d i s t i n c t i o n 
'between the genesis and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
b e l i e f s . ) 
Ramsey proceeds from t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of the analogy 
of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of love-assertions i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
r e l i g i o u s case ,to a more general use of the analogy* " I f 
a r e l i g i o n takes 'love' as i t s key concept, " he asserts, 
" i t s cosmic claims are much more l i k e l y t o be reasonably 
sustained" (lIC- 214). For: 
the t e s t of whether our " f a l l i n g i n love" i s 
or i s not reasonable, w i l l be...whether the 
r e s u l t i n g l o y a l t y and p r o - a t t i t u d e can remain 
when confronted w i t h a l a r g e r and l a r g e r 
p i c t u r e , and when the empirical canvas 
broadens„(ibid.) 
Ramsey goes on to add the complication t h a t " i t i s 'love' which 
of a l l personal a c t i v i t i e s i s the one most able of i t s e l f t o 
convert contra-considerations i n t o p r o - a t t i t u d e s " ( i b i d . ) . 
This a d d i t i o n casts doubt on the prima f a c i e most l i k e l y 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the previous q u o t a t i o n as an analysis of 
l o g i c a l r a t h e r than psychological conditions ( c f , "reasonable"). 
The ambiguity i s , however, unavoidable i f we f o l l o w Ramsey's 
main l i n e of thought and view a r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n as 
analogous to " f a l l i n g i n love" and " t r u s t i n g someone". For, 
as I . I i t c h e l l has made c l e a r ( M i t c h e l l (TF) 103 - 105), the 
" f a l s i f i c a t i o n " of a t r u s t i n g commitment i s a matter both 
of psychology and of l o g i c ( c f . also Mooney 11 , Helm (VB) 1b8). 
There can be no such t h i n g as a n e u t r a l , o b j e c t i v e account 
of what f a l s i f i e s an ("impersonal") r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f ; f o r 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s are held by r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r s , and they 
are the people who decide what i n f a c t counts as f a l s i f y i n g 
evidence. And t h e i r decisions on such matters are l i k e l y 
to c o n f l i c t w i t h those of non-believers. 
This aspect of Ramsey's analysis i s a most valuable 
reminder, t h e r e f o r e , of the nature of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v i n g . 
But I f e e l t h a t i t can be pressed f u r t h e r , t a k i n g up the 
assertion t h a t r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i s i n part a r e c o g n i t i o n of 
God's love f o r us, as well as being a l o v i n g response on 
our part t o God. And the point I would want to make here 
i s t h a t love i s e s s e n t i a l l y a personal a c t i v i t y ( c f . I.IcCluskey 
155, RB 192, GS 4, RL 86 - 87, U-PE 47 - 4 8 ) . Thus part of 
the d i f f i c u l t y i n v e r i f y i n g or f a l s i f y i n g love-assertions 
( i n t h i s case assertions about another person's love) i s 
the fundamental general d i f f i c u l t y of v e r i f y i n g assertions 
about persons. For persons are more than what i s observable. 
$>hey are more than what can be v e r i f i e d ( c f . HG 216 - 217). 
Persons are, on the one hand, f r e e centres of a c t i v i t y ; on the 
other hand, they possess an e s s e n t i a l l y p r i v a t e mental l i f e . 
As Ramsey has argued as s t r i d e n t l y as anyone, persons 
transcend v e r i f i a b l e c r i t e r i a . Thus the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
our b e l i e f i n I and our b e l i e f i n God must be problematic, 
f o r I and God are meta-empdrical" agents and centres of 
consciousness. There i s a p a r a l l e l to t h i s problem i n 
psychical research, where the claim that ( f o r example) "there 
i s another - unobservable - agent i n t h i s room" i s so d i f f i c u l t 
to v e r i f y p a r t l y because agents cannot be "compelled" t o 
conform to the experimental method, and because no one can 
guarantee "repeatable r e s u l t s " w i t h "experiments" on agents. 
S i m i l a r l y the psychological and s o c i a l sciences are o f t e n 
denied " s c i e n t i f i c " status because t h e i r subject matter -
man - escapes the net of v e r i f i c a t o r y techniques. Wnat a 
person r e a l l y things, or f e e l s i s d i f f i c u l t f o r us to know$ 
what he w i l l do next i s d i f f i c u l t f o r us to p r e d i c t . By 
comparison genes and electrons are c h i l d ' s play! 
I would argue, then, t h a t God, as a meta-empirical 
agent and a transcendent mind - the s o r t of being of whom 
i t i s appropriate to say t h a t he "loves", can be no more 
open to v e r i f l e a t o r y techniques than a person i s . And i f God 
i s not only transcendent but i n f i n i t e l y transcendent, and 
i f - u n l i k e people - he i s a noncorporeal being, then he v / i l l 
be even more elusive than other people. Theology i s as 
d i f f e r e n t from science as i t s subject matter (God) i s 
d i f f e r e n t from empirical - and even from t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n t i f i c 
- e n t i t i e s . 
3 7 ? 
3<> The C r i t e r i a o f J u s t i f i c a t i o n 
As we have seen, Ramsey - u n l i k e some o t h e r 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n i s t s - does not t r e a t t h e r e l i g i o u s 
language t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e God o f r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n as 
guaranteed by i t s o r i g i n i n such an i n t u i t i o n . He "believes 
t h a t we can he c e r t a i n t h a t r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n s have a r e a l 
o b j e c t , hut argues t h a t t h e language we use t o d e s c r i b e 
such an o b j e c t must he used t e n t a t i v e l y . T h i s r e l i g i o u s 
language -• and t h e r e l i g i o u s " b e l i e f s expressed "by i t -
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s t a n d t h e r e f o r e i n need o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Ramsey o f f e r s 
two main s e t s of j u s t i f i c a t o r 5 r c r i t e r i a ; 
How do we decide "between two a r t i c u l a t i o n s 
from cosmic d i s c l o s u r e s , between two areas 
of m u l t i - m o d e l d i s c o u r s e ? I ansv/er: we 
s h a l l r e a s o n a b l y p r e f e r t h a t d i s c o u r s e 
which ( a ) f o r m a l l y i s t h e most s i m p l e , 
c o h e r e n t , comprehensive and c o n s i s t e n t ; 
(b) m a t e r i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h e best e m p i r i c a l 
f i t , ,,, (i'.IDA 62) 
We must c o n s i d e r b o t h of these s e t s of c r i t e r i a i n t u r n , 
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(A) The Formal C r i t e r i a 
The p h i l o s o p h e r o f r e l i g i o n " t r i e s p r i m a r i l y . . . . t o 
j u s t i f y men's language about God and t o make i t as c o n s i s t e n t , 
comprehensive, s i m p l e and coherent - i n o t h e r v/ords as 
r e l i a b l e - a s p o s s i b l e " (U-PE 1), These l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a 
a re viewed by Ramsey, as we have seen, as t h e d e c i s i v e c r i t e r i a 
f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f those types o f r e l i g i o u s language 
t h a t are e s s e n t i a l l y f o r m a l i n n a t u r e ( o f . MDA 54). But any 
m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme, or any piece of m u l t i - m o d e l r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c o u r s e , must a l s o f u l f i l these same c r i t e r i a , I have 
a l r e a d y quoted I.EDA 62 and ITR Owen 126, which i n d i c a t e 
Ramsey's a p p l i c a t i o n o f such c r i t e r i a t o r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e 
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( c f , a l s o CD 8 2 , FG 6y, I'ZLR 2 6 6 ) . The defence o f t h e i s m as 
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a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme u s i n g these c r i t e r i a i s t o "be found 
i n U-FL1G B 7 8 / 1 9 1 ? 2 ( 5 ) 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 7 ; CL 3 3 8 ; . U-HA " C r e a t i o n 
ex n i h i l o " , C, c . 1 9 5 5;etc. A l t h o u g h t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 
f o r m a l c r i t e r i a t o th e i s m as a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme was 
g r a d u a l l y r e p l a c e d "by i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o m u l t i - m o d e l r e l i g i o u s 
d i s c o u r s e , Ramsey was a b l e t o w r i t e t h e f o l l o w i n g as l a t e as 
1965s 
r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i n e v i t a b l y l e a v e s us w i t h 
competing key-words, e.g. "God", and " A b s o l u t e " , 
and t o judge between these r i v a l s we can o n l y 
a p p e a l , i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t , t o t h e s i m p l i c i t y , 
c o n s i s t e n c y , comprehensiveness and coherence 
o f t h e t o t a l language over which our key-word 
p r e s i d e s - t h e language map which we have as 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l e x p e r i e n c e whether 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s o r n o t . (U-HA: "The 
T r a d i t i o n a l Arguments f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e of God 
( C o n t d ) " II 6 5 , 1 9 6 5 , P.5) 
We may now examine each of t h e f o r m a l c r i t e r i a 
i n t u r n ; f o r Ramsey notes t h a t t h e y r e p r e s e n t " v e r y d i f f e r e n t 
c l a i m s " (CL 3 3 8 ) . 
( i ) S i m p l i c i t y 
I n metaphysics, we search f o r one comprehensive 
language map and one u n i f y i n g , u l t i m a t e c a t e g o r y ( c f . M 4 , 2 4 ) . 
One m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme w i l l "be "better t h a n a n o t h e r "the 
fewer m e t a p h y s i c a l words i t demands t o complete t h e o b j e c t 
languages and t o u n i t e them" (TJ-FMG-B78/19I). A s i m i l a r 
2 3 
c r i t e r i o n i s used i n sc i e n c e . A t one l e v e l t h i s i s s i m p l y 
a m a t t e r o f " a e s t h e t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " i , e . "neatness o r 
> 
s i m p l i c i t y " (BP I I 202$ c f , RSCS 16 - 2 1 ) . At anothe r 
l e v e l i t i n v o l v e s an appeal t o "Occam's ra.zor" - t h e 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t e n t i t i e s s h o u l d not be u n n e c e s s a r i l y m u l t i p l i e d . 
We have a l r e a d y met w i t h t h i s i n Ramsey's espousal o f monotheism, 
which i n v o l v e s an appeal " t o t h e c r i t e r i o n of s i m p l i c i t y - i f 
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a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e i s g e n u i n e l y 'cosmic' why s h o u l d we 
suppose t h a t i t has more t h a n one o b j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e 
£U.- ITR Bvt^s 4-) • 
i n t o t o ? "\ 'fhis search f o r " s i m p l i c i t y " o r "economy" 
A 
( c f . TG 90) was, f o r Ramsey, a search f o r a m o n i s t i c 
metaphysio as w e l l as a search f o r a m o n o t h e i s t i c t h e o l o g y . 
I n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e d i f f e r e n t areas o f r e l i g i o u s d i s c o u r s e , 
however, i t i s expressed i n t h e f a c t t h a t Ramsey p r e f e r s 
d i s c o u r s e c o n t a i n i n g a s i n g l e "dominant model" t o t h a t u s i n g 
a number o f sub-models - p r o v i d e d , t h a t i s , t h a t t h e f o r m e r 
species of d i s c o u r s e a c t u a l l y does c o n t a i n a l l t h a t i s 
s a i d by the l a t t e r about God. 
( i i ) Comprehensiveness 
Ramsey contends t h a t "The more comprehensive t h e 
whole [ m e t a p h y s i c a l } map i s i n i t s survey of t h e u n i v e r s e " 
t h e b e t t e r i t i s as a map (U—FI.IG B7B/191). A metaphysic 
must be a l l embracing, i t must i n t e g r a t e a l l t h e phenomena 
t h e r e a r e ; thus t h e t h e i s t i c metaphysic o f t h e r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e v e r must s t r i v e t o " l e a v e n o t h i n g out " i n i t s 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d . I n r e l i g i o u s d i s a u r s e t h e demand 
f o r comprehensiveness i s expressed i n t h e way t h a t r e l i g i o u s 
( m u l t i - m o d e l ) d i s c o u r s e a t t e m p t s a f u l l y comprehensive 
survey o f a l l aspects of God's n a t u r e . 
( i i i ) Coherence 
A m e t a p h y s i c a l map s h o u l d not o n l y be s i m p l e and 
comprehensive, i t must a l s o be "coherent.... i n r e l a t i n g 
t h e d i v e r s e f e a t u r e s of t h e u n i v e r s e most c o n c i s e l y t o g e t h e r " 
(U-FI.IG B 7 8/191). Coherence may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
comprehensiveness i n t h a t t h e l a t t e r r e f e r s t o t h e range 
of phenomena t h a t are t o be i n t e g r a t e d and e x p l a i n e d , wheress 
t h e f o r m e r r e f e r s t o t h e i n t e g r a t i o n i t s e l f . "Coherence", o f 
course, f u l f i l l e d a v e r y i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n a t one t i m e as 
t h e I d e a l i s t s ' c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h ( c f . White (T) c h . 6 ) . 
B e a r i n g i n mind Ramsey's i n t e l l e c t u a l background we should 
expect him t o g i v e i t some s i g n i f i c a n c e as one o f h i s own 
j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i o n . Coherence i s o f t e n a problem i n 
t h e o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e . Ramsey notes, f o r example, t h a t 
d o c t r i n e s o f t h e atonement can e a s i l y he developed i n such 
a manner t h a t t h e y are d i f f i c u l t t o f i t t o g e t h e r w i t h 
o t h e r C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e s ( e . g . d o c t r i n e s of t h e person 
of C h r i s t , o r t h e n a t u r e of God)and w i t h e t h i c a l b e l i e f s 
C l e a r l y t h i s c r i t e r i o n may "be expressed i n terms 
of t h e next one on our l i s t : 
Ramsey a v e r s , t h a t : 
That m e t a p h y s i c a l system w i l l be b e t t e r t h a n 
a n o t h e r i f , w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e o b j e c t language 
which t h e system c o n t a i n s , a l l these languages 
are most t h o r o u g h l y broken down i n t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e l o g i c a l areas. (U-FL"G 3378/1 91 ) 
He goes on: 
T n i s , i t seems t o me, i s t h e p o i n t behind the 
o l d emphasis of c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h i n a m e t a p h y s i c a l 
system. For a map w i l l not d i s p l a y c o n s i s t e n c y 
i f t h e r e are s t i l l l o g i c a l r e g i o n s t o be 
sep a r a t e d . ( i b i d . ) 
I n o t h e r words, a m e t a p h y s i c a l system s h o u l d i n c l u d e no 
"c a t e g o r y m i x i n g " o r " t y p e t r a n s f e r " . 
However v;e i n t e r p r e t t h o s e remarks, the demand f o r 
c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e i s presumably t o be 
i n t e r p r e t e d as a demand t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t s t r a n d s of t h e 
m u l t i - m o d e l d i s c o u r s e should be b o t h i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
and m u t u a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ( i . e . t h a t they s h o u l d cohere one 
( c f . CD 4 3 ) . 
I n j u d g i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l system we must n o t e , 
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w i t h a n o t h e r ) . I t would a l s o i n c l u d e t h e demand t h a t t h e 
" m i x i n g o f models" shou l d n o t l e a d t o t h e " u t t e r l y u n r e v e a l i n g 
paradoxes g e n e r a t i n g "bogus q u e s t i o n s " (PR 1 9 9 ) , i n which 
t h e r e i s a c o n f u s i o n between l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t areas 
o f d i s c o u r s e . But Ramsey s p e c i f i c a l l y n otes t h a t t h e 
c r i t e r i o n o f c o n s i s t e n c y i s not alone s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
j u s t i f y i n g a t h e o l o g y (H 223 - 224). 
I n h i s use of th e s e c r i t e r i a Ramsey has c l e a r l y 
t a k e n over t h e " g r e a t t e s t s of t r u t h " o f t h e " o l d e r i d e a l i s t s " 
(CL 338); a r g u i n g t h a t "any person, p o s i t i v i s t , m a t e r i a l i s t , 
C h r i s t i a n o r what-not, ought t o agree t h a t he who has t h e 
most comprehensively coherent language map has prima f a c i e 
t h e 'best' basic a t t i t u d e " ( i b i d . ) . But such c r i t e r i a 
on t h e i r own w i l l not s u f f i c e f o r j u d g i n g a b e l i e f ( c f , 
(VR) 52 - 54). A l c h emy and the Ptolemaic t h e o r y 
"were b o t h p r e s e n t e d as c o n s i s t e n t , c o h e r e n t , comprehensive 
and ( t o some e x t e n t ) s i m p l e schemes i n t h e i r heyday. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e y are b o t h f a l s e and ' were shown t o be 
f a l s e Y/hen i t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h ey d i d not correspond 
w i t h t h e f a c t s . D e s p i t e some a t t e m p t s t o c o n s t r u e t h e 
correspondence c r i t e r i o n as a c r i t e r i o n of coherence ( c f . 
e.g.,Blanshard and Cleobury (RUT) 42 - 47; c f . White (T) 
115 - 122) ? i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t a b e l i e f may 
be j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f i t i s b o t h coherent and corresponds 
w i t h what i s i n f a c t t h e case, B u t what of m e t a p h y s i c a l 
and t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s ? Do they correspond w i t h t h e f a c t s ? 
Ramsey argues t h a t t h e i s m a t l e a s t does correspond w i t h 
t h e f a c t s . And he means by t h i s not o n l y t h a t i t corresponds 
w i t h t h e "meta-emprical " or " t h e o l o g i c a l f a c t s " - f o r example 
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t h a t t h e r e i s a t r a n s c e n d e n t , l o v i n g b e i n g who c r e a t e s t h e 
•world. Ee means a l s o t h a t such a b e l i e f may be j u s t i f i e d i n 
so f a r as i t f i t s the e m p i r i c a l f a c t s , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t 
t h e o l o g y has - i n a d d i t i o n t o p u r e l y f o r m a l c r i t e r i a o f 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n - an e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i o n as w e l l . Whereas 
" f i t t i n g the m e t a - e m p i r i c a l f a c t s " i s not a v e r y p r a c t i c a b l e 
c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h ( f o r where i s t h e unambiguous, agreed 
evidence about the m e t a - e m p i r i c a l f a c t s ? ) , " f i t t i n g t h e 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t s " appears to be a much" more.practicable c r i t e r i o n . 
(B) The l l a t e r i a l ( E m p i r i c a l ) C r i t e r i o n o f ."Empirical F i t " 
T h e o l o g i c a l models and "hypotheses", u n l i k e 
s c i e n t i f i c ones, do not g i v e r i s e t o v e r i f i a b l e ( o r 
f a l s i f i a b l e ) d e d u c t i o n s . But Ramsey argues t h a t t h i s does 
not mean t h a t t h e r e i s no vi&y i n which they can be t e s t e d : 
The t h e o l o g i c a l model works more l i k e t h e f i t t i n g 
of a boot or a shoe t h a n l i k e t h e "yes" or "no" 
of a r o l l c a l l . I n o t h e r vfords, we have a 
p a r t i c u l a r d o c t r i n e which, l i k e a p r e f e r r e d and 
s e l e c t e d shoe, s t a r t s by a p p e a r i n g t o meet our 
e m p i r i c a l needs. But on c l o s e r f i t t i n g t o t h e 
phenomena t h e shoe may p i n c h . V/heh t e s t e d a g a i n s t 
f u t u r e s l u s h and r a i n i t may be proven t o be not 
a l t o g e t h e r w a t e r - t i g h t or i t may be c o m f o r t a b l e -
y e t i t must not be too c o m f o r t a b l e . I n t h i s way, 
t h e t e s t of/ashoe i s measured by i t s a b i l i t y t o 
match a wide range o f phenomena, by i t s o v e r a l l 
success i n meeting a v a r i e t y o f needs. Here i s 
what I might c a l l t h e method of e m p i r i c a l f i t 
which i s d i s p l a y e d by t h e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i z i n g . . . (I.5M 17) 
The t e s t o f "a l o v e s b" i s a " t e s t by e m p i r i c a l f i t " (LH.i 38; 
c f . HG 214), So a l s o i s t h e t e s t o f t h e a s s e r t i o n s , " t h i s 
p a t i e n t i s a m i l d d e p r e s s i v e " and " t h i s crime was committed 
by X " ( c f . U;l 38 - 40, TG 90, TMR 267). "Empirical f i t " i s 
i n no sense an " e x a c t f i t 1 ' , but i t i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e 
importance a l l t h e same: 
Exact f i t s are what no a p o l o g i s t w i l l ever 
p r o v i d e ; h i s models w i l l never be t h a t . 
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Nor are sl oes. But i t i s p o s s i b l e and so 
much more i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between 
shoes t h a t are c o m f o r t a b l e and shoes t h a t 
p i n c h and l e t i n t h e s l u s h . I t i s l i k e w i s e 
p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between more u s e f u l 
models and l e s s u s e f u l models,(CPCF 58) 
Ramsey s t r e s s e d t h e f o r m a l c r i t e r i e i n t h e 
e a r l y years o f h i s t i m e a t Oxford^ d u r i n g which he was s t i l l 
v e r y l a r g e l y , concerned w i t h t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c a l 
schemes. The c r i t e r i o n of e m p i r i c a l f i t , however, comes 
i n t o i t s own i n t h e p e r i o d ( p o s t 1962) when the t o p i c o f 
r e l i g i o u s language i s h i g h e s t on Ramsey's agenda. E m p i r i c a l 
f i t i s t h e way i n which, a c c o r d i n g t o Ramsey, r e l i g i o u s 
phrases " t o u c h down &n t h e w o r l d around us" (I.IDA 20). He 
p r o v i d e s us w i t h a number o f examples of what he means by 
t h i s ' e m p i r i c a l f i t " : 
I n " T e l k i n g about God" he w r i t e s o f t h e n e c e s s i t y 
of t h e r e b e i n g . . . , 
s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s which can be l e g i t i m a t e l y 
" i n t e r p r e t e d by l o v e " i f t h e model of l o v e has 
any i n i t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n at a l l . There must be 
a p a t t e r n o f e m p i r i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s which f i t 
" l o v i n g " d i s c o u r s e when used o f God. Such a f i t 
i s p r agmatic i n t h e widest sense; but i t i s not 
g i v e n by e x p e r i m e n t a l v e r i f i c a t i o n i n a s t r i c t 
s c i e n t i f i c sense. (TG 90) 
Ramsey contends t h a t such an e m p i r i c a l f i t may be e x e m p l i f i e d 
i n t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n s t h a t he g i v e s e a r l i e r i n t h e same paper: 
i . e . seed t i m e and h a r v e s t , a moorland walk, n a t i o n a l events 
or a m o n a r c h i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , "./e may tr.ke up two of these 
examples: 
on o c c a s i o n circumstances a l l "go our way", as 
i t i s o f t e n s a i d . On these o c c a s i o n s , the w o r l d 
d i s p l a y s p r e d o m i n a n t l y f a v o u r a b l e f e a t u r e s , 
f e a t u r e s which g i v e r i s e t o a sense of dependence, 
but dependence on what i s r e l i a b l e and secure. 
Such f e a t u r e s are those, f o r example, which 
c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e changing seasons i n 3uch a way 
t h a t t h e f a r m e r ploughs h o p e f u l l y and h a r v e s t s 
t h a n k f u l l y . Or i t may happen t h a t when 
we are f a c e d w i t h some major problem as t o 
v o c a t i o n , or e m i g r a t i o n , o r t h e s u f f e r i n g of 
an aged r e l a t i v e , or m a r r i a g e , t h e r e occurs a 
complex s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t o o complex and 
too d i v e r s i f i e d t o be the r e s u l t of any one man's 
de s i g n , which h e l p s us t o r e s o l v e the problem 
as w e l l f o r those around us as f o r o u r s e l v e s . 
Or i t may be t h a t we are w a l k i n g i n remote, 
mountainous c o u n t r y , and as n i g h t comes on we 
are f i l l e d w i t h a l l k i n d s o f u n c e r t a i n t i e s and 
a n x i e t i e s . But t h e n we r e f r e s h o u r s e l v e s at 
a mountain stream, l o o k up t o t h e s t a r s as 
symbols o f s t a b i l i t y 5 and f i n d our p a t h 
i l l u m i n a t e d by t h e moon, A sense o f k i n s h i p 
w i t h n a t u r e s t r i k e s us| t h e U n i v e r s e i s 
r e l i a b l e a f t e r a l l . (TG Y9 - 80) 
Ramsey's examples o f t e n f o c u s on c e r t a i n C h r i s t i a n hymns 
which " r i n g t r u e t o e x p e r i e n c e " (LDA 20): 
I t must be the case: 
t h a t b l e s s i n g s undeserved have marked, my 
e r r i n g t r a c k ,that care and t r i a l have 
seemed a t l a s t t h r o u g h memory's sunset a i r 
l i k e Mountain ranges o v e r - p a s t , i n p u r p l e 
d i s t a n c e f a i r 
t h a t more and more a p r o v i d e n c e of l o v e i s 
u n d e r s t o o d 
making t h e s p r i n g s of t i m e and sense - a l l 
t h a t belongs 
t o our t r a n s i t o r i n e s s and decay -sweet w i t h 
e t e r n a l good. 
I t must be t h e case t h a t t h e c l o u d s we so much dreaded 
have been f i l l e d w i t h unexpected b l e s s i n g s . Experience 
must have enabled us t o decide how b l e s t are t h e y and 
o n l y they who i n h i s l o v e c o n f i d e . I t must be t h e 
case t h a t t a k i n g a l o n g p e r s p e c t i v e on t h e events 
of our l i v e s , on t h e f o r t u n e s of humanity g e n e r a l l y , 
p a t t e r n s of the k i n d which an "economy" d i s p l a y s , 
p a t t e r n s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e r u n n i n g of a household-.^ 
s h a l l be able t o be d e l i n e a t e d . I f t h e e m p i r i c a l 
circumstances were such t h a t some t h r e a t e n i n g 
f r o w n i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s c o u l d r a r e l y , i f ever, be 
seen i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a w o r l d s m i l i n g upon us; 
i f Y / n i t t i e r ' s counsel t o take a l o n g l o o k back 
never showed cares and t r i a l s l i k e mountain ranges 
o v e r p a s t , never t r a c e d undeserved b l e s s i n g s , t h e n 
p r o v i d e n t i a l d i s c o u r s e would be u n j u s t i f i e d , and 
t h e model o f economy v i r t u a l l y u s e l e s s as a guide 
t o t h e l o g i c of C h r i s t i a n or t h e i s t i c d i s c o u r s e . . . 
(uDA 20; c f , i b i d . 62 - 63) 
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I argued above t h a t Ramsey t r e a t s e m p i r i c a l f i t 
as something t h a t i s known i n a d i s c l o s u r e - a d i s c l o s u r e o f 
the s i m i l a r i t y i n s t r u c t u r e between a m o d e l - s i t u a t i o n and a 
p a r t i c u l a r e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n (cf„ I.'H.I 39 - 40). And a s i m i l a r 
d i s c l o s u r e , I c l a i m e d , served as Ramsey's b a s i s f o r t h e i n i t i a l 
use of b o t h s c i e n t i f i c and t h e o l o g i c a l models, Ramsey's 
d i s c u s s i o n s seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he i s t r e a t i n g t h e t h e o l o g i c a l 
case as a p a r a l l e l t o the s c i e n t i f i c case, w h i l s t r e c o g n i z i n g 
i t s g r e a t e r degree o f a b s t r a c t i o n from e m p i r i c a l events and 
th e wider r a n g i n g n a t u r e of t h e o l o g i c a l "hypotheses". 
I n b o t h cases i n s i g h t i s evoked by a " t a n g e n t i a l meeting" o f 
the " model-context" and one p a r t of t h e w o r l d (Events 1 ) , 
and the h y p o t h e s i s thus produced i s seen t o f i t o t h r t s 
of the w o r l d (Zvents 2), Thus, f o r example, when t h e 
f a t h e r - c o n t e x t and t h e ( r e l i g i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d ) w o r l d 
"meet" i n t h e mind o f t h e t h e o l o g i a n , t h e r e i s a d i s c l o s u r e 
of isomorphy on t h e b a s i s o f 'which he speaks o f God as " f a t h e r " . 
S i m i l a r l y t h e phenomena of f l o w i n g water and e l e c t r i c 
c u r r e n t s "combine" t o d i s c l o s e t o t h e s c i e n t i s t t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e form e r as a model f o r t h e l a t t e r . 
as i n the s c i e n t i f i c s i t u a t i o n , the two groups of events 
I n t h e t h e o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n , ^ (1 and 2) are i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e ; 
and i n b o t h cases t h e " f i t " o f t h e model t o t h e w o r l d ('Events 2") 
i s r e v e a l e d i n anothe r d i s c l o s u r e o f isomorphy. The o n l y 
d i f f e r e n c e , i n d e e d , between t h e s c i e n t i f i c and t h e t h e o l o g i c a l 
cases i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s t r i c t e x p e r i m e n t a l 
v e r i f i a b i l i t y which i s p o s s i b l e i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c case and 
the " l o o s e r k i n d of e m p i r i c a l f i t " (liLIR 267) possessed by-
t h e o l o g i c a l hypotheses, Tne d i s t i n c t i o n i s somewhat b l u r r e d , 
however, by Ramsey's c l a i m s : ( i ) t h a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 
use o f models i n c e r t a i n s ciences - e.g. psychology - i s a l s o 
by the method of e m p i r i c a l f i t ( c f . MK 38 - 40)? and 
( i i ) t h a t e m p i r i c a l f i t , r a t h e r t h a n e x p e r i m e n t a l v e r i f l a b i l i t y , 
i s t h e c r i t e r i o n t o he used i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f c e r t a i n 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses - e.g. i n archaeology and a n t h r o p o l o g y -
where by t h e n a t u r e o f t h e case c o n c l u s i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n i s 
i m p o s s i b l e , and y e t t h e o r i e s are s a i d t o " f i t " what evidence 
t h e r e i s ( c f . 1.3.31 267). I would contend, however, t h a t these 
e x c e p t i o n s o n l y serve t o emphasize t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
between " e x p e r i m e n t a l v e r i f i c a t i o n " and " e m p i r i c a l f i t " i s 
simply a f u n c t i o n of ( a ) the g e n e r a l i t y and w i d e - r a n g i n g 
n a t u r e of t h e a s s e r t i o n b e i n g t e s t e d (which i n t h e o l o g y i s 
so g e n e r a l as t o be " m e t a p h y s i c a l " ) and ( b ) t h e e x t e n t t o 
which the o b j e c t b e i n g modelled transcends t h e e m p i r i c a l 
w o r l d ( i . e . t h e degree t o which i t i s a " m e t a - e m p i r i c a l " 
. . . N26 entxty J, 
As we have had o c c a s i o n t o c o n s i d e r a l r e a d y , t h e 
w i d e - r a n g i n g n a t u r e of t h e o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s 
one of t h e i r g r e a t s t r e n g t h s - but i s a l s o t h e i r g r e a t e s t 
weakness. Of course a (mono) t h e i s t i c metaphysics " f i t s " 
t h e whole w o r l d , f o r t h e whole w o r l d has been taken i n t o 
account i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of such a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme. 
And i t i s a " c o n s t r u c t e d " ( o r "reconstructed") m e t a p h y s i c a l 
scheme, and not s i m p l y a bare u n q u a l i f i e d i n t u i t e d datum, 
t h a t i s s a i d t o f i t t h e f a c t s of t h e u n i v e r s e . I n a s i m i l a r 
manner,an a t h e i s t i c metaphysic may a l s o be c o n s t r u c t e d so 
as t o " f i t " t h e cosmos. And t h e same may be s a i d of 
p o l y t h e i s t i c or n a t u r a l i s t i c m e t aphysics, and so on. They 
a l l " f i t " i n d i f f e r e n t ways, but t h e e m p i r i c a l f a c t s t h e y 
l i t do not bear t h e i r m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s on t h e i r 
sleeves. They are ambiguous enough ( o r n e u t r a l enough) t o 
p e r m i t w i d e l y d i f f e r e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l schemes t o be c o n s t r u c t e d 
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around them. How t h e n are we t o decide between a l l these 
d i f f e r e n t " f i t s " ? The answer t o t h a t q u e s t i o n i s l i k e l y 
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t o be a h i g h l y p e r s o n a l one , dependent on t h e answers t o 
q u e s t i o n s l i k e : "Which f a c t s do you t h i n k i t i s most i m p o r t a n t 
t h a t a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme should f i t w e l l ? " . The answer might 
be " the f a c t s o f e v i l " , or " t h e f a c t s o f goodness'^ or "my 
p e r s o n a l a u t o b i o g r a p h y " , or " t h e h i s t o r y o f I s r a e l " , o r 
"the person o f Jesus". But t h i s , is a l l a m a t t e r o f 
per s o n a l c h o i c e , as i s our ch o i c e of a a "good" shoe. 
For we a l l have d i f f e r e n t f e e t ( d i f f e r e n t l y "shaped" worlds -
i . e . d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s of what i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n the 
w o r l d ) , and t h e r e f o r e t h e same shoe w i l l f i t d i f f e r e n t people 
t o d i f f e r e n t e x t e n t s , T h i s aspect o f t h e f i t o f a shoe o r 
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a t h e o r y i s p r i o r t o i t s b e i n g t e s t e d more w i d e l y a g a i n s t 
t h e s l u s h and r a i n of t h e w o r l d ; a t h e o r y t h a t f a i l s t h i s 
( p e r s o n a l ) t e s t i s never "adopted" and t h e r e f o r e never 
t e s t e d f u r t h e r . 
I would argue t h a t t h e e m p i r i c a l f i t o f a t h e o l o g i c a l 
a s s e r t i o n , l i k e t h a t of any o t h e r m e t a p h y s i c a l c l a i m , n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n v o l v e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r s o n a l and s u b j e c t i v e element. 
A l l m e t a p h y s i c a l schemes w i l l appear t o those who espouse 
them t o " f i t " the w o r l d , Where t h e r e are areas which do not 
seem t o f i t w e l l , the d i s c i p l e of a p a r t i c u l a r metaphysic 
w i l l adapt h i s scheme a p p r o p r i a t e l y so as t o e x p l a i n t h e 
apparent e x c e p t i o n s . T h i s i s s i m i l a r t o t h e way i n which 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s are m o d i f i e d so as t o cover a p p a r e n t l y 
f a l s i f y i n g evidence ( c f . Kuhn ( S S R ) c h . V I I I , (LDPR) 13 - 19, 
Lakatos p a s s i m ) , I n t h e case of a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme - which 
i s of a h i g h e r o r d e r of a b s t r a c t i o n and g e n e r a l i t y - i t i s 
even more marked. I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t " e m p i r i c a l 
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f i t " cannot be a c r u c i a l (and n e u t r a l ) c r i t e r i o n o f 
m e t a p h y s i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l t r u t h - I would a l s o contend ." 
( a ) t h a t any w e l l - c o n s t r u c t e d metaphysic worthy of t h e name 
w i l l he c o h e r e n t , comprehensive and c o n s i s t e n t ; and 
(b ) t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t b o t h t o a p p l y and t o j u s t i f y 
a p r e f e r e n c e f o r " s i m p l i c i t y " as a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h i n 
metaphysics. I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t n e i t h e r Ramsey's 
f o r m a l nor h i s m a t e r i a l c r i t e r i a can serve us as c r u c i a l 
t e s t s f o r t h e t r u t h o f C h r i s t i a n t h e i s m . 
4. The J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s I n t u i t i o n 
However, i t does seem t o me t h a t t h e r e are two p o s s i b l e 
ways out of t h e impasse i n t o which Ramsey has l e d us. 
L o t h of them a r e suggested by t h e w r i t i n g s o f John H i c k , 
( i ) I have argued t h a t " a l l t h e f a c t s " have a l r e a d y been 
tak e n i n t o account i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme. 
Lut " a l l t h e f a c t s " here must mean a l l t h e mundane f a c t s , a l l 
the f a c t s of t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l "world e x p e r i e n c e d by 
men i n t h i s l i f e , I see no reason t o deny, however, t h a t 
t h e r e may be o t h e r c r u c i a l f a c t s t h & t w i l l enable us t o 
decide i n f a v o u r of one p a r t i c u l a r m e t a p h y s i c a l scheme 
( t h e i s m ) and a g a i n s t some o t h e r s ; these f a c t s may be 
"exper i e n c e d " i n some post-mortem e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s t h e 
ba s i s o f Hi c k ' s h y p o t h e s i s of " e s c h a t o l o g i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n " : 
S u r e l y our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n which the r e a l i t y o f God's l o v i n g 
purpose f o r us i s c o n f i r m e d by i t s f u l f i l m e n t 
i n a heavenly -world, and i n which t h e a u t h o r i t y 
of Jesus, and thus of h i s t e a c h i n g , i s c o n f i r m e d 
by h i s e x a l t e d p l a c e i n t h a t w o r l d , would 
p r o p e r l y count as c o n f i r m a t o r y . I t would not 
...amount t o l o g i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n , but 
i t would c o n s t i t u t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
the grounds f o r r a t i o n a l doubt which 
o b t a i n i n t h e p r e s e n t l i f e would have been 
d e c i s i v e l y removed, ( H i c k (FK) 199; c f . ch,8 
passim, & v i i - v i i i , ( P R ) 100 - 103; c f . 
a l s o P r i c e (B) ch.10, Crombie) 
U n l i k e K i c k , I would t r e a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
v e r i f i c a t i o n as r e l e v a n t o n l y t o t h e t r u t h o f t h e i s m , and 
not as t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f i t s m e a n i n g f u l n e s s . I n v i a 
we s h a l l not be a b l e t o decide between d i f f e r e n t w o r l d -
views o r metaphysics on the e m p i r i c a l evidence alone 
( a l t h o u g h the t r a n s e m p i r i c a l evidence o f r e l i g i o u s 
experience may be d e c i s i v e f o r us)., But i n p a t r i a 
we may be p r o v i d e d w i t h new - and d e c i s i v e - evidence o f a. 
q u a s i - e m p i r i c a l n a t u r e ( c f . K i c k (FK) 177 ~ 178)' 
( i i ) I n v i a , t h e r e f o r e , t h e i s t s must r e l y on t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
e x perience a l o n e . H i c k argues t h a t i t i s indeed "reasonable 
f o r a man who has a p o w e r f u l r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e t o t r u s t 
i t s v e r i d i c a l i t y : 
Tne a p o s t l e , prophet or s a i n t may be so v i v i d l y 
aware of God t h a t he can no more doubt t h e 
v e r a c i t y o f h i s r e l i g i o u s awareness t h a n o f 
h i s sense e x p e r i e n c e . . . . ( H i c k (AEG) 114) 
H i c k i n t e r p r e t s a r a t i o n a l b e l i e f as "a b e l i e f which i t i s 
r a t i o n a l f o r t h e one who h o l d s i t t o h o l d , g i v e n t h e dat a 
a v a i l a b l e t o him" ((AEG) 115; c f . 109, a l s o S l o t e 199 & n.3). 
He examines t h e analogy of our " n a t u r a l b e l i e f " i n the 
e x i s t e n c e of an e x t e r n a l w o r l d , which we r e g a r d as " r a t i o n a l 
on the grounds of i t s i n v o l u n t a r y c h a r a c t e r and t h e f a c t 
t h a t we can and do a c t s u c c e s s f u l l y i n terms o f i t : 
That i s t o say, b e i n g b u i l t and c i r c u m s t a n c e d 
as we are we cannot h e l p i n i t i a l l y b e l i e v i n g 
as we do, and our b e l i e f i s not c o n t r a d i c t e d , 
but on the c o n t r a r y c o n t i n u o u s l y c o n f i r m e d , 
by our c o n t i n u i n g e x p e r i e n c e , ((AEG) 110) 
And t h e same s i t u a t i o n o b t a i n s , H i c k argues, w i t h r e g a r d 
t o v i v i d r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e : 
Tne sense o f t h e presence of God r e p o r t e d by 
th e g r e a t r e l i g i o u s f i g u r e s has a s i m i l a r 
i n v o l u n t a r y and c o m p e l l i n g q u a l i t y ; and as 
they proceed t o l i v e on the b a s i s of i t they 
are s u s t a i n e d and c o n f i r m e d by t h e i r f u r t h e r 
e x periences i n t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e y are 
l i v i n g i n r e l a t i o n , not t o i l l u s i o n , but t o 
r e a l i t y . I t t h e r e f o r e seems prima f a c i e , 
t h a t t h e r e l i g i o u s man i_s e n t i t l e d t o t r u s t 
h i s r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e and t o proceed t o 
conduct h i s l i f e i n terms of i t . ( i b i d . 112j c f . 116) 
" I t seems"jHick concludes, " t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t l y v i v i d 
r e l i g i o u s e xperience would e n t i t l e a man t o c l a i m t o know 
t h a t God i s r e a l " ((FK) 2 1 0 ) . 
I am i n complete agreement w i t h Hick's p o s i t i o n 
h e re, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e " f u r t h e r e x p e r i e n c e s " are i n t e r p r e t e d -
as seems most reasonable - i n terms of f u r t h e r r e l i g i o u s 
e x p eriences. As I have h i n t e d more th a n once a l r e a d y , I 
h o l d t h a t i t i s t h e s t r e n g t h of our r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n 
which i s alone d e c i s i v e . ITor do I b e l i e v e t h a t such a 
p o s i t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y opens t h e door t o each and every 
r e l i g i o u s ( o r s e c u l a r ) f a n a t i c . For we do have some t e s t s 
f o r d i s c o v e r i n g d e l u s i o n even i n t h e f i e l d of r e l i g i o n ( c f . 
K.V/ard (EC) 129)""''. Having"passed" such t e s t s , we may 
r e a s o n a b l y t r u s t our r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n s i f t h e y are 
s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p e l l i n g . 
=* = =£a =*= 
But here we must r e t u r n t o Ramsey. For he o f f e r s 
h i n t s i n more th a n one p l a c e t h a t p a r t o f h i s e m p i r i c a l 
c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i s 
something which i s much more p r a c t i c a l , The r e l e v a n t passages 
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are as f o l l o w s : 
I£y second p o i n t i l l u s t r a t e s how w i t h d i s c o u r s e 
about t h e S p i r i t , when i t i s r i g h t l y c o n s t r u c t e d , 
t h e r e can be e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i a f o r i t s 
a p p r a i s a l , '.'.'hen we are a r t i c u l a t e about t h e 
S p i r i t from models such as we have suggested, 
e m p i r i c a l f i t becomes p o s s i b l e ; and i t i s not 
a p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n which t h e 
f l u i d c o n t e x t f o r S p i r i t might l e a d us t o suppose. 
Rather does i t a r i s e l i k e t h i s . Those who are 
f i l l e d w i t h t h e S p i r i t , those who a c t " s p i r i t u a l l y " , 
those who f u l f i l themselves because of t h e a c t i v e 
i n f l u e n c e o f God, are those who d i s p l a y genuine 
wisdom, "humane be h a v i o u r " as d i s t i n c t from 
r o u t i n e , i m p e r s o n a l b e h a v i o u r , a moral s t a t u r e 
which i s more t h a n r e c t i t u d e . (MBA 13) 
. . . . t h e f i n a l t e s t of our t a l k about t h e 
Ascension w i l l l i e i n t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e 
d i s c o u r s e t o which t h e model l e a d s can f i n d 
e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e i n our l i f e and b e h a v i o u r . 
V/e are r e l i a b l y a r t i c u l a t e about t h e A s c e n s i o n 
when our d i s c o u r s e p o i n t s t h r o u g h t h e model t o 
the d i s c l o s u r e i n one d i r e c t i o n and i n f o r m s 
our v o c a t i o n s i n t h e o t h e r , ( T L 25) 
t h e . . . c l a i m f o r a a " o b j e c t i v e " element i n t h e 
Atonement w i l l o n l y be s u b s t a n t i a t e d i f t h e 
s t o r y has an e m p i r i c a l f i t i n our own day -
the k i n d of e m p i r i c a l f i t v/e spoke o f i n t h e 
f i r s t l e c t u r e and by r e f e r e n c e t o B u t l e r . , . , 
I f t h e model of l o v e has secured i t s cosmic 
s e t t i n g by b e i n g embedded, f o r example, w i t h i n 
a Remnant s t o r y , t h e n t h e c l a i m f o r an " o b j e c t i v e " 
element i n t h e Atonement w i l l be t h e more 
r e l i a b l y made, t h e more the Church has proved 
i t s e l f i n i t s l i f e and works t o be an i n c l u s i v e 
f e l l o w s h i p o f t h e S p i r i t , t h e new I s r a e l , t h e 
redeemed of God 0(CD 59 - 60) 
I n t h i s l a s t passage, Ramsey i s r e f e r r i n g back t o an e a r l i e r 
argument i n C h r i s t i a n D i s c o u r s e : 
t o r e c a l l B u t l e r . . . suggests a t l e a s t one t e s t 
f o r t h e reasonableness of our C h r i s t i a n 
c o n v i c t i o n s which are f ounded i n a d i s c l o s u r e 
which a r i s e s around, h i s t o r i c a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s , 
and so a d m i t t e d l y embody a h i s t o r i c a l r i s k . 
The t e s t i s t h i s : i f we have "seen" w i t h t h e 
eye o f f a i t h , i t roust presumably have some 
p a r t i c u l a r b e a r i n g on our b e h a v i o u r , so t h a t 
we may expect t h e r e t o be some r e l e v a n t 
f e a t u r e of t h a t b e h a v i o u r t o which we may 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o i n t . Our b e h a v i o u r must i n 
some way w i t n e s s t o the t r a n s c e n d e n t d i s c l o s u r e 
t o which i t i s a response..... I t i s as and when 
we show d i s t i n c t i v e b e h a viour - such as' g o i n g 
the second m i l e - t h a t v/e may hope b o t h t o 
commend our C h r i s t i a n c o n v i c t i o n s i n which such 
behaviour i s r o o t e d , and t o have c r i t e r i a t o 
j u s t i f y a c l a i m t o a cosmic d i s c l o s u r e ; , . . . 
(CD 24 - 25; c f . i b i d . 46 - 47) 
Ramsey's p o i n t seems t o "be t h a t one t e s t o f whether 
or not we have i n f a c t seen t h e l o v i n g , f u l f i l l i n g and 
empowering God i s whether or not we respond t o t h a t ( p u t a t i v e ) 
d i s c l o s u r e w i t h an a p p r o p r i a t e l o v e , p e r s o n a l f u l f i l m e n t and 
s p i r i t u a l power. C e r t a i n l y t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e s s 
i n the l i t e r a t u r e on s p i r i t u a l i t y on t h e q u a l i t y of t h e 
C h r i s t i a n ' s l i f e as t h e c r i t e r i o n by which we judge h i s 
s p i r i t u a l i t y : we know them by t h e i r f r u i t s (l.Iatthew 7 v. 2 0 ) 0 
As L a r t i n T h o r n t o n p u t s i t , " o n l y moral t h e o l o g y p r o v i d e s 
a c e r t a i n t e s t f o r s p i r i t u a l p r o g r e s s " ; "Whatever our 
p r a y e r , i n whatever elementary stage i t remains, we are 
making pr o g r e s s i f we commit fewer s i n s " ( T h o r n t o n (ES) 
41 , 2 2 ) ^ . However i f , as I have argued above, commitment 
i s a f r e e response t o a d i s c l o s u r e and does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w from i t , t h e n i t c o u l d be t h a t a person might have 
a r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e but not respond w i t h an ( a p p r o p r i a t e ) 
commitment. Conversely, such a commitment might a r i s e 
w i t h o u t b e i n g r e l a t e d t o a d i s c l o s u r e o f God a t a l l . 
A l l t h e same, Ramsey i s on t o an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t here. 
For we do not j u s t "Know them by t h e i r f r u i t s " , we do a l s o 
tend t o judge what they c l a i m t o know, "by t h e i r f r u i t s " . 
Those who have t h e r e l i g i o u s i n s i g h t s on which t h e o l o g y i s 
founded may be a p p r o p r i a t e l y t e s t e d by t h e i r b e h a v i o u r . A 
person who c l a i m s t o have an i n t u i t i o n o f a God o f l o v e and 
behaves i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y , may expect t o have h i s c l a i m 
c h a l l e n g e d . A g a i n Hick's w r i t i n g s are r e l e v a n t : 
Suppose someone p r o f e s s e s t o be m a g i c a l l y immune 
t o f i r e so t h a t he can walk unharmed t h r o u g h flames 
and p i c k up hot c o a l s . I f he does c o n f i d e n t l y p i c k 
up b u r n i n g c o a l s o r walk w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n i n t o 
a b l a z i n g f i r e we should say t h a t he r e a l l y does 
b e l i e v e t h a t f i r e cannot h u r t him. But i f he 
s h r i n k s back from t h e flames...we know th e n t h a t 
he r e a l l y b e l i e v e s t h a t f i r e w i l l h u r t him. The 
t e s t of h i s b e l i e f i s found i n h i s a c t i o n s , A 
r e a l 1361161 i n e v i t a b l y makes i t s a p p r o p r i a t e 
d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e way we "behave. 
V'hat t h e n does i t nean t o "believe i n t h e 
r e a l i t y of God as the heavenly F a t h e r whose 
n a t u r e was t a u g h t and shown by J e s u s ? , . , i t 
i n v o l v e s b e i n g i n a d i s p o s i t i o n a l s t a t e t o 
a c t on t h e b a s i s t h a t God, so conceived., i s 
r e a l , and t h e e x t e n t t o "which a person r e a l l y 
b e l i e v e s i n God i s p r e c i s e l y t h e e x t e n t t o 
which he or she l i v e s on t h a t b a s i s ..(Hick 
(CC) 71; of. (PK) 247 - 250, a l s o '..'.E. A u s t i n 
(RNS) 46). 
L u t how f a r does t h i s get us? U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t 
gets us no f u r t h e r t h a n s a y i n g " I can see from X's beh a v i o u r 
t h a t X p r o b a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t p" o r "X 1s be h a v i o u r i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s b e l i e v i n g t h a t p" . !iut i t cannot take 
us back behind t h e b e l i e f t o assess whether or not p i s 
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t r u e , i . e . whether o r not A's i n t u i t i o n i s v e r i d i c a l . 
However, Ramsey seems from t i m e t o time t o l i k up 
behaviour (commitment) w i t h d i s c l o s u r e i n a n o t h e r way. 
D i s c l o s u r e g i v e s r i s e t o b e h a v i o u r , but t h e r e i s a l s o a 
type o f b e h a v i o u r which l e a d ; t o , evoke..-, o r " p u t s uo i n 
t h e r i g h t p o s i t i o n f o r " , f u r t h e r d i s c l o s u r e s , Tnus Ramsey 
speaks of " T r i n i t a r i a n b e haviour" or " T r i n i t a r i a n l i v i n g " : 
we o n l y know, we o n l y u n d e r s t a n d , T r i n i t a r i a n 
t h e o l o g y as we r e t r a c e our s t e p s , as we r e t u r n 
f r o m t h e i.Iount of V i s i o n t o which T r i n i t a r i a n 
d i s c o u r s e should heve l e d us, and prove our 
T r i n i t a r i a n t h e o l o g y , i n T r i n i t a r i a n l i v i n g , . , 
T r i n i t a r i a n b e l i e r i s knowledge of m y s t e r y 
d i s p l a y e d and " v e r i f i e d " , l i k e a l l knowledge 
of a mystery, i n t h e a c t i o n t o which i t l e a d s , 
(TL 59) 
Eut t h i s T r i n i t a r i a n "behaviour" i s i n f a c t t r e a t e d by Ramsey 
as a m a t t e r o f d i s c e r n i n g God as F a t h e r , Son and S p i r i t i n 
d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of our l i v e s : 
F i r s t , we s h a l l be l e d t o God as F a t h e r when we 
d i s c e r n God i n our v e r y l i v e s and human e x i s t e n c e 
"..'hen we see t h e whole c r e a t i o n g r o a n i n g and 
t r a v a i l i n g t o g e t h e r i n pain....we know a m y s t e r i o u s 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h God the Son. , „ . .And as 
and when we f i n d d epth and mystery i n human f e l l o w s h i p 
.„a.then we know God as t h e E o l y S p i r i t who hinds 
us t o g e t h e r i n t h e Cnurch. 
T r i n i t a r i a n "behaviour f i n d s God i n t h i s way as 
C r e a t o r , Redeemer, S a n c t i f i e r , and w h i l e a l l 
our t a l k i n g about t h e T r i n i t y w i l l always be 
i n a d e q u a t e , f a i t h and b e l i e f i n t h e 'J. r i n i t y has 
i t s most assured e x p r e s s i o n i n T r i n i t a r i a n behaviour. 
For t h e r e we know and d i s c e r n more t h a n w i l l ever be 
a d e q u a t e l y t a l k e d about: i t i s by our f r u i t s t h a t 
men know us, and by our behaviour t h a t we make our 
b e l i e f s most e v i d e n t . ("The T r i n i t y " - no page numbers-
o f , TL 39). 
Thus our "behaviour" does not o n l y make our b e l i e f s more 
e v i d e n t . I t l e a d s us back t o t h e d i s c l o s u r e s from which such 
b e l i e f s a r i s e . " T r i n i t a r i a n b e h a v i o u r " i n such a c o n t e x t 
i n v o l v e s our becoming i n v o l v e d i n and a c t i v e l y g e t t i n g t o 
know and b e g i n n i n g t o m e d i t a t e on The C r e a t i o n , Tne Human 
Race i n need of Redemption, and 'Tne f e l l o w s h i p of t h e Church. 
T h i s i s presumably t h e dimension t h a t Ramsey i s r e a l l y 
s e e k i n g by u s i n g t h e language o f b e h a v i o u r , and i t enables 
us t o see r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e as l e a d i n g t o "the "form o f 
l i f e ' Known as C h r i s t i a n worship and b e h a v i o u r " ( C - i l l ( I R ) 
123) which i n t h e i r t u r n evoke t h e r e l i g i o u s d i s c l o s u r e 
once a g a i n . 
Here, t h e n , we have indeed come f u l l c i r c l e . V/e 
s t a r t w i t h d i s c l o s u r e and - t h r o u g h r e l i g i o u s commitment, 
worship and s e r v i c e - we come back t o d i s c l o s u r e . I n 
Ramsey's r e l i g i o u s epistemology the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l i g i o u s 
i n t u i t i o n i s b o t h Alpha and Omega. I b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s 
emphasis on i n t u i t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o r r e c t ; i n t h e end 
i t i s f a r more i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e search f o r a p p r o p r i a t e 
c r i t e r i a f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . As 
Schedler has put i t : 
While our systems may 'be checked by " e m p i r i c a l 
f i t " t h e y are u l t i m a t e l y checked "by r e p e t i t i o n 
of t h e i n s i g h t which gave them b i r t h . 
( S c h e d l e r ( T h e s i s ) 220; c f . E a i l l i e (SPG) G"() 
I t i s Ramsey'a o v e r r i d i n g concern w i t h r e l i g i o u s 
i n t u i t i o n t h a t seems t o t h e prese n t w r i t e r t o be t h e most 
s i g n i f i c a n t element i n h i s t h o u g h t . Perhaps i t i s a l s o t h e 
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key t o a prop e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s whole l i f e , 
POSTSCRIPT: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IAN RAMSEY'S RELIGIOUS EPISTSIIOLOGY 
At t h e t i m e o f - w r i t i n g ( 1978) 9 o n l y s i x years a f t e r 
Ramsey's death, i t must "be s a i d t h a t h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a 
r e l i g i o u s t h i n k e r does n o t stan d v e r y h i g h , and t h a t h i s 
i n f l u e n c e i n contemporary p h i l o s o p h y of r e l i g i o n i s n e g l i g i b l e 
He i s u s u a l l y seen as a man who had one, not v e r y o r i g i n a l , 
i d e a and r a t h e r " r a n i t t o death " - w i t h o u t b e i n g e i t h e r 
p r e c i s e enough o r s e l f - c r i t i c a l enough f o r h i s work t o m e r i t 
much s t u d y , 
I have at t e m p t e d t o show i n t h i s t h e s i s something 
of the range of Ramsey's t h o u g h t , t o d i s c u s s t h e problems 
t h a t i t r a i s e s , and t o r e l a t e i t t o t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s 
which must f a c e every r e l i g i o u s epistemology. I have 
endeavoured t o i n d i c a t e t h e o e n t r a l i t y of t h e n o t i o n o f 
r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Ramsey's p o s i t i o n . 
And I have argued f u r t h e r t h a t t h i s concept must be c e n t r a l 
t o any v i a b l e a n a l y s i s o f r e l i g i o u s knowing. A l t h o u g h 
Ramsey's d i s c u s s i o n o f d i s c l o s u r e - d i s c e r n m e n t c o n t a i n s many 
f l a w s i t does h i g h l i g h t those f e a t u r e s o f r e l i g i o u s 
i n t u i t i o n i s m t h a t deserve f u r t h e r c r i t i c a l study: i n p a r t i c u l a 
t h e problems of o b j e c t i v i t y and c e r t a i n t y , t h e n a t u r e o f 
"mediated" i n t u i t i o n , and t h e v a r i e t y of types o f i n t u i t i o n 
i n 
i n r e l i g i o n , I have t r i e d t o i n d i c a t e / t h e a p p r o p r i a t e places 
t h r o u g h o u t t h i s t h e s i s ways i n which some of these problems 
might be r e s o l v e d . Ramsey's t r e a t m e n t of r e l i g i o u s language 
and t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s i m i l a r l y serve t o 
fo c u s our a t t e n t i o n on i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s - i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
r u n c t i o n s o f r e l i g i o u s language and t h e c r i t e r i a t h a t may "be 
used i n i t s e v a l u a t i o n . Here a g a i n h i s work i s open t o a 
number of c r i t i c i s m s and I have suggested p o s s i b l e developnmts 
o f Ramsey's p o s i t i o n t h a t might make i t more a c c e p t a b l e . 
I nave found l e s s of v a l u e , however, i n h i s t r e a t m e n t o f 
metaphysics, a l t h o u g h I have s t r e s s e d t h e importance o f 
h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t u s o f t h e i s t i c 
a s s e r t i o n s i n t h e debate on t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e f . 
t h e r e f o r e , as l y i n g e s s e n t i a l l y i n f o u r a r e a s : -
( l ) t h e way i n which i t focusses our a t t e n t i o n on t h e 
c e n t r a l problems o f r e l i g i o u s e p i s t e m o l o g y , and 
r e v e a l s t h e fundamental importance o f t h a t t o p i c f o r 
t h e o l o g y ; 
(z) h i s p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e c a t e g o r y of di s c e r n m e n t , or 
i n t u i t i o n , i s t o be t a k e n as t h e f o u n d a t i o n - s t o n e o f 
r e l i g i o u s e p istemology; 
(3) h i s g e n e r a l approach t o r e l i g i o u s language: i n p a r t i c u l a r 
h i s concern t o produce a d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s of how 
such language a c t u a l l y f u n c t i o n s and h i s w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o take a s e r i o u s and p o s i t i v e v i e w of a l l types o f 
r e l i g i o u s language, f r o m hymns t o p a t r i s t i c t e c h n i c a l i t i e s 
(4 ) h i s r e c o g n i t i o n o f the need t o produce some s o r t o f 
" e m p i r i c a l " . j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s language, w h i l s t 
t a k i n g i n t o account i t s m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t u s and i t s 
d i f f e r e n c e from ( t o g e t h e r w i t h i t s s i m i l a r i t i e s t o ) 
s c i e n t i f i c language. 
I would not c l a i m t h a t Ramsey's c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n any o f these 
I r e g a r d t h e main v a l u e of Ramsey's t h o u g h t , 
 ,ju 
f i e l d s were p a r t i c u l a r l y o r i g i n a l , a l t h o u g h h i s t e r m i n o l o g y 
of " d i s c l o s u r e s " and " q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l s " made h i s w r i t i n g s 
d i s t i n c t i v e . But I would c l a i m t h a t t h e problems he -
t a c k l e d are of major importance and. t h a t a t l e a s t one o f 
t h e t o o l s he used t o solve such problems - th e c a t e g o r y 
of r e l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n ™ possesses c o n s i d e r a b l e power. 
Thus t h e study of I a n Ramsey's though t does not 
o n l y p r o v i d e 'a f i r s t - r a t e e d u c a t i o n i n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s and 
b e n e f i t s of b o t h " p h i l o s o p h y and t h e o l o g y ( G i l l ( I R ) preface)', 
i t can a l s o serve as a s i g n post i n d i c a t e d some o f t h e 
paths t h a t r e l i g i o u s e pistemology might p r o f i t a b l y e x p l o r e 
i n the f u t u r e . 
=<== =*>= 
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A number of philosophers of r e l i g i o n have s t r e s s e d the 
s i m i l a r i t y between science and r e l i g i o n with regard to the 
s t a t u s and function of the models that they use (cfo p a r t i c u l a r l y 
F e r r e (LIKH) , (L1LIJ)| and Barbour ( l £ E ) c h s 4 6 , 8 9 (IMP) passim)» 
There is a considerable l i t e r a t u r e on the r o l e of models i n 
s c i e n t i f i c thought and I s h a l l make no attempt to give a corapre— 
hensive survey of the f i e l d . But i t i s important for our topic, 
to look b r i e f l y at one or two i s s u e s which are r a i s e d i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e o 
Some philosophers of science have tended to be rather 
disparaging about models ?^ claiming that they have a u s e f u l 
h e u r i s t i c function i n the construction of theories , but are without-
any important explanatory r o l e (cf» Kuipers, Gruenewold, Jeans 
9-16, 174-176) <> P i e r r e Duhem i s even more negative, arguing that 
the use of models i s u s u a l l y misleading and not always even 
h e u r i s t i c a l l y valuables 
The share of booty i t has poured into the bulk of our 
knowledge seems quite meagre when we compare i t with 
the opulent conqu|sts of a b s t r a c t theories* (i)uhem 99, 
cfo ch.IV passim) 
g 
Duhem espouses a form of instrumentalism 9 viewing s c i e n t i f i c : 
laws and theories as instruments for p r e d i c t i n g observable 
phenomena.. They are to be judged by t h e i r usefulness alone and 
not as " d e s c r i p t i o n s " or explanations of r e a l i t y (cfo •/« Ho 
Austin (HNS) ch„2, Losee 133-135)o On t h i s view the models of 
science do not represent r e a l e n t i t i e s i n the world at a l l (cfo 
a l s o Ryle (CM) 269-275, Toulmin chs.3,4)o As Ernest Ilagel puts 
i t s 
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proponents of t h i s view supply no uniform account of 
the various " s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s " (such as electrons 
or l i g h t waves) which are o s t e n s i b l y postulated by 
microscopic t h e o r i e s . But ..... i t i s f a r from 
c l e a r how, on t h i s view, such " s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s " 
can be s a i d to be p h y s i c a l l y e x i s t i n g things. For 
i f a theory i s j u s t a leading p r i n c i p l e - a technique 
for drawing inferences based upon a method of 
representing phenomena — terms l i k e " electron" and 
" l i g h t wave" presumably function only as conceptual 
l i n k s i n r u l e s of representation and inference* 
(Nogel 140) 
Other philosophers of science have argued that models are 
" u t t e r l y e s s e n t i a l parts of t h e o r i e s " (N. R. Campbell, Physics 
the Elements (1920), pJ29, quoted i n Hesse (LIAS) 5) as w e l l as 
being a f r u i t f u l source of s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s ( c f . Hesse (LjP) , 
Nagel 107-114). Norman Campbell i n p a r t i c u l a r has s t r e s s e d the 
important r o l e of models/analogies i n s c i e n t i f i c explanation 
arguing that "the explanation offered by a theory ... i s always 
based on an analogy, and the system with which an analogy i s 
traced i s always one of which the laws are known" (N. II. 
Campbell 96°, c f . Losee 137-138). Many have questioned the 
s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s of instrumental ism i n s c i e n c e ^ " "i/hy", they 
ask, "do some theories work while others do not? I s i t not the 
case that the usefulness of theories depends on the objective 
features of the world; that theories are e i t h e r true or f a l s e ? " . 
iuch c r i t i c s often take a r e a l i s t i c ; view of s c i e n t i f i c - t h e o r i e s : 
t r e a t i n g them, and the models they contain, as representations of 
the r e a l world. Thus Grover Maxwell w r i t e s : 
The only reasonable explanation for the success of 
theories of which I am aware i s t h a t well-confiroed 
theories are conjunctions of well-confirmed, genuine 
statements, and that the e n t i t i e s to which they r e f e r , 
i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , e x i s t „ (Uaxwell 1E°, c f . Popper (Cii) 
111-119, Guinton (NT) 297-299, Kearney 159) 
Ian Barbour comments: "The lesson to be learned from the mistakes 
of nineteenth century physics i s not that models must be discarded 
but that they must not be interpreted l i t e r a l l y " (Barbour ( i S I i ) 
of science as i t i s i n the philosophy of perception; but a 
p o s i t i o n of " c r i t i c a l r e a l i s m " i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e i n both areas 
( c f . Barbour i b i d * 1 7 2 ) . On t h i s view s c i e n t i f i c models are 
accepted as analogical representations? rather than l i t e r a l 
d e s c r i p t i o n s , o f the " r e a l world". A r e a l i s t i s however faced by 
the n e c e s s i t y of defining what e x a c t l y he means by "physical 
r e a l i t y / e x i s t e n c e " i n r e l a t i o n to subatomic p a r t i c l e s and the 
other " t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s " of the s c i e n c e s . Various c r i t e r i a 
have been suggested ( c f . Nagel 146-152); and we may note that f or 
many r e a l i s t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y rather o b s e r v a b i l i t y seems to be the 
most important c r i t e r i o n . Thus Campbell w r i t e s that a man c a l l s 
things " r e a l " "because they are necessary to make the world 
i n t e l l i g i b l e to him". He continues: 
Theories are also designed to make the world i n t e l l i g i b l e 
to us, and they play quite as important a p a r t as do laws 
i n rendering i t i n t e l l i g i b l e . And i f anything i s r e a l 
that renders the world i n t e l l i g i b l e , then s u r e l y the 
ideas of theo r i e s — molecules and e x t i n c t animals and 
a l l the r e s t of i t - have j u s t as much claim to 
r e a l i t y as the ideas of laws.(N. R. Campbell 105-106) 
But Maxwell has argued th a t we must be c a r e f u l not to confuse 
meaning with evidence i n our d i s c u s s i o n of the "existence" of 
t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s ; for the evidence for the existence or 
r e a l i t y of such e n t i t i e s i s not the same as the defining 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of existence. He goes on: 
I submit that i n "ordinary language" the most usual 
uses of these teflas ( i . e . " r e a l " , e x i s t s " ) are such 
that 
161). A naSve r e a l i s m i s as unacceptable i n the philosophy 
'5 are r e a l •5 e x i s t 
and t h a t 
>< e x i s t = df. there are 4 
and that the meanings of these d e f i n i e n s are c l e a r enough 
so that no fur t h e r explanation i s s e r i o u s l y needed. 
(Maxwell 21) 
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At any r a t e , many philosophers of science seem to be agreed that 
" r e a l i t y " need not be r e s t r i c t e d to what i s observable and s t r a i g h t -
forwardly describable in. the language of observables: 
... in, so f a r as s c i e n t i f i c language i s understood 
i n i t s own proper context, the st r u c t u r e s about 
which i t speaks do e x i s t in external nature? and e x i s t 
j u s t as s u r e l y as c h a i r s and tab l e s and s c i e n t i s t s 
and philosophers e x i s t ... 
Not only that, but there seems also to be a kind of 
co n t i n u i t y between our perception of ordinary objects 
and our inference to such s c i e n t i f i c concepts ex 
the fundamental p a r t i c l e s . Je do not doubt the 
ob j e c t - l i k e - n e s B of v i r u s e s and large organic 
molecules which j u s t come into view i n highl y 
magnifying microscopes, and i t i s natural to e x t r a -
polate to a hierarchy of p a r t i c l e s of decreasing 
s i z e and i n c r e a s i n g unlikeness to ordinary objects: 
atoms, n u c l e i , protons, e l e c t r o n s . i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how a r i g i d ontological d i s t i n c t i o n ca.n be 
made anywhere in. the hierarchy, that i s , we cannot 
f i n d grounds for saying the p a r t i c l e s greater than, 
says Angstroms i n diameter are objects i n the 
external world, and those l e s s then two Ingstroms 
are only mathematical constructions. (Hesse (SHl) 
150-151; c f . also Maxwell 7-11, 26-27, Theobald 
124-134) 
\!e may then accept c r i t i c a l r e a l i s m as a v i a b l e p o s i t i o n 
to adopt in. the philosophy of science, arguing that the 
t h e o r e t i c a l models of the sciences "are neither p i c t u r e s of 
r e a l i t y nor u s e f u l f i c t i o n s ; they are p a r t i a l and inadequate 
ways of imagining what i s not observable" (Barbour (Lilp) 4 8). 
I n Barbour's view: 
C r i t i c a l r e a l i s m acknowledges the in d i r e c t n e s s of 
reference and the r e a l i s t i c i n t e n t of language as 
used i n the s c i e n t i f i c community ... I t recognises 
that no theory i s an. exact d e s c r i p t i o n of the world, 
and that the world i s such as to bear i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i n some ways and not i n others. I t affirms the r o l e of 
mental construction and imaginative a c t i v i t y i n the 
formation of the o r i e s , and i t a s s e r t s that some 
constructs agree with observations better than others 
only because events have an objective pattern. (Barbour 
(ISR) 172; c f . Quinton (NT) 290-291) 
At the very l e a s t one might be w i l l i n g to agree with philosophers 
of science who contend that: "To propose something as c, model 
of (ail) x i s to suggest i t a,c e, way of representing x which 
provides at l e a s t some approximation of the actual s i t u a t i o n ; 
moreover, i t i s to admit the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e repre-
sentations u s e f u l for d i f f e r e n t purposes" (Achinstcin (Til) 105; 
cfe Spector passim)o 
I a n Barbour's views are p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to our 
d i s c u s s i o n because he argues further that a c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n should be adopted by theologians i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s of 
t h e o l o g i c a l models (Barbour (ISR) 216-218, (Ojp) 50,69; cf„ 
Ferre (tiLM) 74-78, (MMR) 344) „ Our r e l i g i o u s models are p a r t i a l 
and approximate "representations" of the nature and a c t i v i t y of 
God; they are by no means exact, l i t e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s of him. 
I n r e l i g i o n ^ as i n science, "The p r i c e of the employment of models 
i s e t e r n a l v i g i l a n c e " (Braithwaite (S32) 93). But the question to 
which we must now turn i s whether Ian Ramsey i s a c r i t i c a l r e a l i s t , 
i n science and r e l i g i o n . I t seems c l e a r to me that he i s ; and I 
propose now to argue for t h i s t h e s i S o 
Students of r e l i g i o u s language have r e f e r r e d to the w r i t i n g s 
of such authors as R. B. Braithwaite (e.g. (I2V)), Y/„ T. Stace: and 
Paul van Bur en (e.g. (SMG), (CE)) as examples of "instrumentalism 
i n r e l i g i o n " (cf» Y/„ H„ Austin (KNS) ch.13, Brown 90-96, Fawcett. 
88)o At f i r s t s i g h t i t might appear that Ramsey stands close to 
a p o s i t i o n suggested by Stace; that; " r e l i g i o u s doctrines are <,. o 
the o r i e s about how r e l i g i o u s experiences can be evoked", "that 
they have t h e i r use i n the evocation of mystical experiences" 
(V/.. Ho Austin (RNS) 47, 31-32). But I have argued th a t Ramsey 
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regards r e l i g i o u s models as having a representative function i n 
addition to t h e i r function i n evoking r e l i g i o u s disclosure:. 
And we have seen that Ramsey r e j e c t s the views of Braithwaite. and 
van Buren on the non-cognitive status of r e l i g i o u s language ( c f . 
CPL 248-249, TTST 78, 'HIS passim, DCCB passim). 
T i l l e y has described Ramsey as "an. i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t with a 
minimum ontological commitment" ( T i l l e y ( T h e s i s ) 275*, c f . 138). 
I t seems to me, however, that Ramsey must be placed very f i r m l y 
on the r e a l i s t side of the d i v i d e . For he has w r i t t e n : 
Those who, l i k e Clerk Maxwell, have displayed an ontological 
commitment are more to be admired for t h e i r i nconsistency 
than for t h e i r l a t e r caution. L-odels ere nei t h e r mnemonics 
nor j i n g l e s ; neither black sheep nor skeletons i n the 
cupboard. The E n g l i s h p h y s i c i s t s of the nineteenth 
century were r i g h t i n wanting some "ontological commitment,", 
some " r e a l existence"; they were wrong, but badly wrong, 
i n thinking -this could be given d e s c r i p t i v e l y . I t " i s 
t h i s error which the contemporary use of models mokes 
evident and s p o t l i g h t s and i s determined to avoid« The 
ontological commitment a r i s e s i n a d i s c l o s u r e , and the 
model, whether i n science or theology, provider us with 
i t s own understanding of, and i t s own inroad i n t o , what 
the d i s c l o s u r e d i s c l o s e s . (L3U 20; c f . PPLIT 162) 
For Ramsey, then, models do have some s o r t of "ontological 
r e f e rence"; however: 
i t i s another question altogether as to how these or any 
models secure such ontological reference as they have. 
Undoubtedly K e l v i n and others believed that t h e i r 
s c i e n t i f i c models r e f e r r e d as a p i c t u r e r e f e r s , and t h i s 
i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y untenable: how could two d i f f e r e n t 
and i t may be incompatible p i c t u r e s " p i c t u r e " one 
world? tiy a l t e r n a t i v e suggestion i s that the reference 
i s d i s c l o s u r e - given through any and a l l models - the 
reference being that "world" or "Universe", or i n a 
Berkeleian sense that "God", which a l l discourse from 
the models with l e s s or more r e l i a b i l i t y t r i e s to 
understand. (iMR 268; c f . RSCS 22-23, RL 56-57) 
Thus Ramsey seems to r e j e c t the view that s c i e n t i f i c - theories 
have merely a h e u r i s t i c function, w h i l s t accepting t h a t they 
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are v e ry f a r from simply being l i t e r a l " d e s c r i p t i o n s " of r e a l i t y 
( c f o RSCS 10-12, 72, 81-82, BSP 82-85)s 
Models, whether i n theology or science, are not 
d e s c r i p t i v e miniatures, they are not p i c t u r e 
enlargements; i n each case they point to tnystejeyo 
(Ml 21) 
V/hat Ramsey i s attempting to do i s to "salvage something from the 
older l a b e l l i n g view" of s c i e n t i f i c models, so that we can "say 
that these i n v a r i a n t s of science, i n some way or another, are 
clues to the r e a l world" (RSCS 12)o And i t i s i n h i s epistomology 
of d i s c l o s u r e s that Ramsey f i n d s the " d i s t i n c t i v e reference" for 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v a r i a n t s (ibid)» 
I t would appear, then, that Ramsey should also be counted 
among those who would draw a close p a r a l l e l between s c i e n t i f i c and 
r e l i g i o u s models» A. great deal of Ramsey's e a r l i e r work, 
r e f l e c t i n g as i t does h i s search for a C h r i s t i a n metaphysics, 
tends to view the s c i e n t i f i c endeavour i n the context of the 
construction of an o v e r a l l metaphysical scheme (cfo U-OCP 16-17, 
U-EP 40-46, .SRCP passim, li passim, U-FTG B16/l29-B19/l32, FPMT 
passim, EST passim)o This approach to the language of the 
sciences has been reviewed above. I t may be summarised by noting 
Ramsey's claim that "God" i s an " e f f e c t i v e key idea to u n i f y 
a l l languages, not only s c i e n t i f i c , language, but a l l the languages 
which together express d i s c u r s i v e knowledge" (U-SLiR 25). Some-
thing of t h i s approach i s s t i l l to be found i n Ramsey's l a t e r 
work, e s p e c i a l l y i n h i s view that "God" - l i k e " I " - i s an 
i n t e g r a t i n g categoryo This suggests that: 
theology has a l o g i c p e c u l i a r enough to unite the 
fragmentary languages of science ooo and o°» thus a o o 
to provide for a fragmentary science the one cosmic 
map which remains the s c i e n t i f i c idealo (RSCS x i i i ; 
cf= ibido75-83) 
But i n I.Iodels and Mystery, which i s itauisey's most thorough and 
most important contribution to the Religion/Science debate, a l l 
the emphasis i s l a i d on. comparing s c i e n t i f i c and t h e o l o g i c a l 
models. And he concludes there that there i s "a far-reaching 
p a r a l l e l between, models i n science and models i n theology" 
(HI 1 4 j . For both d i s c i p l i n e s use " d i s c l o s u r e models", rather 
than " p i c t u r i n g models", i n d i r e c t i n g us towards a f u l l e r under-
standing of t h e i r subject matter - i n enabling us "to be r e l i a b l y 
a r t i c u l a t e " ( i b i d . 1 5 ) . S c i e n t i f i c and t h e o l o g i c a l models, 
therefore, have a s i m i l a r l o g i c a l status and a r i s e i n a s i m i l a r 
way - i . e . i n a disclosure-situation.. 
I n f i n e i t should be noted that fcamsey's e a r l i e r work on 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between, science and theology, which str e s s e d 
that the union of the two d i s c i p l i n e s was e s s e n t i a l l y a p a r t of 
the metaphysical task - the p r o v i s i o n of a key category ("God") 
that i s able to unite a l l languages, speaks of a u n i t y which i s 
achieved at the end of the road. I t t e l l s of a, u n i t y that i s 
given to us by the metaphysical map-maker. But i n h i s more 
recent w r i t i n g s , concentrating as they do on d i s c l o s u r e s rather 
than the second order a c t i v i t y of metaphysical map-making, the 
union of science and r e l i g i o n may be seen from the s t a r t . I t 
stems d i r e c t l y from the common o r i g i n of both d i s c i p l i n e s i n a 
shared d i s c l o s u r e . Both s c i e n t i s t and theologian have to do with 
a mystery which i s "more than" and "beyond" what i s immediately 
observable, a mystery that can. only be knovm i n an act of i n t u i t i v e 
discernment. And a l l such acts are the raw material of r e l i g i o u s 
worship: 
the union of d i s c i p l i n e s i s to be found i n a wonder and 
i n s i g h t and worship, which a l l may share and for whose 
understanding they a l l o f f e r t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r c l u e s . 
(Oi 70; cf .COGS H 17, Sermon (3; 17-20) 7 
I a n Ramsey was not a Thomist; h i s language, presupposition 
and method (both p h i l o s o p h i c a l and the o l o g i c a l ) were v e r y 
d i f f e r e n t from those u s u a l l y employed by Thomists. But he was 
sympathetic to the work of those neo-Thomists - e.g. Itiaritain, 
l i a s c a l l , Trethowan and Daly - who attempted an "exploration of 
metaphysics ... by way of i n t u i t i o n , rather than by a grasping 
of essences" (Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 7; c f . Prospect for lietaohysics; 
E d i t o r ' s Introduction, CPCF 47, 54, 60=61, U-FUG B80/l93, LIBA 
32-34, 3 44, Schedler ( T h e s i s ) 134, 167, Evans (IRTG) 220-221). 
I n p a r t i c u l a r Ramsey has described h i s own work on r e l i g i o u s 
language as "a po s s i b l e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of Thomisai", claiming 
that " i n p r i n c i p l e we are only doing what ... S t . Thomas Aquinas 
was doing, though we are not thereby committed ( f o r better or 
worse) to h i s ontology and system" (RL 185). E. P. Owen 
recognises "a marked s i m i l a r i t y between h i s theory of models 
and q u a l i f i e r s and the Thomistic doctrine of analogy", claiming 
that Ramsey o f f e r s us "a wholly novel restatement of the; 
doctrine" (Owen (PTR) 69; c f . (CKG) 254-255). Another commen-
t a t o r , Donald Evans, has described Ramsey's p e r f e c t i n g and 
negating q u a l i f i e r s as "twentieth-century descendants of Aquinad 
'way of eminence' and 'way of negation'" (Evans (8RTG) 221). 
Ramsey's t h e s i s i s that we can have a doctrine of 
analogical p r e d i c a t i o n without the need to accept S t . Thomas' 
ontological system; that a theory of models can provide - i n 
the words of another philosopher of r e l i g i o n - "a new form of 
analogical thinking which i s not dependent on the metaphysical 
assumptions of the s c h o l a s t i c doctrine of analogy" (Barbour 
(l.IIij?) 179)o However, a number of commentators on Ramsey have 
challenged him on t h i s points claiming that the doctrine of 
analogy can stand only with the support of those "metaphysical 
assumptions" (Lebblethwaite 643, Owen (CKG) 255, (CD) 37,° 
Cohen ( T h e s i s ) 2G3, 213). 
Ramsey's views on analogical p r e d i c a t i o n are stated most 
c l e a r l y i n a secondary source - h i s interview with Ved Llehta, 
recounted i n The Mew Theologian, ilamsey argues: 
I see my theory as a more generalised form of Aquinas's 
doctrine of analogy, but i t depends l e s s than, h i s did 
on a kind of background metaphysics. For instance, you 
couldn't j u s t i f y S t . Thomas's doctrine of analogy unless, 
as p a r t of your metaphysical background, you adopted 
h i s theory of the Creation, which i s , roughly, that 
since God created the world of man, there i s a kind of 
common background- between them. So that words used by 
men, of men, must have some kind of r e l a t i o n to God, 
because the Creation has given God and man a kind of 
common l i n k . But I myself simply t r y to describe the 
Creation i n terms of these models. I would say the 
Creation i s the way of understanding a c e r t a i n kind of 
cosmic d i s c l o s u r e , which can come to us when we ask 
ourselves the question "Tlhj i s there anything at a l l ? " * 
This question brings up c e r t a i n patterns, which we 
r e f l e c t on, and then at some point or other we get a 
f e e l i n g of cosmological dependence. That would be my 
ba s i s for adopting a theory of the Creation. But I 
wouldn't put t h i s theory i n a sacrosanct p o s i t i o n . 1 
think i t would have to be j u s t i f i e d i n r e l a t i o n to a 
di s c l o s u r e reached i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. (VM 100-101) 
The s o - c a l l e d "analogy of being", the analogia e n t i s , between 
God and the world (and p a r t i c u l a r l y between God and men — h i s 
" s p i r i t u a l creatures"''") i s j u s t i f i e d by the unique r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of creator to creature: 
t h i s very r e l a t i o n means that the creature bears a 
li k e n e s s to God within the l i m i t s of i t s creaturehood. 
Creatures ... p r e - e x i s t i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y as "ideas" 
i n £God's3 mind, and are brought into being s o l e l y 
by h i s w i l l , (Owen (CKG) 213) 
On t h i s view t h e r e i s , as Ramsey puts i t , an " o n t o l o g i e s ! 
c o n t i n u i t y " between t h e w o r l d and God, A c o n t i n u i t y w i t h which 
"can go l i n g u i s t i c c o n t i n u i t y " , so t h a t "words used ( o f ) 
d e t e r m i n a t e E x i s t e n t s can have an ' a n a l o g i c a l ' r e f e r e n c e beyond 
them" (U-GCF 1 5 ) . I n t h i s way 'I'hoiaism "grounds episteniology 
i n o n t o l o g y " (Gwen (CKG) 255). 
I t i s t h i s "grounding" t h a t Ransey r e j e c t s , a p p a r e n t l y 
a r g u i n g t h a t o n t o l o g y must i t s e l f be j u s t i f i e d by epistemology 
- and t h a t the d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n can have no p r i v i l e g e d 
p o s i t i o n i n t h e vo c a b u l a r y o f C h r i s t i a n , t h e o l o g y . I n Ramsey's 
eyes " c r e a t i o n ex n i h i l o " i s t o be t r e a t e d as a q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l 
which i s i t s e l f adopted o n l y because i t a r i s e s i n a d i s c l o s u r e . 
The d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n does n o t g i v e us the s o r t of p r e c i s e and 
unambiguous d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and t h e 
w o r l d which c o u l d j u s t i f y a c l a i m f o r t h e r e being an a n a l o g i a 
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e n t i s between them. 
But i n h i s v e r y l a s t w r i t i n g s Ramsey does seem t o p o i n t t o 
t h e need f o r some k i n d of " l i n k " i n order t o j u s t i f y h i s own 
t h e o r y of analogy. I n 1970 he wrote i n a l e t t e r t o Donald Evans: 
g 
I went so f a r i n t h e ... Zenos l e c t u r e s i n Chicago, t o 
suggest t h a t f o r my own p o s i t i o n a c t i v i t y was t h e one 
word which could be used l i t e r a l l y of God and ours e l v e s 
- t h a t here was t h e k i n d o f b r i d g e f o r g e d f o r S t . 
Thomas by a d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i v i t y , and which I 
c e r t a i n l y need i f I am t o g i v e any answer whatever t o 
those who would q u e s t i o n whether I can r e a l l y argue 
t h a t I am saying a n y t h i n g r e l i a b l e about what i s 
o b j e c t i v e l y d i s c l o s e d or (not}« For me, a c t i v i t y p r o v i d e s 
t h e one f i r m l i n k i n f a c t and language. (U—ITR Evans l ) 
And i n h i s "Personal Credo" w r i t t e n i n 1972, Ramsey confessed: 
f o r me a c t i v i t y i s a word which I (use n o t } e q u i v o c a l l y 
nor even a n a l o g i c a l l y , b u t u m i v o c a l l y about God and 
man. This f o r me takes t h e pl a c e of the r e l a t i o n o f 
Creator - Creature i n Thomism, which I f i n d 
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u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because I t h i n k t h a t the d o c t r i n e of 
c r e a t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s a model as much as any o t h e r 
t h e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e . . A c t i v i t y 9 on the c o n t r a r y ? 
i s t h a t concept which p r o v i d e s me w i t h the one 
necessary example o f a word used o f man and God i n 
the same senses This i t i s which makes sure in. t h e 
l a s t r e s o r t we are t a l k i n g of God in. a way t h a t i s 
r e l i a b l e 9 and n o t j u s t engaging i n t a l k of our own 
mailings (U-Credo 3) 
A c t i v i t y , t h e n " i s t h e v e r y bond of e x p l i c i t , l i t e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
between God and o u r s e l v e s " (EFT 3 0 ) ^ 
I should l i k e t o focus on two sets of questions which 
seem t o me t o be r a i s e d by these remarks: 
( 1 ) Does a d o c t r i n e of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n r e q u i r e a b e l i e f 
i n the analogy of be i n g as a basis? And does Ramsey's 
a n a l y s i s of the d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n undermine t h i s 
f oundation? 
(2) V/ithout the support of t h e analogy of being does Ramsey's 
tr e a t m e n t of r e l i g i o u s language r e q u i r e the view t h a t one 
word (e.g. " a c t i v i t y " ) must be u n i v o c a l l y p r e d i c a t e d of 
God and man? 
I n order t o answer these q u e s t i o n s some attempt must be made 
t o sample the c o n s i d e r a b l e l i t e r a t u r e on the use of analogy 
i n r e l i g i o u s language- However, a d e t a i l e d study o f t h e s u b j e c t 
i s i m p o s s i b l e i n t h e space a v a i l a b l e hereo 
( l ) The r o l e of t h e a n a l o g i a e n t i s i n t h e d o c t r i n e of 
a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n 
I t may be p r o f i t a b l e t o begin t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h a summary 
of t h e orthodox Thomistic p o s i t i o n . . For t h i s purpose I s h a l l 
r e f e r t o J , F 0 Anderson's s y s t e m a t i c t r e a t m e n t i n The Bond of 
Beingc Anderson, we may n o t e , i s one of those who views Cajetan, 
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S t . Thomas' s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y commentator, as a f a i t h f u l 
i n t e r p r e t e r o f h i s master. 
"'Analogy'", Anderson, w r i t e s , " s i g n i f i e s a c e r t a i n l i k e n e s s 
i n d i f f e r e n c e . a mean between (Jhe) extremes" o f u n i v o c i t y and 
pure e q u i v o c i t y (Anderson 19; c f . i b i d - 3 0 ) . L i k e S t . Thomas 
( ( S i ) l a , . 13 s 5 ) ? ~ Anderson r e j e c t s b o t h u m i v o e i t y and pure 
e q u i v o c i t y as accounts of t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e meaning of 
words when a p p l i e d t o men and t h e i r meaning v/hen a p p l i e d t o God. 
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The espousal of pure e q u i v o c i t y as a t h e o r y of r e l i g i o u s language 
- i . e . the view t h a t words a p p l i e d t o God bear a c o m p l e t e l y 
d i f f e r e n t meaning from the meaning t h e y have when p r e d i c a t e d of 
men • - can o n l y l e a d t o complete a g n o s t i c i s m about the n a t u r e of 
Godo For s i m i l a r reasons Anderson a l s o r e j e c t s any t h e o l o g i c a l 
v i a nepcativa (way of n e g a t i o n ^ c f . Aquinas (ST) 1©, 13, 2, p53) 
t h a t i s a p p l i e d t o a l l God's a t t r i b u t e s w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . 
Such an approach, which construes p o s i t i v e a f f i r m a t i o n s about 
God as n e g a t i o n s - i n - d i s g u i s e , i s e q u a l l y f a t a l t o t h e o l o g y . 
Anderson w r i t e s : 
i f n o t h i n g we say about God t r u l y and p o s i t i v e l y 
s i g n i f i e s t h a t which He i s , then we would have 
a b s o l u t e l 3 r no p o s i t i v e or a f f i r m a t i v e knowledge of 
Him. Consequently t h e r e would be no grounds f o r 
any n e g a t i v e a t t r i b u t i o n .... ( i b i d . 223; c f . (ST) 
l a , 13, 2, Kayner 859) 
Tlie s o - c a l l e d "Analogy of i n e q u a l i t y " ( o r generic p r e d i c a t i o n ) 
i s a l s o r e j e c t e d by Anderson. He d e f i n e s i t as " t h a t k i n d of 
i m p e r f e c t l i k e n e s s which a r i s e s from the unequal p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
o f t h i n g s i n a common ge n e r i c c h a r a c t e r " ( 3 0 ) . Cn t h i s view 
the same word i s used w i t h t h e same meaning v/hen a t t r i b u t e d t o 
bo t h man and God, al t h o u g h God possesses t h e q u a l i t y s p e c i f i e d 
t o a d i f f e r e n t ( i . e . h i g h e r ) degree. Anderson r e j e c t s t h i s as 
"pseudo-analogy", " o n l y a s o r t o f u m i v o c i t y " , and "a p o t e n t source 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l e v i l s i n p h i l o s o p h y and even i n t h e o l o g y " ( 9 0 ) . 
A more p r o m i s i n g candidate f o r the r e l i g i o u s language user 
i s Symbolic Analogy or the "Analogy of hietaphor". C u r e l y we con 
t r e a t r e l i g i o u s language as e s s e n t i a l l y m e t a p h o r i c a l i n s t a t u s ? 
Thomists, however, tend t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphor 
(which i s of l i m i t e d u s e f u l n e s s i n t h e o l o g y ) and r e a l analogy 
(whose scope i s much w i d e r ) . According t o Anderson t h e use of 
metaphor i s based on a r e a l l i k e n e s s b ut one which i s o n l y " i n 
t h e dynamic or d e r , i n t h e order of e f f e c t s produced or a c t i o n s 
done" ( l 7 l ) j metaphor does n o t speak of a s i m i l a r i t y o f essence. 
I t i s a r e l a t i o n between r e l a t i o n s : God's a c t i o n ( e f f e c t ) on me 
i s s i m i l a r t o an angry men's a c t i o n ( e f f e c t ) on me, and t h i s i s 
the b a s i s f o r my saying t h a t God i s "angry" w i t h me. This i s 
improper p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y "because i t operates w i t h a concept 
which i s u n i v o c a l in. i t s e l f and which i s merely employed a n a l o -
g i c a l l y " (174): 
since whatever i s denominated m e t a p h o r i c a l l y from some 
other t h i n g i s n o t s a i d t o be t h a t t h i n g b ut t o be l i k e 
i t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i n g s s a i d m e t a p h o r i c a l l y do n o t 
r e t a i n the same concept a t a l l ... b u t o n l y t h e same 
name. (174-175) 
Aquinas h i m s e l f t r e a t s such words as "rock" and " l i o n " as 
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metaphors when a p p l i e d t o God. Ee w r i t e s : 
Some words t h a t s i g n i f y what has come f o r t h from God 
t o c r e a t u r e s do so i n such a way t h a t p a r t of t h e 
meaning of the word i s the i m p e r f e c t way i n which the 
c r e a t u r e shares i n t h e d i v i n e p e r f e c t i o n . Thus i t i s 
p a r t of t h e meaning of "rock" t h a t i t has i t s b e i n g 
i n a merely m a t e r i a l way. Such words can be used of 
God o n l y m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . There are other words, 
however, t h a t s i m p l y mean c e r t a i n p e r f e c t i o n s w i t h -
out any i n d i c a t i o n , o f how these p e r f e c t i o n s are 
possessed - words, f o r example, l i k e "being", "good", 
" l i v i n g " and so on. These words can be used l i t e r a l l y 
o f God. ((ST) l a , 13, 3, p.59) 
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I t would appear from t h i s t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between (a) 
m e t a p h o r i c a l language* and (b) l i t e r a l 1 anguage5 about God 
l i e s i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between (a) words which have i m p e r f e c t i o n 
or l i m i t a t i o n as i t were " b u i l t i n " — where l i m i t a t i o n i s a 
necessary p a r t of t h e i r meaning, and (b) words where t h i s i s 
n o t the case. As Aquinas p u t s i t : 
These words ( i . e . the ones t h a t can be used l i t e r a l l y } 
have a b o d i l y c o n t e s t n o t i n what t h e y mean b u t i n t h e 
way i n which t h e y s i g n i f y i t ; t he ones t h a t are used 
m e t a p h o r i c a l l y have b o d i l y c o n d i t i o n s as p a r t of what 
t h e y mean. (i b i d . ) 
D e s pite Anderson's remarks quoted above, the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
m e t a p h o r i c a l and l i t e r a l language about God cannot r e a l l y depend 
- f o r a Thomist - on a d i s t i n c t i o n between d e s c r i b i n g the o p e r a t i o n s / 
e f f e c t s of God and d e s c r i b i n g h i s essence. For the Thomist 
b e l i e v e s t h a t we cannot know God's essence: we know t h a t God 
i s , b u t n o t what God i s ( c f . (ST) l a , 12, passim; l a , 13, 
a r t i c l e s 1, 2, 8 ) . 
But Thomas' b e l i e f t h a t "being", "good", " l i v i n g " e t c . may 
be used n o n - m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ( a l t h o u g h a n a l o g i c a l l y ) of God, i n 
c o n t r a s t w i t h " r o c k " and " l i o n " which are metaphors, may be 
c h a l l e n g e d . I t would appear t h a t "being" and "good" ("one", 
" e x i s t s " e t c . ) do seem t o be a p p l i e d t o God n o n - m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . 
Indeed these words do n o t seem t o possess any m e t a p h o r i c a l usage 
a t a l l . But i t does n o t seem t o be so c l e a r t h a t " l i v i n g " i s 
a p p l i e d n o n - m e t a p h o r i c a l l y t o God. Some r e c e n t w r i t e r s appear 
w i l l i n g t o b l u r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n made by Aquinas between 
metaphor and analogy. Thus Hesse w r i t e s t h a t i n metaphor as 
opposed t o r e a l analogy " t h e r e i s g e n e r a l l y no i m p l i c a t i o n of 
a r e a l s i m i l a r i t y " , and t h a t a metaphor tends t o be more 
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"dispensable" (Hesse (SHl) 145)» The d i s t i n c t i o n between analogy 
and metaphor i s s u r e l y n o t a hard and f a s t d i s t i n c t i o n ( c f o 
B u r r e l l ch.lG, Kearney 74=79); t h e y are p r o b a b l y b e s t t r e a t e d 
as occupying d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s on a continuous spectrunu 
Anderson d e s c r i b e s t h e "analogy of metaphor" as "a k i n d 
of 'mean' between analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n and analogy of proper 
p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y " (180; c f o L a s c a l l (EA) 103-104) <, I t i s these 
two l a t t e r types of analogy which are of most concern t o the 
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Analogy of p r o p o r t i o n or a t t r i b u t i o n , i s "a case of comparing 
many t h i n g s t o one t h i n g as t o an e f f i c i e n t p r i n c i p l e or cause" 
(Anderson 95) o Thus God i s ( " v i r t u a l l y " ) wise because he i s 
the cause of wisdom i n men (who are " a c t u a l l y " t r i s e ) o I n a 
s i m i l a r way d i e t s and c l i m a t e s are d e s c r i b e d as " h e a l t h y " , i n 
the sense t h a t t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o the h e a l t h of men. But as 
S t o Thomas h i m s e l f notess "»7hen a man speaks of the ' l i v i n g God* 
he does n o t s i m p l y want t o say t h a t God i s the co.use of our 
l i f e o o 0 " o Rather "such words do say what God i s ; t h e y are 
p r e d i c a t e d of him i n the c a t e g o r y of substance b u t f a i l t o 
r e p r e s e n t adequately what he i s " ((ST) l a , 13, 2, pg,54-55; c f o 
l a , 13, ( l ) o The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s c l a i m , a c c o r d i n g t o 
Thomas, i s t h a t an e f f e c t n e c e s s a r i l y resembles i t s cause; 
a c r e a t u r e i s n o t l i k e t o God as i t i s l i k e t o another 
member of i t s species or genus, but resembles him as 
an e f f e c t may i n some way resemble a transcendent 
cause ( i . e . i m p e r f e c t l y ) o o c ((£f) l a , 13, 2, v>55) 
Any p e r f e c t i o n found i n an e f f e c t must be found also 
i n the cause of t h a t e f f e c t °»<> {and} <> o. i n a more 
p e r f e c t manner when cause and e f f e c t are n o t o f the 
same s o r t . This i s because e f f e c t s o b v i o u s l y p r e -
e x i s t p o t e n t i a l l y i n t h e i r causes. Now t o p r e - e x i s t 
p o t e n t i a l l y i n a cause i s t o p r e - e x i s t i n a more 
p e r f e c t 0„„ manner ... l^ince God t h e n i s t h e p r i m a r y 
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o p e r a t i v e cause of a l l t h i n g s , t h e p e r f e c t i o n of 
e v e r y t h i n g must p r e - e x i s t i n him i n a hi g h e r manner* 
((ST) l a , 4, 2, p.53; c f . l a , 4, 3) 
Therefore?; 
Any c r e a t u r e , i n so f a r as i t possesses any 
p e r f e c t i o n , r e p r e s e n t s God and i s l i k e t o him, f o r 
he, being s i m p l y and u n i v e r s a l l y p e r f e c t , has p r e -
e x i s t i n g i n h i m s e l f the p e r f e c t i o n s of a l l h i s 
c r e a t u r e s . ((ST) l a , 13,^2, p„55) 
For Thomas, the n , t h e word "wise" i s used p r i m a r i l y and more 
p r o p e r l y of God t h e cau s e j t h a n of man whose wisdom i s t h e 
e f f e c t of God. But t h i s i s o n l y i n terms of the res s i g n i f i c a t a 
( r e a l i t y s i g n i f i e d ) and n o t i n terms of the modus s i g n i f i c a n d i 
( t h e way of s i g n i f y i n g ) ; i n terms of the l a t t e r "wise" p r i m a r i l y 
a p p l i e s t o man and i s a p p l i c a b l e "to God o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y and 
i m p r o p e r l y ( ( ^ T ) l a , 13, 3; l a , 13, 6; c f . doss ( i l i E i ) 120-128). 
But our main concern must be w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t e f f e c t s 
n e c e s s a r i l y resemble causes. This p r i n c i p l e has been acclaimed 
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as " m e t a p h y s i c a l l y s e l f - e v i d e n t " ( K e l l y 17; c f . Foote 15 ) ; 
b u t I share the view of those who regard i t as a mistake - no 
more than "mere s u p e r s t i t i o n " (Emmet (NMT) 183; c f . Kearney 7 1 , 
Owen (Cm) 214). I n any case i f God i s t h e c r e a t o r of a l l 
c r e a t u r e s and t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s , the p r i n c i p l e i s i n danger of 
p r o v i n g t o o much ( c f . F e r re (LLG) 74-75, Lewis (PR) 215-217, 
c f . Owen (CKG) 209). Anderson h i m s e l f expresses c o n s i d e r a b l e 
unease w i t h t h i s form of analogy, b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t reduces t o 
u n i v o c i t y (122) and s u f f e r s f r a n other inadequacies ( 1 2 8 ) . But 
i t s main d e f e c t , i n h i s view, i s t h a t " i n the order of being 
( j i t r e m a i n s j o n l y v i r t u a l ... i t has no a c t u a l s t a t u s i n the 
n a t u r e of t h i n g s " (162; c f . Hayner 857). 
Before we leave t h e analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n we should note 
the c r u c i a l p a r t p l a y e d i n i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n by t h e d o c t r i n e of 
c r e a t i o n * Creatures resemble t h e i r Creator because he i s t h e i r 
Creatoro For Thomists the l i k e n e s s between e f f e c t and d i v i n e cause 
i s a l i k e n e s s or analogy of esse ( e x i s t i n g ) - f o r a l l t h i n g s have 
e x i s t e n c e i n common, and a l l created t h i n g s d e r i v e t h e i r 
e x i s t e n c e from Gods 
\7hile t h e cause i s never exhausted i n the e f f e c t c o o i t 
i s a l so t r u e - and presumed t o be so of God, i f man i s 
t o understand him a t a l l - t h a t cause produces l i k e 
e f f e c t , i n t h a t agere s e q u i t u r esse; i t i s from God's 
created e f f e c t s t h a t we may come, i n v o k i n g t h e analogy 
of b e i n g , t o some understanding of h i s uncreated 
n a t u r e . (Stacpcole 6) 
I n Anderson's v i e w , however, the o n l y v a l i d way of speaking 
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of God i s by "the analogy of proper p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y " . This i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a s i m i l i t u d e of two p r o p o r t i o n s and d e r i v e s from 
mathematics. Thus t h e model i s a f o u r term r e l a t i o n s h i p — 
a : b :.: c. : d, "a, i s t o b as -c i s t o d", which i s based on 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s such as 1 : 2 :: 3 : 6 - t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of the 
1 3 p r o p o r t i o n /2 t o t h e p r o p o r t i o n J/6 being a " p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y " . 
Anderson claims t h a t analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i s "the 
o n l y metaphysical analogy because i t i s t h e o n l y analogy t h a t , 
i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y a n a l o g i c a l " (245; c f . 252-253). He contends 
t h a t t h e b a s i s of the analogy i s t h e analogy between the d i f f e r e n t 
a c ts of e x i s t i n g of d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s . Thus t h e r e i s a 
p r o p o r t i o n 
t l i i s match : i t s a c t of e x i s t i n g :% t h a t match ; i t s a c t o£ 
e x i s t i n g (278-279) 
But where t h e e n t i t i e s d i f f e r i n essence ( e s s e n t i a ) as w e l l as i n 
i n d i v i d u a l a c t s of e x i s t e n c e (esse) ( e . g . when a man i s compared 
w i t h a dogmas opposed t o s i m p l y comparing two e n t i t i e s which have 
the same n a t u r e ) the analogy must be m o d i f i e d a c c o r d i n g l y . So 
most Thomists speak of an analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y based on 
t h e d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e s (essences) of God and man - e.g.; 
l i f e of man : essence of man l i f e of God : essence of God 
( c f . L a s c & l l (Eil) 109) 
T h i s , however, immediately r a i s e s a problem f o r t h e Thomist -
f o r God's essence i s unknown. Thus the e q u a t i o n , 
l i f e of man _ l i f e o f God (X) l 0 
essence of man essence o f God (Y) 
appears t o c o n t a i n two "unknowns" (X and Y): c f . F e r r e (LLG) 
72-73, Palmer (A) ch.V, Geach (k) 123, e t c . 1 l a s c a l l reviews the 
arguments i n f a v o u r of t h e view t h a t term Y i_s known; as essence 
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and e x i s t e n c e are i d e n t i c a l i n God and God's esse i s known 
(Masca l l (EA) 110-112). But Mascall h i m s e l f recognises the need 
t o f e l l back on t h e r e l a t i o n o f c r e a t i o n "which t h u s , as i t were, 
c u t s h o r i z o n t a l l y across the analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y w i t h an 
analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n " ( i b i d . 112). lie concludes t h a t : 
i n order t o make t h e d o c t r i n e of analogy r e a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
we must see the a n a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n , between God and the 
w o r l d as combining i n a t i g h t l y i n t e r l o c k e d u n i o n both 
analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n and analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . 
Without analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i t i s v e r y d o u b t f u l 
whether t h e a t t r i b u t e s which we p r e d i c a t e of God can be 
a s c r i b e d t o him i n more than a merely v i r t u a l sense; 
w i t h o u t analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n i t h a r d l y seems p o s s i b l e 
t o avoid a g n o s t i c i s m , ( i b i d . 113; c f . F a r r e r (ttF) 66-67, 
Copleston (HP 2 I I ) 76) 
Anderson a l s o s t r e s s e s t h e importance of t h e d o c t r i n e of 
c r e a t i o n i n h i s own account of analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . The 
r e l a t i o n s i n which the essences of Elan and God stand t o t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e acts of e x i s t i n g are r e l a t e d i n an analogy of 
p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . John L i c l n t y r e comments on Anderson; 
when he comes t o d e a l w i t h the statement t h a t "human 
essence i s t o human e x i s t e n c e as D i v i n e essence i s 
t o D i v i n e e x i s t e n c e " , Anderson holds t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n 
of essence t o a c t o f e x i s t i n g i s t h a t of potency t o 
a c t , and t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s the r e s u l t of 
C r e a t i o n i n which God's e f f e c t s are l i n k e d t o 
him as Agent by r e a l r e l a t i o n s of a n a l o g i c a l s i m i l a r i t y . 
( L i c l n t y r e (A.) 10) 
Anderson, h i m s e l f d e c l a r e s ; 
the a c t of c r e a t i o n i s the p o s i t i n g i n e x i s t e n c e of 
analogues of t h e Author of t h a t a c t . Since t h e 
e x i s t e n c e of every b e i n g i s g i v e n t o i t by Him who 
i s Existence? every e x i s t e n t i s a created analogue 
of i t s Author; and, as such, i t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n 
Him and i m i t a t e s Him e x i s t e n t i a l l y . (Anderson 309=310) 
# # fl-
i t would appear thea t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e of 
a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n i s , v e r y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e meta-
p h y s i c a l n o t i o n of an analogy of b e i n g between God and t h e 
w o r l d , and hence t o the d o c t r i n e o f c r e a t i o n o But t h i s b a sis 
may be questioned on a number o f d i f f e r e n t grounds:-
( a ) I t does appear t h a t t h e concept of an a n a l o g i a e n t i s i s 
most a t home i n an A r i s t o t e l i a n - T h o m i s t i c metaphysics w i t h i t s 
a n a l y s i s of e n t i t i e s i n terms of essence/existence and potency/ 
a c t (Aquinas (ST) l a , - 3, 1| l a s 3,- 2| c f . Gop Ires torn ( i l ) ch. 2, 
(HP 2 I I ) chs.33, 35)o Those who are unable t o make much sense 
of t h i s a n a l y s i s f i n d themselves i l l a t ease w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e 
(e.g. Ko Ward (CG) 157-158; c f . (EC) 172, 174. But c f . Geach 
(A) 88-97, B u r r e l l 238). 
(b) One may q u e s t i o n whether t h e d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n can j u s t i f y 
our use of mundane language in. speaking of the transcendent God. 
I t has been argued t h a t : 
t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t any i d e n t i t y of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
can h o l d between God and man i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
t h e fundamental t h e i s t i c assumption t h a t God i s 
i n f i n i t e . ( F e r r e (LLG) 76) 
And t h e d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n does seem t o widen t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 
between God and t h e w o r l d a t t h e same time as i t connects them. 
God i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o the w o r l d as t h e c o n t i n u i n g cause o f 
i t s e x i s t e n c e . lie i s t h e r e f o r e immanent i n the w o r l d , o r , r a t h e r , 
"present t o " i t "as an. agent i s p r e s e n t t o t h a t i n which i t s 
a c t i o n i s t a k i n g p l a c e " (Aquinas (ST) l a , 18, l ) = But God i s 
12 a l s o t r anscendent; and t h e r e i s a profound o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between Creator and c r e a t u r e . And of course i t i s p r e c i s e l y the 
transcendence of God t h a t i s t h e reason f o r our h a v i n g t o use 
a n a l o g i c a l language about him ( F a r r e r (RF) 6 5 ) . I t might be 
argued t h a t t h i s r a d i c a l transcendence i s p u t a t r i s k by the. 
d o c t r i n e of a n a l o g i a e n t i s . But John L i e I n t y r e has defended 
analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n a g a i n s t the charge t h a t i t leads t o the 
i d e a of an " o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t i n u i t y between God and man"; 
I t i s God's a c t of c r e a t i o n which e s t a b l i s h e s t h e 
an.alogia e n t i s so t h a t t h e r e can be no question of 
the a n a l o g i a e n t i s involving any d e n i a l of t h e 
fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between Creator and c r e a t u r e s 0 
I n Anderson's words ..., "God and the w o r l d are 
e s s e n t i a l l y d i v e r s e " . ( L c l n t y r e (A.) 12; c f o Anderson 
809) 
Thus pace Ferre ((LLG) 7 6 ) , t h e a n a l o f t i a en.tis does n o t speak 
of i d e n t i t y , b u t of " i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e " - , between God and 
man ( c f . Cwen (CKG) 212, L I c I n t y r e (A) 11-12). The e x t e n t t o 
which t h i s i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e impugns the n o t i o n of the 
transcendence of God i s open, t o debateo I t seems f a i r t o 
conclude t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n (and t h e n o t i o n of 
transcendence t h a t i t e n t a i l s ) might be compatible w i t h the 
a n a l o g i a e n t i s . 
But i t i s another m a t t e r a l t o g e t h e r when the Thomist 
claims t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n i m p l i e s an analogy of b e i n g 
between God and t h e w o r l d . I cannot see how t h i s c l a i m can be 
j u s t i f i e d w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t e f f e c t s are l i k e 
causes and/or t h e Thomistic a n a l y s i s of e n t i t i e s i n terms of 
essence and e x i s t e n c e . C e r t a i n l y r e c e n t defences o f the c l a i m 
do n o t seem t o me t o be v e r y c o n v i n c i n g ( c f . Cwen (CKG) 213-214; 
(CD) 4C)O V/hy should the w o r l d be n e c e s s a r i l y l i k e i t s Creator 
except in. t h e minimal sense t h a t b o t h " e x i s t " ( a l t h o u g h i n 
v e r y d i f f e r e n t ways}? As H. Do Lewie I i a t p u t i t , i t i s one 
t h i n g t o c l a i m t h a t : 
t h e r e can be n o t h i n g which i s t r u l y a l i e i a t o God or 
o u t s i d e His c o n t r o l as the u n c o n d i t i o n e d source of 
t h i n g s . But i t i s v e r y m i s l e a d i n g t o p r e s e n t t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r t r u t h about the u l t i m a t e r e l a t i o n o f God 
t o c r e a t u r e s i n the form of a general p r i n c i p l e 
about an a l l e g e d community of n a t u r e of cause and 
e f f e c t That i s a d i s t o r t i o n ... (Lewis (Pii) 217) 
( c ) Some have c r i t i c i z e d t h e a n a l o g i a e n t i s on t h e grounds t h a t 
i f t h e causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and the w o r l d i s t o be used 
t o support a t h e o r y of aoalogy, then t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p must be 
t r e a t e d u n i v o c a l l y and n o t a n a l o g i c a l l y . 
I f God i s t o be spoken of as " f i r s t cause" of the w o r l d , 
t h a t a t t r i b u t i o n must foe proposed i n some u n i v o c a l sense. 
Thus, even i f an analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n can be shown t o 
ho l d i n f o r m a t i v e l y among o b j e c t s i n the w o r l d , i t 
appears t o f l o u n d e r h e l p l e s s l y i n am. i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s o f 
e q u i v o c a t i n g on i t s key word "cause", when a p p l i e d i n 
hopes of g a i n i n g knowledge of-God. (j^'erre (~Air) 961 c f . 
Emmet (NMT) 173, 181, 188) 
The i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s i n t o e q u i v o c a t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y one ever-
p r e s e n t danger i n b u i l d i n g one analogy on t h e f o u n d a t i o n of 
another. 
(d) I n any case, and t h i s must be t h e r e a l l y i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i n 
any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Ramsey's views, Ian. iianisey i s s u r e l y r i g h t 
i n r e f u s i n g t o t r e a t the d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n as separable from 
the r e s t of t h e language we use about God. The C r e a t i o n d o c t r i n e 
cannot j u s t i f y a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n , f o r i t stands i t s e l f •= 
l i k e our a n a l o g i c a l language - i n need of t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t 
can o n l y come from r e l i g i o u s experience. Eamsey f o r c e s us t o 
ask t h e p r i o r q u e s t i o n , "how do we know t h a t the w o r l d i s crea t e d ? " . 
C l a s s i c a l l y t h e b e l i e f t h a t man i s made i n the image of God was 
d e r i v e d from t h e B i b l e , coupled w i t h a n a t u r a l t h e o l o g y t h a t 
claimed t o show t h a t " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s [must} have been caused 
by God" and t h a t " i t f i s ^ e x c l u s i v e l y f o r God t o c r e a t e " (Aquinas 
4-23 
(&T) l a , 44, 1; l a , 45, 5, e k > ) < Today we - w i t h Ramsey - need 
t o go behind and beyond the B i b l e and ground such a b e l i e f i n 
a " n a t u r a l t h e o l o g y " of r e l i g i o u s experiences For " i n the 
f i n a l a n a l y s i s our judgements concerning r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s are 
i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d t o the q u a l i t y of experiences which we have 
enjoyed" (Badham 13-14-). 
I t may be t h a t Ramsey's d e t a i l e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f c r e a t i o n 
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ex n i h i l o as a q u a l i f i e d - m o d e l leaves much t o be d e s i r e d . 
When i t was f i r s t proposed, i n an unpublished paper, A u s t i n 
F a r r e r wrote t o c r i t i c i z e Ramsey f o r t a k i n g " ' C r e a t i o n ' i n the 
sense o f ' c r e a t u r e ' " and r e d u c i n g the whole phrase " t o something 
about t h e n y s t e r i o u s n e s s of e v e r y t h i n g " ( F a r r e r ( L e t t e r ) 2, 1956). 
One might p r e f e r t o say t h a t c r e a t i o n - e x - n i h i l o ( " t h e o l o g i c a l 
c r e a t i o n " ? ) i s a n o t i o n t h a t can o n l y be a p p l i e d p r o p e r l y t o 
God - a n o t i o n t h a t may then, be a n a l o g i c a l l y a p p l i e d t o human 
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a c t s . I n t h i s case the word " c r e a t i o n " would n o t be a human 
model which i s t h e n used of God. But Ramsey's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 
t h e d o c t r i n e d e r i v e s from a d i s c l o s u r e of " c r e a t u r e l y dependence" 
(RL 73; c f . i b i d . 71-75, VLi 101, RbCo ch 4, e t c . ) s u r e l y cannot 
be questioned. The c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of God, l i k e h i s " f a t h e r l y " 
a c t i v i t y , i s dis c e r n e d i n and thro u g h r e l i g i o u s experience. 
Ramsey, t h e n , may be s a i d t o b e l i e v e i n a d i s c o v e r e d 
" a f f i n i t y " ( c f . Macquarrie (GT) 220) between God and man: an 
a f f i n i t y t h a t i s di s c o v e r e d i n our d i s c o v e r y of God. ">Ve use 
c e r t a i n , human analogies of God because we f i n d i n our r e l i g i o u s 
experience t h a t t h e y are a p p r o p r i a t e t o h i s di s c e r n e d n a t u r e . 
He seems t o us t o be " j u s t " , " l o v i n g " , "wise" and so on. I t i s 
t h i s d i s c e r n e d i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e which i s t h e bas i c 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our use of a n a l o g i e s . I f one wants t o c a l l 
t h i s an "analogy of toeing" t h e n I suppose one may ( c f . Schedler 
( T h e s i s ) 209); tout i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t o be understood i n 
Tho m i s t i c terms, nor i s i t t o be t r e a t e d - as Thomists do — 
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as an a p r i o r i j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f analogy. I t i s , r a t h e r , v e r y 
much a p o s t e r i o r i ; b eing d i s c o v e r e d i n our r e l i g i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c i n g . The r e l i g i o u s experience, as always, i s fundamental. 
As Baelz has expressed i t : 
t h e p o i n t of r e f e r e n c e ( f o r o u r language about God^ 
may be g i v e n i n and w i t h r e l i g i o u s experience. I f 
t h i s i s so, then we may c l a i m t o know what we are 
t a l k i n g about when we are u s i n g our a n a l o g i e s . I f 
i t i s n o t so, we may f i n d ourselves committed t o an 
u l t i m a t e a g n o s t i c i s m ... or t o a v i r t u a l atheism ... 
(Baelz (CTU) 99-1C0) 
( 2 ) Does Ramsey need a u n i v o c a l p r e d i c a t e ? 
Despite h i s r e s e r v a t i o n s about the a n a l o g i a e n t i s Ramsey 
appears t o f e e l t h a t the d o c t r i n e of c r e a t i o n does p r o v i d e t h e 
Thomist w i t h a necessary l i n k between, language about God and 
language about the w o r l d . Ramsey p r e f e r s , however, t o p r o v i d e 
t h e " m i s s i n g l i n k " h i m s e l f by t r e a t i n g a c t i v i t y as u n i v o c a l l y 
p r e d i c c b l e of both man and God. ile may r e c a l l t h a t Aquinas 
b o l d l y a s s e r t s t h a t " i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c a t e a n y t h i n g 
u n i v o c a l l y of God and c r e a t u r e s " ( ( ^ T ) l a , 13, 5, p.63;s 
thus he does n o t see the n e c e s s i t y of a u n i v o c a l a t t r i b u t e i n 
or d e r t o make t h e o l o g i c a l analogy v i a b l e . Jhy t h e n does 
Ramsey? 
I b e l i e v e t h a t the appeal t o t h e u n i v o c a l s t a t u s of " a c t i v i t y " 
r e v e a l s a ( r a t h e r b e l a t e d ) r e c o g n i t i o n on. Ramsey's p a r t of t h a t 
s t r e n d i n h i s own thought t h a t comes dangerously near t o espousing 
pure e q u i v o c i t y i n t h e o l o g i c a l . language ( c f . U-PE 25, Cohen 
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( L H L ) passim) . C e r t a i n l y Ramsey jis_ sometimes i n € anger of 
s l i p p i n g o f f t h e v i a media, i n t o the abyss of a g n o s t i c i s m . His 
appeal t o the f a c t t h a t a t l e a s t one word i s a p p l i e d t o God 
u n i v o c a l l y t h e r e f o r e a cts as a safeguard. For i f we know t h a t 
"God i s a c t i v e as we are a c t i v e " — t h a t he too i s an, agent = 
then we do understand a l i t t l e b i t b e t t e r what we mean by c a l l i n g 
him " l o v i n g " , "wise"; and so on. 
I would argue, however, t h a t : 
(a) t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p l o y i s doomed. For the a c t i v i t y of God 
cannot mean t h e same as human a c t i v i t y , and must be t r e a t e d 
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a n a l o g i c a l l y . F u r t h e r , ilamsey's evidence f o r h i s c l a i m -
i . e . t h a t we become aware of God's a c t i v i t y i n becoming aware 
of our own - i s no evidence a t a l l . I t t e l l s us n o t h i n g about, 
the meaning of the word " a c t i v i t y " \rhen p r e d i c a t e d o f God. 
(b) t h e p l o y i s i n any case unnecessary. For we can. p r e d i c a t e 
a l l our language of God a n a l o g i c a l l y w i t h o u t f a i l i n g t o 
p r e d i c a t e m e a n i n g f u l l y . The s e c r e t , which Ramsey does n o t appear 
always t o remember, i s t o make some attempt t o s p e c i f y the e x t e n t 
and d i r e c t i o n of the s h i f t i n meaning which occurs when we ap p l y 
terms t o God. Despite h i s pleas t h a t r e l i g i o u s language has a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n , Ramsey's God sometimes does appeox t o 
be t o o mysterious - a c o m p l e t e l y unknowable "2". Too o f t e n 
ilamsey has, in. Cohen's words, "made r e l i g i o u s language so 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y t h a t i t has l o s t a l l connection, w i t h o r d i n a r y 
language" (Cohen (LkiL) 144", c f . (Thesis) 177). 
This second p o i n t i s perhaps w o r t h y of a m p l i f i c a t i o n . The 
d o c t r i n e of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n has f r e q u e n t l y been c r i t i c i z e d 
on t h e grounds t h a t we cannot use analogies i n making i n f e r e n c e s . 
I f God i s o n l y "good " and "powerful but n o t "good " and 
"powerful''"", we cannot make r e l i a b l e i n f e r e n c e s about the way 
i n which he w i l l a c t . As J . S, H i l l p u t i t : 
one of the commonest forms of f a l l a c i o u s r e a s o n i n g 
a r i s i n g from a m b i g u i t y , i s t h a t of a r g u i n g from a 
m e t a p h o r i c a l e x p r e s s i o n as i f i t were l i t e r a l s 
( L i i l l , system of L o g i c , Tenth e d i t i o n , V o l * I , p48; 
Longmans, Green & Co: London (1879)) 
L i i l l 's words have been echoed by a number of r e c e n t w r i t e r s on 
analogy - c f . UcCLoskey 220=222, Hepburn (<CP) 35=39. Humphrey 
Palmer's book, Analogy, i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s e t of v a r i a t i o n s on the. 
theme of the uselessness of t h e d o c t r i n e of a n a l o g i c a l p r e d i c a t i o n 
t o t h e t h e o l o g i a n s He w r i t e s : 
A l l i t says i s t h a t t h e t h e o l o g i c a l meaning, when 
grasped, w i l l be found t o stand t o t h e o r d i n a r y 
meaning i n t h e way God stands t o man ... t u t 
l i k e t h i s the: t h e o r y of analogy s i m p l y r e s t a t e s 
the o r i g i n a l p o i n t t h a t God i s so d i f f e r e n t from 
man t h a t our language must also become d i f f e r e n t 
when a p p l i e d t o him. But i t does n o t say how 
d i f f e r e n t ... I t says t h a t no one can know what 
he i s spying when t a l k i n g about God. (palmer ( A ) 
4 2 - 4 3 ) l b 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , Palmer ergues, analogy i s d i s a s t r o u s i n t h e o l o g i c a l 
argument. He b e l i e v e s t h a t " a l l t h e o l o g i c a l argument i s ... 
v o i d f o r u n c e r t a i n t y " ( i b i d . 8 4 , c f . 9 9 ) . For ( a ) we have no 
way i n r e l i g i o n (as we hove i n science) of checking the 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e o l o g i c a l analogies (94-95), and ( b ) the 
a m b i g u i t y of analogy makes i n f e r e n t i a l argument i m p o s s i b l e : 
the c o n c l u s i o n reached — t h a t every t h e o l o g i c a l statement 
i s l i a b l y t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o an u n s p e c i f i a b l e degree -
d e s t r o y s t h e whole s u b j e c t . For p r o p o s i t i o n s regarded 
as t r u e o n l y i f a p p r o p r i a t e l y (and i n c a l c u l a b l y ) 
m o d i f i e d cannot u s e f u l l y be c o n s t r u c t e d i n t o arguments.(97) 
The f o r c e of an argument depends upon the statements 
w i t h i n i t s h a r i n g t h e same terms: ... And i t must be 
the same term i n b o t h ( c o n c l u s i o n and p r e m i s s e s } : 
n o t the some word meaning something d i f f e r e n t . (98; 
c f . 106) 
analogy i s almost as bad f o r arguments, as i s o u t r i g h t 
a m b i g u i t y . I f a term means something p a r t l y d i f f e r e n t 
when applied to God, and i f we camuxot ccy how d i f f e r e n t 
i t s meaning then becomes, them any argument i n which i t . 
plays a p a r t i s u n r e l i a b l e f o r us. Then s.. as terms 
are applied to God here below only by analogy, 
argumentative theology cannot e x i s t at> a de s c r i p t i v e 
science. ( l 4 l ) 
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But can we not argue t h a t the "ambiguity" of theol o g i c a l 
analogy i s a matter of degree; and open to c l a r i f i c a t i o n ? There 
i s surely sone t r u t h i n Swinburne's remarks ( i a a review of 
Ch r i s t i a n Discourse): 
what the theologian . h a s to do i s to show i n deta.il 
t h a t by his use of analogy, a h i g h l y coherent and 
comprehensible p i c t u r e of the universe emerges, ^nd 
what hi s opponent has to do i s to show tha t the 
analogies break dorm too quickly, lead to too many 
apparent contradictions and y i e l d no coherent p i c t u r e . 
I f the user of analogy i s successful i n his task, then 
t a l k about the objects r e f e r r e d t o by the analogy 
i s recognised as d e s c r i p t i o n and statements about then 
as true or f a l s e . (Swinburne (CD) 25-26) 
I should l i k e now to t u r n to one very thorough attempt to 
ou t l i n e the ways i n which an analogy can be explained and i t s 
meaning made more determinate. I r e f e r to an unpublished 
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thesis on Analogical Predication by i t . J. Kearney (1974). 
Kearney provides a s p i r i t e d defence of the necessity of 
analogical p r e d i c a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the natural sciences, 
psychology, e t h i c s , p o l i t i c s , metaphysics and theology ( c f . 
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Kearney 142, 155-188, 259).'' Ee discusses the use of what he 
c a l l s "univocal explanation" and "supplementary analogical 
p r e d i c a t i o n " i n our understanding of analogy. Under the former 
heading he proposes the P r i n c i p l e of Liaximum Univocity; 
Except to the extent t h a t the contrary i s stated or 
otherwise evident, a word i s always t o be understood 
as having i t a f u l l primary meaning, (ibid.212) 
I t i s the task of the user of analogy, bearing i n inind t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e , to specify which of the predicates entailed by the 
p r e d i c a t i o n of a word i n i t s primary sense are not t o be affirmed 
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i n i t s secondary meaning and which predicates may be affirmed 
u n i v o c a l l y - i»eo to point out i t s univocal a f f i r m a t i o n s and 
teuialso This c l e a r l y i s one way of e x p l i c a t i n g an analogy 0 
For the remaining " i r r e d u c i b l e " elements of the analogy 
Kearney suggests t h a t supplementary analogical p r e d i c a t i o n can 
help s he discusses:-
(a) Subsidiary analogical entailments: 
J\ secondary meaning of a. word may be better understood 
by determining which, i f any, of the predicates 
e n t a i l e d by the predication, of tha t word i n i t s 
primary sense are themselves now entailed only in. a 
secondary cense. The statement "God i s a person", 
f o r example, may be better understood i n the l i g h t 
of the explanation t h a t i t e n t a i l s the statement 
"God has i n t e l l i g e n c e " , even i f i t has to be 
pointed out tha t i n t h i s statement the predicate 
"has i n t e l l i g e n c e " - no less than the predicate 
"person." i n the o r i g i n a l statement - i s to be under-
stood only a n a l o g i c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s meaning 
when used of subjects other than Godo (219) 
(b) .additional analogical entailments; I n a word's secondary 
meaning there may be a f u r t h e r predicate e n t a i l e d t h a t i s not 
ent a i l e d i n i t s primary meaning: t h i s secondary predicate being 
analogicalo Thus i n "disembodied person", "person" no longer 
e n t a i l s "having a body" but "aptitude to have a body" - and t h i s 
can be explained a n a l o g i c a l l y (cf« the foetus i n the womb, the 
acorn in. the ground, e t c o ) 0 
(c) Complementary aiialogical p r e d i c a t i o n : Here the "understanding 
of one analogical p r e d i c a t i o n i s made more determinate by i t s 
conjuction w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e one" (223), Thus i f God i s c a l l e d 
botii " f a t h e r " and "judge", then the meaning of "f a t h e r " i s 
modified i n the l i g h t of the use of "judge".. This i s c l e a r l y 
c r u c i a l in. the "multi-model discourse" of theology 0 
(d) iParovllel analogical p r e d i c a t i o n : Here one compares one 
predication w i t h a similar analogical use of the same predicate 
word concerning a d i f f e r e n t subject. Kearney quotes Shelley's 
l i n e : "make me thy l y r e even as the f o r e s t i s " ("Ode to the 
west Wind", 57). 
Understanding analogy, then, i s l a r g e l y a matter of 
"determining the manner i n which the entailments of the primary 
meaning are eit h e r discarded, retained or transformed" i n i t s 
analogical p r e d i c a t i o n (2£7). I n chapter XIV of h i s t h e s i s , 
Kearney turns to the problem of inferences He admits: 
To the extent ... t h a t a secondary meaning i s not 
fu r t h e r determined - beyond the minimum comprehension 
t h a t what i s predicated i s a p a r t i a l resemblance to 
the properties s i g n i f i e d i n the primary meaning of the 
word - no sp e c i f i c inference at a l l i s j u s t i f i e d . 
(227-228) 
Without t h i s f u r t h e r determination nothing con be i n f e r r e d from 
an~anal~ogy - and t h i s i s true" even i f the" i n f e r r e d predicate i s 
to be affirmed a n a l o g i c a l l y rather than uni v o c a l l y . 
Kearney adopts a,s an i l l u s t r a t i o n an argument of fct. 
Thomas ((ST) l a , 20, l ) , s t a t i n g i t i n s y l l o g i s t i c form: 
i/hatever can w i l l , can love; 
But God can w i l l ( i n the analogical sense proper to 
pre d i c a t i o n concerning God); 
Therefore God can love ( i n the analogical sense 
proper t o predicotioa concerning God). (Kearney 229) 
I f " w i l l " and "love" i n the f i r s t premiss are to be understood 
i n the sense proper to man, then the argument i s c l e a r l y i n v a l i d . 
I n Kearney's view the only way i n which the argument can be made 
v a l i d i s by incorporating the P r i n c i p l e of Laximuin Univocity i n t o 
the body of the argument. The r e s u l t i n g argument i s "patently 
v a l i d " : 
Whatever i s entailed by the primary p r e d i c a t i o n of a 
word i s also e n t a i l e d by a secondary predication,as 
f a r as t h i s i s compatible w i t h the t o t a l denials t h a t 
are c o n s t i t u t i v e of the a n a l o g i c a l i t y ( r r i n c i p l e of 
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Llarimuni I f e i v o c i t y ) ; 
But the predication of " T r i l l " i n it s ; primary sense 
e n t a i l s the predication, of ! ,love"; 
Therefore the p r e d i c a t i o n of " v / i l l " in. c, secondary 
secce e n t a i l s the predication of "love" as f a r 
as t h i s i s compatible w i t h the t o t a l denials t h a t 
are c o n s t i t u t i v e of the a n a l o g i c a l i t y ; 
But " w i l l " i s predicated of God i n a secondary 
sense, w i t h the analogical i t y c o n s tituted by the 
t o t a l denial of any m a t e r i a l i t y or imperfection; 
Therefore "love" i s to be predicated of God, as 
f a r as t h i s i s compatible w i t h the t o t a l denial of 
any m a t e r i a l i t y or imperfection; 
But p r e d i c a t i o n of "love", analogically? i s 
compatible w i t h the t o t a l denial of any m a t e r i a l i t y 
or imperfection; 
Therefore "love" i s to be pred.icated of God, 
anal o g i c a l l y 8 
Kearney concludes: 
.Although i t remains true t h a t from a coiraletely 
unspecified analogical raredication no inference i s 
v a l i d ? from an analogical predication t h a t i s 
specified only p a r t i a l l y and negatively inferences 
can be made i n v i r t u e of the P r i n c i p l e of Lasimum 
Univocity. (238) 
Thus, i f a theologian can adequately — although p a r t i a l l y -
specify the meaning of the analogy he applies to Godi, he nay 
incorporate i t i n t o a v a l i d argument.. But the p r e d i c a t i o n remains 
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an analogyj t h i s p a r t i a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n does not reduce i t t o , 
nor replace i t by, a univoeal term« I f Ramsey's doctrine of 
analogy were to allow f o r a s u f f i c i e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the 
representative meaning of r e l i g i o u s analogies, then he could foe 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h a situation, i n which a l l the language he used about 
God was analogical (cop.tra L c l n t y r e ( l ) 20, Blackstone (MU066-67, 
. 24 
etco)o I believe t h a t Ramsey's theory of r e l i g i o u s language 
does allow f o r t h i s . I contend, therefore, that there i s no need 
f o r him to seek a univocal safety net; the analogical t i g h t r o p e 





1 . HoHo Parmer, whom Ramsey l a t e r referred to as his "revered 
teacher" ( P G 5 9 ) , was Stanton Lecturer i n Cambridge between 1937 
and 1 9 4 0 . 
2. Ramsey wrote affectionate t r i b u t e s to Raven i n Proceedings 
of the B r i t i s h Academy, L l ( 1 9 6 5 ) and The Modern Churchman N.S. 
V I I I , 2 ( 1 9 6 5 ) » I n the l a t t e r publication he wrote, " I am one 
of many whose decision- to seek ordination was greatly influenced 
by his Cambridge sermons" ( p . 1 3 4 ) ° 
3° Cf. his a r t i c l e , " S p i r i t u a l Healing" i n The Central Society 
of Sacred Study, l e a f l e t 2 1 5 ( A p r i l 1 9 5 6 ) * 
4» Ramsey reprinted chat part of the report i n which he had been 
most concerned i n CECP ( c h . 1 9 ) ° 
5« Ramsey chaired the committee pro^ilCing the report Abortion; 
an ethical discussion, ( 1 9 6 5 ) ° He also served on the committees 
which prepared other reports on et h i c a l issues: Ought Suicide to 
be a Crime? ( 1 9 5 9 ) 9 S t e r i l i z a t i o n s an ethical enquiry ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 
Punishment ( 1 9 6 3 ) and Decisions about L i f e and Death ( 1 9 6 5 ) ° ( A l l 
published by C.I.O: London). 
6 . I n a l e t t e r to the President of Colgate D i v i n i t y School, 
Sept, 1 9 6 6 . 
7 . The Report, Prayer and the Departed, SPCKs London ( 1 9 7 1 ) was 
prepared under his chairmanship; as was the report on SubBC^aption 
and Assent to the 39 A r t i c l e s , SPCKs London ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
80 Cf. also DCCD, CELCE, OCR, TE etc„ 
9o The style of much of Ramsey's unpublished w r i t i n g s , particular-
l y those of his "Cambridge period", i s very f a r removed from t h i s 
description. Indeed the c l a r i t y of the early material suffers 
badly from not o f f e r i n g the reader enough i n the way of analogies 
and examples. 
1 0 . A l l the abbreviations used f o r Ramsey's unpublished writings 
are prefixed by the l e t t e r "U" and are l i s t e d separately i n the 
Bibliography. Appendix B provides the date of composition. 
1 1 . Here I agree with T.W. T i l l e y , who i s the only other student 
of Ramsey's work to have studied the text i n question ( T i l l e y 
(Thesis) 283). 
1 2 . For the evidence r e l a t i n g to Ramsey's intentions regarding 
the publication of U-FMG see Appendix B. 
13= See p.16 below f o r a f u l l e r account of what i s essentially 
the same argument. 
1 4 . By Peter Baelz, quoted by T i l l e y (Thesis) 62 . 
1 5 ° The influence of Whitehead on Ramsey's early thought was 
considerable, but by no means completely determinative. Thus 
although Ramsey writes of the experiential unity as a "process" 
(U-Burney SS, 82), he i s not to be c l a s s i f i e d as a "Process 
Theologian". 
1 6 0 Cf. U-EP 47? "Perceptual experience . .„ stands to another 
unity of experience i n precisely that abstractive relationship as 
do sense-data and mental events to perceptual experience. Such 
more concrete experience i s ... conational or v o l i t i o n a l " . 
1 7 » "Sentient experience ... i s r e a l i t y , and what i s not t h i s i s 
not r e a l " (Bradley (AR) 1 2 7 ; cf. i b i d . 4 6 3 , also Ramsey U-EP 6 - 7 ) . 
Saxena comments, " f o r Bradley, 'experience' i s , i n the end,identical 
with 'the experienced'". "Experience ... i s never without content; 
and content i n tur n , neither i s nor i s thinkable apart from 
experience" (Saxena 221 -222; cf. Bradley (ETR) 194, G. Dawes 
Hicks (JW) 9 0 - 9 1 ) O 
18. For a defence of Bradley against Ward's c r i t i c i s m s i n t h i s 
a r t i c l e , see Saxena 9 7 - 1 0 9 . Ward also c r i t i c i s e d Bradley's account 
of the Self f o r giving no more than an Empirical Self, whereas 
what was needed was a Pure Ego as the subject of experience, 
actively attending to the presentation which i s the object of 
experience ( c f . Wollheim 1 3 0 - 1 3 5 ) • 
190 "Bodily-abstractives" are the group of spatio-temporal 
abstractives froffT concrete experience which we describe as "human 
bodies". 
2 0 . The argument was l a t e r gradually modified by Ramsey and f i n a l l y 
abandoned ( c f . M 18; U-HA; "Idea of God" B,c .1953, p 2 ; U-HAs "Idea 
of God" 0,0 .1955,52; U-FMG ( 2 ) 10/85/192-(3) 11/16/208 (c . 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 6 O ) ) . 
I n i t s last appearance ( i n 1 9 6 5 ) i t i s no longer a t h e i s t i c 
argument but a plea to use personal disclosures around h a i r , 
f e e t , skin etc. "as our u n i t of thinking f o r the Universe, so that 
around a l l the observaMes a cosmic disclosure i s evoK ed" 
(U-HAs "The Traditional Arguments f o r the Existence of God" R"65,p.4). 
21 o Cf. Rashdall 1 7 - 1 9 , to which Ramsey appeals at U-Bumey 8 6 . 
Ramsey argues that " i f we are to be f a i t h f u l to our prin c i p l e s , 
and especially the philosophical need f o r a proper degree of 
concretion we cannot i n t e r p r e t 'God' as anything less than another 
V o l i t i o n a l Unity with a Timeless Self and mental events analogous 
to our own" (U-EP 7 0 ) . Hence "the Present may be described (not 
as an Absolute)as an Absolute Unity of Experience which can only be 
described i n terms of ( i ) God's Unity of V o l i t i o n ( i i ) Personal 
u n i t i e s of V o l i t i o n - a l l i n mutal accommodation" (ibid.71» c f . 9 6 ) . 
Such an argument, i n Ramsey's view, i s an improvement on that of 
Berkeley, f o r "Berkeley has to conceive God as a sort of super-human 
organism ... an organism capable of seeing, and so on, very much 
l i k e ourselves ... We are not so l i k e l y to think i n terms of God's 
physical organism .„„ once we see that our ideas of God must s t a r t i n 
an Act of w i l l , which w i l l then have f o r abstractives various routes 
of sense - data and mental events which, i n our case, effe c t 
descriptions of 'minds' and 'bodies' but i n God's case w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
not do precisely t h a t " ( i b i d . 7 5 ; c f . 7 8 , 9 6 - 9 7 , 1 3 5 ) . 
433 
22. Ramsey c r i t i c i z e s Rudolf Otto f o r making rel i g i o u s experience 
"altogether d i f f e r e n t from a l l else" (U-HAs "Elements of 
Philosophical Theology I I , " e . 1 9 4 5 , p. 1. 5 c f . U-EP48, 9 4 - 9 5 ) ; 
see below pp. XZS Cf. 
2 3 o ITR Raven 2 5 9 , The l e t t e r was w r i t t e n i n c r i t i c i s m of a 
reviewer's comments on a book by C.E. Ravens i t ends with the 
c r i de coeur; "With the moon of Wittgenstein on the wane, the sun 
of IBerkeley may r i s e again"! 
2 4 ° Ramsey concluded that "Individuals - or, rather, persons -
are ultimates, but they are only ultimates as 'persons - i n -
community1 " ( i b i d . 3 1 0 ) . 
2 5 . The reference i s to the "encounter" of r i d i n g on a London tube 
t r a i n , compared with the various maps or models of the tube system 
which might be constructed. Ramsey l a t e r applies the analogy to our 
encottnter with God, which can be inadequately mapped by s c i e n t i f i c 
and theological language (ibi d . 1 2 ) . 
2 6 . According to Whitehead, "The ultimate fact f o r sense-awareness 
i s an event" (Whitehead (CN) 15$ of, (PR) 9 8 , Emmet (WPO) 7 8 ) . 
2 7 . Whitehead had deP-ied that an abstractive series of events had 
any last term. I t converges to nothing and not to a " l i m i t " ; 
although the set of quantitative measurements of events "does i n 
general converge to a d e f i n i t e l i m i t " (whitehead (CN) 81)„ I n fact 
Ramsey argues against Whitehead that "the word 'point' must be taken 
as i t s e l f specifying the l i m i t indicated by a converging punctiform 
route" (U-EP40)o Thus Ramsey's modified version of Whitehead's 
theory can be described as a thoroughgoing Limit Theory of Language, 
even i n i t s application to the language of mathematics ( c f . i b i d . 1 1 , 
3 9 = 4 1 ) ° However, the " l i m i t s " which Ramsey i s describing i n common 
sense language are merely lowest common denominators of abstractions. 
Ramsey's modification of Whitehead's views on the l i m i t i n g nature 
of mathematical concepts i s more relevant to his l a t e r application 
of mathematical analogies to the problem of the meaning of rel i g i o u s 
discourse (see CD 3 4 - 3 5 and below)„. 
28. i . e . noise or mark on paper. 
2 9 . I n a b r i e f e r discussion i n U-OCP 6 , and some marginal notes to 
U-EP 1 3 , Ramsey describes a l l words other than those introduced by 
ostensive d e f i n i t i o n as being "metaphysical", insofar as they are 
"preferred descriptions of the Present 'immediate' experience" 
(U-OCP 6). However Ramsey does recognise that words l i k e "chair" 
are less metaphysical than words l i k e "God"! (U-EP 13 margin). 
Perhaps we have here a precursor of that element i n Ramsey's l a t e r 
thinking which seems to suggest that our knowledge of, and language 
about, physical objects d i f f e r s only i n degree and, not i n kind, 
from our knowledge of, and language about, s t r i c t l y "metaphysical 
e n t i t i e s " . For both are disclosure-based (see below). 
3 0 . Gf. below pp«l"7| „ por an early formulation of t h i s con-
v i c t i o n c f . TJ-HA "The Reasonableness of the Christian Faith I " , 
Cambridge period, p.3; " A l l notions of an indubitable theology have 
gone ... Theology must be empirical and tentative, though i t may dare to 
be speculative". 
31 o C f o below pp.£67(£, p o r an early articulatiocv of t h i s , which 
i s coupled with his Cambridge doctrine of experience,cf.SRCP 3 0 0 ; 
"neither physics nor theology need deny t h e i r claim to describe 
r e a l i t y , once they admit that i t i s not described d i r e c t l y by either 
maths or the Bible ... i n such descriptions as each gives l i e s 
only 'understanding' of ' r e a l i t y ' ... ' r e a l i t y ' i n 'fact' i s 
apprehended at a more concrete l e v e l ... i n a personal encounter". 
3 2 . i . e . the active Subject (the Self) and i t s active Object (other 
persons and God, known via the objective spatio-temporal particulars 
of other people's bodies and the external world). 
3 3 » Cf. J.E. Smith (EFR) 5 3 9 . 
3 4 ° 0 f » SR 5s " I believe i n f a c t , that words l i k e God ... complete -
f i l l out - our language map, and help us to give the best possible 
description to the encounter". Gf. also SRGP 2 9 9 ° 
3 5 « Hume (T) BK°I, Part IV, Sect. VI and Appendix. Gf. below pp.54-f„ 
3 6 . Cf. below pp. 8r» 
3 7 ° " I t i s clear that i t i s i n some ways a Pure Ego Theory, but ... 
i t d i f f e r s essentially from that type of theory as, o r d i n a r i l y 
formulated- ... (a) ... we do not regard 'Pure Ego1, Mind and Body as 
three independent existents ... (b) .„ we are not committed to such 
philosophical absurdities as supposing the 'Pure Ego' to 'act' or to 
'descend into time' ... "~(U-EP 5 7 ) ° Ramsey rejected t r a d i t i o n a l 
views of a substantial self but spoke of "a 'permanent substance' i n 
the continuity of a Unity of V o l i t i o n a l Experience - always 'mine' 
i n v i r t u e of a Timeless Self which i s an abstractive constituent of 
i t . Yet ... i t s constituents are always changing .." ( i b i d . 6 5 ) 
3 8 . I t i s only a "Serial .. Theory" i n so f a r as the Self may be 
analysed in t o a TineLess Self (Pure Ego) together with "the two series 
dear to the hearts of the supporters of the Serial Theory" (tl-OCP 7 ) 
- i . e . a series of mental events and a series of human body events. 
Certainly Hume should not have expected to "stumble upon" or "observ e 
his Pure Egos "We may perfectly s e l l agree that the Pure Ego i s not 
a datum of introspection, f o r i t i s no 'object' at a l l ..." (U-EP 5 9 ) . 
3 9 ° I t has however clear s i m i l a r i t i e s to Ramsey's l a t e r theories 
about the " i n t e g r a t i n g " function of certain metaphysical "key-words". 
See below ch * HL » 
4 0 . Ramsey's position here bears s i m i l a r i t i e s to the thought of James 
Ward? cf . J. Ward (WA I I ) 1 3 3 - 1 3 f , a l s o i b i d . 1 1 1 , 1 3 1 . Cf. Ramsey's 
l a t e r remarks on t h i s topic, below pp. 3?2.ff-. 
4 1 . C f o Ewing (FQP) 140 ( t h e o r y ( 4 ) ) . 
4 2 . Whitehead's philosophical system i s , of course, basically 
r e a l i s t i c ( c f . Whitehead (SMW) 81-82, 113—114 e t c ) . However,Whitehead 
and Bradley appear to "agree i n making experience or Sentience 
fundamental", by claiming that "A concrete actual e n t i t y i s an act of 
experience" (Emmet (WPO) 8 9 , 1 4 1 ) ° I t has been claimed that Whitehead 
theory of the world as a prehensive unity of events " i s c l e a r l y ... a 
resuscitation of the cardinal presupposition of idealism, the doctrine 
^35 
of i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s " (Quinton (CBP) 535» cf„ Passmore 341). 
Whitehead himself described his cosmology as "a transformation 
of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a r e a l i s t i c 
basis" and confessed "though throughout the main body of the 
work I am i n sharp disagreement with Bradley,, the f i n a l outcome 
i s a f t e r a l l not so greatly d i f f e r e n t " (Whitehead (PR) Prefaces v i i ) . 
43„ The reference i s to MRIC 
44» The s h i f t of i d e a l i s t influence i n Ramsey's l a t e r work i s 
found most e x p l i c i t l y i n his reliance on Berkeley rather than 
Bradley. We have already seen Ramsey's attempt to "reinstate ... 
Bishop Berkeley" (U-0GP8) through his account of the active object 
of the conational encounter. Later he l a i d more stress on Berkeley's 
doctrine of "notions" and t h e i r role i n making possible an empirical 
metaphysics. I n a review of F.H. Cleobury's Christian Rationalism 
and Philosophical Analysis, Ramsey agreed with that author "that we 
may press a Bradley-like epistemology into the service of the 
empirical Berkeley "thus giving the absolute i d e a l i s t position "an 
empirical turn"(Review Cleobury 355). Certainly the name of Berkeley, 
the pioneer of phenomenalism, has proved to be more respectable i n 
the ears of twentieth century philosophers than that of a Bradley 
tarredinevitably with the same brush as Hegel the Obscure. I n 
order to survive the ba t t l e at Oxford, Ramsey had to chose ca r e f u l l y 
the banners under which he was prepared to f i g h t j as well as the 
ground that i t was absolutely necessary to defend. 
CHAPTER I I " 
1. See p. 17. 
2. I t i s s t i l l to be found, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the work from his early 
days at Oxford,, i n Ramsey's treatment of metaphysics and the philosophy 
of science. Cf.» passim, M, PPMT, U-FMG-. I n Ramsey's early work 
cognitive experience was i t s e l f seen to be an abstractive of the 
conational encounter. The same emphasis i s perhaps p a r t l y expressed 
i n Ramsey's l a t e r thinking i n the way that he views the " s i t u a t i o n " 
of discernment - commitment as the t r u l y concrete datum0 For t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n "contains" two abstractivess ( i ) The cognitive experience 
of discernment as a response to a disclosure| and ( i i ) the conative 
element of commitment which leads to human v o l i t i o n a l responses. 
Thus i n 1951 Ramsey could s t i l l write of "a non-inferential awareness 
more concrete than cognition" (M 16). And i n a d r a f t f o r his a r t i c l e 
on "Wisyenschaft" f o r the Encyclopaedia Die Religion i n Geschichte 
und Gegenwart (3rd e d i t i o n ) , he argued that theology has"a d i s t i n c t i v e 
anchorage i n a s i t u a t i o n closely similar to that of personal 
commitment. I n t h i s way i t i s i n conation and i t s language that the 
languages of cognition f i n d t h e i r u n i t y and concretion". 
3. Thus Ramsey had once w r i t t e n about the self being "disclosed as 
an abstraction of a v o l i t i o n a l u n i t y " (U-Burney 133—134)-
4. Ramsey sometimes used "empiricism" and "empiricist" to refer to 
the narrow empiricism association (uith Logical Positivism (PF 333, 
n . 1 ) . More usually, however, he applies the terms to the whole 
t r a d i t i o n including the broader elements w i t h i n i t (e.g. CPCF 51)» 
The adjective "empirical" i n "empirical theology" and "empirical 
metaphysics" i s always to be taken i n t h i s wider sense (e.g. CCP 2 5 4 ; 
c f . Schedler (Thesis) 1 7 0 , Macquarrie (GT) 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 ) . 
5 . Cf .BPM H i A notion i s not "an inactive idea" but "some sort 
of an active thinking image" (Berkeley (D) 2 6 7 ) . 
6 . For a vigorous defence of the importance of "notions" i n Berkeley's 
epistemology and metaphysics, together with a complete survey of the 
occasions on which the term i s used, see Park, espec. chs. I t© I I I , 
7 . Berkeley usually presents his theory of a divine visual language 
rather d i f f e r e n t l y from t h i s . He argues that visual experience i s 
divine language because visual sense-data "suggest" other, t a c t i l e , 
sense-data ("as words suggest the things s i g n i f i e d by them"). Such 
"suggestion" (inductive inference) i s a result of a regularly 
experienced connection between the two sets of ideas, the connection 
having been effected by God (c f . Berkeley (A) BK. I¥, sec. 1 0 ; (MTV) 
sees. XLV, CXLVII; (P) secs.XLIII-XLIV). However,Berkeley also writes 
occasionally (and t h i s f i t s Ramsey's use of the theory much better) 
as i f the "language" of sense-data actually reveals God's a t t r i b u t e s 
( c f . Berkeley ( p ) , 1 7 1 0 edition,sec.CVIII). J . D . Mabbott has attempted 
a modus Vivendi here by suggesting that "God's words - our sense-data -
express or suggest other sense-data, but evince h i s power and good w i l l " 
(Mabbott 3 7 6 ) . 
8. Cf. Helm (VB) 9 4.Butler's dissertation "Of Personal I d e n t i t y " , 
i n which he argues that we cannot define personal i d e n t i t y but are 
simply aware of i t , i s more open to being understood i n t h i s way (cf. 
Butler 330 and PF 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 ) . 
9 . Cf, Cohen (Thesis) 79-80; the "questions of great consequence" 
are of great consequence to the agent rather than, as i n Ramsey's 
examples (RL 16—17), other people. 
1 0 . This sort of argument i s similar to Pascal's "wager", but, as 
Jeffner indicates ( i b i d , 85^86), Butler's argument i s from the positive 
p r o b a b i l i t y of C h r i s t i a n i t y rather than i t s bare (unevidenced) 
p o s s i b i l i t y , and i s therefore more reasonable than Pascal's. 
110 Cf, below p. 8O. 
1 2 . Ramsey often seems to be s t r i v i n g to make Butler's analysis f i t 
his own "sure i n r e l i g i o n / t e n t a t i v e i n theology" framework (cf . ITR 
Owen 127 , CPCF 6 0 ) and below pp. I 7 i ft-. But Butler i s t a l k i n g about 
evidence rather than theology, i . e . something which comes before 
discernment-commitment rather than something which -plows from i t . 
However one could argue that a person might commit himself t o t a l l y 
yet reasonably to someone else's theological assertions (which are 
only t e n t a t i v e ) , rather than his own re l i g i o u s experience (based on 
"probable", ambiguous evidence); c f . PPMT 1 7 6 . 
1 3 ° , I n his 1962 lectures Ramsey argued that Hume was a "Skeptical 
believer", who accepted that "with f i r m r e l i g i o u s feelings can go what 
(as based o.n ideas and impressions) i s a problematic theology", (cf. 
"he would be saying; We can be sure of God's existence while t a l k of 
him i s at every point problematical", Review Pike 2 3 8 ) 
1 4 « Ramsey goes on to interpret Hume's position vis-a-vis God as 
a species of "natural b e l i e f " - ju s t as he says elsewhere that we 
can be sure of the existence of physical objects without being 
able to give compelling reasons fo r that b e l i e f . Others have 
strenuously denied that Hume thought of b e l i e f i n God i n t h i s way -
and have drawn t h e i r support from the philosopher's very negative 
views i n h i s Natural History of Religion. 
1 5 » Hume adds that "PHILO was a l i t t l e embarrassed and confounded" 
( i b i d 0 1 2 9 ) at the arguments l a t e r he i s made to confess (and t h i s Is 
iii Dialogue X I I ! ) that; "A purpose, an i n t e n t i o n , a design strikes 
everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker" ( i b i d . 189). 
He clearl y argues elsewhere,however, that whatever the "feeling" 
the argument from design can prove l i t t l e . 
1 6 . Cf. below pp. £*o3$f; p 0 r a recent restatement of .the fundamental 
objections to t h i s theory Cf. Ch isholm (0 S). 
1 7 ° V/hen Hume claims that a man i s made up solely of "perceptions" 
he i s r e f e r r i n g not to other people's perceptions of that man, but 
to the man's own (private) sensations, dreams, feelings, images, and 
so on ( c f . Penelhum (HPI) 2 1 9 ) . I n c r i t i c i s i n g Hume,, Ramsey' s 
language sometimes obscures t h i s f a c t . 
18. Presumably Ramsey would apply t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume's 
"feeling" - as an i n t u i t i o n - to the l a t t e r ' s analysis of the idea 
of necessary connexion i n causality i n general. After a l l Hume 
considers that the self i s only understandable i n terms of causal 
relations ( c f . Hume (T) Bk.I, Part IV, Sec. VI,p.261 5 N. Kemp Smith 
(PDH) 5 0 0 - 5 0 2 ) . And the "feeling" mentioned i n the Appendix to the 
Treatise i s jus t a p a r t i c u l a r example of Hume's general thesis that 
the idea of necessity i n causal connections i s not conveyed by 
sensations but i s " i n t e r n a l l y f e l t by the soul" (Hume (T) Bk.I, 
Part I I I , sec. XIV, P . 1 6 6 ) . "This connexion ... which we f e e l i n the 
mind, t h i s customary t r a n s i t i o n of the imagination from one object 
to i t s usual attendant, i s the sentiment or impression from which we 
form the idea of power or necessary connexion" (Hume(EHU) sec.VII, 
part I I , p. 755 c f . N. Kemp Smith op.cit, ch.XVILX I n an unpublished 
passage Ramsey does i n fact argues "We might also evoke metaphysical 
situations by t e l l i n g causation stories ... A certain i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
belongs to the s i t u a t i o n . Don't you f e e l ( i t might be said) some 
sort of 'necessary connexion'? ... Here i n a causal pattern we should 
know a sit u a t i o n 'more than' i t s spatio-temporal feature" (U-FMG B.40/ 
1 5 3 ) . 
1 9 . Wittgenstein's own view seems to have been that to discover that 
a statement has no v e r i f i c a t i o n was to discover an important piece of 
information which assists our understanding of i t . I t did not imply 
t hat there was nothing to understands Cf. Malcolm (lAvM) 6 6 . 
2 0 0 we may note especially the d i f f i c u l t y of defining the v e r i f i c a t i o n 
p r i n c i p l e i n any acceptable way. 
2 1 . Ramsey usually uses the term " l o g i c a l empiricism" to cover the 
whole movement i n recent Anglo-Saxon philosophy which emphasises the 
l o g i c a l analysis of language and the importance of sense experience 
as our primary source of knowledge ( c f . CPCP 4 7 ) , I t therefore 
refers both to the early phase of l o g i c a l positivism and to the 
l a t e r broadened empiricism, the l a t t e r including what i s usually 
described as ordinary language philosophy or l i n g u i s t i c analysis 
(a better term might be " l i n g u i s t i c empiricism"; cf. Black (LL) 
2 6 3 ) 0 Sometimes, however, Ramsey uses "l o g i c a l empiricism" to 
refe r solely to the l a t e r stages of the entire movement (cf.RL 1 3 ) « 
2 2 o Ramsey notes that; "This newer emphasis of Empiricism unites 
with Existentialism i n suggesting that personal situations may very 
well provide helpful p a r a l l e l s to re l i g i o u s situations". (Enc» B r i t . 
6 0 2 ) . 
2 3 » I n 1 9 5 6 Ramsey wrote "the Christian i n claiming exceedingly 
odd situations which demand f o r t h e i r currency language whose 
l o g i c a l structure i s suitably odd, need not apologise f o r wanting 
a rather more extravagant empiricism than one which has on quite 
general grounds never been adequate. Indeed, I should say that 
contemporary Oxford philosophy should encourage him" (U-ITR S W 2 ) „ 
2 4 o Both terms are used, and declared synonymous, i n Religious 
Language (e.g. RL 2 4 , 5 7 , 1 1 2 , 1 4 9 ; c f . U-FMG B 3 9 / 1 5 2 , RE 4 0 4 ) . 
2 5 « or "my awareness of (a putatively objective) X" . 
2 6 . There i s another common meaning of "disclosure", i.e."disclosed 
f a c t " . This i s what Ramsey describes as "the newspaper sense ... 
a sense which carries with i t overtones of information disclosed" 
(ID 1 1 5 ) » He wishes to avoid t h i s sense of the word as he believes 
that the objective r e a l i t y of what i s disclosed i s known i n c o r r i g i b l y ; 
whereas the language we use about i t i s c o r r i g i b l e ( t e n t a t i v e ) . 
"Disclosure i n the newspaper sense" would appear to involve the 
disclosure of propositions, i . e . of language. Cf. below pp. 12.*? 
2 7 o Commitment i s usually specified as a response to a disclosure, 
rather than as a response to a discernment ( c f , R E 4 0 4 , RFT 3 4 , HG 2 1 2 ) „ 
But t h i s i s simply a convenient shorthand, f o r commitment arises i n 
response to the discernment we have, through which a "more" i s 
disclosed to us. 
28. i . e . "what ... an i n t u i t i o n discloses"(Prospect f o r Metaphysics 
introduction,^] 1 ) . Ramsey actually writes of "the object of 'disclosure 
or'revelation'" (RL 1 6 7 ) ; but his stress on the "active o b j e c t i v i t y " 
( c f . U-Credo 2 , MM 5 8 ) of what i s disclosed indicates that the word 
"subject" would be more accurate, 
2 9 o This i s clea r l y preferable i n the case of God, f o r orthodox 
theism does not view the world as a "part" of God. But the case of 
I i s d i f f e r e n t , f o r we cannot get away from the fact that the word 
" i n r e f e r r i n g to what i s d i s t i n c t i v e l y personal about a certain 
s i t u a t i o n , also refers to my public behaviour as w e l l " (PI 1 0 0 ) . 
This i s one element of disanalogy between God and I which raises 
problems f o r the t h e i s t . 
3 0 . Although, as we shall see, "ordinary sense experience" i s 
i t s e l f (at another level) disclosure-based. 
3 1 . Cf. Review Trethowan 336. 
3 2 . or "supra-logical" - with Owen (PTR) 6 8 . 
33. The use of such "revelation" language i n regard to other types 
of disclosures i s however more problematic ( c f . MM 19-20, TL 4 , 
PA 196)0 The problem i s discussed below (pp. A10(f» )„ 
34° Ramsey describes such "transcendent objects" as transcending, 
but including, the spatio-temporal ( c f . NL 3 8 9 , OCR 2, MDA 57 ) . 
However the sit u a t i o n would be better expressed i n terms of mediation 
through the spatio-temporal. 
35. Here again Ramsey i s to be found w r i t i n g of "discernment" as a 
species of awareness that includes but goes beyond sense experience 
( c f . RL 90: "Here i s a discernment which i s perceptual and more")« 
And again i t would be better to think of t h i s as an i n t u i t i v e awareness 
that i s mediated through the objects of perception but i s d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
d i f f e r e n t from sensory awareness. And although sensory awareness i s 
i t s e l f based on a d i s t i n c t i v e i n t u i t i o n ^ discernment-basest sense 
experience and discernment-based meta-empirical disclosures are 
obviously to be placed i n d i f f e r e n t epistemological categories. 
360 I n Models f o r Divine A c t i v i t y Ramsey states that "cosmic d i s -
closures"occuraround^ 6 5 ) . But when Ramsey i s w r i t i n g 
of "models" i t i s often not clear whether he i s r e f e r r i n g to model 
language or model situations - cf . below pp. &T1 -fh 
37. Here, and i n a l l the examples that follow, "juxtaposition, " 
must be taken to mean "juxtaposition i n thought" ( c f . W.H. Austin 
(MMP) 4 5 ) . 
380 Ramsey must be r e f e r r i n g here to mental images because the phrase 
i s introduced as an alternative to "language". 
39. At least according to an elementary theory of catalysis. 
40o Ramsey may be interpreted here as o f f e r i n g another " c a t a l y t i c " 
analysis. For the imperative evokes a disclosure as i t i s brought 
"alongside" the pattern of "the t r a n s i t i o n from chaos to order" 
(RSCS 91)? but t h i s disclosure ( i . e . the revelation of the Creator 
God) i s r e a l l y a "second order disclosure" through a mixed medium, 
which i s only possible because the imperatives themselves have given 
r i s e to ( f i r s t order) disclosures! "the school imperatives make us 
aware of a master ... they disclose his presence" ( i b i d . ) , 
41. Mathematicallys i f Sn i s the Sum of the f i r s t n terms of an 
i n f i n i t e geometrical progression, Sn = a ( l - r ) ; then, i f r<r1 and 
n s© , L t 0 Sn = a 1 - r 
42. Mathematically? as n 0 , 0 , Lt . n = 1 . 
n n+1 
43° A model-word, therefore, i s a word "which specifies /such/ a 
par t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n " (RL 61)5 c f . i b i d . 6 8 , 71, CD 44, TL 7 . 
44° As i s the " l i n g u i s t i c medium" i f we come to understand language 
through disclosures. 
45° Thus Ramsey writes both of a disclosure of a pattern (F1 93=94, 
RSCS 8) and of a disclosure of purposiveness or personal a c t i v i t y 
through patterns of design or behaviour (Fl 1 2 7 , MM 1 6 , TG 81). 
Here the "medium" of the second disclosure i s taken to be what i s 
disclosed i n the p r i o r disclosure ( i . e . a pattern), rather than that 
p r i o r disclosure i t s e l f . Cf. also MDA 6 2 . 
4 6 . Evans' c l a s s i f i c a t i o n (Evans (IRTG) 1 2 7 ) l i s t s the following 
types of disclosed "more"sl,0ther selves, Moral claim, Aesthetic 
wonder, Whole, S c i e n t i f i c models, I n f i n i t e mathematical series and 
Concrete p a r t i c u l a r . 
4 7 o I n fairness to Ramsey we must note that, although he describes 
a l l disclosures as "going beyond" t h e i r medium and revealing a "more", 
he usually uses the actual word "transcendent" only i n r e l a t i o n to 
disclosures of I (F126, 81, RSCS 5 7 , BPEM 18), disclosures of moral 
claim or duty (FX 3 3 , 4 2 , 6 1 ) , disclosures of persons and personal 
behaviour (HG 2 0 9 , RB 191); and disclosures of God and e t e r n i t y (CD 45 
MDA 6 1 , E 4 7 ) o I n such cases what i s disclosed i s always more than 
spatio-temporal objects (the empirical medium of the disclosure), 
although the objects o>f discernment are a l l very d i f f e r e n t fvcmeach 
other and therefore show d i f f e r e n t kinds of transcendence ( c f . 
Evans (IRTG) 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ) . However, Ramsey does on occasions also 
describe other disclosures as "transcendent": e.g. a recognition (or 
gestalt) disclosure i s so described at PA 180. 
48. There are exceptions; e.g. PA 178, but they are very rare ( c f . 
PA 1 9 4 , FD 120 etc.). 
49. I t i s perhaps not too far-fetched to see Ramsey's disclosure 
by means of an ( i n f i n i t e ) series as or i g i n a t i n g i n Whitehead's 
analysis of concepts l i k e that of a point i n terms of experienceble 
e n t i t i e s such as a series of concentric spheres (his"Method of 
Extensive Abstraction", c f . Whitehead (CN) ch.IV). As O'Connor notes, 
Whitehead "found that such a series (that i s , the set of spheres 
together with the r e l a t i o n which orders them) constitutes an e n t i t y 
which s a t i s f i e d a l l the l o g i c a l requirements of the geometrical con-
cept point "(O'Connor (BR) 480). For Ramsey the series produced 
by a qualif i e d empirical model can s i m i l a r l y represent the transcendent 
e n t i t y (concept?) to which rfe points. 
50o Cf. above pp. S?6f. 
5 1 . Cf. AC 91 where Ramsey i s reported as having "certainly rejected 
the so-called 'sense-data' of Bertrand Russell, that i s , s t a t i c brute 
facts, detached and independent". Recent analytical philosophers have 
tended to attack sense-datum theories (Cf. J.L. Austin (SS)^Ryle (CM) 
ch. V I I ) . For a recent defence of such theories, which treate the 
sense-datum as "an i n t e r n a l accusative a f t e r 'perceive' " i n the 
analytic t r u t h "we perceive sense-data",see DoLoek§ espec. ch„11 
(quotation from p.180). 
5 2 . An "existent" i s here to be defined as " everything that i s i n 
anyway discriminated, p a r t i c u l a r ised, i n any s i t u a t i o n " ( i b i d . ) , I t 
is/category which includes "phenomena", "events", "situations", 
"states of a f f a i r s " , and "features of the world" (PA 178; cf. FD 125 
1 3 3 ) . 
5 3 » These two kinds of awareness (subsidiary and focal) together 
comprise " t a c i t knowledge" ( c f . Polanyi (LTl) 7 ) S " i n t a c i t knowing 
we always attend from the proximal / i . e . the clues/ to the d i s t a l 
term / I . e . the object/ " ( i b i d . 1 3 , c f . (TD) 9 - 1 6 ) . 
5 4 . Cf. OCR 3 , where Ramsey argues that "when older philosophers talked 
of 'substance' ..„ they were claiming some such discernment and commit-
ment around ... the 'appearances' o f (say) an apple. They saw that 
a certain number of perceptible q u a l i t i e s - hardness, sweetness, 
redness, greenness, and so on - 'go constantly together' ... and the 
penny dropped - ' I t ' s an apple I ' ", I f the observer had exclaimed 
" I t ' s something - I-know-not-what" he would have been tr e a t i n g the 
disclosure merely as a disclosure of o b j e c t i v i t y ; by saying " I t ' s 
an apple" the observer reveals that the same disclosure i s also ( f o r 
him) a recognition disclosure. 
5 5 » For criticismsof Hick's position see Nielsen (CCR) 86-88 and 
Schedler (TGT) 2 4 0 . 
5 6 . Ramsey gives the example of the observable"fact" that the sun 
rotates around the earth. 
57• For Ramsey, conlza Russell, even a sense-datum i s no "uninter-
preted f a c t " ; "sense-data are never given to us as mere patches they 
are always of something", "an in t e r p r e t a t i o n would be always there" 
(U-FMG 1 / 7 / 9 ) . 
58. I t allows Ramsey to espouse a l i b e r a l standpoint (cf„ Sermon 
( 5 ) 7 - 9 ) and reje c t any view i n which "the Bible, or the Church, or 
a par t i c u l a r brand of theology had the authority of God himself" 
(The Times Lit e r a r y Supplement 2 5/12 / 6 9 , p.1477? cf.H212, OBSR 77-8, 
CF 3 0 , u-Credo 6 ) . 
59« I n one place Ramsey distinguishes between "analysing out a 
pattern" from twelve crlss~crossed lines (seeing, f o r example, two 
squares with lines j o i n i n g t h e i r corners) and the "subsequent stage" 
"when the twelve l i n e s disclose, a further dimension and we recognise 
a cube" (CSC 49). However, we may treat t h i s t h i r d dimension as 
part of the t o t a l "pattern" disclosed around the twelve l i n e s . 
60. "Isomorphy", basically, i s "structural s i m i l a r i t y " (MM 12). 
The term i s derived from mathematics where two groups - a group 
being a set of elements, together with an operation - are said to be 
isomorphic i f a one-to-one correspondence can be established between 
t h e i r respective ( d i f f e r e n t ) elements. Cf. Black (MM) 222 -223 . 
6 1 . Ramsey's treatment of s c i e n t i f i c invariants shows that he 
believes that induction i s disclosure-based also ( c f . RSCS 72 n.1, 
FD 1 3 1 ) » An inductive generalisation goes beyond the immediate 
empirical facts and arises i n a movement of i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t . To 
say "water b o i l s at 100 c (under normal pressure) " i s to say more 
than" the water i n t h i s beaker boils at 100 c. (under normal pressure)" . 
But the "more" can s t i l l be adequately expressed i n empirical 
language ( c f . M 5 ) , we have not yet reached a meta-empirical "more". 
62. Such an e n t i t y may be categorised as "metaphysical" i n the sense 
that the postulation of such objects " i s very often considered to be 
£thej defining characteristic" of metaphysics,where metaphysics i s 
the study of being or r e a l i t y "as such" or "as a whole" (Kearney 178). 
^2. 
63o Thus according to Ramsey parables stories evoke cosmic d i s -
closures "because and i n so f a r as the stories repeat a structure 
and pattern of universal significance ..„ repeated i n situations 
the world over" ( i b i d . ) 
6 4 . Ramsey distinguishes between " f i n i t e " ("restricted", "limited") 
disclosures and "cosmic^ disclosures. A person may be the occasion 
of a f i n i t e disclosure, when we recognise an "impersonal o f f i c i a l " 
as an old f r i e n d , a "real person ; i. But the friend could also be 
the occasion of a cosmic disclosure i f we are led to say, "You are 
the whole world to me" (MMR 2 6 5 )• The other person i s then seen as 
having universal significance, his (her) existence takes on a l l -
inclusive relevance. Taking a t h e o l o g i c a l example, we may evoke 
the cosmic disclosure of "the God of a l l power and might, the King 
of the whole earth" by "developing a pattern" of kingship "whose 
range i s unlimited" (TG 82). 
6 5 . Gf. "Ko matter how much°?he universe I survey, t h i s i s s t i l l my 
duty" (RFT 2 9 ) . However, Evans' d i s t i n c t i o n between positive and 
negative all-inclusiveness i s one that Ramsey himself does not make 
( c f . U-WM 1 9 - 2 0 , TS 168, RFT 1 9 - 2 0 ) . 
6 6 . And, conversely, "there i s no self-disclosure without a 
si t u a t i o n which comes alive objectively as w e l l " (TJ-WM 18). 
6 7 . G.E. Moore i s one of those who uses the word " e n t i t y " i n a 
wider sense than t h i s . I n h i s eyes, " i t i s by no means clear ... 
that a l l _ ' . e n t i t i e s ' ... can r i g h t l y be said to 'exist' " (Moore 
(SMP) 2 3 6 , c f . Whitehead (SMW) 1 7 3 ) . We confront here, of course, 
the problem of what i t i s to "exist". I t may be argued on the one 
hand that "there neither i s nor i s not a standard existence", f o r 
"the word 'exist' can only function wi t h i n the context already given 
by t h i s or that type of sentence" (Miles (NE) 399 - 4 0 1,cf. Lewis 
(EM) 31)<> On the other hand we are surely j u s t i f i e d i n at least 
distinguishing between the "everyday" (standard?) senses of existence 
(whether applied to chairs or God) and the more technical sense i n 
which "to £'ay that A exists means that A i s a class which has at least 
one member" (Russell (EIP) 9 8 - 9 9 )° Mathematical e n t i t i e s (e.g. 
numbers) can be said to "ex i s t " only i n t h i s technical sense. 
68. Cf. p. <??. 
69o For the d i s t i n c t i o n c f . Frege (OSN). I am not, at t h i s point, 
arguing that Ramsey accepts a r e f e r e n t i a l theory of meaning. The 
"meaning of 'meaning' " adopted here i s simply f o r convenience of 
exposition: although c f . ITR Owen 1 2 6 , OBSR 62 and below ch.!V. 
7 0 „ I n the same way "2" i s "posited" to designate the l i m i t of an 
i n f i n i t e sum and " c i r c l e " i s "posited" to designate the l i m i t of a 
series of regular polygons with an increasing number of sides 
( c f . RL 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 9 - 7 0 ) . 
7 1. He stresses " I am not claiming l o g i c a l i d e n t i t y between 
mathematics and theology" (OBSR 2 3 ) , f o r these mathematical 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s are "by no means exactly similar" to r e l i g i o u s 
disclosures (U-WM 1 6 \ although they are "not at a l l unlike" (RL 7 0 ) » 
Hepburn r i g h t l y notes that the basic question., which Ramsey's account 
never answers, i s ; "how close i s t h i s analogy between mathematical 
4-4-3 
and religious disclosures?" (Hepburn ( MM) 21) . My own feeling 
i s that Ramsey - the mathematician turned philosophical theologian -
believed that the analogy was very close indeed. 
72. Ramsey expresses i t thus; "there may at a certain point be a 
'disclosure' , a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n - what we may 
c a l l mathematical insight - and i n the mathematical case there might 
at the same time come to our minds the number »2" ' (RL 70) . 
73. Of. below pp. 13.4-ff. and pp. 184-ft-. 
74» James Harris and V i l l i a m Austin both seem to concur with t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Harris writes of the consideration of a succession 
of regular polygons as suggesting "the notion of a c i r c l e " (Harris 
(MQ) 91 )O Austin, i n describing the disclosure of an i n f i n i t e sum, 
argues;"what i s disclosed i s the significance of the concept, 'sum 
of an i n f i n i t e series* " (W.H. Austin (HMP) 43 ) ° For another general 
argument to the effect that Ramsey's disclosures are only "disclosures 
of meaning", cf„ Schedler (The..sis) 226). 
75. Although c f . below (pp. 139 (f, ) f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
mathematical and moral disclosures. 
76. See Russell (KAKD) and (PP) ch ,5„ 
77o Cf. i b i d . 32; "Knowledge concerning what i s known by description 
i s ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what i s known by 
acquaintanee. The fundamental principle of the analysis of propositions 
containing descriptions i s t h i s ; Every proposition which we can under-
stand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted"(Cf. also Price (B) 69) . 
78„ And conversely; "To speak of re l i g i o u s experience as a 'sense' 
reminds us, e . g o j o f Russell's claim f o r sensation as being knowledge 
•by acquaintance1 where an object i s 'given d i r e c t l y ' . " (U-HA 
"Religious Experience and i t s significance", 6.1954? pl)» 
79o Paul P, Schmidt argues that because of t h i s lack of t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y (and of j u s t i f i c a t i o n procedures ) } we should speak of 
"acquaintance claims" and "knowledge suggested by acquaintance" rather 
than "knowledge by acquaintance" ( c f . Schmidt 121, 123). We may f e e l 
free to adopt such terminology, while disagreeing with Schmidt's 
contention that the b e l i e f "that there i s a bridge from acquaintance 
experience to a descriptive claim to knowledge" i s an " i l l u s i o n " 
( i b i d . 125). 
8O0 Hofstadter does recognise the p d s s i b i l i t y of "sheer reference" 
i n an apprehension (e.g. "an orange cross not qua orange or a cross 
but simply qua something"; 85) . However, " I t i s true that I cannot 
refer to anything which i s not somehow characterised, which does not 
somehow possess describable (or indescribable) character" ( 84 ) . 
81, Cf„ Pritchard 10-11. 
82„ Cf. Ryle (CM) 155. 
83. Cf„ Hart 86-87 . 
84o Cf. Quinton (PP) 83 
85, Cf. D. Locke 187s 
86„ Clearly mathematical e n t i t i e s can be treated as "formal unive:sals" 
and moral values as "non-sensory predicative universals"; but i t i s 
probably easier to t r e a t them separately because of the d i f f e r e n t 
prPblems that they raise. 
87. "Imagism", the view that universals are mental images rather than 
concepts, may be treated either as a type of conceptualism or as a 
type of nominalism. 
88. Whether a real e n t i t y or a mental concept. 
89= i . e . "collections of things which i t i s natural to class 
together i n contrast to other collections whose association i s 
arbitrary"(Quinton (NT) 262). 
90. The published text actually reads: "substance , the s e l f , 
universals"; but t h i s i s c l e a r l y a mistake and i s corrected i n 
Ramsey's personal copy of the a r t i c l e . 
91. Gf. pp. ^ 2 
92. Ramsey's p r o l i f i c use of the concept of i n t u i t i o n (discernment) 
i n mathematics suggests a non-formalist position ( c f . also PR 206)j, 
and might make us think that "Intuitionism" would appeal to him as 
a philosophy of mathematics. As "the subject matter of i n t u i t i o n i s t 
mathematics ... i s i n t u i t e d non-perceptual objects and constructions 
which are introspectively self-evident" (Korner 120), such a,-, view 
would have implications f o r our understanding of Ramsey's analysis of 
the nature of the formal universals of mathematics. Despite Ramsey's 
mathematical background, however, his writings o f f e r us very l i t t l e 
by way of evidence f o r his position on these matters. 
95. Cf. below pp. T 7 3 f . 
94= Knowing by i n t u i t i v e insight whether a certain object or 
si t u a t i o n i s good or bad i s less c l e a r l y a part of Ramsey's moral 
in t u i t i o n i s m . However, both " r i g h t " and. "good" can be related to 
the equally fundamental concept of "duty" (obl i g a t i o n , moral claim 
etc.). Of. Strawson (El) 30s " 'Right' - sentences, 'good' - sentences 
are shorthand f o r 'ought' - sentences." 
95« Cf, "the believer must remember that i n t a l k i n g of God's w i l l 
or God's command he i s t a l k i n g about God and not about man" (MJGG 
171). 
96. Stace c a l l s them "unreasoned b e l i e f s " , i . e . b e l i e f s that (a) 
are not cases of immediate knowledge, and (b) have not been reached 
by a process of reasoning (Stace (PUB) 29) . 
97. Arthur Danto puts the point s t r i k i n g l y ; "There i s knowledge only 
i f , a f t e r having attained understanding, i t i& open whether what we 
understand i s true or false ... Quests f o r certainty ... f o r f e i t , at 
once, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g knowledge... Truth does not l i e 
beyond t r u t h - and - f a l s i t y " (op.cit, 181-182). 
98. Many philosophers seem to think so. Thus W.D. Hudson describes 
the b e l i e f "that men have a f a c u l t y which i s unerring i n i t s 
apprehension of certain t r u t h s " as "the bedrock belie f of 
intuitionisra " (Hudson (MMP) 82), 
99« Ewing, we should r e c a l l , was Ian Ramsey's supervisor at Cambridge 
and I would argue that he had a considerable influence on the l a t t e r ' s 
thinking. I t should be pointed out, however, that Ramsey himself 
alludes only ra r e l y to Ewing's work (e.g. GCP 263-264). As Dr. Ewing 
died i n 1973 i t was not possible to canvass his views on Ramsey's 
work and i t s r e l a t i o n to his own. 
100. i . e . " i n t u i t i o n " ; i s normally used as an "achievement" (or 
"got i t " ) word - cf . Kyle (CM) 125-126, 143-147. 
101. Cf. also Bobik 271-273. 
102. The account that follows i s indebted to a paper by Donald Evans 
(Evans (PKCT) ) , but i s supplemented by the re f l e c t i o n s on which 
Evans' analysis i s i t s e l f based ( i . e Ayer (PK) 75-83 and Gasking)and 
by the suggestions of Ch: isholm((TK) ch . 4 ) , Quinton ( (NT) 112-114), 
Waismann ( (LS) 28-29)and Bambrough ((PM) 101-107). Cf. also Dretske 
40-42. 
103. Quinton prefers "transcendentalism". Cf, also Bambrough (PM) 
106-107, 
104. The "supporting" fact (statement) i s the one which appears to 
form the basis of our knowledge of the "supported" fact (statement). 
Cf, Gasking 185. 
105. And perhaps also to Chisholm's " C r i t i c a l Cognitivism" (Chisholm 
(TK) 60-61, 66, 68); c f . also Waismann (LS) 28-30. 
106. Or as "o f f e r i n g a simpler explanation" than the alte r n a t i v e . 
107. Here the explanation i s "metaphysical" rather than "analogical -
inductive" (as i n (c) )„ 
108. And ( i n Ramsey's case) rather overshadowed by t h i s element of 
intu i t i o n i s m . 
109. Such a combination of approaches i s also to be foundloA.C. Ewing 
( c f . Ewing (TO) and Knox (ACE)). 
110. Cf. Warnock 15 . 
111. Cf. Bambrough (VffiWS) footnote 1, 255-256 
112. Hepburn c i t e s the examples of Emil Brunner, Karl Barth and 
H.H. Parmer, i n addition to theeeminal work, I and Thou, by 
the Jewish r e l i g i o u s thinker Martin Buber ( c f e . g . . , Buber 80-81)„ 
113. Cf, above pp. 14-6 f . 
114» cfs "the fact that I may be wrong does not mean that I cannot 
have the r i g h t to be sure" (D. Locke 220). On the next point compare 
also 222-2 28. and below pp. 1 8 2f. 
4^4 
115• " C r i t i c a l Realists" tend to distinguish "between the i n t u i t i v e 
element i n perception (the direct awareness of sense-data) and a non-
intuitiwfi? element of judgment ("an active external reference .„. we 
refer an i n t u i t e d datum ... to an external object",' H i r s t (PEW) 20). 
V/e could argue, however, that t h i s "reference" i s i t s e l f an act of 
i n t u i t i o n rather than an act of judgment ( a l b e i t i m p l i c i t judgment)} 
cf. Owen (CRG) 125 - 126, and above pp» 1 0 7 Cf-. For a recent account 
of C r i t i c a l Realism see R.W. Se l l a r s j c f . also R.J. Hirs t (PP) 
especially" ch„10. 
116. I t may be argued that only a "true theology" would i n fact 
mediate a reli g i o u s i n t u i t i o n . But adherents of d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n s 
have a l l claimed to have rel i g i o u s experiences mediated through 
t h e i r own, often incompatible, theologies and symbols. 
117. But c f . also U.K. Smith (IDEC) 119, Bobik 255. 
118. Disclosures through a mixed medium were also distinguished. 
For the purposes of t h i s argument, however, they may be considered as 
a sub-category of empirical disclosures. 
119» Or even through the medium of mental images. 
120. Cf. below pp, 2 33fr 0 
121o u f 0 Badham 122-123, 145; J.E. Smith (EG) 81 etc. 
122. Cf, King 70-76. 
123. "IrO" i s used by Ramsey to symbolise the subject-object 
structure of awareness; i t represents the se l f ("I") i n r e l a t i o n 
("r") to some object {"0"). Cf. also F l 98-99-
124. V/e may appropriately observe at t h i s point that Ramsey has been 
c r i t i c i z e d f o r not seriously applying his analysis of reli g i o u s 
epistemology and reli g i o u s language to re l i g i o n s other than 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y ( c f . Smart (PR) 222=226, (ICBC) 33-34; Lewis (Fl) 175). 
But i n the few references that Ramsey does make to "Other Religions" 
he would appear to be prepared to do just thats c f . JR7, RE 405s 
VM 106. Although t h i s aspect of his work was one that he l e f t almost 
completely undeveloped, i t would be f a i r to claim that Ramsey's 
philosophy of r e l i g i o n might prove to be useful i n the dialogue 
of r e l i g i o n s . For Ramsey would contend that a l l r e l i g i o n s unite 
at t h e i r disclosures and diverge only i n the d i f f e r e n t languages 
that they use to int e r p r e t what i s disclosed ( c f . Review Smart 88) . 
125. V/e might observe once again how much more natural i t i s to speak 
of things, events (and people) as "media", rather than to apply the 
same term to our experiences. Further, i n the example given here, 
there i s only one "experience-medium" but many "thing-media" involved. 
126o V/e should note, however, that t h i s position has not gone un-
challenged - c f . Ayer (PE) 116-120. 
127. For an account of the r e l a t i v i t y of theological model language 
i n d i f f e r e n t and changing cultures see Glenn. 
1280 An i n c o r r i g i b l e statement may be defined as one that i s wholly 
v e r i f i e d by the experience that prompts i t 0 
129o Cf. above pp. 5 I f . 
130. I t was Russell's view that a l o g i c a l l y proper name (a category 
which fo r Russell seemed to be l i m i t e d to such demonstratives as 
" t h i s " and "that") was characterised by the fact that " i t s s i g n i f i c a n t 
use guarantees the existence of the object which i t i s intended to 
denote" (Ayer (R) 57, c f . 103-104; c f . also U-FMG B7/120). I n 
Ramsey's view t h i s could only be true of proper names or demonstratives 
w hose referent was some mundane.^  perceptual object. Russell himself 
argued that "God", as used i n the proposition "God exists", must 
be a description and not a name. For " I f 'God* were a name, no 
question as to existence could arise" (Russell (LA) 108)„ 
131. As well as t r e a t i n g the certain/tenitative dichotomy i n terms 
of the differences between proper names and descriptions, Ramsey also 
relates i t to Russell's d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge by .acquaintance 
and knowledge by description ( c f . FD 122). But, as we have already 
argued, "acquaintance" i s not a form of knowledge, and therefore i s 
not something of which one could predicate certainty. I n order to 
transmute an acquaintance-experience into knowledge one has to spe l l 
i t out i n terms of c o r r i g i b l e assertions - i . e . one must give i t 
"content". 
132. Cf. below pp. 2 33>9r. 
133. See Geach (GS) chs .4 & 8; but c f . also Durrant (LSG) preface and 
ch.I,(Tl) 75-864(GA) 17-21; Barnes ch„4; Z i f f ; Ross (PT) 35-37, 68; 
Owen (CD) 154. For St. Thomas' position cf. (S T)la, 13, 9; 1a, 
13, 11. 
134. For t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n cf. Owen (CKG) 284-286, Quinton (NT) 171 . 
Norman Malcolm and others have strenuously argued against the position 
that only the i n c o r r i g i b l e i s "certain"; c f . Malcolm (KB), also 
Trethowan (AV) 74-79-
135. The examples Ramsey has given are ( i ) "coming to oneself" i n re-
membering that the car i s low on p e t r o l ; ( i i ) the revelation of the 
unknown man as Robin Hood to the Tinker who i s looking f o r him; and 
( i i i ) the moral challenge constituted by a l e t t e r being found by a 
park sweeper i n the course of his duties; PPMT 168-171. 
136. Ryle rejected the dualism of "mind" and "physical world", 
speaking rather of a person's "one career" or "one a c t i v i t y " ; c f . 
Ryle (CM) espec. chs.1 & 2, also p.190. 
137. I t should be noted that such an in t e r p r e t a t i o n , unlike Ramsey'sj 
necessitates our "describing" what has been disclosed - i . e . our 
moving into the domain of c o r r i g i b l e language. 
138. Ramsey himself hints at these c r i t e r i a ; cf. Fl 48 and below pp. 377ff. 
Cf. also Smart (RRR) 84-85, K. Ward(CG) 106-107 and passim , 
139. "In order to see what i s being talked about", Ramsey writes, 
we must "consider words i n the context of sentences, themselves i n 
the context of discourse, which i t s e l f i s given i t s concrete social 
s e t t i n g " (TECF 221) . 
140. Compare Ramsey's much e a r l i e r (1954) remarks i n a l e t t e r to W.H 
Poteats " I e n t i r e l y agree that to ask 'Is t h i s r e a l ' i s often the 
same as to ask 'Can i t he cashed i n language of t h i s kind?'„ I n 
other words, to say that 'pink rats are not r e a l ' i s to say that 'pink 
rats cannot be talked about i n the language of v e r i d i c a l perception'„ 
On the either hand, pink rats are 'real' f o r that language which 
organises hallucinations" (U-ITR WHP). 
141. Ramsey writes not only of the "Universe", but also of the "real 
world", "hidden r e a l i t y " etc,, confronting us. Compare the reference s 
above, and also MMR 266, 268 and MM 13, 19. 
142. Worris Clarke i s another philosopher of r e l i g i o n who suggests the 
experience of the other's a c t i v i t y , coupled with our own passivity, as 
a c r i t e r i o n f o r the o b j e c t i v i t y of an "encounter" with God. Cf. 
Clarke 59. 
143o We may note, however, that i n Ramsey's l a t e s t thought " a c t i v i t y " 
i s a word that may be uni vocally predicated of God and Man; c f . note 
146 beloWo This suggests that at t h i s stage Ramsey would not wish to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t "types" of a c t i v i t y . For another 
metaphysics 1 of a c t i v i t y cf„ MacMurray, especially chs. 5 and 10. 
144. a favourite phrase of Ramsey's, used of the disclosure -
sit u a t i o n ; c f . PD 115 etc. 
145o Of., e.g., an "active volcano" and " r a d i o a c t i v i t y " . Ramsey remarks 
that machines and o f f i c i a l s "may be 'active* but i n no disclosure 
sense" (PG66)„ 
146. Ramsey l a t e r changed h i s views on " a c t i v i t y " , t r e a t i n g i t no 
longer as a model or "super-model", "but a word which unites God and 
ourselves i n a l i t e r a l sense" (U-ITR Evans 3)5 cf. Excursus I I where 
I argue that his o r i g i n a l position i s more credible. 
147. Compare Ramsey's d i s t i n c t i o n between the "reciprocity",, 
s i m p l i c i t e r that exists between a dri v e r and his car ( i . e . "the 
mutual v a r i a t i o n which even things can display"; PG 63-64) §nd the 
"personal r e c i p r o c i t y " that "relates to a disclosure s i t u a t i o n 
characterised by and a r i s i n g out of a behaviour pattern displaying 
mutual v a r i a t i o n " ( i b i d . 64 ) . 
148. Cf. below pp. 2.74- ft-. 
149. Cf., e.g., Parmer ch.V ;also Webb (RE) 29, 39-40. 
150. Cf. Penelhum; "even i f one holds that i t i s God who i s revealed, 
and not propositions about God, t h i s cannot be rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e 
i n a form which does not e n t a i l that the person to whom God i s revealed 
i s thereby made aware of some c r i t i c a l t r u t h s about God" (Penelhum 
(PRK) 92; c f . Lewis (EM) 269). 
151. I t i s true that we do speak of people "revealing themselves" 
by t h e i r non-linguistic behaviour. But i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that we 
usually only use such a phrase when a person's behaviour reveals his 
personality, "despite himself". And we cannot then describe such a 
revelation as an active revelation on the part of i t s subject, 
152. While recognising a " l o g i c a l kinship" between "God and "I", 
Ramsey denies that there i s any " i d e n t i t y of l o g i c a l behaviour". 
God, a f t e r a l l , i s not a man ( c f . PI 49, PPMT 174, BPII 187). 
153° For "whatever fact you t e l l me now, might have been otherwise" 
(RSGS 73)° 
154° Compare also Alvin Plantinga's "tentative conclusion"; " I f my 
b e l i e f i n other minds i s r a t i o n a l , so i s my b e l i e f i n God. But 
obviously the former i s rational? so, therefore, i s the l a t t e r " , 
(Plantinga 271)° However, our knowledge of God and our knowledge 
of another mind do not share an id e n t i c a l epistemological structure 
( c f . Owen (CKG) 135-136? Lewis (CM) 2 18, 236-237), The fact that I 
have a p r i o r knowledge of my se l f means that there i s some p o s s i b i l i t y 
of an argument by analogy to other minds, but t h i s argument i s much 
more tenuous when applied to the transcendent ' God, Further, 
another person's body i s a part of him, f o r people are psycho-physical 
u n i t i e s . But the world i s not i n the same way an in t e g r a l "part" of 
God, 
155» Ramsey does t r e a t the word "thou""as a l o g i c a l counterpart of 
• I ' " , recognising that the empirical anchorage of "thou" i s a d i s -
closure-situation (U-FMG B75/188), He also makes similar claims f o r 
the word "person" ( c f . U-FMG (3) 11/13/205) 0 Several commentators 
have noted the s i m i l a r i t y of Ramsey's thought to that of Martin Buber 
with his emphasis on the I-Thou encounter ( c f . Evans (IRTG) 129-130, 
Lewis (PR) 105), 
156, Cf, Shaffer (MMB), Putnam etc, 
157, Such a theory i s also defended by Owen (CKG) 130=134, Lucas 142-
144? J°E„ Smith (EG) 85-86. 
158, Cf. above pp. 1^1 flh 
159° The basic question f o r the r e l i g i o u s epistemologist i n h i s 
examination of Schleiermacher's work must be whether the catalogue 
of terms used by that author connote an "objective" experience of 
God or merely a "subjective" feeling-state. Schleiermacher's 
language i s both varied and ambiguous? he writes of "immediate 
consciousness", "immediate feeli n g " , " a f f e c t i o n " , "revelation" (e.g. 
Schleiermacher (OR) 36) , "sense", "taste", ( i b i d . 39) , "feeling" 
( i b i d . 49 , ) " i n t u i t i o n " (ibid,278-281), "feeling of absolute dependence 
"God consciousness" (e.g. Schleiermacher (CF) 17) , and "immediate s e l f -
consciousness" ( i b i d a 1 8 ) . Rudolf Otto i s one commentator who in t e r p r e t 
Schleiermacher as viewing r e l i g i o u s experience solely i n terms of 
feelings from which we must i n f e r the existence of God as a cause (otto 
(IH) 10). Others, however, have been more generous i n t h e i r interpre-
t a t i o n . Even H.R. Mackintosh - who i s c r i t i c a l of Schleiermacher's 
general approach - writes t h a t , i n Schleiermacher, "Feeling i s indeed 
an experience on the part of the s e l f , yet one i n which the s e l f 
•apprehends' not i t s e l f but God" (Mackintosh 685 c f , i b i d . 51-52, 
and also Macquarrie (TAG) 161-162, Sykes passim, Welch 64-68) . I t 
would appear that Ramsey would also i n t e r p r e t Schleiermacher i n t h i s 
way? and he i s surely r i g h t to do so. 
160O Cf, Otto (IH) espec, chs.XIV-XVII. Many others have c r i t i c i s e d 
Otto's use - or misuse - of Kantian concepts, H,J, Paton remarked 
that "Kant must have shuddered i n his grave"! (Paton 139)? c f , also 
Dawes Hicks (PBT) 139° CA. Campbell ( (SG) 337) i s more kindly 
disposed. 
161. Cf. below pp. XIS fc. 
162.. I n fact t h i s c r i t i c i s m forms only a small part of Tennant's 
discussion of re l i g i o u s experience (see Tennant (PTl) 322-323). 
163. Cf. Tennant (PTl) 311 . 
164. I n an unpublished paper, which bears neither t i t l e nor date but 
was ;probably w r i t t e n around 1955-6, Ramsey wrote of Tennant's inferen-
t i a l theologys "Tennant's mistake ... was to suppose that theological 
language i s j u s t a matter of strengthening the evidence when i t i s 
rather a matter of commending an e n t i r e l j / d i f f e r e n t l o g i c . " (p. 12, 
cf. RL 77). 
165. Cf. Alasdair Maclntyre: "The only apologia for a r e l i g i o n i s to 
describe i t s content i n detail;and then either a man w i l l f i n d himself 
brought to say 'My Lord and my God1 or he w i l l not" (A.C. Maclntyre 
(LSRB) 195). 
166. I t i s j u s t possible that t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s supported by 
a passage i n Ramsey's Models and Mystery; "a q u a l i f i e r l i k e ' i n f i n i t e ' 
w i l l work on a model of human love u n t i l there dawns on us that 
p a r t i c u l a r kind of family resemblance between the various derivative 
models which reveals God - God as ' i n f i n i t e l y l o v i n g " 1 (MM61, 
emphasis added). There seem to be two "revelations" here5 
a) a revelation of family resemblance,, i . e . a disclosure of s i m i l a r i t y 
between the d i f f e r e n t examples of "love"; and 
b) a revelation of God, superimposed on ( a ) 0 
I n t h i s case, however, the f i r s t - s t a g e disclosure i3 not a disclosure 
of the concept " i n f i n i t e l y loving", though i t might be described as 
a disclosure of the concept "love". 
167. Cf. Palmer (W). 
168. For a positive and a negative use of t h i s "parable" i n i t s 
general form ( i . e . t r e a t i n g the t h e i s t as the one who can see i n 
a country of b l i n d men (atheists)) see Ecsrsburgh 192-193 and Matson 
34-37. 
169. My argument here bears some s i m i l a r i t i e s to that of H.H. Price 
i n chapter 10 of Bel i e f . He argues there that a man may need to 
acquire certain conative and emotional dispositions i n order to 
discern certain ( r e l i g i o u s ) facts ( i b i d . 471-473);and that one way 
of acquiring these dispcations i s by imaginatively indulging i n 
relig i o u s practices (484-488). I t may be that one of the main 
functions of such practices i s to evoke and express a f u l l under-
standing of the central concepts of r e l i g i o n . Cf. also Baelz (lT>) 
ch.8„ 
170. I n his paper The Systematic Elusiveness of I , Ramsey contends 
that Ryle's analysis of the elusiveness of the self i s i n error. 
For Ryle, the I i s elusive i n a systematic way because with regard 
to any one of our actions there i s the systematic p o s s i b i l i t y of an 
i n f i n i t e series of higher order operations. Thus we can never 
arrive at a completely adequate self-description. But there i s no 
ultimate mystery; the elusiveness of I i s no more than the elusiveness 
of an i n f i n i t e series to a term by term enumeration. Ryle writes; 
"To concern oneself about oneself i n any way ... i s to perform a 
higher order act, jus t as i t i s to concern oneself about anybody else 
... A higher order aation cannot be the action on which i t i s performed. 
So my commentary and my performances must always be s i l e n t about one 
performance, namely i t s e l f , and t h i s performance can be the target 
only of another commentary", (Ryle (CM) 186). Ryle goes on to argue 
that selfaelusiveness i s comparable with "diary elusiveness"s 
"every act of a d i a r i s t |cannotJ be the topic of a record i n h i s 
diary; f o r the l a s t entry made i n his diary s t i l l demands that the 
making of i t should i n turn be chronicled. 
"This, I think, explains the feeling that my last year's s e l f , or my 
yesterday's s e l f , could i n p r i n c i p l e be exhaustively described and 
accounted f o r by me, but that my today's self perpetually s l i p s out 
of any hold of i t that I t r y to take" (Ryle (CM) 187). 
Ramsey proffers two c r i t i c i s m s of Ryle's position: 
( i ) I t blurs the d i s t i n c t i o n between subject and object: 
" I f we assume that what eludes us now, becomes i n the next minute 
wholly tractable ( i . e . wholly describable i n object language), then 
since, at t h i s next minute, an e a r l i e r s i t u a t i o n has been completely 
o b j e c t i f i e d , what account can we then give of the subject - object 
d i s t i n c t i o n . . . ? " (SE1 197). 
( i i ) I t can give no account of personal i d e n t i t y : 
"any attempt by ' I ' to discover ' I ' replaces ' I ' by some fact I n 
and so^without end ... How are we to t a l k of 'one s e l f i f a l l we 
have i s an i n f i n i t e series of perceptual terms? How can ' I i + 12 + 
I 3 + ... + I n + elucidate ' I ' ? " (SEt 197). 
The elusiveness of I , Ramsey claims, i s an observational elusiveness 
( i b i d . 198)5 Ryle's analysis, therefore, i s inadequate and misleading 
( c f . also Lewis (EM) 84-85; G i l l (01) ) . 
cf. 
1718 For similar arguments/-also Jones (SK) * (TC), Ayer (HG), 
Russell (VM), Campbell ( R l ) , Davie c h . I I etc. 
172. I t i s not correct,therefore, to speak of "acquaintance" with my 
se l f as something s t r i c t l y analogous to my acquaintance with an 
object. For the self i s not something we can stand apart from and 
observe; something having an objective, describable character which 
we can note by observation ( c f . Lewis (EM) 229-231, (Si) 44-45, 
Novak 274). 
173. Ramsey refers here to^ f a c t t h a t , on the B i b l i c a l view, man need s 
God's "activating breath, wind, or s p i r i t " i n order to l i v e (ibid.80). 
174. Ramsey goes on to re l a t e t h i s point to James Ward's contention 
"that i t i s conation and not cognition which must be taken as the 
d e f i n i t i v e account of the.- s e l f " ( i b i d . ; c f . above pp.13<^) 
175. Although recent thinkers have paid attention to the notion of 
the "pattern of what we are" being v/hat ensures our personal 
continuity i n a post-mortem existence ( c f . the accounts i n Hick 
(DEL) 281-283, and Badham ch.5). 
176. Such a pure ego view has been recently defended by Ramsay's 
Cambridge teacher A.C, Ewing - Ewing (Vll) ch„4 and 254-255 ( c f . 
also Campbell (SG) ch.V). Ramsey himself, as we have seen, accepted 
some such theory of the se l f during his Cambridge period. The concept 
of the mind as "an e n t i t y i n i t s own r i g h t " has been recently descri bed 
as "making a vigorous conEback " (Smythies i x ) . We may c i t e p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the work of H.D.' Lewis ( c f . (EM) and (Si) ) which contains'a s p i r i t e d 
and reasoned reje c t i o n of the "Functional Theory" of the Mind (as 
espoused by A r i s t o t l e and Ryle - cf. White (PM) 46-55). According to 
Lewis the self i s "essentially mental r e a l i t y " (Lewis (Si) 1935 c f . 
(EM) 307, 320-321); i t i s more than our pa r t i c u l a r experiences, but 
i s always i n some mental state. Others have suggested, however, that 
the self i s r a d i c a l l y distinguishable from the mind and may survive 
the l a t t e r ' s death (see Knox (CSS) and (RPW) and c f 0 Weodhousej, 
177. "Im-mortality" i s treated by Ramsey as a qualified-model leading 
to a disclosure ( c f . P I 92-93)9 as are the terms "everlasting l i f e " 
and "eternal l i f e " ( c f . F l 94-96) . 
178'. Ramsey often interprets i t i n t h i s fashion; f o r i n every day 
language, he reminds us, ""'I' stands i n part f o r my public behaviour 
to which everyone has equal access .However,'"'!' also stands f o r 
something more .." ( F l 25, cf„ i b i d . 100)„ I t i s , of course, the 
status of the personal "more", the transcendent I , that i s under 
discussion. 
179. Cf. below pp. 3o3 ( f . 
180. W.F. Zuurdeeg's analysis of convictional language i n r e l i g i o n i s 
relevant here. For Zuurdeeg a "conviction" involves elements of l o y a l t y 
and decision as well as an element of persuasion concerning the 
meaning of l i f e , God etc. Convictional language i s the language of 
a person who has had the experience of "being overcome". I n some 
correspondence between Zuurdeeg and Ramsey i n 1956, Ramsey agreed that 
the former's analysis accords well with some of his own concerns (ITR 
WFZ; Cf. also PA 190, Zuurdeeg 64=68). Zuurdeeg's analysis,: however, 
i s Mess adequate than that of Ramsey i n so f a r as he holds that 
convictional u t t erances have no "indicative" ( i . e . representative, 
descriptive) elements c f . McClendon and Smith (URC) 30-35,80. 
181. However Ramsey argues that the devotion of the lover might 
count as a "cosmic" commitment on occasions,being cosmic i n scope, 
i . e . "when someone said (and we had reason to believe i t ) 'You are 
the whole world to me'" (U-ITR Evans 2; c f . Evans (IRTG) 131-2). 
182. Presumably " f a i t h " i n the sense of f i d u c i a ( t r u s t ) . 
183. Further,Ramsey, unlike the "Wittgensteinian Fideists!!., never 
claims that i t i s impossible f o r someone who:has no re l i g i o u s 
commitment to understand r e l i g i o n ( c f . Schnetzer 162-163). 
184. Ramsey allows that "Christian f a i t h might reasonably remain i f 
some one event or other proved false as a h i s t o r i c a l f a c t " . But 
he adds;"not a l l the events must be proved false without our being 
converted to i n f i d e l i t y " (HG 214);" because our commitment may be 
reasonably based on a few fac t s " i t i s not thecdse "that i t might j u s t 
as well be based on none at a l l " (ibid.2 1 6 ) . Thus love i s more than overt 
behaviour but there could be no love " i f there i s no v i s i b l e behaviour 
at a l l " . ( I b i d . ) . 
185. On the view that God i s disclosed only through an empirical 
medium. 
186. I t i s si g n i f i c a n t that Ramsey writes both of "a discernment 
which provokes a commitment "and of" a claim to which a re l i g i o u s 
man makes an appropriate response" at RL 90 (emphasis added). 
^53 
187. For Ramsey "to deny to re l i g i o u s language.its r e l i g i o u s 
significance" - e.g. to tr e a t the B i b l i c a l accounts of creation as 
merely descriptive, merely s c i e n t i f i c , accounts; or to give models 
of God the status of God himself - " i s to worship the creature 
with a vengeance - to make idols of words" (RSCS 94; cf„ MDA 36-37, 
BS 54)o To commit oneself to a r e l i g i o n without having had any 
discernment of i t s transcendent referent i s precisely the same 
mistake? i t i s i d o l a t r y . But i t i s also bigotry ( c f . GS5) 
i. e . "something which prescribes the answers and dictates the 
conclusions irrespective of evidence" (Sermon (4) 61). 
1 , Ramsey, l i k e most contemporary philosophers, speaks of the 
"logic" of an assertion "to t a l k of the kind of argument or discourse 
i n which i t may be found" and thus as "a compact way of r e f e r r i n g to 
the d i s t i n c t i v e kinds of reason which might be given f o r i t ; the 
d i s t i n c t i v e kinds of evidence which might be given i n support of i t " 
(WG 9; cf. FP 13, CPGF 50 ), The "logic" of theology,then, i s i t s 
(informal) " l o g i c a l structure" or "l o g i c a l syntax" (CCP 256) which 
can be displayed by the philosopher of re l i g i o n ' s " l o g i c a l mapwork" 
(c f . M 3)« 
2, The accusation may appear to be supported by the s u b - t i t l e of 
Religious Language; "An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases". 
However, i t appears from Ramsey's papers that i t was his publishers j, 
and not Ramsey himselfjwho were responsible f o r both the t i t l e and 
t h e - s u b - t i t l e of t h i s book, 
3. "Theological", l i k e " r e l i g i o u s " , can bear both a wider and a 
narrower connotation when specifying forms of language. The language 
of "systematic theology" excludes "religious language" when the 
l a t t e r i s interpreted more narrowly. Cf. Ferre (LUG) v i i - v i i i , 
4 . Cf. Jeffner (SRL) 10. Jeffner suggested Rudolf Bultmann as an 
example of one who proposes such a theory ( i b i d . 2 7 ) . 
5. Paul Helm also c r i t i c i s e s Ramsey for his "a prior'tapproach" to 
reli g i o u s language. He argues that "nothing but confusion can result 
from t r e a t i n g 'religious language' as one d i s t i n c t i v e phenomenon" 
(Helm (VB) 5 8 ) . 
6. Cf. Schnetzer 354-356. See TL 21-24 f o r an example of a 
rather "forced" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of re l i g i o u s language (about the 
ascension)5 
7 . Ramsey i s very fond of using the word "currency" i n t h i s sort of 
context. He often speaks of language as Tappropriate", "suitable", 
" r e l i a b l e " , "apt" or "adequate" currency for a disclosure (cf.RL 56, 
87 and passim? FI 118 and passim; CE 182, RSCS 2 6 ) . "Currency" i s 
Ramsey's word fo r language which i s i n general use or c i r c u l a t i o n 
and relates to disclosure-situations; normally i t denotes language 
which "represents" what i s disclosed i n a disclosure (e.g.RL114» 
c f . below pp. jZ*?7 £•). At other times, however, Ramsey extends the 
use of the word to cover the evocative function of re l i g i o u s language 
as well (e.g. MDA 9; cf. below pp. 2>^2_#. )„ 
CHAPTiiK I I I 
aee ous 
8. For Ramsey " l i t e r a l " language i s "unadorned" language which serves 
as a "plain description" of i t s spatio-temporal object (MDA 58). We 
should note that, at least i n his l a t e s t thought, Ramsey viewed, 
empirical language as disclosure-based, but s t i l l treated i t as 
"descriptive ;' a I t i s language about the meta-empirical that i s 
l o g i c a l l y odd. 
9. John Mclntyre, having noted Ramsey's d i s t i n c t i o n between " a r t i c u -
l a t i o n " and "description", contends that he uses the former word i n 
the sense of "the delineation of relations within a mystery which 
might otherwise remain inexpressible "(Mclntyre (SC) 63-64). Mclntyre 
goes on to claim ( r i g h t l y ) that " a r t i c u l a t i o n by means of models i s 
the form which description takes when we are dealing with certain 
parts or aspects of r e a l i t y " ( i b i d . 64) a 
10. As opposed, i n p a r t i c u l a r , to "image" ( c f . TTST 82, TG 76n.2, 
86n7, H 219-221). Ramsey tends to use the term "model" very widely 
(c f . MacQuarrie (GT) 198). Others, however, would distinguish images 
(e.g. Father) with t h e i r l i m i t e d h i s t o r i c a l and social associations 
from models which are of greater generality and give coherence to a 
set of images (e.g. the model of transcendence); cf. King 11. 
Ramsey rejects "symbol" because i t "suggests that i t i s something 
which i s e n t i r e l y other than what i s symbolized" (TTST 82; c f . RB 192). 
Contrast Scharlemann 69-70. 
11. The value of a similar p l u r a l i t y of models i n science (modern 
physics) has been stressed by P.M. Clark 44-45. 
12. Against t h i s i t could be argued that i t ' i s not the televisi o n or 
telephone as an object^bu^ the resu l t of i t s a c t i v i t y ( i . e . the image 
or the sounds produced)y i s the real medium. Similarly i t i s not, e.g., 
Christ's nature,that i s the medium of God's revelation, but his a c t i v i t y 3 2 1 ( 1 
i t s effects on us ( c f e . g . , Hick (GUF) ch.11). And these a c t i v i t i e s 
do resemble (the a c t i v i t i e s o f ) the objects they reveal. Perhaps i n 
the end we shall have to accept that the term "medium" i s too 
ambiguous f o r arguments and analogies to be very he l p f u l i n any 
dir e c t i o n . 
13. Ramsey confesses, " I cannot produce a blue p r i n t of a dominant 
model" and adds s i g n i f i c a n t l y ( i n the context of a discussion about 
models of the Church), "Perhaps one has to conclude that the concept 
of God i s alone complex enough to incorporate a l l these diverse 
strands *» (TL 28-29). 
14. Some have argued that such models may have been di v i n e l y 
i n s t i t u t e d and authenticated - cf . Farrer (MM) 490, Mascall (wi) 
118-120. 
15. Ramsey had his lectures on "Models and Mystery", " i n a f i r s t 
d r a f t " before Black's Models and Metaphors reached him (c f . MM l i t ) . 
To some extent, therefore, the two analyses are independent, 
Ramsey cert a i n l y goes much furt h e r than Black,eg.in stressing the 
importance of the model i n s c i e n t i f i c understanding (MM 19) and i n 
adapting Black's account to f i t i n with his own theory of disclosures. 
16. Ramsey observes that similes are very l i k e " picturing models" 
( c f . below), having a descriptive, utivocal use (MM 47-48). Allegories 
have a similar status (CD12-13). 
17. Ramsey gives as examples of metaphorical expressions having the 
structure "A i s B"s " E l e c t r i c i t y i s flowing i n the wire", "Light i s 
a wave motion", "Jesus i s the Messia h" ( i b i d . ) . Presumably the 
"disclosed objects" i n these cases would be " E l e c t r i c i t y as 'flowing'" 
"Light as 'wave' motion", "Jesus as'Messia. h'", and not " E l e c t r i c i t y " , 
"Light", "Jesus" s i m p l i c i t e r . For " E l e c t r i c i t y " , "Light" and "Jesus" 
can be known by perception, without the need f o r any disclosure (of 
t h i s nature). What Ramsey c a l l s "a disclosure revealing some object" 
may then be interpreted i n our terms as "a disclosure of isomorphism 
which reveals an interpreted object, i . e . i n which we recognise an 
object as an object having certain characteristics" ( c f . below pp.^-S^-f.). 
I t w i l l be recalled that disclosures of insomorphism have been c l a s s i -
f i e l d as examples of recognition disclosures (above pp.111 £ , ) f t 
18. " a l l metaphors are models; but not only metaphors", Ramsey iiotes 
(U-TLIE 5)5 he l a t e r speaks of metaphors as "very imprecise models" 
(U-FMG B65/I78a). Thus his concept of a model i s "very close to 
that of a metaphor" (TL 28, c f . TTST 82 and Perre' (MM) 333)» Ramsey 
would probably agree with T i l l e y that "metaphors f a i l to work as 
models i f they do not have a capacity f o r analogical development, 
or a systematic complexity i n t h e i r source, or a systematic deploy-
a b i l i t y " ( T i l l e y . (Thesis) 188). 
19° We should note that Ramsey adopts a much looser notion of 
isomorphism than t h a i used by Black. Ramsey seems to be speaking 
of a s i m i l a r i t y between the web of relationships i n model and 
phenomena. Black's account, however, which i s based on the 
mathematical concept'of isomorphism, c a l l s f o r an i d e n t i t y ( c f , 
Black (MM) 222, Cohen (Thesis) 137, W.H. Austin (MMP) 46-47). 
20. Of course Ramsey argues that models may also be given " d i r e c t l y " 
i n r eligious experience when disclosures arise around fathers, kings • 
and other "model-situations" or phenomena ( c f . MM 58-9, TG 88). I n 
such cases there i s no "tangenti a l contact" schema as analysed above. 
Nor does t h i s arise when a disclosure occurs around language alone, 
as when "we ... t a l k about fathers, and lc-ving fathers, approaching 
as i t would be said the 'ideal' as closely as we can" u n t i l - " a t the 
end a cosmic disclosure breaks" and we then "reasonably t a l k of X -
what the disclosure discloses - i n terms of the model of 'loving 
father* ..." (MMR 265-266). 
21. Oddly enough, Ramsey immediately continues; " I t i s on these 
occasions that we speak ... of a 'friendly' valley ...", thus 
p u l l i n g the discussion back down to the lev e l of the use of metaphors 
about an observable pattern. He ought to have pointed out that i t i s 
such situations that j u s t i f y us i n speaking also of a " f r i e n d l y " 
God. 
22. For the 'c a t a l y t i c ' e f f e c t of disclosures cf „ above pp- S'S-f, 
23. Ewing would argue that such an inference i s i n any case based 
on i n t u i t i v e l y known "steps" (of. above .p. [i^J ) . This would not, 
however, put the whole argument at the same lev e l as Ramsey's 
i n t u i t i o n of a personal God. 
24. Cf. above pp. ZX\ $ 
25. Cf. above pp., 2$?0.ff „ Note also, however, that Ramsey occasion-
a l l y applies the term "to the "self-appointed" models of re l i g i o u s 
experience ( c f . MM 58) . 
26. An operator i s a mathematical symbol or function denoting an 
operation, e.g. a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n or square-root sign ( c f . P I 92, 
CD 80). 
27. I t might be argued that my own position, as outlined above (pp. \jt6>$)f 
and below (pp- X^5f,), amounts to the collapse of function ( i ) 
into function ( i i ) . For I hold that q u a l i f i e r s q u a l i f y models 
so as to disclose the concept of God, and not God himself. 
28. Sometimes Ramsey describes q u a l i f i e r s as having "some minimum 
descriptive character" because they "interlock with a p a r t i c u l a r 
context" (CO 79? cf. CD 71). Similarly the word "essi t " has some 
descriptive force, though i t functions mainly as an imperative 
(CD 79). 
29. Ramsey actually refers to t h i s function as " l o g i c a l " (RL 68)j 
though he describes i t i n terms of our being stimulated to develop 
a sequence of models i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . Perhaps McCluskey has 
the r i g h t balance when he writes of q u a l i f i e r s as " l o g i c a l signposts 
i n s t r u c t i n g us as to how we ought to proceed i n our analysis" 
(McCluskey 131. the "analysis" involving our meditation on the model-as -
qu a l i f i e d u n t i l the disclosure comes). 
30. Ramsey himself at one time adopted-a d i f f e r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n between 
specific examples of the two types of q u a l i f i e r . He argued that the 
q u a l i f i e r " i n f i n i t e l y " reveals the analogyt 
Gods laving-languages:Infinite sums f i n i t e sum.; whereas the use of a 
q u a l i f i e r l i k e "perfect" or " a l l " claims that "the wor d. 'God' i s a 
unique and ultimate key word dominating the whole of a t h e i s t i c 
language scheme, an »irreducible posit'... ." (PR 208). Unlike Evans1 
d i s t i n c t i o n , t h i s account distinguishes the two q u a l i f i e r s by means 
of t h e i r "formal function" alone - cf. above p.2.3?. 
31. Ramsey also relates his own position on self«realization, the 
peculiar nature of f i r s t person log i c , and the necessity of the 
subject term i n a l l assertions,to Austin's views - cf . PA passim, 
MDA 9.60, TTST 80, WG12, BP I I 47-48 . 
32. Cf. Donald Evans' Austinian study of the language of creation, 
The Logic of Self Involvement; Evans also uses the word "performative" 
despite his recognition of Austin's l a t e r position ( c f . Evans (LSI) 
38 n . 1 , 45 and passim, ) t t 
33. I am not convinced by Ramsey's frequent assertions that he i s 
"not at a l l concerned with the psychological ... or i g i n s of re l i g i o u s 
language" bu?7wlth i t s l o g i c a l foundations (U-ITR WFS 3) . I t does 
not seem to me that Ramsey "distinguishes c l e a r l y between logic 
and psychology" (Owen (PTR) 70). Certainly he stresses - and ought 
to stress - that "disclosure" i s not merely a psychological categoryj 
f o r i t i s both a psychological and an epistemological category. But 
Ramsey refers too often to the d i s t i n c t i v e psychological concomitants 
of disclosure - situations f o r us to ignore t h i s element i n h i s work 
(cf, FD115» Gaskin 134). I n any case, discernment must occur as a 
real mental (psychological) event before the epistemologically-
minded student of discernment has anything to analyse (cf.PPMT 175). 
I n j u s t the same way, sense experience - whatever i t s v e r i d i c a l 
status generally or i n p a r t i c u l a r cases - i s a real psychological 
phenomenon which the epistemologist treats i n h i s philosophical 
investigation. Ramsey's account of the evocative function of 
rel i g i o u s language involves him unavoidably i n claims as to what 
does i n fact occur i n people's mental l i v e s when they are confronted 
by qualified-models. No amount of contending that i t i s the 
lo g i c a l structure of such language with which Ramsey i s r e a l l y 
concerned should b l i n d us to the psychological weaknesses i n h i s 
account (of.TI.17t TTST82; also Cohen (LRL) 153, McCluskey 89, 
T i l l e y (Thesis) 172). 
34« The reference i s actually to "pes.ting"'the word God", 
but Ramsey recognises that the problem i s raised by many aspects of 
his exposition. 
35» D.Z. P h i l l i p s has recently argued that " i t i s not at a l l obvious 
that the sequence of cases i t s e l f determines that there must be a 
r e a l i t y called the i n f i n i t e goodness of God" ( P h i l l i p s (IA) 483). 
He contends that unless a series of morally good people already some -
how t i e s up t h e i r goodness with the goodness of God, the series i s 
neutral and so does not necessarily point to God ( i n the way that 
the mathematical series does point to a certain mathematical sum). 
36. See the next section. 
37. Cf. D i l l e y 101. 
38. Another term that might be used fo r t h i s function of reli g i o u s 
language i s "expressive". This too can be supported by reference to 
Ramsey's writings, but has the disadvantage of carrying with i t non-
cognitive connotations from i t s use i n such phrases as "the expression 
of emotion". Cf. RL 152, Fl 122, LEP 542, U-NRLt; also Smart (PR) 
224, Schnetzer 193. 
39. H.D. Lev/is has argijed that Ramsey "just manages to keep his feet" 
on the "very slim tightrope between ... 'the p i t of anthropomorphism' 
and 'the p i t of agnosticism' " (Lewis (PR) 109). I fear that t h i s 
must be denied, on the evidence i n p a r t i c u l a r of Ramsey's unpublished 
work on theodicy. And when Ramsey does f a l l i t i s in t o the agnostic 
(equivocal) p i t , rather than the anthropomorphic (univocal) one. 
Ramsey was always more aware of the dangers of the l a t t e r chasm ( c f . 
RL 78, MJGC 152). 
40. Ramsey's argument against such a position seems to ignore the 
helpful d i s t i n c t i o n that he drew e a r l i e r between positive -
comprehensive and negative - exclusive q u a l i f i e r s ; c f . p -2- ? I. 
41. Cf. T i l l e y (Thesis) 176; ; also OCR 14, OBSP\ 57-58. 
42. i . e . the doctrine that the att r i b u t e s or a c t i v i t i e s proper to one 
nature of Christ may be a t t r i b u t e d to his other nature by v i r t u e of 
the un i t y of both i n one person. 
43. Cf. "the Athanasian formula i s claiming, that Father, Son and 
Holy S p i r i t - as a group - have the placing of the word 'God* " 
(U-TLIE 8). 
44. i . e . the concept of "coming from/belonging t o " , and the 
. : doctrine of the "interpenetration" of the Persons of the Trinity/espectively. 
45. Ramsey also speaks of q u a l i f i e r s as "mnemonics" and we r e c a l l 
that one of t h e i r major .functions was a "formal" one (cf.^,2-,Bc? ) . 
"Qualifier sentences", e.g. "God i s up there" ("up there" being the 
q u a l i f i e r or operator), are described as "slogans or mnemonics" which 
must never be viewed descriptively. They are "much more l i k e a rule 
about operators" (CD 80). Ramsey also views moral rales and principles 
as "no more and no less than convenient mnemonics" whose purpose was 
to preserve and recapture a basic moral insight (U-UBMD 51 cf. U-Man 
and Morality 6 ) . Wo shall observe below that Ramsey distinguishes 
models from "mnemonics" i n both seisnce and r e l i g i o n ; f o r models have 
a representative function, some "ontological commitment" ( c f . MM 20, 
PPMT 162). 
46. Even the F a l l and the V i r g i n B i r t h may be spoken of as "mythological 
representations" of real meta-empirical states of a f f a i r s i n the 
relationship between God and human beings (although not necessarily 
of the states of a f f a i r s they appear prima facie to be describing). 
47• We r e c a l l that Ramsey speaks of "balancing" one model against 
another i n the multi-model discourse of theology. Unfortunately he 
never develops t h i s into a solution to the problems of religious 
paradox. His "tracking back" to a disclosure i s seen as a way of 
revealing the evocative, rather than the representative, function of 
the language so analysed, 
48. Ramsey argues (surely incorrectly) that the word "cause'! always 
implies a causal predecessor; i n which case " f i r s t cause" would be 
self-contradictory. The phrase i s therefore analysed i n terms of i t s 
evocative and formal functions, and the paradox thus resolved ( c f . 
Rl 61-65 and Ramsey'^  similar treatment of "eternal purpose" i n 
RL 75-79). 
49. See above pp. ^ 4- GP. , 3 2. . , 4-1 £ . 
50. One i n which Ramsey attempted to argue from " l i n g u i s t i c necessity" 
to e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y ( i . e . that as God i s needed to "complete" 
the language hierarchy, God ex i s t s ) . 
51. But c f . my remarks on the dating of FMG'mAppendix B. 
52. "Berkeley and the P o s s i b i l i t y of an Empirical Metaphysics" was 
Ramsey's t i t l e f o r a paper published i n 1966, though much of i t had 
already appeared i n two pieces published i n 1952 (NI and Homage). 
This concern f o r an "empirical metaphysics" may also be documented 
from other writings of the early part of Ramsey's Oxford career - cf. 
M4, 18,245 CCP 254; SEE 204; U-FMG 1/19/21, 3/29/67 etc. 
53• Ramsey agrees with Stparwson , however, that no actual metaphysical 
scheme i s e n t i r e l y either "descriptive" or "revisionary" (PPMT 154 n .1). 
54. Ordinary language i t s e l f , i n Ramsey's view, "exhibits such 
d i v e r s i t y as argues f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of metaphysics, i . e . f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of some language used aptly about what i s 'unseen' ..." 
( F I 152). 
5 5 . On t h i s analysis, a l l language reduces to elementary (atomic) 
propositions consisting of names, and the world reduces to states of 
a f f a i r s which consist of objects. The "structure" or "form" of 
propositions mirrors the structure or form of the world ( c f . Russell 
(LA), Wittgenstein (T) ). 
56„ Gfo below Chapter IV. This i s not to say that there may 
not be some "future crux" of a quasi-experiential (non-mundane) 
state of a f f a i r s , which may "guarantee retrospectively" one meta-
physical scheme at the expense of another (Hick (CC) 102; cf„ (FK) 
ch . 8 ) . Bui^iguch a state of a f f a i r s i s not a part of the world which 
i s open tqf sense experience of people l i v i n g i n the world, and 
therefore i t i s not part of the evidential raw material that meta-
physics seeks to explain and organise. 
57= Cf. CCP ( 1 9 5 2 ) , U-TLIE (co1953) and U-FMG Draft ( c „ 1 9 5 5 ) . 
58o Ramsey equates the three terms on p.1 of U-TLIE, but then 
goes on to speak mainly of "levels"„ 
59o As i l l u s t r a t e d by Russell's Theory of Types (see Russell (LA) 
153-155* Ayer ( R ) 49 -52 ; c f . also CE 179, RSCS 7 7 - 7 9 ) . 
6 0 o He also uses t h i s theory i n wider contexts - e.g. "God i s loving" 
i s an incomplete assertion compared with "God i s i n f i n i t e l y loving", 
the word "object" i s l o g i c a l l y incomplete as i t always presupposes 
some correlative subject ( c f . V/G 8 , TL A, 9» RSCS 419 CPL 245-246, 
BP I I 199)<> W.Ao de- Pater srteports that Ramsey argued (in- an un-
published paper delivered i n 1971) that "for a Christian the expression 
•There i s eternal l i f e ' i s incomplete i n two ways, i t ought to be 
' I believe (or hope, or witness)s that there i s eternal l i f e i n 
Christ"' (de Pater 115» own translation),, 
61o This i s described elsewhere as a "top grade metaphysical category" 
which presides over the f u l l range of models, but i s i t s e l f impossible 
to model. Ramsey gives as examples " I " and "God" (B 6 5 / 1 7 8 C| c f . 
below pp. 3 ^ pf. ) . 
6 2 . I t should be noted that Ramsey's mathematical p a r a l l e l s to the 
boundary/apex words of metaphysics are not very close.. As N.H.G. 
Robinson puts i t , with reference to the cognate circle/polygon 
analogy, "The c i r c l e may.be said to bear a relationship of l o g i c a l 
transcendence to the 'language route' which consists of the series of 
regular polygons, but i t does so wit h i n the context of geometrical 
language as a whole" (' Robinson 427«Ramsey's apex word, on the 
other hand, presides over a l l languages. 
63<> The index of a book i s the place where "alone perhaps the un i t y 
of the book i s portrayed" (U-TLIE 3) „ 
64o i . e . at the fact of "self-other awareness" or disclosure ( c f . 
U-FMG 3 / 2 9 / 6 7 ) . 
6 5 . Ramsey remarks elsewhere; " I c e r t a i n l y would not wish to assert 
that there v/ere no more than three" (U-ITR WFZ 2 ) ; the three here 
( I , person, God) are simply the index words which are "near the apex 
of the metaphysical map". 
4&o 
66 . I n a draft/^Fact, Metaphysics and God", Ramsey argues that the 
metaphysical enterprise always needs both "heterogeneous language" 
and "continuity of language", i . e . the recognition of the d i f f e r e n t 
levels (areas) of language, together with some attempt to unite 
them (U-FMG Draft 1/19 - 2 / 1 ) . 
67c l i t e r a l l y "to combine (parts) i n t o a whole". This i s a useful 
word which covers the "explanatory" x$le of both science and meta-
physics, and w i l l be used as such below — cf. . chapter IV. 
6 8 . Ramsey sometimes distinguishes "God" as a " f i n a l key concept" 
(TL 8) or a "unique and ultimate key word" (PR 208). 
6 9 . Gf. above pp.'<£4-flr. 
7 0 . I n a d i f f e r e n t context, Ramsey uses t h i s metaphor to designate 
whatever puts an end to the development of a model i n a certain 
d i r e c t i o n ( c f . BP I I 194, OBSR 22 , CD 3 6 ) . Formal ryO.es fo r 
developing certain doctrines - e.g. the doctrine of the T r i n i t y - are 
also treated as "lo g i c a l stop cards" which prevent the development of 
certain of the theological models which the doctrine u t i l i z e s 
(CD 4 3 - 4 4 ) . 
7 1 . "To c a l l a posit a posit i s not to patronise i t . A posit can 
be unavoidable except at the cost of other no less a r t i f i c i a l 
expedients. Everything to which we concede existence i s a posit 
from the standpoint of a description of the theory-building process, 
and simultaneously real from the standpoint of the theory that i s 
being b u i l t " (Quine (WO) 2 2 ) . 
72. For c r i t i c i s m s of Quine1 s position c f . Ayer (i-ICS) 53—54* Staniland 
ch .5 and the papers by R.L. Cartwright, R. Carnap and G. Bergman i n 
F e i g l , Sellars and Lehrer. 
CHAPTER IV 
1o This " r e f e r e n t i a l function" of re l i g i o u s language i s coupled with 
i t s "representative function" which gives content to the term "God"— 
the referent of t h e i s t i c language. Cf. above pp. 2 . ^ 7 and 
T i l l e y (Thesis) p p > 1 5 1 - 1 5 4 . 
2 . Cf. above pp. 1 f f . 
3 . Kai Nielsen's terms c f . Nielsen (WF), (WFA), (CCR) ch . 5 . Some 
have argued that the Wittgenstein_ian Fide^ists are not r e a l l y 
Wittgenstein! an (W.H. Austin (BBS) 8 5 , Bell;but cf. Brown 4 6 - 4 7 ) . 
4» Gf. Smart; "God, i f at a l l an ostensive concept, i s only 
c i r c u i t o u s l y ostensive - by pointing, as i t were, to the place 
from which you see rather than to what i s seen" (Smart (PR) 224 ) • 
Cf. also Ramsey on the d i f f i c u l t y of pointing at a mysterys CPCF 57, 
MM 21 . 
5 8 Cf. also Stebbing 151-152; Waismann (PLP) 330-333? HcPherson (AA) 
213; Lucas 136, 140; Kellenberger (FC)j Meynell (SNC) 164-165; 
Walsh (M) 44 ; Pepper, C W $>oci^ 1 ^ l b g n * * ^ ( i f f c fc l VcSl.a 
pp 3T{ — Z~?$, . " ' 
6. i . e . i n the sense i n which "Lincoln was assassinated" i s true, 
and "Napoleon had twelve fingers" i s false, 
7 . Cf 0 Hick (FK) v i i 5 (PR) 106; Nielsen (CGR)66-68; Gopleston (CP) 6n„ 
17. 
8. Cf. Blackstone (PRK) 75-76; Schedler (TGT) 238, cf. 235. For t h i s 
response see M i t c h e l l (TF) j Hick (FIC) preface and'Ch08j Ferre (LLG) 
ch . 10 , i b i d . (MLM)„ Ramsey rejects e n t i r e l y the "Left Wing Response" 
of the non-cognitivists ( c f . Review Meynell 270) s a fact that often 
passes unnoticed both by Ramsey's "followers" and his detractors 
( c f . van Buren (SMG) 93-97> Bebblethwaite 645; Robinson 39 -40) . 
9o I t has often been pointed out (cf„, e.g.jPenelhum (PRK) 84-85) that 
Flew's challenge relates not only to the question of the f a l s i f i a b i l i t y 
of r e l i g i o u s assertions, but also to the problem of the analogical use 
of language. Ramsey's analysis of r e l i g i o u s language i n terms of 
qualified-models, and his recognition of the importance of using 
many complementary models i n theology, comprise his own attempts to 
deal with t h i s aspect of the challenge ( c f . MM59, TG85, U-PE2). 
10. pace Wisdom^G) 187)1 
11. On the nature and problems of explanation i n science cf. Theobald 
ch 0 6 ; Hempel ch .5» 6; N.R. Campbell ch.5$ Popper (GR) ch . 5 and 
appendix. 
12. For an analysis of the "explanatory" ro l e of the concept of God 
cf. K. Ward (Cfi) 138=152, Ward concludes "that God can be said to 
explain events by placing them i n a r a t i o n a l , purposive and 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y valuable context" ( 1 5 2 , cf„ 148—149)« Cfo also Hick 
(AEG) 4 6 - 5 2 . 
13. A d i s t i n c t i o n i s often made i n science between (a) hypotheses, 
which are highly specific and have a l i m i t e d range; and (b) theories 
which are much more general, inclusive and wide-ranging, and employ 
theoretical concepts of a meta-empirical nature ( c f . Hutten 295-296 , 
Braithwaite (SE) i x , Nagel 89 -90 , Hesse (SHl) 135 e t c ) . As Ferre' 
puts i t s "Hypotheses are subjected to procedures of v e r i f i c a t i o n . 
Theories are weigh ed" (Ferre (SDG) 1 4 4 ) . 
14. i 0 e 0 a "programme" of aims, methodologies, theories,techniques 
etc. ( c f . Lakatos 132-138). 
15. i . e . a concrete s c i e n t i f i c achievement viewed as an exemplary 
model f o r "doing science" and treated as a standard "puzzle-solution" 
fo r students. (Kahn (SSR) postscript and passim ). Kuhn also uses 
the term more widely on occasions ( t r e a t i n g i t as equivalent to 
Lakatos' "research programme"). 
16. Barbour's examples include "Events i n the l i f e of Moses, 
Buddha and Christ" which have a dominant role i n defining the s e l f -
i d e n t i t y and development of a re l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n ( i b i d . 133-134)0 
I n an unpublished paper, G. Lindbeck has spoken of the papacy 
as a "pastoral paradigm" and Jerome as a paradigm f o r b i b l i c a l 
scholarshipo 
17. Boes i t , e.g., recognise "the existence of the metempirical 
within experience" and adequately make sense of i t ? ( c f . Baly 2 0 3 ) . 
18. Cf. above pp., 3 6 2 . . and Excursus I "below. 
19. He may therefore be described as a " q u a l i f i e d i n t u i t i o n i s t " . - . .. 
(c f . Shepherd 128). 
20 . The employment of these c r i t e r i a i s described by Ramsey as 
"a l o g i c a l translation of the Vincentian Canon" (U-Inter-Communion 1 
2 0 ) . 
21. The phrase "theism as a metaphysical scheme" designates an 
e x p l i c i t l y metaphysical treatment of God-language as al'Kata-language". 
"Religious discourse" i s always fundamentally metaphysical ( i n 
being discourse about a meta-empirical entity" that provides a 
general int e g r a t i n g category) I but i n Ramsey's 
la t e r work he i s more interested i n j u s t i f y i n g the application of 
d i f f e r e n t models to God than i n j u s t i f y i n g the metaphysical status 
and function of the term "God ". 
22 . Quoted above p. 34- I . 
2 3 . The d i f f i c u l t i e s of stating clear c r i t e r i a of s i m p l i c i t y i n 
science, and of j u s t i f y i n g the preference given to simpler hypotheses 
and theories,are reviewed i n Hempel 40-45» Cf. also Losee 161—162; 
Popper (CR) 6 1 , 241-242 . 
24. Cf, MMR 267 s U-Intercommunion 20 . 
25„ Cf. yf 111 f • 
26„ W.H. Austin argues that " f a l s i f i c a t i o n procedures i n science are 
not so clear-cut, nor so d i f f e r e n t from the method of empirical 
f i t as Ramsey supposes"(W,H, Austin 52} cf„ Kuhn (SSR) c h . V I I l ) . 
But Ramsey himself notes the absence of "knock-down" c r i t e r i a of 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n s c i e n t i f i c method} and i n h i s references to the social 
and human sciences acknowledges that the method of empirical f i t 
has i t s place w i t h i n the sciences as w e l l . 
27 . Cf. above pp. 376 % also McClendon and Smith (iRMRl) 423? 
M i l l e r 257', McCluskey 1585 T i l l e y (Thesis) 222-228, (iREP) 9 7 1 -
976. 
28. Cf. T i l l e y 1 s d i s t i n c t i o n between the i n i t i a l "testing" of a shoe 
at the time of purchase, and the l a t e r t e s t i n g that takes place 
outside the shoe shop ( T i l l e y (Thesis) 222 ,225; (IREF) 971, 9 7 3 - 4 ) . 
The f i r s t element of testing (mainly f o r comfort, "looks" etc.) may 
be regarded as equivalent to the more a p r i o r i t e s t i n g of a theory 
f o r i t s l i k e l y adequacy i n integrating those facts with which the 
individual i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned. Such a test i s a very 
individual matter, as i s one's choice of shoes. This i s then 
followed by the more a posteriori t e s t i n g of the shoe (mainly f o r 
waterproofness,durability, long-term comfort, etc.) which may be 
regarded as analogous to the empirical t e s t i n g of a theory against 
the entire range of relevant empirical facts (i.e.. not jus t those 
which the in d i v i d u a l personally regards as most c r u c i a l ) . 
29 . Hence t h i s i s not a return to the notion of "self-authenticating" 
i n t u i t i o n s . I n t u i t i o n s may be wrong, but we do have ways of 
checking whether we are l i k e l y to be duping ourselves. Ramsey himself 
us es the phrase "the p o s s i b i l i t y and necessity of checking i n t u i t i o n s " 
i n the context of "looking again" at the ever widening s i t u a t i o n 
(medium) of the o r i g i n a l disclosure ( c f c EE 156);cf„ above pp 
3 0 o Thornton c r i t i c i s e s Ramsey for jump ing "straight from f a i t h 
t,o works without the mediation of grace through prayer". He asks 
"Is not prayer i t s e l f another, and more workable, test f o r the 
reasonableness of doctrinal models and analogies?" (Thornton (FT) 
7 9 ) o But he seems to mean by t h i s no more than that certain models 
may be " j u s t i f i e d " i f , when used i n prayer and meditation, they give 
r i s e to further (deeper) disclosures of God. 
3 1 ° For the argument that, as "the p r i n c i p a l concern of a l l r e l i g i o n s 
i s how to get r i d of e v i l " , one may "speak of f a i t h as being v e r i f i e d 
(or f a l s i f i e d ) i n action", see Boyce Gibson 2 1 1 - 2 1 4 . Cf. also 
Farrer (RF) 1 4 5 - 1 4 8 and Christian 2 6 4 - 2 6 6 . 
3 2 . Cf. FL 4 8 * G i l l (IR) 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 , T i l l e y (Thesis) 2 5 4 - 2 6 2 , D. Edwards 
4 9 . 
.: EXCURSUS I 
1 . i . e . " r e a l " or "iconic" models (" real or imagined things and 
processes which are similar to other things and processes i n various 
ways, and whose function i s to further our understanding" - Harre 1 7 4 ) • 
For various views of the relationship between models, analogies and 
theories see Achinstein (MAT), (TM)$ Hesse (MP), (MAS),(SHI) Ch.VIII; 
Spector; Brafthwaite (SE) c h s . I I I , IV? Ferre (MLM) 5 4 - 5 6 ; Nagel c h „ 5 
etc. 
2 . Tae"Duhemist position" i s convincingly countered by Hesse ((MftS) c h . l ) . 
3 . The other main non-realistic account of theoretical e n t i t i e s among 
philosophers of siience i s the related reductionist view that sentences 
that refer to them are statements but r e a l l y refer to observables, and 
not to unobservable e n t i t i e s . Cf. Quinton (NT) 288 - 2 8 9 , Barbour (ISR) 
1 6 2 - 1 6 4 , Hampel 8 8 - 9 1 , Losee c h . 1 2 , Hease (SHI) chs. VI and V I I . 
4 . The arguments are reviewed i n Nagel 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 9 1 4 5 - 1 4 6 , Barbour 
(ISR) 1 6 6 ; W.H. Austin (RNS) 2 4 - 3 0 ; Maxwell; Harre ch . 3 etc. 
5 « The question of the ontological status of the theoretical e n t i t i e s 
of science i s relevant to other areas of philosophy i n addition to 
the problem of perception. I t i s of p a r t i c u l a r relevance f o r the 
problem of other minds; as Maxwell puts i t s "Sensations and inner 
states ... are theoretical e n t i t i e s (and they 'real l y exist')and 
not merely actual and/or possible behaviour. Surely i t i s the 
unwillingness to countenance theoretical e n t i t i e s „.. which i s 
responsible f o r the 'logical behaviourism' of the neo-V/ittgensteinians" 
(Maxwell 1 4 n . 9 l c f . also Ferrd' (MMR) 3 4 4 ) . 
6 . Cf. Theobald 134s "The term 'exact model' cannot apply to anything 
i n science - indeed i t i s a contradiction i n terms except when applied 
to things l i k e motor cars". 
7 o Ramsey has also stressed the s i m i l a r i t y of science and r e l i g i o n 
from another angle, arguing that he "always found i n science the 
kind of exploring attitude to the universe which was i t s e l f 
wonderful and mysterious"(U-BBC^N 
4 6 f 
EXCURSUS I I 
1. Owen (CKG) 2555 cf. ibid,214 . 
2. This seems to be the same concern which l i e s behind the c r i t i c i s m 
that the doctrine of analogy needs a univocal and not an analogical 
conception of creative causality; cf „ pv^ -f- 2. 2 below. 
3 . i„e, Models f o r Divine A c t i v i t y , Cf, " I f we are looking f o r some 
concept, some feature of the disclosure which characterises ourselves 
and what confronts us equally, which we therefore t a l k about neither 
equivocally nor analogically but univocally ,,, which we can use of 
what confronts us i n the same sense as we can use i t of ourselves, 
we have i t i n ' a c t i v i t y ' . For we only know our own a c t i v i t y i n 
matching i t with _an a c t i v i t y which confronts us'$TBA.6l) * " I f Christians 
claim to go beyond picturesque, i n s p i r i n g stories, at least t a l k 
about God's a c t i v i t y must be l i t e r a l and univocal, straightforwardly 
r e l i a b l e " ( i b i d - 57=58) , 
4« For more on Ramsey's use of " a c t i v i t y " see above pp. 2 . 0 2 . Ff, 
He had always treated i t as an "index word" or a "word of odd l o g i c " , 
" a word which i s not exhaustively unpacked i n terms of any public 
language" (U-FMQ ( 3 ) 11/14/206; c f , the d i s t i n c t i o n between "action" 
and "behaviour" - e.g. BPII 196 -7 9 200-201 , MM 25 -27 , BPEM 17 -19 , 
TW 8^-83)0 At one stage he viewed " a c t i v i t y " as a "dominant model" 
(c f , CD 84 , TRT 53-55) whereas his l a t e r position was differents 
" I have now changed my views on a c t i v i t y which I do not see as a 
model, even a 'super model' k i t a word~which unites God and ourselves 
i n a { l i t e r a l ] ) sense" (U-ITR Evans 3 )» 
5 . I shall adopt t h i s standard convention of r e f e r r i n g to the Summa 
Theologiae (S.T,) by part, question, and a r t i c l e . Page references 
are to the Blackfriars e d i t i o n , Eyre & Spottwoodek London (19&3-) ° 
6. Classical Thorn .ist s , along with many modern interpreters, often 
treat analogy as a type of equivocation, whilst denying that i t i s 
"pure" or "simple" equivocation, Cf, Gilson 154s Bochenski 430-4539 
Ross (NTA) 127-128, 131-132, Mclnerny 151-156 . 
7 o According to H, McCabe,St„ Thomas' objection to the metaphor theory 
of theological language " i s that i n metaphor the primary use of the 
word i s a l i t e r a l one, so that words would always apply primarily 
to creatures and to use them of God would be to move outside t h e i r 
ordinary meaning" (p « 1 0 7 , VolJ of the Blackfriars edition of the 
Summa Theologiae). Cf. (S.T„) 1a, 13 , 6 ; Gilson 152, 
80 For a more cogent and inte r e s t i n g - but i n the end unconvincing -
defence of. Ross (ARM) 135-138. 
9 o Recent Thornist scholarship has tended to stress the r e l a t i v e 
unimportance of t h i s form of analogy i n Aquinas' o w n thought, i n comparison 'with the analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n . Cajetgn has been 
"charged with having mischanneled centuries of speculative e f f o r t 
into defending what he called 'analogy of proper proportionately' 
as the normal form of analogical discourse" (Bur r e l l 120; cf. H„ 
Kyttkens; The Analogy between God and the World, Upsadla Universitet 
A r s s k r i f t ; Upsalla (1953) pp.218-220, 409-475? R. Mclnerny; The Logic 
of Analogy, Martinus Kijhoffs The Hague (1961) pp. 1-2}, Such 
c r i t i c s have also stressed (against Cajetaai and Thornists l i k e 
Anderson) that analogy i n Aquinas i s basica l l y a lo g i c a l rather 
than a metaphysical matter (cf„ also Mclnerny passim). 
10„ There are great dangers, of course, i n in t e r p r e t i n g the 
equals sign too l i t e r a l l y - c f 0 Mascall (EA) 104, Hesse (MAS) 
71-74* Ross (ARM) 94 n . 4 „ 
1 1 0 Cfo Aquinas (S.T„) l a , 3s> 3$ l a , 3?4° God's esse i s known as 
"unparticipated being" ( s e l f - e x i s t e n t , uncaused e t c , j - Anderson 
289-290 . 
12„ Ninian Smart points out that i n one sense immanence i s i d e n t i c a l 
with transcendence, " f o r 'within' i s an analogy l i k e 'beyond' - not 
to be taken l i t e r a l l y ? who • i s to say that '\vithin' and 'beyond' 
point i n d i f f e r e n t directions? And God's dynamic working withi n a l l 
things i s surely equivalent to his continuous, omnipresent, 
c r e a t i v i t y " (Smart (MT) 487} cf. i b i d . (CH) 229-230, 238) 
13o Cfo U-SMR 2 1 - 2 2 , RL 7 1 - 7 3 . I t should be noted that Ramsey 
also views creation language as placing "God" "as a 'key' word f o r 
the universe of ' creatures 5 "a (RL 73? .cf. U-CM8, U-SMR 22 ) . Giving 
the word "God" the status of/key or apex "word" i s i n Ramsey's view 
"a l i n g u i s t i c formulation of the doctrine of creation ex n i h i l o " 
(CCP 2645 c f . PR 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ) . An int e r e s t i n g example of Ramsey's s h i f t 
i n interes t from metaphysics to re l i g i o u s model-language i s to be seen 
i n the fact that he l a t e r writes i n "The Problem of E v i l " MSs 
"every feature of the world can be used as a model to be developed 
by a q u a l i f i e r u n t i l , i n p r i n c i p l e J T L O t h i n g i s excluded from the survey 
and a worshipful . " s i t u a t i o n i s evoked... This indeed i s the 
l i n g u i s t i c version of the doctrine of creation" (U=PE 2 0 ) . 
14<> Or used i n a modified sense without the "ex n i h i l o " ; c f . 
Mascall (HWl) 98. 
15« Perhaps t h i s point i s to some extent acknowledged by Thoaaiists 
who accept that i n the ordo cognoscendi the f i n i t e analogue comes 
f i r s t , whilst i n the ordo essendi the Creator comes f i r s t ( c f . Mascall 
(WI) 108). 
16. Of course certain "abstract negative terms" - e.g. "eternal", 
"simple", "immaterial" - can be univocally predicated of God. 
Aquinas i s concerned here with positive concrete terms which are 
a l l predicated analogically. Clearly a "negative a t t r i b u t e " i s 
the denial of a positive predication and as such may be understood 
non-analogically,, a.tfck<Afc,k (Za-^se^-\ stSIL treohs. s-u&U. Verr^S ^NtaA'fce^^ 
17. Cf. above pp. CLoCLQ. 
18. For Palmer's view of Ramsey's r e l i g i o u s epistemology ("that 
theological burbling can help a penny drop") see pp.53-54° However 
Ramsey i s not mentioned by name. 
19° Ramsey himself allows that i t i s possible to make inferences 
from theological models ( c f . CD 5 0 ) . 
20 . A similar i n t e n t i o n may be discerned i n Paul Hayner's defence of 
analogy i n his paper "Analogical Predication". He writes "The 
word 'love' i s being used ambiguously when predicated of God compared 
to i t s use i n other contexts. But the ambiguity can always be 
c l a r i f i e d by designating the properties s i g n i f i e d by t h i s term when 
predicated of God, and comparing these properties with those s i g n i f i e d 
by the same term when predicated of other things. Whenever an 
analogical meaning i s involved, the two sets of properties w i l l 
overlap. Thus 'love' as predicated of God may s i g n i f y , among other 
things, the property of having tender concern, and the same property 
may be s i g n i f i e d by t h i s term when predicated of a human father i n 
his r e l a t i o n to his children. I n other words, having tender concern 
i s a property s i g n i f i e d i n common i n both cases of i t s predication," 
(Hayner 861 ) a Cf. also Dueasse 284-285, Sherry 443-445 . 
21, With regard to metaphysicsjKearney claims thats" I n two respects 
metaphysics can proceed only by using words analogically, namely i n 
respectto affirmations concerning the whole of r e a l i t y , and i n respect 
to affirmations concerning the nature of meta-empirical e n t i t i e s " ( l 7 9 ) , 
As our descriptive words "are o r d i n a r i l y such as to distinguish some 
parts " of realityfrom others, not to describe the whole of r e a l i t y " 
( i b i d , ) , metaphysics must use "the language of p a r t i a l r e a l i t y " i n a 
"new, analogical sense" (181). Examples of such uses are the idealist's 
use of "idea" and the materialists conception of "matter" (.181-182; c f . 
Emmet (NMT) ch.IX, Pepper 369-370). I n r e l a t i o n to meta-empirical 
e n t i t i e s , the same situ a t i o n obtains;"to the extent that the words 
of experienced r e a l i t y carry connotations of the empirical nature of 
the objects or properties to which they r e f e r , i t i s only with some 
modification of t h e i r meaning that they can be used concerning meta-
empirical e n t i t i e s "(182-183)o I f God i s meta-empirical -- i . e . "not 
an object accessible to d i r e c t human observation of any kind" - then 
"analogical predication i s a necessary and fundamental feature of the 
language of theological explanation" (18 8)„ Such a view might be 
another way of i n t e r p r e t i n g •= and accepting - the Thomnist maxim 
that "the 'salvation of metaphysics' l i e s i n analogy ... \*ithout t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e metaphysics i s l o s t " (Anderson 317)* 
2 2 0 Or i n Mary Hesse's words, to recognise the "negative analogy" i n 
his models i . e . the properties which belong to the model but not to 
r e a l i t y (Cf. Hesse (MAS) 9 - 1 0 ) , 
23o i , e . the " i r r e d u c i b i l i t y " of re l i g i o u s metaphors "must pr o h i b i t 
an exact paraphrase" but i t does "not necessarily prevent a p a r t i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by analogy" (MacCormac 405)° As Copleston has 
remarked; "To demand that the content of analogical ideas should 
be perfectly clear and expressible .., would be to misunderstand 
altogether the nature of analogy" (Copleston (HP 2 I I ) H 6 5 c f . 
V/oods (TIACT) passim). 
24, Those who demand a " p r i o r l i t e r a l knowledge (f°rD any meaningful 
use of analogical language" (Harris (ESAL) 212,' c f . Blackstone 
(SGT) 361, Schedler (TGT) 2 3 5 ), often seem to be demanding no more 
than that there be an observed s i m i l a r i t y between the two things 
which are compared (Harris op.cit. 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 ) . Harris writess " i f 
i t i s admitted that there are not observed s i m i l a r i t i e s between God 
and other terms which would serve as bases f o r analogies, then could 
one ever know what i t would be l i k e to j u s t i f y such connections ...? " 
(218), But i f such observed s i m i l a r i t i e s vrere discovered by a 
re l i g i o u s i n t u i t i o n (a transcending "observation"), would t h i s not be 
s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the analogy? The only " l i t e r a l knowledge" 
presupposed would then be that "God i s l i k e a father, judge etc.". 
I t i s surely such "knowledge by acquaintance" which alone allows 
us to specify the analogy more clearly ( c f . Hepburn (CP) 1 7 7-178). 
2 5 . One function of the analogia entis i n Thomism i s precisely 
to prevent the agnosticism of a pure ( i . e . unspecified) analogy 
of proportionately ( c f . Parrer (RF) 7 6 - 7 7 ) . 
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Review of G. Mac lagan: The Theological F r o n t i e r 

















Sermon ( l ) 
Sermon (2) 
Sermon (3) 








Review of W. I . Mat SOB.: The Existence of God, i n 
The Journal of Philosophy, LXXV, 4 (1967). 
Review of T. LicFherson: The Philosophy of Religion, 
i n Trivium I I I (1968). 
Review of I I . A. Heynell: Sense, Nonsense & 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , i n Journal of Theological Studies, 
X V I , 1 (1965). 
Review of H. Pike's e d i t i o n of E. Humes Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, i n Religious Studies, 
9, 2 (1973). 
Review of Sillem's book on Berkeley, Philosophical 
Quarterly, 9, 34 (1959). 
Review of N. Smart: Reasons & Faiths, i n Philosophy, 
XXXV, 132 (19.60). 
Review of Y7. T. Stace: Reli g i o n and the Iuodern Llind 
and Time and E t e r n i t y , i n Lind, LXIV, 253 (1955). 
Review of I . Trethowan: Absolute Value, i n The Church 
Quarterly, 3, 4 (1971). 
Review of J. v/isdom: Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, 
i n The Oxford Magazine, LXXII, 3 (1953). 
"The Reasonableness of F a i t h today", Rochester 
Cathedral Lectures (1969). 
Religious Language, S.C.Li.: London (1G57). Lectures 
delivered 1955. 
Religion end Science:. C o n f l i c t and Synthesis, S.P.C.It.: 
London (1964).Lectures del i v e r e d 1 9 6 0 . ' 
"Religion and Science: A. Philosopher's Approach", 
The Church Quarterly Review, CLXII (1961). 
Lecture delivered 1959. 
"The Systematic Elusiveness of ' I * " , The Philosophical 
Quarterly, V, 20 (1955). 
"Un i v e r s i t y Sermon", Cambridge Review, LXX, 1711 (1S49). 
"Un i v e r s i t y Sermon", Cambridge Review, LXXII, 1751 (195G), 
"The Feast of Meeting", The Church Quarterly Review, 
CLX (1959). 
"The V/ay ahead f o r Christian. Thinking", a sermon 
preached at Gt. St. Kary's, Cambridge, 12 November, 
1967, Point, No. 3, Summer 1968. 
"Opening Sermon", 52nd Conference of Modern Churchmen: 
L i b e r a l C h r i s t i a n i t y i n H i s t o r y , Liodern Churchmen, 
X I I I , 1, N.S. (1969). 
"Science and Religion", BoB.C. discussion of 1951 
w i t h C. A. Coulson, Church Po.storal Aid Society 
Fellowship Papers, X I I I , 149 (1951). 
"Some Reflections on a Contemporary Problem raised 
by Scieoce and Religion", Cambridge Journal, I I , 5 
(1949). 
Thinking about the Eucharist, S.C.U.: London (1972), 
preface by I . T. Ramsey. 
"Ch r i s t i a n Values i n the Boarding School: Towards 
a Theology of Education", Learning f o r L i v i n g , 15, 
4 (1976). Lecture delivered 1972. 
"Theology i n England: I t s Changing Face", Escape 
(Groningen: The Netherlands), 4, 6 (1972). 
"Talking about God: IJodels, Ancient and Llodern", i n 
F. \7. DilBstone (ed) L'yth and Symbol, S.P.C.K.: 
London (1966). Also p a r t l y r e p r i n t e d i n OQo 
4 - 7 2 
TL*- "Theological L i t e r a c y " , Chicago Theological 
iaenii».ary Register.. L I I I , 5 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . L e c t u r e s delivered 
1G63 (lo C'n. Understanding f j y s t e r y * 
2. Cn Being A r t i c u l a t e about the Gospel" 
3. A Logical Exploration of some Ch r i s t i a n 
Doctrines) 
T r i n i t y "The T r i n i t y " , Sandhurst w i t h Newend.en Parish Magazine? 
June 1961. 
TRT "Towards the Relevant i n Theological Language", 
Modern Churchman, V I I I , 1, JJ.Li. (1964). 
TS "The Theology of Salvation", i n E. Claxton & I I . 1. Ce 
McKay (eds) Medicine, Morals & Man, Blanford Press; 
London (1969).(Ramsey describes t h i s poper as "a 
modified version of p a r t of a paper already published 
i n a symposium e n t i t l e d 'The Jhole Lian' (ed J. 
McGilvray)". I have been unable to trace the l a t t e r 
but suspect that i t may be U-WM.) TS Lecture 
delivered 1964 0 
TTST "Theology Today and S p i r i t u a l i t y Today", i n So James 
(ed). S p i r i t u a l i t y f o r Today, S.C.M.: London (l96S). 
Lecture delivered 1967. 
TW "The Theology of Wholeness", i n N. Autton (ed) : 
From Fear to F a i t h , S.P.C.K.: London ( l 9 7 l ) . 
Lecture delivered 1869. 
U- indicates an. Unpublished work - see separate l i s t 
below. 
UP Our Understanding of Prayer, S-.P.C.-K.s London 
(1971). 
VII Conversations between L T. Ramsey and Ved Llehta 
i n V. Lehta, The New Theologian, V/eidenfeld Qt 
Nicholson: London (1966). This i s assumed to be a 
verbatim record. 
WG "Words about God", edited by I . T. Ramsey, S.C.M.: 
London (1971). 
WT "William Temple: some aspects of h i s thought and 
l i f e " , Bishoprick, 44, 4 (1969). Lecture delivered 
1968. 
(B) Unpubl ished Jorks 
U BBC^ Transcript of interview w i t h Robin Cay, broadcast 
T T on. B.B.C. Radio 4, J u l y , 1970. U—BBC 
W Transcript of programme on "Wittgenstein & the Language 
Game", broadcast on B.B.C. TV March 1965. 
U-Burney "The Concept of the Supernatural", Burney Prize Essay 
(1938). 
U-CECPT "Contemporary Empiricism: the challenge to 
Philosophical Theology", synopsis of paper delivered 
196Co 
U-CI "Chr i s t i a n I n d i v i d u a l i s m " (c.1947). 
U-CLI "Creation Models", c.1955. 
U-Credo "A Personal Credo", document 156 f o r Synodical 
Commission on Ch r i s t i a n Doctrine (1972). 
U-EP "Experience & Personality", c.1945. 
U-FMG A. t y p e s c r i p t , presumably of Ramsey's planned magnum 
opus: "Fact, Metaphysics & God"(c.1956-1960). 













U- Han ei 













An e a r l i e r version of the t y p e s c r i p t designated 
"FLIG" (material not included i n l a t e r r e d a c t i o n ) . 
(c.1955). 
Duplicated "hand-outs" f o r students, being summaries 
of Ramsey's l e c t u r e s . Various dates. D e t a i l s given 
t / i t h reference i n t e x t . 
"The H i s t o r i c a l Element i n Religion", an essay f o r 
Mr. Boys Smith, 27 x 38. 
"A Further Possible Approach", paper w r i t t e n f o r 
the Intercommunion Commission (1972). 
L e t t e r to A. Boyce Gibson, 25 March, 1958= 
Le t t e r to Donald Evans (1970). 
L e t t e r to Stephen U i l l i a m s , 1956. 
L e t t e r to .7. F. Suurdeeg, 27 June, 1956, 
Lett e r to ./. I I • Poteat, 23 June, 1954. 
Marginal comments by I . T. Ramsey to t y p e s c r i p t by 
./alter V/eist (re Ramsey'B: work on r e l i g i o u s language), 
Oxford Period. 
"Man and M o r a l i t y " , a lec t u r e delivered at the 
U n i v e r s i t y of Birmingham c.1969. Student's Notes. 
"The Mature of Religious Language", t y p e s c r i p t of 
Open Un i v e r s i t y discussion w i t h J. Ferguson. F i r s t , 
broadcast 1971. 
"An Outline of a Chr i s t i a n Philosophy"' (c.1946). 
Studert notes from Ramsey's lectures on the B r i t i s h 
E m p i r i c i s t s , October, 1962. 
"The Problem of Evil"", t y p e s c r i p t (revised to p.38 
by Ramsey) of a book intended f o r p u b l i c a t i o n by 
Maciuillan i n t h e i r "New Studies i n Philosophy of 
Religion" series, edited by .7. D. Hudson. Completed 
i n 1971. 
"Revelation", on essay f o r Boys Smith, 26 i i 39. 
A sermon from the chapel of Christ's College, 
Cambridge, broadcast by the B.B.C. (1948). 
"Science, Metaphysics and Religion", c.1955. 
"Theology and Language: Some I l l u s t r a t i v e Examples", 
c.1953-1955. 
"Theology and M i n i s t r y " , c.1971. 
"Use of the Bible i n Moral Decision", l e c t u r e delivered 
1965. 
"The V e r i f i c a t i o n P r i n c i p l e " , an essay f o r A. C. 
Ewing, 12 i i 38. 
Material drafted f o r V/G but never published. 
"The ./hole Man:r The Concept of the Personal i n 
Medicine, Philosophy and Theology". Lecture delivered 
1967. (See note Pa TS) 
2. Other V/orks Cited 
R.I.Aaron Knowing and the Function of Reason, O.U.P.: 
London (1971). ~*~ 
P.Achinsteiiv "Models, Analogies, and Theories", Philosophy of 
(MAS) Science, .XXXI, 4 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . 
F.Achinstein "Theoretical Models", B r i t i s h Journal f o r the 
(TM) Philosophy of Science, XVI, 62 (1965). 
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G.Berkeley (A.) 
( D ) 
The Bond of Being, Herders St„ Louis ( l 9 4 9 ) 0 
"Towards the Formal Study of Ilodels i n the non-
Formal Sciences" i n Kazemier & Vuysjeo 
Summa Theologxae, B l a c k f r i a r s e d i t i o n . Eyre & 
Spottiswoodes. London ( l 9 6 3 - ) 0 
B e l i e f , Truth and Knowledge, C0U.P0: Cambridge, 
(l973)o 
"The Argument f o r Religious Experience", Religious 
Studies, 11 (l975)o ' 
How to do things w i t h words, 0 oU oPo i London, 
(1962) 0 
Philosophical Papers, CUoPo.s London ( l 9 7 0 ) o 
Sense and S e n s i b i l i a , OoUoPoS London (l962)o 
"liiodels, Llystery and Paradox i n Ian Ramsey", 
Journal f o r the S c i e n t i f i c Study of Religion, V I I , 
1 (l9.68)o " " ~ ~ 
The Relevance of Natural Science t o Theology, 
Kacmillan: London (1976)o 
The Concept of a Person, IJacmillans London (1963) 0
The Central Questions of Philosophy, V/eidenfeld 
& Nicolson: London (1973) 0 
"An Eonest Ghost." i n 0oPoJood & GoPitcher (eds) 
Ryl e, Macmillans: London (1971 ) D 
Metaphysics and Common Sense, Lacmillan:. London 
(l969)o — — ' 
"Onejs Knowledge of Other Linds", i n H0Feigl,.'.ro 
S e l l a r s & K o L e h r e r o 
Philosophical Essays, Liacinillan: London (1954)o 
The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin: Harmordsuorth 
(1956) 0 " " """""" 
Russell, Fontana: London (l972)o 
C h r i s t i a n B e l i e f s about L i f e a f t e r Death, 
Macmillan: London (1976) Q 
C h r i s t i a n Theology and Metaphysics, Epworth: 
London (1968)o 
Ethics and B e l i e f , Sheldon: London (1977)o 
The Forgotten Dream, tlowbrays:. London ( l 9 7 5 ) Q 
The Idea of Revelation i n Recent Thought, 
Columbia U0P0s New York (1964) 0 
Our Knowledge of God, O0U0P0S London (1939) 0 
The Sense of the Presence of God, OoUoPo.s London 
(1962) Q 
" P r i n c i p i a Metaptoysica", Philosophy, X22IX, 148 
(1964)o 
"v/hat Br, Ewing would say", Theology, LS2VIII, 
659, (1975) o 
Issues i n Science & Religion, S.Coli.: London (1966) 0
l i y t h s , Llodels and Paradigms, S0C0M0S London (19.74)o 
(ed) Science and Religion, SoColIoS London (1968)» 
The Cntological Argument, liacmillan: London (1972) 0 
"V/ittgenstein and Descriptive Theology", Religious 
Studies, V, 1 (l969)o 
Alciphron, i n AoAoLuce & ToE.Jessop (eds): The; 
Works of George: Berkeley, Vol I I I , Nelson:. London 
(1950) 0 
Three Bialogues .00 , Everyman E d i t i o n (ed AoBo 
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P o K o C l a r k 
An Essay Towards a Hey Theory of Vision., Everyman 
Edition (ed AeBoLindsay), Dent: London (1910) 0 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, Everyman Edition ( e d A o D o I i n d s a y ) . Dents. 
London (l910) o 
Symbolism and Belief, Fontana: London (1962)o 
The Labyrinth of Language, Penguin, Harmondsv/orth 
(1972) 0 
Uodels and Metaphors, Cornell UDPo: Ithaca (19.62) 0 
The Problea of Religious Knowledge, Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood C l i f f s (1963)„ 
"The Status of God - Talk", Journal for the S c i e n t i f i c 
Study of Religion, 5 (l966) D 
"The Coherence Theory", i n Jo-VoCanfield & F„H0Donnell 
(eds): Readings i n the Theory of Knowledge., Appleton-
Century=Crofts: New York (1964)» 
" I n t u i t i o n and God and some New metaphysicians",, 
i n New Themes i n Christian Philosophy, UniVoNotre* I)ame 
Press: Notre Dame, Indiana (1968) 0 
"On Analogy"1, Thomist, 11 (1948)o 
Appearance and Reality, 0 oU oPo: London (l930) o 
Essays on Truth and Reality, 0 o UoP o : London (1914) 0 
"An Empiricist,'s View of the Nature of Religious 
Belief", i n B o i i i t c h e l l (ed) The Philosophy of 
Religion, 0 o U o Po: London ( l 9 7 l ) D 
'Discussion^-): Elorality & Religion" i n I0T0Ramsey 
(ed) CECPo 
"Models and Kystery", Theoria to Theory, I , 3 (1967)» 
Scientific Explanation, CoUoPo: Cambridge (1968 )o 
Do Religious Claims Hake Sense? S.CoiioJ London (l969)c 
I and Thou., t r anso RoGoSmith, To & To Clark: 
Edinburgh (1958)o 
"Christian Education Post Llortem Dei", Religious 
Education, LZ, 1 (1965)o 
The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, Penguin: 
Harmondsworth (1968) o 
Analogy &. Philosophical Language, Yale U DPo: New 
Haven (l973) 0 
The Analogy of Religion, Tegg: Oxford (1844)» 
Review of Religious Language, i n the Scottish 
Journal of Theology, 11 (1958) 0 
"Ryle on the I n t e l l e c t " , i n ILSoLewis (ed): Clari t y 
i s not Enough, George Allen & Unwin: London (1963)o 
On Selfhood and Godhood, George Allen & Unwin? 
London (l957)o ~~~~ 
»7hat is Science?., Dover: New York (1953) D 
"On the Observability of the Self", i n JoDonnelly 
(ed): Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism, Fordham 
UoP0: New York (1972)o 
Theory of Knowledge, Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliff.s 
(1966) 0 
leaning and Truth i n Religion,, PrincetonUoPo: 
Princeton (1964)o 
"Image and Symbol: the roUe of models i n modern 
physics", i n ToShanin (ed): The Rules of the Game, 
Tavistock: London (l972) D 
4-76 
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( T I ) 
Discussion Note i n J o H i c k (ed): Faith and the 
Philosophers, llacmillan: London (l966Jk 
Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis; 
Janies Clarke: London (1959). 
A Return to Na,tural Theology, James Clarke: 
London (1967)a ~"*" 
"Knowledge as Trans-Sensational", Review of 
Metaphysics, XVII, 3 (1964)„ 
"Some Aspects of Ian Ramsey's Empiricism", 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
I I I , 1 (1972)* 
"The Logic of Religious Language", Religious 
Studies, 9, 2 (l973}„ 
"The Logic and Ontology of lan Ramsey's Theory 
of Religious Language", an unpublished Ph.£« 
dissertation submitted to Columbia University (1970). 
Aquinas, Penguin: Karmondsworth (1955) 0 
Contemporary Philosophy, Search Press: London (1972). 
A History of Philosophy, Vol 2, Part I I , 
Doubleday: Garden City (1962). 
A History of Philosophy, ¥ol 5, Part I , 
Doubleday: Garden City (1964)o 
A History of Philosophy, Vol 8, Part I , 
Doubleday: Garden City (1967). 
"The Similarity of Science and Religion", i n 
loGo Barbour (SR)e _ 
"Theology and Fa l s i f i c a t i o n " , i n A.GoN.Flew & 
A o C o UacIntyr e o 
Christ and the Hiddenness of God, Lutterworth: 
London (1971) 0 
Sprachlogik des Glaubens, Chr.Kaiser Verlag: 
tiunchen (1974) o 
"Metaphysics and the Limits of Language" i n IoTo 
Ramsey (ed): Prospect for Metaphysics, George Allen 
& Unwin: London (l96l)„ ~~ 
Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, C.U.Po! 
Cambridge (1968) 0 
A Theology of Speech, Sheed & V/ard: London (1973) o 
Metaphysics and Religious Language, Columbia U.P.: 
New York (1964). 
Religious Language, Sheldon: London (1976)., 
"Perception and Other Minds", Nous, V I I , 1 (1973). 
"Are Religious Dogmas Cognitive and Leaningful? 
I I " , i n RoEoSantoni (ed):. Religious Language and the 
Problem of Religious Knowledge, Indiana U.P0: 
Bloomington (1968)» 
The Aim end Structure of Physical Theory, transo 
PoPoV/iener, Princeton U.P.: Princ eton N.J. (l954)o 
Revelation Theology: A History, Burns & Oates: 
London (1970). 
"Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and Belief 
i n God", unpublished PhoB. thesis submitted to 
King's College, London (l969) s 
"God and Analogy", Sophia, V I I I , 3 (1969). 
The Logical Status of 'God' and the function of 
theological sentences, kacmillan: London (1973) D 













" " " (PKCT) 
JU Co3\7ing(F2P) 
" " " (KM 5) 





I I I I 
T„Fawcett 
Ian Ramsey, Bishop of Durham - A I.iemoir, OoUoP„: 
London (1973),, ~~~ 
(ed) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Liacmillaz 
Co. & Free Press: New York (l967) s 
The Mature of Metaphysical Thinking, Uacmillan: 
London (l966)o 
"Whitehead5 Aired Worth", i n P.Edwards (ed) Vol 8 9 
Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, Uacaillanj 
London (1966) D ' 
"Differences between Scientific and Religious 
Assertions", i n I.G.Barbour (CR)e 
"Ian Ramsey on Talk about God", Religious Studies« 
7, 2 & 3 ( I 9 7 l ) 0 
The Logic of Self-Involvement, S.C.M.: London (1963)„ 
"The Problem of Knowledge and Christian Theism", 
Sophia, I , 2 (1062)„ 
The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, Routledge 
& Kegejn. Pauls London (1951 )o 
Non-Linguistic Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin: 
London (l968) e 
Value and Reality, George Allen & Unwin: London (1973), 
The World and God, Fontana: London (1963)„ 
Finite and I n f i n i t e , A. & Co Black: London (1959)„ 
(Letter) Letter to Ian Ramsey, 13 Jan e, 1956o 
Review of tloriels and Mystery, i n Journal of 
Theological Studies, N.S. XV, 2 (1964) 
(LIE:) 
(RF) Reflective Faith, ScPoCoK.: London (1972) 
F.Ferre (AT) 
















The Symbolic Language of Religion, Sod!.: London 
(1970)o 
"Analogy i n Theology", i n p„ Edward.? (ed) Vol 1» 
Language, Logic and God, Eyre & Sp<Htiswoode: 
London (1962) 0 
"Liapping the Logic of Models i n Science and 
Theology", i n B.M.High (ed) New Essays i n Religious 
Language, O.U.P.: Hew York (1969). 
"IJetaphors, tlodels and Religion", Soundings, L I (1968). 
"Science and the Death of God", i n I.G.Barbour (SR)0 
(eds) Wew Readings i n Philosophical Analysis, 
Appleton-Century-Crofts: .New York (1972)o 
"Can God's Exist en.ce Be Disproved.", i n A.GoNoFlew 
& Ao CoLIacIntyreo 
"Can. a man witness his own funeral?", Hibbert 
Journal, LIV (1956), 
God and Philosophy, Hutchinson: London (l966) Q 
(eds) New Essays i n Philosophical Theology, SoC.L.: 
London ( 1 9 5 5 ) o ™ = ~ * 
"Cn Sense a.n.d Nominatum", i n E.Feigl and Cellars 
(eds) Readings i n Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-
Century-Crofts: New York (1949) 0 
"Anatomy of Analogy", The Modem Schoolman, XVIII 
(1940)o 
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"Disclosures", Religious S t u d i e s , 9, 2 (1973) <, 
"The Philosophy of John 7isdom", Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, ISDM, 2 (1954) . 
"Aquinas", i n GoE„I,i = Ansconibe & PoToGeach: Three 
Philosophers, Blackwell: Oxford (1973)„ 
God and t h e Soul, Routledge & Kegan Pauls 
London (1969). 
Theisp and Buroiricism, ioCoIloS London (l970) o 
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Ian Ramsey; To Speak Responsibly of God, George 
Allen & Unwins London (1976) 9 
"On I " - , Hind, LZSJ2, 314 (l97C). 
The P o s s i b i l i t y of Religious Knowledge, J.Bo 
Eerdmans: Grand Rapids (1971)o 
"Ian Ramsey's Interpretation of Christian Language", 
an unpublished Ph.E. dissertation submitted to 23uke; 
University (1966). 
'The Tacit Structure of Religious Knowing", In t e r -
national Philosophical Quarterly, 9 (1969). 
The Elements of Christian Philosophy, Doubleday: 
New York (1960). 
"Knowledge of God", Philosophy, M I (1957) 0 
"Criteria for Theological tlodels", Scottish Journal 
of Theology, 25, 3 (1972). 
"The model i n Physics", i n Kazeniier & Vuysje. 
The Theory of Knowledge. Pacini 11 an:. London (l970) o 
"The analogy of feeling", i n IKE.Lewis (ed): 
C l a r i t y is not Enough^ George Allen &. Unwin: London 
(1963) D 
) "Metaphysical Systems'* i n D.F.Pears (Nil). 
The Attractiveness of God, S.P.C.K.: London (1973). 
The Language of Llorals, G.U.PoS London (l96l)<> 
"How Belief is Based on Inference", Journal of 
Philosophy, LSI (1964). 
The Philosophies of Science: An Introductory Survey, 
GcU.Po: London (1972). 
"The Epistemic Status of Analogical Language", 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
I , 4 (1970) 9 " 
"Models and Qualifiers", International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion, I I I , 2 (1972). 
"Is the© Knowledge by Acquaintance?", Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume XZIII (1949). 
"Analogical Predication", The Journal of Philosophy, 
LV, 2C (1958). 
"Concept", in P.Edwards (ed) Vol 2. 
"The Philosophical Theology of I.T.Ramsey: Some 
Further Reflections", Theology, L3LSYI, 642 (1973). 
Theology and Ileaning. George Allen & Unwin: 
London (1969). 
Review of Christian Empiricism, i n Religious Studies 
10, 4 (1974). 
The Varieties of Belief, George Allen & Unwins 
London (1973). " 
Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood C l i f f s (1966). 
Christianity and Parados, l/atts: London (1958). 
Review of ilodels and Mystery, i n Philosophical 
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.1 .1 1, ( T C ) 
Ilodels and Analogies i n Science, Sheed & ./ard: 
London (l963)o 
"llodels i n Physics", B r i t i s h Journal for the 
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APPENDIX A; 
A Chronological Table of Ramsey's \7orks 
Notes;. 
( i ) Only the more important works are included i n thi s table 
( i i ) I n the case of lectures or sermons the date given i s the 
date of delivery rather than the date of publication; 
( i i i ) (?) indicates that the date i s uncertain; 


















































NI U-TLIE(?) Homage 
CL 
RL S 1 I U-CM(?) U-3UR(?) 
Emp.R PF P0 RE 
ER FI RB 
Locke 
PPLT RSP LEP PR 
CE RSCS U-FMG(?) 
HG CPL FP FRFI 
CELCE BP I I 
BP I CD tela TL 
TS TRT AC 
U-UBMB CPCF ITR Smart DCCD 
BPS! CECP tIDA 
OBSR OCR 
TG J PG 
1967 LttlR TTST U-'M 
1968 PA H 
1969. J B I I HPT TV/ 
1970 E U-ITR Evans 
1971 U-PE ITR Owen UP 
1972 U-Credo CF FB 
WG HP 
APPENDIX B; 
Motes on the dating of Ramsey's 
unpublished and undated works 
U-CI : c.1947. - similar themes to those i n MRIC (1948)? found 
in f i l e with papers dated i n 1940 s. 
U-EP ; c1945 - le t t e r to Ramsey dated 1945 and attached to 
MS refers to a "magnum opus" from Ramsey 
and gives page references which are consistent 
with the MS, Another l e t t e r referring to the 
thesis by name is dated 1949. 
U-FHG : c. 1956-1960 - referred to as " i n ha.n.d" i n U-ITB '..'FZ 
(1956). RL9 (1957). Comparison with 
published works indicates the late 1950 s 
as the date of composition. Ramsey's later 
themes (as i n , e.g., OBSR, MM, TL etc.) are 
not to be found within i t s pages. Portions 
of the thesis are, however, reproduced i n SEI, 
RL, PPMT etc. 
Ramsey was s t i l l w r i t i n g of his determination 
to produce "the major work" i n the mid 1960 s 
( i n September, 1966 he wrote to Russell 
Aldwinckle that i t was nearly ready for 
publication.'). But Ramsey's chaplain at 
Bishop Auckland was not aware that Ramsey ever 
worked on i t during his time there, and Ramsey 
signed two contracts with S.C.M. i n 1966 for 
books on other topics (The Empiricists and 
Religi on, and the Logical Status of Creeds). 
Neither book was written and I have been unable 
to trace any publisher with a contract for FMG. 
And yet Professor i'/. A. de Pater wrote i n 1972 
of a conversation with Ramsey the year before 
in which he indicated that FMG was s t i l l "on 
the way"; although de Pater added "but his 
l i t t l e smile made me unsure". For other 
references to the work see ITR Smart 110, 
D.Edwards 60, T i l l e y (Thesis) 283. 
U-HA ; various dates - many of Ramsey's lecture summaries are 
undated but I have attempted to give an. 
approximate date on the basis of internal and 
external evidence ( i n particular comparison 
with his developing thought as evidenced by 
publications). 
U-GCP ; c.1946 — this shorter and somewhat different version of 
U-EP was found in. the f i l e s with a l e t t e r 
relevant to i t s contents dated February, 1947. 
I t appears to have been produced for a group 
of theologians (the "WLK" group?), but cf. also 
T i l l e y (Thesis) 14 and B.Edwards 27. U-0CP, 
unlike U-EP. contains references to works published 
in 1945. 
U-PE :. c. 1969-1971 - H. McClatchey (Ramsey's chaplain) 
gave evidence of the date of writing of thi s 
work. 
U-TLIE s c.1953-1955 - copies of this paper were f i l e d with 
l e t t e r s da.ting from 1952 to 1955. A 
le t t e r from Ian Ramsey to Austin Farrer dated 
January. 1956 refers to "Theology and 
Language" and the "Department Store Analogy". 
Ramsey's position i n U-TLIE indicates that, 
i t was written somewhat earlier than RL 
(Lectures delivered i n 1955). Cf. also 
U-ITR iTFZ, T i l ley (Thesis) 100 n. 26 . 
